SS3 Glendevon 1

Glendevon (1) 1937  Congress's Office Acceptance Saga over Governor's Powers,   John  Glendevon
Quotes included:
  • Governor's Powers and Office Acceptance after the 1937 Provincial Elections
Also see:
Glendevon (2) Federation, Jinnah,  Congress activism in Princely States
Glendevon (3) 1939-1942  Linlithgow, Congress, Jinnah,War-time Realignments
John Glendevon quoted from The Viceroy At Bay Lord Linlithgow in India 1936-1943, Collins, 1971.

Comment
The Marquess of Linlithgow was  Viceroy of India from 1936 to 1943.   His son John Glendevon's  book 'The Viceroy at Bay' presents a particular view of the Viceroy and his tenure which some may not agree with. However, the book offers an insight into a British view of that period and also contains a number of illuminating quotes of various major players of the time, including Gandhi, Nehru, Jinnah and Viceroy Linlithgow and Secretary of State Zetland themselves.

The excerpts from the book presented here cover the tussle between Congress and the Viceroy in 1937 when Congress refused to accept office after winning majorities in six provinces in provincial elections held under the Government of India Act 1935.   

Despite the Government of India Act 1935 specifying that provincial governments were responsible to legislatures, the Congress seems to have felt that the Governor's special powers would be used to retain British control over working of provincial governments.  So as condition for assumption of office, the Congress insisted  that Governors abide by a convention whereby disagreement between the provincial ministry and Governor  would result in the Governor's dismissal of or demand for resignation of the ministry.  This convention would ensure that the Governor would also share the political cost of disagreement with elected provincial government and would effectively curtail the Governor's discretion to intervene.

The Viceroy did not agree to Congress's condition. He held that a Governor's use of special powers to prevail over provincial governments was specified by the Government of India Act 1935 to be a matter of normal functioning (as opposed causing the provincial ministry to fall as Congress insisted) because  such Governor's discretionary powers were a necessary constitutional safeguard for ensuring peace, tranquility and rights of minorities.

The Viceroy would not agree to even a statement to the effect that the Governor's powers would be used only in special circumstances because even this would put limitations on a Governor's discretion. When the British Cabinet looked like yielding to the Congress position, the Viceroy threatened to resign. In the event, the Viceroy's definition and scope of the Governors' special powers finally prevailed and Congress abandoned its demand and accepted office unconditionally. 

The narration of the tussle between the Viceroy and Congress over use of Governor's special powers is particularly interesting for two reasons.

One reason is that apparently contradicting completely the actual outcome of the Viceroy-Congress tussle over Governor's powers, Jinnah accused Governors of abandoning the minorities in Congress-ruled provinces. For instance in October 1938 Jinnah said :

"I know that Governors and the Governor-General have failed the minorities and specially the Mussalmans. But on the other hand, we are told that there is a gentlemen's agreement and a secret understanding between the British Government and the Congress in consequence of which assurances were given that such powers will not be exercised, and so it is obvious that the Congress ministries are getting the longest rope with the result that the foolish policy of the Congress is responsible not only for intense bitterness between the two sister communities but among the various classes and interests. "

The second reason is that, again apparently contradicting Viceroy Linlithgow's arguments about the Governor's constitutional responsibility to maintain peace and tranquility, during the Calcutta riots in August 1946, the Governor of Bengal pleaded that the principle of responsibility of the Muslim League government of Bengal then in power, constitutionally prevented him, the Governor, from taking action to quell the riots.   Governor Burrows wrote to Viceroy Wavell:

 "The obligations of the Constitution make my task far harder. My special responsibility for law and order is not a "discretionary" matter, and in handling the situation, particularly at the outset, I had always to consider the susceptibilities of my Ministry."

Government of India Act 1935
Glendevon writes:
When Linlithgow was appointed to India, the total population of British India was, in round figures, 390 million. On these nearly 300 millions were Hindus and the Muslims numbered a little over 90 millions. In addition there were 660 Princely States with a population of about 91 millions. They varied in size from Hyderabad, which was half the size of France, to little territories of a few square miles. Scattered throughout British India they were not constitutionally part of it but they acknowledged the paramountcy of the Crown. ..

The chief provisions of the 1935 India Act were as follows. The Provinces were to have responsible government of the parliamentary type but their Governors would be armed with special powers for the protection of minorities and also to take over the administration in the case of a breakdown. These were sometimes called 'Section 93' powers from the number of the relevant section of the Act.

Secondly, the franchise was extended to 30 million voters and there would be separate electorate for Hindus and Muslims under what was known as the Communal Award.

Thirdly, at the Centre a Federal Government was to be set up consisting of representatives both of British India and of princely States, the latter to be nominated by their rulers. The Legislature would consist of two houses, a Legislative Assembly and a Council of State.

Fourthly diarchy was to be abolished in the Provinces and introduced at the Centre.[Diarchy meant key subjects were reserved to Governor or Governor-General and were out of scope of Indian ministers and legislatures]. The Governor-General in Council was to be responsible for the portfolios of Defence and External Affairs, all the remaining posts being held by Ministers responsible to the Legislature...

Fifthly, the Federation could not be brought into force until half the number of princely States entitled to sit in the Council of State acceded, provided that this half also represented half the total population of all the States.

 
Office Acceptance Saga after the 1937 Provincial Elections

Glendevon writes:
In the early months of 1937 India went to the polls to elect its provincial governments, which were to take over on an autonomous basis on 1st April. In six Provinces Congress won a sweeping victory, Central Provinces, United Provinces, Bihar, Orissa, Bombay and Madras. They were unsuccessful in the Punjab, Bengal, Sind, the North-West Frontier Province(?) and Assam. The extent of the Congress victories surprised the Viceroy less than some of the provincial Governors. Linlithgow had formed the view that, with the exception of the Unionist Party in the Punjab and of the Justice Party in Madras, the Congress Party was the only one worthy of the name, and certainly the only one possessing an active and widespread organisation in the constituencies.

[Sir Hyde Gowan, Governor of Central Provinces wrote]
'The name of Gandhi is unquestionably one to conjure with among the masses in this Province - not for any particular political reason, but simply because he is Gandhi-and reports from several districts indicate that the one Congress slogan which has been universally successful is - "Put your papers in the white box and vote for Gandhi".'..

As soon as the elections were over the question whether or not Congress would accept office came to a head. Ostensibly this turned on the potential use of the special powers of the Governors. The Governors of the Provinces in which Congress had secured a majority invited the provincial leaders to assist them in the formation of ministries. The leaders, acting under instruction from their All-India Committee, demanded an undertaking that they would not use their special powers vested in them by section 93 of the India Act of 1935. Obviously no such undertaking could be given. The Congress leaders therefore refused to take office.

This was an early setback for the Viceroy. He knew that the President of the Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru, had been resolutely opposed to acceptance of office from the outset because, Linlithgow thought, if his lieutenants busied themselves with provincial politics they would become wrapped up in them and be of no further use to him in his plans for revolution on the grand scale. From Gandhi the Viceroy had hoped for better things. The Mahatma was both abler and more moderate than Nehru but he, too, was afraid of the divisive possibilities of provincial responsibilities. Yet he realised that Congress would suffer loss of prestige if its members, having made lavish promises to their electors, declined to serve. He therefore made an issue of the special powers in an effort to throw the blame on to the Government of India for the Congress decision.

Meanwhile in the non-Congress Provinces the Constitution went ahead. The Punjab, Bengal, the North-West Frontier Provinces and Assam all equipped themselves with Governments claiming to enjoy the support of a majority of their Legislatures...The Viceroy hoped that the successful launching of provincial autonomy in these five Provinces would influence Congress towards reconsidering their attitude. Another factor which he felt would encourage the same trend was the formation of minority Governments in the Congress Provinces. Here the Governors had succeeded in persuading appropriate members of their Legislatures to accept office without commanding parliamentary majorities.

This had infuriated the Congress, which had confidently looked forward to the immediate breakdown of the Constitution. The minority Governments would probably be able to avoid facing their Legislatures until June or July when they would have to meet them in order to secure further supply. The interval would at least give Congress a chance of second thoughts.

The Viceroy now began a long battle of attrition with Congress, knowing that if he could not get them to change their minds the whole of the policy which he had been sent to India to carry out would collapse...

On 3rd March[Governor of Madras] Erskine reported to Linlithgow an interview he had had on that day with Rajagopalachari, who had said that Congress would probably take office if they could get a public assurance about the use of the Governors' reserved powers. Rajagopalachari had just returned from Wardha and he now suggested that it would ease the situation if the Viceroy were to see Gandhi and agree a formula with him. Linlithgow saw the trap immediately-and wired to Zetland[Secretary of State for India]. It would be of the greatest value to Congress, he pointed out, for them to be able to say that, far from acceptance of office being a climb-down on their part, they had taken office only in return for a specific concession by Government. It would be short-sighted in the extreme for the Viceroy or the Governors to give Congress an undertaking, whether written or oral, on the way in which the special powers would be used. Linlithgow asked for Zetland's support in refusing to follow such a course:

"We have abundant proof that the ultimate purpose of Nehru and Gandhi is to make for the overthrow of Government by the organisation of agrarian mischief on the grand scale. Our best hope of avoiding a direct clash is in the potency of Provincial Autonomy to destroy the effectiveness of Congress as an All-India instrument of revolution."

They should do everything possible both in public and private to make clear to Congress that it could look for sympathy and co-operation in the working of the Act. Linlithgow added that he thought that pressure from the Provinces would force the Congress to accept office, but in any event he was quite clear that he would rather face an immediate breakdown and the use of Section 93 than agree to any limitation of his own freedom of action or that of the Governors as regarded special responsibilities or the use of safeguards.

[Later in March] Rajagopalachari saw Erskine in Madras and put his own suggestion for a formula. Admitting that a Governor could not legally divest himself of his responsibilities if Congress took office Rajagopalachari wanted an undertaking that the Governor would not use his special powers of interference or set aside the advice of his Cabinet in matters appertaining to and within the legitimate scope of the provincial ministry. Linlithgow would not accept this for the obvious reason that the last phrase would be susceptible to infinite argument.

Rajagopalachari developed his idea further to the effect that the Governors and their Chief Ministers should agree to ignore the provision of the Act and leave it to the Secretary of State and the Viceroy alone to operate the safeguards. Linlithgow saw that this, too, was impossible....

Lord Halifax in Cabinet thought that Congress should be given a chance of making its position clear. He was attracted by a suggestion in the Press of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, the Indian Liberal leader, that the Viceroy should call a conference with the Congress leaders. Zetland, although he saw the difficulties of a conference, was afraid that, if a move of some sort was not made immediately, Congress might issue a manifesto which would make further attempt of remove the deadlock impossible. He therefore suggested that Linlithgow should make a statement that Government would not use its reserved powers in a legalistic way or to halt social reforms, but would adopt a sympathetic attitude to the proposed reforms.

The Viceroy replied by telegram next day. After a summary of the case against concessions to Congress he said that a conference as suggested was out of the question, given the existence of minority ministries. The non-Congress Provinces would demand association.

'We must also bear in mind not only the danger of disturbing minorities and driving the Muslims into the arms of the Congress (I am aware that they are watching us closely and I do not wish to see a united front created in this area), but the undesirability in view of the accepted policy of provincial autonomy of centralising discussions under the Viceroy.' There was nothing that Congress were more anxious to secure...

Linlithgow said he knew that some sections of opinion and certain newspapers were demanding an interview between the Viceroy and Gandhi was a way out of the impasse without any idea of how it would provide a solution. But Congress treated with contempt any expression of goodwill. They were simply out for a formula which would effectively nullify the reserved powers. For two reasons the Viceroy did not think it possible to contemplate any formula which attempted to define what Governors could or could not accept: first there would be the difficulty of interpretation; secondly a proposal, legislative or administrative, which might be harmless in ordinary times might in altered circumstances appear so inadvisable a to warrant a Governor exercising his special responsibility...Finally he said that ..he had decided that it was not yet time for him to intervene... 

[In the House of Lords on 6th May, 1937] Lord Snell led for the Labour Opposition.. The deadlock seemed to him to be due for the most part to a clash in temperament rather than to substantial material barriers... The Government should give an assurance that the reserved powers of the Governments would not be used unnecessarily. To the Indian leaders he appealed not to lead their people into the wilderness of barren negotiation..

In the event of a breakdown Linlithgow was ready for the consequences but he was under no illusion as to how serious they might be... If the authority of Governors were to be challenged it would be necessary to act with the utmost promptness and resolution...

There were signs that Congress was becoming uneasy. The Congress President(Nehru) launched a strenuous propaganda campaign to break the solidarity of the Muslims by efforts to induce the left wing of the Muslim League to join the Congress. It merely led to acrimonious controversy and an increase of communal tension. Communal riots broke out in the United Provinces, Bihar, Sind and the Punjab.

Next Rajagopalachari came to Erskine with a change of formula. He proposed that, in the event of disagreement with ministers, a Governor should ask for their resignation. Erskine's correct reaction was that this was exactly the same as dismissal and was unacceptable. What the Congress wanted, of course, was a state of affairs where responsibility for the fall of a Ministry must always be seen to be the Governor's  and never his Chief Minister's.

At the beginning of June, 1937, Gandhi.. professed himself very anxious that Congress should take office but only if the Government showed a willingness to conciliate Congress. The only obstacle he could see was the Congress demand that a Governor should dismiss his ministers in the event of serious disagreement. He said he would be satisfied if the Governor were to demand resignation(i.e. Rajagopalachari's formula). Zetland rejected Gandhi's demand. Governor and ministers might well disagree on one issue but be willing to carry on with the rest of the programme. A Governor could dismiss his ministers or ministers could resign, but the latter choice must be theirs.

Zetland's views were in line with Linlithgow's. To the Viceroy the very basis of the Act was the assumption of co-operation between Ministers and Government and the avoidance if possible of occasions of difficulty. He was aiming at a convention that the use of special responsibilities ought not necessarily to involve demission of office, although the possibility could not be eliminated...

Meanwhile Rajagopalachari was having another tilt at Erskine. He said that Gandhi was only asking for dismissal of a ministry in a vital crisis. Congress had to make this condition in order to control their extreme left. If there could be some understanding arrived at, the Congress leader could appeal to the honour of their followers to carry it out. The British Government, he pointed out, did not seem to realise that Gandhi was holding out an olive branch. If he was met on this matter he would agree to working his constitution normally and would not countenance petty tactics. Here was the chance to get rid of the civil disobedience mentality for good.

Zetland was unimpressed by all this. The hope of getting rid of the civil disobedience mentality he described as 'optimism run mad'. He suspected that Gandhi (who was, he thought, behaving like a 'saintly old sinner and humbug') was trying to trick either the Government or Congress itself in order to prevent a split in the Congress ranks.

"And to what end?..I can see no other end than to have his forces united when he considers that the moment has arrived for dropping the mask and launching a grand offensive against the British connection.."

[On 22nd June  the Viceroy issued a statement.] He went in detail into the constitutional conflict, showing how Ministers would work with Governors, and explaining the point of the special powers and their bearing on resignation or dismissal of a ministry. At the end he said he realised that for some people the plan did not go far enough in the direction of self-government. He gave the assurance that, in his best judgment and given goodwill on all sides, the Constitution would work and work well...

"I am convinced that the shortest road to that fuller political life which many of you so greatly desire is to accept this Constitution and to work it for all it is worth. Of their nature, politics are ever dynamic, and to imagine that their expression in terms of a written Constitution can render them static would be to utterly disregard the lessons of history and indeed the dictates of common sense."

He could not have hinted more strongly that this was the right road to complete independence. On the practical side he proclaimed his conviction that the Constitution offered immense opportunities for public service and that in its working lay the best hope for improving the conditions of the rural population and the poor...

Press reaction to the Viceroy's statement of 22nd June was all that could be desired with the exception of the Hindustan Times, which said that there could be no compromise of any sort. The paper hoped that Congress would tell Government that if there was a breakdown now the country must face the consequences(i.e. civil disobedience). Gandhi's son Devdas was the acting editor and it was thought that the article might be the result of pique over the Viceroy's refusal to invite Gandhi to see him. In spite of the favourable Press response Linlithgow could not be sure how Congress would decide at its forthcoming meeting on 5th July...

On 28th June Zetland wrote to the Viceroy..If the [Congress] decision was against co-operation the left wing would carry the bulk of the Congress with them. If Congress did co-operate the gulf between Britain and nationalist India would diminish because Indians would become absorbed in administration. When so much turned on the question of dismissal versus resignation was it right to be rigid?

'Gandhi's latest formula as I understand it', wrote Zetland, 'is that he would be satisfied if we agreed that the Governors should dismiss their Ministers only if the disagreement was of a serious character. If this meant that the matter over which the disagreement arose was one of really first class importance, it might be possible to consider meeting them..?'

Linlithgow was aghast at the letter's contents. He received it on 6th July, at the very moment when Congress were making their decision. He had made up his mind that he could not agree to any arrangement with the Congress which could be seen as being made at the expense of the minorities. He had thought his Secretary of State supported him. Now, at this very moment, he found that Zetland was contemplating what he felt would amount to a stab in the back. He wired at once that if he was ordered to yield he would resign. Within hours of his sending his telegram Congress agreed to accept office unconditionally...

On 12th July Zetland wrote his congratulations to the Viceroy on Congress's decision which, he said, had been due in large measure to Linlithgow's patience and restraint... Linlithgow wrote back on 28th July and explained why he had been so shocked by Zetland's earlier letter.

'What was my position?' he asked.'I had made it abundantly clear to you that in my view we ought not give way upon a single point... and you in your turn having taken this matter before  the Cabinet were able to assure me of their support. Next we put together, you and I, the Section 93 proclamation and the Ordinance, and we corresponded with Governors on the basis of the immediate passing into force of Section 93 in the event of Congress refusing office. Then came my statement in which I made it very clear that there could be no concessions, and that we could not go beyond your speeches and those of Governors... Congress knew exactly where they stood, and the minorities and parties other than Congress were at once steadied and pleased by the knowledge that we proposed to give nothing away. ...had Congress refused office on the terms laid down in my statement and had Cabinet decided in the sense indicated, I should have been bound to regard my position here was no long possible.'...

Let us see now what had happened on the other side of the hill. Reliable information reached the Viceroy from a source which had been in intimate touch with all those who were present at the vital meeting. Never had a statement from official quarters had such an effect on Congress as that created by the Viceroy's statement of 22nd June.

There was criticism on a few points of detail, but the sincerity of the whole and the friendliness of the Viceroy's approach to Congress were universally acknowledged. Evidently members of the Working Committee of Congress and the provincial leaders were anxious not to provoke a clash for the present. ...[T]he majority regarded a breakdown, followed by unconstitutional activity, as inevitable. But they agreed that Congress should show itself capable of governing the country for a year or two and then they would take stock of the position. Bhulabhai Desai strongly advocated acceptance; he had gathered the impression on a recent visit to England that there would be more support here for Congress when the breakdown eventually occurred if they had meanwhile accepted office. This overwhelming feeling in favour of acceptance had been drilled into Gandhi before the meeting and the Mahatma then brought Nehru into line to the extent of persuading him to remain silent during the proceedings. The left wing hardly raised its voice at all.

It had been a triumph for the Viceroy. His judgment had been completely vindicated. Above all he had kept his nerve throughout the long ordeal. Lady Linlithgow wrote home in September, 'His stock is ever soaring and he remains calm and unmoved through all - he is never really free from worry of some kind or another.'1

1For instance, Waziristan had now developed into an extensive campaign with 25,000 troops employed.

Home

CMP(1) -  From Ayesha Jalal's 'The Sole Spokesman'

CMP(2) -  Congress and Muslim League positions on 12 May 1946

CMP(3) -  The Cabinet Mission Plan 16 May 1946

CMP(4) - Jinnah  and ML  responses to the CMP 22 May  and June 6 1946

CMP(5) -  Jinnah's meeting with Mission Delegation on 4 April 1946

CMP(6) -  Jinnah's meeting with Missiion Delegation on 16 April 1946

CMP(7A) - Maulana Azad's meeting with Mission Delegation on 17 April 1946

CMP(7) -  The Congress unease with parity  8-9 May 1946

CMP(7B) - Jinnah and Azad responses to preliminary proposals 8-9 May 1946

CMP(8A) - Simla Conference meetings on 5 May 1946 on the powers of the Union

CMP(8) -  More exchanges on parity, Simla Conference meeting  11 May 1946

CMP(9) -  Jinnah and Wyatt(1) on Pakistan and CMP, 8 Jan. and 25 May 1946

CMP(10) -  Jinnah and Wyatt(2) on the interim government, 11 June 1946

CMP(11) -   Congress opposition to grouping. Gandhi, Patel and Azad, May 1946

CMP(12) - Congress Working Committee resolutions, May-June 1946

CMP(12A) - Arguments over inclusion of a Congress Muslim, June 1946

CMP(12B) - Behind the scenes-Gandhi, June-July 1946

CMP(12C) - Behind the scenes-Jinnah, June-July 1946

CMP(13) - Jawaharlal Nehru's press conference on the Plan, 10 July 1946

CMP(14) - League rejected Plan, called Direct Action,  July-August 1946

CMP(15) - Viceroy strong-arming Nehru, Gandhi on compulsory grouping, Pethick-Lawrence to Attlee, Aug -Sept 1946

CMP(16) - Intelligence assessment on Jinnah's options and threat of civil war, Sept. 1946

CMP(17) - League Boycott of the Constituent Assembly Dec. 1946

CMP(17A) - Congress "climbdown" on grouping and Jinnah's rejection, January 1947

CMP (A1) - Plain speaking from Sir Khizr Hayat, Abell on the Breakdown plan, Wavell

CMP(A2) - North West Frontier Province, Oct-Nov 1946 and Feb-March 1947

CMP(A3) - Bengal and Bihar, August - November 1946

CMP(A4) - Punjab, February - March 1947

CMP (18) - My take

CMP (19) - What did parity and communal veto mean in numbers?

CMP(20) - Another take -with links to reference material

CMP(21) - Mountbatten discussing CMP with Patel and Jinnah, 24-26 Apr 1947

CMP(22) - A reply on the Cabinet Mission Plan

Extra(1) - Jinnah's speech in March 1941 on independent sovereign Pakistan

Extra(1A) - Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1941-1942

Extra(1B) - Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1938-1940

Extra(1C) - Jinnah's speeches and Statements from 1943-45

Extra(2) - Gandhi-Jinnah talks in 1944 on defining Pakistan

Extra(3) - BR Ambedkar quoted from his book 'Pakistan or the Partition of India'

Extra(4) - Congress and Muslim parties' on the Communal question 1927-1931

Extra(4A) - Excerpts of Motilal Nehru Committee Report 1928

Extra(4B) - Nehru, Bose, Jinnah Correspondence 1937-38

Extra(5) -  BR Ambedkar on Communal Representation 1909-1947

Extra(6) - Gandhiji's scheme of offering the Prime Ministership to Jinnah in 1947

Extra(6A) - Jinnah on Congress's offers of Prime Ministership 1940-43

Extra (6B) - Apr-Jul 1947 Negotiations on Pakistan between Mountbatten and Jinnah

Extra(7) - M.A.Jinnah and Maulana Azad on two nation theory

Extra(8) - On Separate electorates, Joint electorates and Reserved constituencies

Extra(9) - Links to cartoons on Indian constitutional parleys from the Daily Mail, UK, 1942 and 1946-1947, by L.G. Illingworth

Extra(10) -Nehru Report 1928 (10 MB pdf)
Extra(11) -Iqbal's letters to Jinnah, May-June 1937

Extra(12) -Jinnah, Linlithgow, Sikander Hayat, Pakistan rumblings 1942-43

Durga Das (1) 1919-1931, Jallianwala Bagh to Bhagat Singh

Durga Das (2) 1931-1936, Crescent Card: Jinnah in London to Fazli Husain in Punjab

Durga Das(3) 1937-1940, Provincial Autonomy to Jinnah gets the veto

Durga Das(4) 1940-1945, The War Years: India's War Effort-Pakistan on a platter

Durga Das(5) 1945-1947, The Cabinet Mission to Divide and Quit

1937-1940(2)  Congress and Jinnah fall out in U.P., Jinnah's anti-Congress campaign and the Viceroy gives Jinnah a Veto: Ayesha Jalal, Sarvepalli Gopal and Stanley Wolpert


1937: Congress-Jinnah tussle over coalition government in U. P., M.J. Akbar

1937: Nehru, Jinnah and Coalition Governments, Bimal Prasad

1939-1940: India and the War, Anita Inder Singh

1945-1946: The Elections of 1945-46, Anita Inder Singh

1857-1938 Glimpses of British policy in Punjab: Ian Talbot and David Page

1930-1939 Congress Decline in Bengal, John Gallagher

Glendevon (1) 1937: Congress's Office Acceptance Saga over Governor's Powers

Glendevon (2) 1937-1940: Federation, Jinnah, Congress activism in Princely States

Glendevon (3) 1939-1942: Linlithgow, Congress, Jinnah,War-time Realignments

1939-1947: Jinnah and the Anglo-Muslim League Alliance, Narendra Singh Sarila

1944: Gandhi-Jinnah talks, Jaswant Singh

1830s-1898: British Forward Policy(1)


1899-1947: British Forward Policy(2)

Site Meter
Comments