phil of mind UCD 2012
Professor Maria Baghramian maria.baghramian@ucd.ie
Dr. Cathal O’Madagain cathal.omadagain@ucd.ie
Dr. Thomas Szanto thomas.szanto@univie.ac.at
Here we explore a series of the debates in the philosophy of mind. First, we will discuss the metaphysics of mind. This is roughly the question ‘what is the mind’, and various answers that have been proposed to it. Is the mind the brain, or an immaterial substance? Surprisingly, arguments for the latter position can be very persuasive. We will also discuss the problem of intentionality. This is the question why or how do mental states refer to what they do? For example, I might have a thought about Mars. Something makes my thought about Mars. But what? Is some event in my mind causally connected to Mars? Does some event in my mind look like Mars, or carry information about Mars? Finally, we will discuss the puzzle of consciousness. What part of us makes us conscious? Is there some part of the brain that causes us to be conscious? Could creatures without brains be conscious? Might consciousness depend on some sort of interaction between us and our environment? We will explore texts from Early Modern philosophy to the present day, and touch on issues ranging from metaphysics to robotics.
Evaluation:
Students will be evaluated on the basis of a set of notes to be prepared on the assigned texts, a presentation, and a final essay.
All readings will be made available online, but a good text to buy for the course is:
Chalmers, D. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, 2002.
Schedule
Week 1: Introduction (Maria Baghramian)
No readings
Part I: Metaphysics of Mind (Cathal O’Madagain)
Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy (II and IV)
Place: Is Consciousness a Brain Process?
Putnam: The Nature of Mental States
Block: Troubles with Functionalism
Part II: Intentionality (Cathal O’Madagain)
Week 5: Representational Theories of Content
Smith and Medin: The Exemplar View
Week 6: Causal Theories of Content
Putnam: The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ (excerpt)
Week 7: Multi-Dimensional Theories of Content
Chalmers: The Components of Content
Braisby, Franks, and Hampton: Essentialism, Word Use, and Concepts
Part III: Consciousness, Extended Mind and Enactivism (Thomas Szanto)
Week 8: Phenomenal Consciousness
Nagel, Thomas (1974): What is it Like to Be a Bat
Jackson, Frank: Epiphenomenal Qualia
Week 9: Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness
Rosenthal, David M. (1990): A Theory of Consciousness
Week 10: Consciousness, Representation and Qualia
Harman, Gilbert (1990): The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Chalmers, David (1995): Facing Up The Problem of Consciousness
Week 11: Consciousness and Intentionality
Dennett, Daniel C. (1981): True Believers. The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works
Crane, Tim (2003): The Intentional Structure of Consciousness
Week 12: Extended and Enactive Mind
Chalmers, David/Clark, Andy (1998): The Extended Mind
Rowlands, Mark (2009): Enactivism and the Extended Mind