phil of mind UCD 2012

Professor Maria Baghramian maria.baghramian@ucd.ie

Dr. Cathal O’Madagain cathal.omadagain@ucd.ie

Dr. Thomas Szanto thomas.szanto@univie.ac.at

Here we explore a series of the debates in the philosophy of mind. First, we will discuss the metaphysics of mind. This is roughly the question ‘what is the mind’, and various answers that have been proposed to it. Is the mind the brain, or an immaterial substance? Surprisingly, arguments for the latter position can be very persuasive. We will also discuss the problem of intentionality. This is the question why or how do mental states refer to what they do? For example, I might have a thought about Mars. Something makes my thought about Mars. But what? Is some event in my mind causally connected to Mars? Does some event in my mind look like Mars, or carry information about Mars? Finally, we will discuss the puzzle of consciousness. What part of us makes us conscious? Is there some part of the brain that causes us to be conscious? Could creatures without brains be conscious? Might consciousness depend on some sort of interaction between us and our environment? We will explore texts from Early Modern philosophy to the present day, and touch on issues ranging from metaphysics to robotics.

Evaluation:

Students will be evaluated on the basis of a set of notes to be prepared on the assigned texts, a presentation, and a final essay.

All readings will be made available online, but a good text to buy for the course is:

Chalmers, D. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, 2002.

Schedule

Week 1: Introduction (Maria Baghramian)

No readings

Part I: Metaphysics of Mind (Cathal O’Madagain)

Week 2: Dualism

Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy (II and IV)

Dennett: Where am I?

Week 3: Materialism

Ryle: Descartes’ Myth

Place: Is Consciousness a Brain Process?

Week 4: Functionalism

Putnam: The Nature of Mental States

Block: Troubles with Functionalism

Part II: Intentionality (Cathal O’Madagain)

Week 5: Representational Theories of Content

Plato: Euthyphro

Smith and Medin: The Exemplar View

Week 6: Causal Theories of Content

Putnam: The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ (excerpt)

Dretske: A Recipe for Thought

Week 7: Multi-Dimensional Theories of Content

Chalmers: The Components of Content

Braisby, Franks, and Hampton: Essentialism, Word Use, and Concepts

Part III: Consciousness, Extended Mind and Enactivism (Thomas Szanto)

Week 8: Phenomenal Consciousness

Nagel, Thomas (1974): What is it Like to Be a Bat

Jackson, Frank: Epiphenomenal Qualia

Week 9: Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness

Rosenthal, David M. (1990): A Theory of Consciousness

Week 10: Consciousness, Representation and Qualia

Harman, Gilbert (1990): The Intrinsic Quality of Experience

Chalmers, David (1995): Facing Up The Problem of Consciousness

Week 11: Consciousness and Intentionality

Dennett, Daniel C. (1981): True Believers. The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works

Crane, Tim (2003): The Intentional Structure of Consciousness

Week 12: Extended and Enactive Mind

Chalmers, David/Clark, Andy (1998): The Extended Mind

Rowlands, Mark (2009): Enactivism and the Extended Mind

Essay Guide