In the months before
the Mission arrived in India, Major Wyatt spoke with both Jinnah and
Nehru. A record of his talk with Jinnah which presages Jinnah's
positions in the months ahead.
From The Transfer of Power 1942-7, Vol VI The post-war phase:new moves by the Labour Government, 1st August 1945-22 March 1946, Eds, Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, 1976.
Enclosure to no 357- Note by Major
Rankin (full text)
Woodrow Wyatt had a long talk with Jinnah today the substance of which he repeated to me as follows:-
1. Interim Government.
(b) Parity of the Muslim League with all other parties, i.e., out of 14 portfolios 7 must be Muslim League. This he said follows from the acceptance of the principle of Pakistan.
2. Constitution-making Body
3. Any attempt to impose a unified constitution or to accept a majority decision by a single C.M.B would be resisted, if necessary by force.
4. Pakistan would remain within the Empire with a British Governor-General. British Industry and Commerce would be encouraged in order to develop Pakistan which would be far behind Hindustan economically.
5. Relations with Hindustan would be purely diplomatic: there would be no common currency, transportation system, army, etc.
All this was said in very definite fashion; and Wyatt received the
impression(no doubt as he was intended to) that Jinnah would not budge
from this position. Jinnah thought the Hindus would accept it as it
would give them three-quarters of India "which is more than they have
ever had before".
Here Major Wyatt suggests to Jinnah what should be in the Muslim League Resolution to be passed on June 6th.[Text of actual June 6 resolution in CMP(4)].
The Transfer of Power 1942-7 Vol VII The Cabinet Mission. Eds, Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon.
page 684 (full text)
NOTE OF CONVERSATION WITH MR.
JINNAH, FRIDAY, MAY 24th 1946
2. He was very anxious to know if all the comings and goings between the Congress leaders and the Cabinet Mission were having the effect of modifying the Statement in any way. I told him that it was most unlikely that the Statement would be modified.
3. He considered that the Statement was not a practicable proposition. The machinery envisaged would not work and could not work mainly because there was no spirit of co-operation on the Congress side. The Mission had obviously not even fully appreciated the situation in India. What was required was a surgical operation. This Statement would settle nothing. He did not think the British were badly intentioned but they would have to learn by experience. There are only two ways of learning things, either by experience or by taking the advice of someone who knows something about it. If he thought that the Mission would not breach his confidence, he would make them some suggestions as to how they should proceed and put the Statement on one side. But he was not sure that he could have complete confidence in the Mission.
I told him that the Mission would not breach his confidence, but that they were most unlikely to alter their Statement in any way. He at once said, "Well, then it is no use my making any suggestions". These undeclared suggestions were connected with the difficulty which he conceived the British felt over the defence of India. From a previous conversation with him I believe that what he wanted to suggest was his idea that the British should remain as the binding force in the Indian Centre for some 15 years and deal with defence and foreign affairs for Pakistan and Hindustan consulting the Prime Ministers of each State.
4. He was perplexed about the interpretation of paragraph 15(v)[of the Cabinet Mission Plan - CMP(3)]. He thought that it should have been so worded as to read that "Provinces grouped in sections should be free to form groups..". I told him that in my view that was the effect of paragraph 15(v). The provinces would be compulsorily grouped together in their sections at the Constituent Assembly and they would then be free to form groups or no.
He fully appreciated that if the representatives of Assam and North West Frontier Province did not take part in the work of their sections they could not be forced to do so and the sections would have to proceed without them, although this did not alter the fact that Assam and the North West Frontier Province would not be able to opt out of their group until the new constitution had been made.
5. He said that the preamble to the Mission's Statement had bitterly hurt the feelings of the Muslims. Not only that, it was inconsistent with the rest of the Statement. This onslaught was quite unnecessary and had been done in order to placate Congress. Indeed, the word Pakistan was an anathema throughout the Statement. This preamble made matters even more difficult for him than before.
6. His general criticism of the Statement was that it had not settled any of the fundamentals. For example:-
(a) The Muslim group of Provinces had not got parity with the others at the centre.
(b) There was no real protection for the Muslims in the Constituent Assembly, because from the very start the chairman would be a Hindu, unless the Muslims were to say that the election of the chairman was a communal issue, in which case the Constituent Assembly would break down straight away.
(c) The position of the States was left far too vague.
(d) Provinces had not been given the right to secede after 10 years although the Congress had always been willing to give the right to secede and had raised no real objection this time at Simla.
(e) The Union had been given the power to raise money. This was not a communal issue and would inevitably lead to taxation from the Centre with other subjects being added on the short list of the Union Government.
7. He explained to the Viceroy why there should be entirely separate Constituent Assemblies which only met together for the purpose of deciding the structure of the Union Government.
He thought the Viceroy had understood. This was a psychological matter and the Mission had created a single Constituent Assembly working in three sections only to please the Congress, ignoring Muslim feeling.
8. The only real safeguard for the Muslims was parity between Federations. The method of voting on communal issues would not work as there would always be dispute as to what was a communal issue and what was not.
9. He could not understand why the Muslim provinces had been split into two groups. He agreed that it was something to have the groups at all and without them he could not even have looked at the Scheme.
10. He disliked the Advisory Committee on which the Muslims would be in a minority, and as far as he could see would be unable to prevent the Union Constituent Assembly incorporating its recommendations as a part of the constitution of the Union Government, thus added another subject to those dealt with by the Union Government. ??
11. He dilated at considerable length on the attitude of Congress who had not conceded anything during the Simla Conference and would never approach the Constituent Assembly in a spirit of co-operation. They would aim the whole time to use their majority to steam-roller the Muslim League and sidetrack the provision as to safeguarding the Muslims on communal issues. It was inconceivable that such a Constituent Assembly could work at all.
12. He will not come down to Delhi until June 1st or
2nd. He can say nothing further until he has consulted the Muslim
League Working Committee and Council. He is being bombarded with
telegrams from his supporters protesting against the Statement and the
Muslim reaction is very strong against it. My own impression is that he
definitely wants to see where he is with the Muslim League before
giving a decision on the Statement and he wants them to have time in
which to absorb the two shocks which they have been given.
He is particularly hurt that the Mission have seized on this concession(which was an enormous one from his stand point) and have not taken his offer as a whole. None of the provisios that went with it have been accepted. I pointed out to him that everything that Congress had asked for had not been accepted either but he did not seem particularly convinced.
13. I asked him, in view of the
foregoing, whether he thought that the Muslim League Working Committee
might possibly pass a resolution on the following lines:-
The scheme outlined in the Cabinet
Mission's Statement was impracticable and could not work. But
nevertheless in order to show that they would give it a trial, although
they knew that the machinery could not function, they would accept the
Statement and would not go out of their way to sabotage the
procedure-but they would accept the
Statement as the first step on the
road to Pakistan.
At this proposition he was delighted and said "That's it, you've got it", and I am completely convinced that that is what the Muslim League will do.14. He will demand parity in the Interim Government if he decides to come into it.
CMP(1) - From Ayesha Jalal's 'The Sole Spokesman'
CMP(2) - Congress and Muslim League positions on 12 May 1946
CMP(3) - The Cabinet Mission Plan 16 May 1946
CMP(4) - Jinnah and ML responses to the CMP 22 May and June 6 1946
CMP(5) - Jinnah's meeting with Mission Delegation on 4 April 1946
CMP(6) - Jinnah's meeting with Missiion Delegation on 16 April 1946
CMP(7A) - Maulana Azad's meeting with Mission Delegation on 17 April 1946
CMP(7) - The Congress unease with parity 8-9 May 1946
CMP(7B) - Jinnah and Azad responses to preliminary proposals 8-9 May 1946
CMP(8A) - Simla Conference meetings on 5 May 1946 on the powers of the Union
CMP(8) - More exchanges on parity, Simla Conference meeting 11 May 1946
CMP(9) - Jinnah and Wyatt(1) on Pakistan and CMP, 8 Jan. and 25 May 1946
CMP(10) - Jinnah and Wyatt(2) on the interim government, 11 June 1946
CMP(11) - Congress opposition to grouping. Gandhi, Patel and Azad, May 1946
CMP(12) - Congress Working Committee resolutions, May-June 1946
CMP(12A) - Arguments over inclusion of a Congress Muslim, June 1946
CMP(12B) - Behind the scenes-Gandhi, June-July 1946
CMP(12C) - Behind the scenes-Jinnah, June-July 1946
CMP(13) - Jawaharlal Nehru's press conference on the Plan, 10 July 1946
CMP(14) - League rejected Plan, called Direct Action, July-August 1946
CMP(15) - Viceroy strong-arming Nehru, Gandhi on compulsory grouping, Pethick-Lawrence to Attlee, Aug -Sept 1946
CMP(16) - Intelligence assessment on Jinnah's options and threat of civil war, Sept. 1946
CMP(17) - League Boycott of the Constituent Assembly Dec. 1946
CMP(17A) - Congress "climbdown" on grouping and Jinnah's rejection, January 1947
CMP (A1) - Plain speaking from Sir Khizr Hayat, Abell on the Breakdown plan, Wavell
CMP(A2) - North West Frontier Province, Oct-Nov 1946 and Feb-March 1947
CMP(A3) - Bengal and Bihar, August - November 1946
CMP(A4) - Punjab, February - March 1947
CMP (18) - My take
CMP (19) - What did parity and communal veto mean in numbers?
CMP(20) - Another take -with links to reference material
CMP(21) - Mountbatten discussing CMP with Patel and Jinnah, 24-26 Apr 1947
CMP(22) - A reply on the Cabinet Mission Plan
Extra(1) - Jinnah's speech in March 1941 on independent sovereign Pakistan
Extra(1A) - Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1941-1942
Extra(1B) - Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1938-1940
Extra(1C) - Jinnah's speeches and Statements from 1943-45
Extra(2) - Gandhi-Jinnah talks in 1944 on defining Pakistan
Extra(3) - BR Ambedkar quoted from his book 'Pakistan or the Partition of India'
Extra(4) - Congress and Muslim parties' on the Communal question 1927-1931
Extra(4A) - Excerpts of Motilal Nehru Committee Report 1928
Extra(4B) - Nehru, Bose, Jinnah Correspondence 1937-38
Extra(5) - BR Ambedkar on Communal Representation 1909-1947
Extra(6) - Gandhiji's scheme of offering the Prime Ministership to Jinnah in 1947
Extra(6A) - Jinnah on Congress's offers of Prime Ministership 1940-43
Extra (6B) - Apr-Jul 1947 Negotiations on Pakistan between Mountbatten and Jinnah
Extra(7) - M.A.Jinnah and Maulana Azad on two nation theory
Extra(8) - On Separate electorates, Joint electorates and Reserved constituencies
Extra(9) - Links to cartoons on Indian constitutional parleys from the Daily Mail, UK, 1942 and 1946-1947, by L.G. Illingworth
Extra(10) -Nehru Report 1928 (10 MB pdf)
Extra(11) -Iqbal's letters to Jinnah, May-June 1937
Extra(12) -Jinnah, Linlithgow, Sikander Hayat, Pakistan rumblings 1942-43
Durga Das (1) 1919-1931, Jallianwala Bagh to Bhagat Singh
Durga Das (2) 1931-1936, Crescent Card: Jinnah in London to Fazli Husain in Punjab
Durga Das(3) 1937-1940, Provincial Autonomy to Jinnah gets the veto
Durga Das(4) 1940-1945, The War Years: India's War Effort-Pakistan on a platter
Durga Das(5) 1945-1947, The Cabinet Mission to Divide and Quit
1937-1940(2) Congress and Jinnah fall out in U.P., Jinnah's anti-Congress campaign and the Viceroy gives Jinnah a Veto: Ayesha Jalal, Sarvepalli Gopal and Stanley Wolpert
1937: Congress-Jinnah tussle over coalition government in U. P., M.J. Akbar
1937: Nehru, Jinnah and Coalition Governments, Bimal Prasad
1939-1940: India and the War, Anita Inder Singh
1945-1946: The Elections of 1945-46, Anita Inder Singh
1857-1938 Glimpses of British policy in Punjab: Ian Talbot and David Page
1930-1939 Congress Decline in Bengal, John Gallagher
Glendevon (1) 1937: Congress's Office Acceptance Saga over Governor's Powers
Glendevon (2) 1937-1940: Federation, Jinnah, Congress activism in Princely States
Glendevon (3) 1939-1942: Linlithgow, Congress, Jinnah,War-time Realignments
1939-1947: Jinnah and the Anglo-Muslim League Alliance, Narendra Singh Sarila
1899-1947: British Forward Policy(2)