Charles J. Thomas, Ph.D.

I am an economist specializing in industrial organization, with associated interests in antitrust policy, microeconomic theory, and experimental economics.  My research uses game-theoretic tools to address issues involving competition. 

Currently I am an Affiliated Research Scientist at Chapman University's Economic Science Institute and Argyros School of Business & Economics.  I also am a Clinical Professor in the John E. Walker Department of Economics at Clemson University.

After earning my Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University in 1996, for over six years I worked in the Bureau of Economics at the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.   For both investigations and litigation I provided economic analyses regarding competition in industries such as ready-to-eat cereal, baby food, prescription pharmaceuticals, drug wholesaling, entertainment, Internet service provision, petroleum, industrial chemicals, and smokeless tobacco.  While at the FTC I held appointments as the Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of Economics, and as a visiting research fellow at Harvard Law School.

From 2002-2005 I was an Assistant Professor of Economics and Management at the University of Rochester's Simon School of Business.  I taught strategic decision making to students in the M.B.A. and Executive M.B.A. programs, and industrial organization to students in the Ph.D. program.

From 2005-2012 I was an Assistant Professor of Economics at Clemson University.  I taught Principles of Microeconomics to undergraduate classes both large and small (more than 300 students and fewer than 40 students), microeconomic theory in the first-year Ph.D. core, the first course in the industrial organization field for Ph.D. students, and game theory to undergraduate, M.A., and Ph.D. students.

For a more complete picture of my background, please view my curriculum vitae.

To get a sense of why I do what I do, please take a look at these statements about my research and my teaching.

Research

The following working papers are available for download:

The following publications are available for download, depending on your institutional access:

Using Experiments to Compare the Predictive Power of Models of Multilateral Negotiations (with Cary Deck), forthcoming in International Journal of Industrial Organization

Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus, forthcoming in Journal of Industrial Economics.

A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis, Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 55, No. 3 (2019), 459-491.

An Alternating-Offers Model of Multilateral Negotiations, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 149 (2018), pp. 269-293.

Coase, Hayek, Pigou and Walras: Taxes vs. Permit Auctions in Environmental Policy (with Bill Dougan) Man and the Economy, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 (2014), pp. 159-170.

How the Nature of Product Differentiation Affects Procurement Competition Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 81, No. 2 (2014), pp. 323-344.

Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations (with Bart J. Wilson) Economica, Vol. 81, Iss. 324 (2014), pp. 768-787.

The Price Effects of Using Firewalls as an Antitrust Remedy Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2011), pp. 209-222.

Vertical Mergers in Procurement Markets International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2011), pp. 200-209.

Information Revelation and Buyer Profits in Repeated Procurement Competition Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 58, No. 1 (2010), pp. 79-105.

The Risk of Contagion from Multimarket Contact (with Robert D. Willig) International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 24, No. 6 (2006), pp. 1157-1184.

Verifiable Offers and the Relationship Between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations (with Bart J. Wilson) Economic Journal, Vol. 115 (2005), pp. 1016-1031.

Using Reserve Prices to Deter Collusion in Procurement Competition (Lead article) Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2005), pp. 301-326.

The Competitive Effects of Mergers Between Asymmetric Firms International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 22, No. 5 (2004), pp. 679-692.

A Comparison of Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations (with Bart J. Wilson) RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2002), pp. 140-155.

The Effect of Asymmetric Entry Costs on Bertrand Competition (Lead article) International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 20, No. 5 (2002), pp. 589-609.

Design Comparisons for Procurement Systems (with Bart J. Wilson) SIGecom Exchanges, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2000), pp. 14-20.

Disincentives for Cost-Reducing Investment Economics Letters, Vol. 57, No. 3 (1997), pp. 359-363.