Papers

HOW TO CITE MY WORK: I prefer to be cited as 'C. Dutilh Novaes' (no hyphen), and to be put in alphabetical order by 'Dutilh' (so often falling right under 'Dummett', which is pretty cool).

(Refereed) journals


        Forthcoming
  1. "Reductio ad absurdum from a dialogical perspective". Philosophical Studies.
  2. (With M. Duncombe) "Dialectic and logic in Aristotle and his tradition". History and Philosophy of Logic.
  3. (With E. Reck) "Carnapian explication, formalisms as cognitive tools, and the paradox of adequate formalization". Synthese.
  4. "Axiomatizations of arithmetic and the first-order/second-order divide". Synthese.
        Published
  1. "A dialogical, multi-agent account of the normativity of logic". Dialectica 69, 587-609, 2015. 
  2. "The formal and the formalized: the cases of syllogistic and supposition theory"Kriterion 131, 253-270, 2015. 
  3. "The undergeneration of permutation invariance as a criterion for logicality"Erkenntnis 79, 81-97, 2014.
  4. "A dialogical account of deductive reasoning as a case study for how culture shapes cognition"Journal of Cognition and Culture 13, 453-476, 2013.
  5. "Mathematical reasoning and external symbolic systems"Logique & Analyse 221, 45-65, 2013.
  6. “The role of ‘denotatur’ in Ockham’s theory of supposition”Vivarium 51, 352-370, 2013.
  7. “Ockham on supposition theory, mental language, and angelic communication”American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86(3), 415-434, 2012 (special issue on Ockham).
  8. “Form and matter in later Latin medieval logic: the cases of suppositio and consequentiaJournal of the History of Philosophy 50(3), 339-364, 2012.
  9. Reassessing logical hylomorphism and the demarcation of logical constants”Synthese 185, 387-410, 2012.
  10. (With E. Andrade-Lotero) Validity, the squeezing argument and alternative semantic systems: the case of Aristotelian syllogistic”Journal of Philosophical Logic 41, 387-418, 2012.
  11. "Towards a practice-based philosophy of logic: formal languages as a case study"Philosophia Scientiae 16(1), 71-102, 2012.
  12. (With E. Andrade-Lotero) A contentious trinity: levels of entailment in Brandom's pragmatist inferentialism”Philosophia 40(1), 41-53, 2012.
  13. “Medieval obligationes as a theory of discursive commitment management”. Vivarium 49 (1-3), pp. 240-257, 2011.
  14. “The historical and philosophical origins of normativism”Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34, pp. 253-254, 2011 (commentary on "Subtracting 'ought' from 'is': Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking" by S. Elqayam and J. Evans).
  15. “The different ways in which logic is (said to be) formalHistory and Philosophy of Logic 32, pp. 303-332, 2011.
  16. “Lessons on truth from medieval solutions to the Liar paradox”. Philosophical Quarterly 61, pp. 58-78, 2011.
  17. “‘He doesn’twant to prove this or that’ – On the very young Wittgenstein. Philosophical Books 51(2), pp. 102-116, 2010.
  18. “Lessons on sentential meaning from medieval solutions to the Liar paradox”. Philosophical Quarterly 59, pp. 682-704, 2009.
  19. “An intensional interpretation of Ockham’s theory of supposition”. Journal of the History of Philosophy 46(3), pp. 365-394, 2008.
  20. (With S. Read) Insolubilia and the fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter. Vivarium 46(2), pp. 175-191, 2008.
  21. “A comparative taxonomy of medieval and modern approaches to Liar sentences”. History and Philosophy of Logic 29(3), pp. 227 – 261, 2008.
  22. Theory of Supposition vs. Theory of Fallacies in Ockham”. Vivarium 45(2-3), pp. 343-359, 2007.
  23. Ralph Strode’s obligationes: the return of consistency and the epistemic turn”. Vivarium 44(2-3), pp. 338-374, 2006.
  24. “Roger Swyneshed’s obligationes: a logical game of inference recognition?”. Synthese 151(1), pp. 127-155, 2006.
  25. “Medieval Obligationes as Logical Games of Consistency Maintenance”. Synthese 145(3), 2005, pp. 371-395, 2005.
  26. “Buridan’s consequentia: consequence and inference within a token-based semantics”. History and Philosophy of Logic 26(4), 2005, pp. 277-297, 2005.
  27. “The Buridanian account of inferential relations between doubly-quantified propositions: a proof of soundness”. History and Philosophy of Logic 25(3), 2004, pp. 215-234, 2004.


Contributions to books and volumes

            Forthcoming

  1. (With Leon Geerdink) "The dissonant origins of analytic philosophy: common sense in philosophical methodology". In S. Lapointe and C. Pincock (eds.), Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. London, Palgrave Macmillan.
  2. (With Sara Uckelman) "Obligationes". In C. Dutilh Novaes and S. Read (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
  3. "5 questions in the philosophy of logic". In Tracy Lupher and Thomas Adajian (eds.), Philosophy of Logic: 5 Questions. Copenhagen, Automatic Press.
  4. "Formal methods in history of philosophy". In S.O. Hansson & V.F. Hendricks (eds.), Handbook of Formal Philosophy. Berlin, Springer.
  5. “Ockham’s supposition theory as formal semantics”. In C. Kann, B. Loewe, C. Rode, and S. L. Uckelman (eds.) Modern Views of Medieval Logic. In the series Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales. Leuven, Peeters.


Published

  1. "Conceptual genealogy for analytic philosophy". In J. Bell, A. Cutrofello, P.M. Livingston (eds.), Beyond the Analytic-Continental Divide: Pluralist Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy), 2015.
  2. (With Joke Spruyt) "Those funny words: medieval theories of syncategorematic terms". In M. Cameron and R. Stainton (eds.), Linguistic Content: New Essays on the History of Philosophy of Language. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, 100-120.
  3. “The Ockham-Burley dispute”. In A. Conti (ed.), A Companion to Walter Burley. Leiden, Brill, 2013, 49-86.
  4. "Medieval Theories of Consequence". In E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2012.
  5. Lessons in philosophy of logic from medieval obligationes”. In G. Restall and G. Russell (eds.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 142-168 (pre-print version). 
  6. "A medieval solution to the puzzle of empty names". In C. Dutilh Novaes and O. Hjortland (eds.), Insolubles and Consequences -- Essays in Honour of Stephen Read. London, College Publications, 2012, 73-92.
  7. “Medieval Theories of Quantification”. In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Berlin, Springer, 2011, 1093-1096.
  8. “Medieval Theories of Truth”. In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Berlin, Springer, 2011, 1340-1347.
  9. “Medieval Theories of Supposition”. In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Berlin, Springer, 2011, 1229-1236.
  10. "Ockham on supposition and mental language". In G. Klima and A. Hall (eds.), Knowledge, Mental Language, and Free Will. Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011, pp. 47-64.
  11. “Surprises in Logic”. In M. Palis (ed.), LOGICA Yearbook 2009. London, College Publications, 2010.
  12. “Judgments, contents and their representations”. In G. Primiero & S. Rahman (eds.), Acts of Knowledge: History, Philosophy and Logic. London, College Publications, pp. 183-206, 2009.
  13. “Medieval obligationes as a regimentation of ‘the game of giving and asking for reasons’”. In M. Palis (ed.), LOGICA Yearbook 2008. London, College Publications, 2009.
  14. “14th century logic after Ockham”. In D. Gabbay and J. Woods (eds.), The Handbook of the History of Logic, vol 2. Amsterdam, Elsevier, pp. 433-504, 2008.
  15. “Tarski’s hidden theory of meaning”. In S. Rahman, T. Tulenheimo & E. Genot (eds.), Unity, Truth and the Liar – The modern relevance of medieval solutions to Semantic paradoxes. Berlin, Springer, pp. 41-63, 2008.
  16. “Contradiction: the real challenge for paraconsistent logic”. In J.Y. Beziau, W.A. Carnielli and D. Gabbay (eds.), Handbook of Paraconsistency. In the series Logic and Cognitive Systems, London, College Publications, pp. 465-480, 2007.
  17. “In search of the intuitive notion of logical consequence”. LOGICA Yearbook 2004, Prague, Filosofia, 2005, pp. 109-123, 2005.
  18. “A medieval reformulation of the de dicto / de re distinction”. LOGICA Yearbook 2003, Prague, Filosofia, 2004, pp. 111- 124, 2004.
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