Welcome! I am a development economist studying labor and behavioral economics questions. My research examines labor and education market imperfections, especially around issues of asymmetric information.
I am currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Becker Friedman Institute and will join the University of Chicago’s Economics Department as an Assistant Professor in 2023.
I received a PhD in Economics from UC Berkeley and worked as a consultant for the World Bank and Save the Children. Prior to working as a researcher, I taught high school physics.
Job Market Paper
Attracting and retaining high-quality teachers has a large social benefit, but it is challenging for schools to identify good teachers ex-ante. This paper uses teachers' contract choices and a randomized controlled trial of performance pay with 7,000 teachers in 243 private schools in Pakistan to study whether performance pay affects the composition of teachers. Consistent with adverse selection models, we find that performance pay induces positive sorting: both among teachers with higher latent ability and among those with a more elastic effort response to incentives. Teachers also have better information about these dimensions of type than their principals. Using two additional treatments, we show effects are more pronounced among teachers with better information about their quality and teachers with lower switching costs. Accounting for these sorting effects, the total effect of performance pay on test scores is twice as large as the direct effect on the existing stock of teachers, suggesting that analyses that ignore sorting effects may substantially understate the effects of performance pay.
The rest of my papers are here.