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Determinants of Support for European Integration. The case of Bulgaria

(2008 European Union Politics 9(3); with Cosmina Tanasoiu.) Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union in January 2007 benefited from strong public support. This article uses a unique set of data for identifying the factors that determine public attitude towards European integration in Bulgaria. Replication data and other related material

 Market Segmentation, Market Integration, and Tacit Collusion 

(2003 Review of International Economics, 11(1), pp.175-192; with Nicolas Schmitt.) Moving from market segmentation to market integration (firms cannot discriminate among markets) is shown to have often anticompetitive effects in an infinitely repeated Cournot game. In particular, market integration between two countries leads both of them to experience anticompetitive effects when product markets are similar. The same conclusion holds when trade liberalization is modeled as a decrease in bilateral trade barriers followed by moving from market segmentation to market integration. The analysis also predicts that a less efficient country (like a country in transition) enjoys pro-competitive effects from market integration. 

Inter-Firm Debt as a Facilitating Practice in a Cournot Duopoly

(2002. Presented at the 9-th annual conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), Madrid, 5-8 September.)
This paper shows that a firm competes less vigorously when it holds debt issued by another, competing firm. Reciprocal holding of debt by two firms may signal a credible commitment to collusion between the firms. This result is robust to a dynamic game setting, where reciprocal holding of debt is shown to reduce the firms’ incentives to deviate from collusion. The message conveyed by these results is that intra-industry debt should raise concerns about tacit collusion.  The results of this study are particularly relevant in the banking sector, where holding reciprocal debt is the norm, rather then the exception.


 The Effect of Antidumping on Tacit Collusion 

(2000. Presented at the 7-th annual conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics EARIE Conference, Lausanne, 7-11 September.) The effect of antidumping on market structure is studied in this essay within the framework of a repeated Cournot game. This work, unlike other studies, raises the question whether antidumping has a built-in pro- or anti-competitive effect, or its effect depends crucially on the way it is enforced. Antidumping is found to be pro-competitive in the country that imposes the antidumping duty, and anti-competitive in the foreign country. The result is at odds with most of the previous findings; this discrepancy shows that the intrinsic effect of antidumping may be reversed by the way this policy is implemented.


Antidumping, Antitrust, and Competition

1997. Working Paper Series No. 115, CERGE-EI, Charles University, Prague ( )