Jinnah, Linlithgow, Sikander Hayat 1942-43

Extra(12) Jinnah, Linlithgow, Sikander Hayat Khan, Pakistan rumblings 1942-1943
Documents included:
  • Report by a reliable informant of a talk with Jinnah on the Pakistan issue, Viceroy Linlithgow to Secretary of State Amery, 16 November 1942
  •  On Jinnah's visit to Punjab, Governor of Punjab, B. Glancy to Viceroy Linlithgow, 28 November 1942
  •  On Sikander Hayat's partition plan for Punjab, Governor of Punjab, B. Glancy to Viceroy Linlithgow, 10 July 1942
  • Enclosed note on proceedings of the in-camera session of the All-India Muslim League, Viceroy Linlithgow to Amery, 11 May 1943
  • Comments on Jinnah's speech, on Pakistan and on discussion with Khizr Hayat Khan, Viceroy Linlithgow to Amery 2-4 May 1943
  • Note on talk with Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-zaman, Governor of United Provinces, M. Hallet to Viceroy Linlithgow, 3 June 1943
  • Discussion of Jinnah's attitude, Viceroy Linlithgow to Amery, 10 June 1943


Unless otherwise specified, quoted from

The Transfer of Power 1942-7 Eds. Nicholas Mansergh and E.W.R Lumby,  Volume III 'Reassertion of Authority, Gandhiji's fast and the succession to the Viceroyalty', 21 September 1942-12 June 1943


Comment

Some additional material on what was being discussed about Pakistan in 1942-1943 is presented here. This supplements material from the same period posted in Extra(1A), Extra(1C), Extra(6A).


A discussion with Jinnah on Pakistan in November 1942 and an account of Jinnah's speech during an in-camera meeting of the Muslim League in April 1943 illuminate further,  Jinnah's conception of Pakistan as a sovereign state and his determination to do everything necessary to achieve it, whether courting the British or fighting them. 

The views of Viceroy Linlithgow and the Punjab Premiers on Jinnah's Pakistan campaign and its practical implications are also included.

The context of these quotes is as follows. In March 1942, Stafford Cripps visited India offering a plan for an Indian national government and Indian constituent assembly. The plan notably also allowed  provinces to "opt out" of the Indian Union if they so decided. The Cripps mission failed for various reasons, but it was agreed by all sides that the "opt out" provision signalled a positive British acknowlegement of Muslim League's Pakistan demand.

However what was meant by Pakistan was still left up in the air. Jinnah revealed his mind to 'a reliable source' in November 1942, leaving no doubt that he was working for a separate sovereign state. The views he expressed on participation in any Provisional government exactly mirrored his attitude towards various Interim government proposals in 1945-1946.

Viceroy Linlithgow also discussed Pakistan and what was on Jinnah's mind with Amery, the Secretary of State for India. He also had discussions on the subject with the Premiers of Punjab,  first Sikander Hayat Khan and later Khizr Hayat Khan.

Punjab was the main recruitment ground for the British Indian Army and it was critical to the British war effort to keep the province quiet and communally peaceful. Sikander Hayat Khan was ambivalent about Pakistan- as an immediate practical consideration of safeguarding his Unionist Party-led government and the British war effort in his province, he had to reassure his Sikh and Hindu allies within the party by distancing himself from the Pakistan concept. But he also had to keep Jinnah and his Punjabi Muslim party members in control by professing support for Pakistan at the same time. A scheme for a partition of Punjab which he came up with, in July 1942, seems to have been an attempt to keep all sides at bay.

On August 8 1942, the Congress began its 'Quit India' agitation and as a consequence most Congress leaders including Gandhi were arrested and imprisoned incommunicado for the next few years. Jinnah, apparently, had now a free hand to pursue his political agenda. He seems to have felt that he could now enter the national government on terms set by himself. The Viceroy however, did not oblige.

It is curious that when Congress after winning elections,  ran  provincial governments  in 6-7 out of 11 provinces(during the period 1937-1939), Jinnah had urged the Viceroy to dismiss these elected governments. He spent the war years  threatening civil war if Congress was allowed back into provincial governments, and demanding that Congress be denied any place in national government as well. However, in contrast, in 1942-43 he considered the fact that Muslim League ran a number of provincial governments as a most compelling reason why Muslim League should be invited into the national government, even in the absence of the Congress.

It is also curious that in 1941-1943 period Jinnah kept citing the principle of self-determination as a reason for Muslims to be granted Pakistan, whereas in 1944, during talks with Gandhi, Jinnah insisted that only Muslims had that right to self-determination.
 
Meanwhile, Sikander Hayat Khan passed away on 26 December 1942. His successor Khizr Hayat Khan displayed a similar ambivalent attitude towards Pakistan - expressing his misgivings to the Viceroy about consequences of growing support for Pakistan among Punjab Muslims while also contributing substantial money to the Muslim League's 'Jinnah fund' during the Muslim League session in April 1943. Many notables from Punjab and Sind also contributed substantially to the fund, contrary to recent historical interpretation that the Pakistan movement did not have any support in these provinces until 1946. 

During the All India Muslim League meeting in April 1943, Jinnah, in a public speech[also quoted in Extra(1C) and Extra(6A)]  invited Gandhi to write to him if he had changed his mind on Pakistan. Having read about this invitation in a newspaper in jail, Gandhi wrote a letter to Jinnah which the Viceroy refused to deliver, and which eventually Jinnah disowned all interest in, accusing Gandhi of trying to embroil the Muslim League in conflict with the British government and to secure his own release from jail. [Episode covered in Extra(6A)]

The in-camera session addressed by Jinnah during the April 1943 Muslim League session quoted on this page  supplements the public speeches and shows Jinnah's truculence on the matter of Pakistan and on being left out of the Central government. In this speech, it is also notable that Jinnah declared that  all talk of defining Pakistan must cease in order to maintain Muslim unity.

By end-May 1943, the Viceroy seems to have concluded that despite Jinnah's private or public truculence, he would not actually confront the British government. By early June 1943, the Viceroy was preparing for his own departure from India.  Viceroy Wavell would succeed him in September 1943.
(end comment)



 187 page 262, 16 November 1942 (excerpts)
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (extract)

                                                                                                                            THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 16 November 1942
   
..
10. I send you by this bag a very interesting report dated 13th November, from a reliable informant(I have been told his name and we can regard him as quite definitely reliable) of a recent talk with Jinnah, which gives the clearest exposition of his views on the Pakistan issue that I have yet seen, and which you may care to have.
..

Annexe to No. 187(full text)

(Enclosed in the letter of 17 November from the Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State)

REPORT BY A RELIABLE INFORMANT OF A TALK WITH JINNAH GIVING EXPOSITION OF HIS VIEWS ON PAKISTAN ISSUE

A reliable informant's account of a recent interview with Jinnah is as follows:-

2. Speaking on the present political deadlock, Jinnah stoutly denied that it was of his creation or that he relished its continuance. He had again and again made it clear that, within the framework of the present constitution, he was prepared to co-operate in the formation of a "so-called" National Government  "on an equal footing". Lest it should be thought that he was a reactionary and was not in favour of rapid political progress, he had gone further and agreed to withdraw the condition that the Provisional Government must function within the existing constitution, provided the principle of self-determination was first recognised and Pakistan conceded after the war in response to the verdict of a Muslim plebiscite.

See the Bombay resolution of the Muslim League Working Committee. On this basis he was, and had always been, prepared to cooperate; he had told the Viceroy so; but he was not going to sell Muslims for the sake of a temporary political settlement and "a few crumbs of office" during the war.

3. His position was this: Did Muslims want separation or not? If they did not, the problem was simple. He could today go to the Congress leaders and tell them that all that Muslims ask for was separate electorates, special weightage and similar safeguards. He was certain Congress would grant him any special concessions he wanted, even though it might go back on them in future years after it had secured complete control of the governmental and Parliamentary machinery. But in that case Muslims must accept the position of a "minority" and expect to be treated as minorities were treated all over the world. Speaking for himself, he did not regard Muslims as a "minority"; Muslims were as much a "nation" as the Czecho-Slavs or the Irish were a nation and as much entitled to a separate homeland.

4. But if Muslims really wanted Pakistan-and he believed they did- then it was impossible for him to take any line other than he had taken. Let there be no mistake: This "provisional" Government, which was being so much talked about, was "Provisional" only in the sense that it was to be hand-picked without reference to the Legislature; it would function not only during the war but for a considerable period after the cessation of hostilities; it would be in authority at that critical time when the future of India was to be decided and the distribution of power was to take place, with Britain no longer there to hold the balance or pretend to do so; and in the matter of what India's future should be and how power should be allocated, it would play a dominant and decisive part.

When that time came and Muslims found themselves in a helpless minority as much in the central Government as in the central Legislature, there would be an end of Pakistan. Muslims would be told that the "provisional" arrangement had worked excellently and must consequently be made permanent; and there would at that time be no means of resisting such a decision. That was why he was so insistent on his demand for the establishment of a Provisional Government "on a footing of equality". He was not prepared to explain what he meant by "footing of equality", but in any case he must have parity with Hindus.   That was the only way in which he could safeguard Pakistan. To accept responsibility in a Provisional Government on any other terms would be to walk into a trap which Congress and Hindus generally were carefully laying for the unwary and impatient Muslims. It was a deep game; and he, at least, was not prepared to play.

5.The present was a time when Muslims were faced with a "life and death problem". He did not say that in an oratorical sense; he meant it literally. Muslims must either choose to assert themselves and win for themselves a place in the comity of nations or go under and accept a position of permanent inferiority. It was for them to say what they wanted. If the former, he was prepared to fight for them till the last; if the latter, he was willing to "take leave and concern himself with making money at the bar".

6. Far from taking a negative line, his attitude was a distinctly positive one. He was prepared to co-operate in the war effort and, to that end, ready to join an emergency Government on conditions which he had clearly and precisely defined. What more could he do? He could not force the Viceroy to accept them; Congress had no intention of accepting them; and the other parties had no standing entitling them to negotiate a settlement. It had been put about that Gandhi, before his arrest in Bombay, had agreed to see him and settle terms; that was lying propaganda. Rajagopalachariar represented nobody but himself and, in his recent talks, had merely sought to clarify some points on which he professed to feel some doubt. If Rajagopalachariar could persuade the Viceroy to let him see Gandhi and then persuade Gandhi to see what Muslims were insisting upon, there might be possibility of going ahead; as it was, there was none.

7. He had been told that he had never clearly defined Pakistan. The fact was that everyone knew perfectly well what was meant by Pakistan and what the words "north-western and eastern zones" signified. The exact delineation of the boundaries of these zones, when separately constituted, and the fiscal and other adjustments which must follow the separation were matters to be decided by special commissions to be set up for the purpose. The question at present was: was the principle of separation to be unequivocally conceded or not? (Separation, envisaged in the Cripps proposals, was an eye-wash.). Once that principle was agreed to, there would be no difficulty in settling details.


228 page 319, 28 November 1942(excerpts)
Sir B. Glancy(Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow(Extract)

                                                                                                                                                        GOVT. HOUSE, LAHORE, 28 November 1942

Dear Lord Linlithgow,
The best thing to be said about Jinnah's tour in the Punjab is that it has come to an end; it was throughout a success for the Qaid-e-Azam, but it has certainly not tended to improve communal relations. At the beginning of his crusade at Jullundur Jinnah made a pointed attack on the author of a certain new formula devised for the solution of India's difficulties; he was obviously referring to Sikander's "partition scheme" [see below-blogger], though he did not mention the Premier by name.

A day or two later Sikander found it expedient to attend the Muslim League meeting in Lyallpur and to make his obeisance to the Qaid-e-Azam. In return for this Jinnah was kind enough to express his approval of the Premier and to say that at Jullunder he had not been alluding to Sikander's formula, which he had not had time to study. Sikander was undoubtedly in an embarrassing position and he could scarcely have been expected to risk an open rupture with Jinnah, but in proclaiming that he saw eye to eye with the champion of "Pakistan" he has to a considerable extent weakened the Baldev Singh-Sikander Pact and undermined whatever confidence other communities have reposed in his assurances.

The Sikhs in particular are feeling injured and bewildered. Master Tara Singh has been freely criticising both Jinnah and Sikander. Giani Kartar Singh appears to be still groping for some means to satisfy the separatist ambitions of his community. In a speech at Nankana he made both to say that the Sikhs would work for the unity of India as a whole, but should aim at an appropriate partition of the Punjab. One of the suggestions is that this partition should be based not on population, but on landed interests, as this would lead to results more favourable to the Sikhs.

Among the Muslims there is a definitely increasing number shouting for "Pakistan", without for the most part any serious attempt at analysing what it means. The general atmosphere is more uneasy than it was and it looks as if cleavages would grow more pronounced.

Another Communal Reunion Party took place yesterday and I was among those present. This time the occasion was the anniversary of Guru Nanak's birthday and the host was Baldev Singh, who showed up well throughout and seems to be gaining self-assurance. The usual speeches were made and everyone appeared very friendly, but there was a certain air of unreality about the proceedings.

Sikander Hayat Khan's formula quoted from The Transfer of Power 1942-7 Eds. Nicholas Mansergh and E.W.R Lumby,  Volume II 'Quit India', 30 April-21 September 1942

243 page 359,  10 July 1942 (full text)
Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow


                                                                                                                                                                        GOVT. HOUSE, LAHORE, 10 July 1942

Dear Lord Linlithgow,
Your Excellency will be interested in seeing the enclosed note which Sikander gave me just before we left Simla, setting forth his tentative formula for the solution of the communal problem. The proposal amounts, as you will see, to a scheme that in absence of a 75 per cent. majority of members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly in favour of either accession or non-accession to the Indian Federation, the Muslim community should by means of a referendum be given an opportunity of deciding on non-accession and that, if they so decide, the non-Muslim portions of the Punjab should by a similar referendum be accorded the right to cut themselves adrift from the Province as constituted at present.

If it actually came to the point of non-Muslims deciding to break adrift, this would mean that, assuming the unit concerned to be a district, the Ambala Division and a large part of the Jullunder Division and also the Amritsar District would cease to belong to the Punjab. If a smaller unity such as a tahsil, as is, I gather, Sikander's idea, is taken, at least a very large part of the areas I have mentioned and possibly certain others would disappear from the Province. In either case a disastrous dismemberment of the Punjab would be involved. The underlying idea of the scheme is therefore to bring it home to all reasonably-minded men that Pakistan should it ever eventuate, would smash the Province as it now exists.

Sikander's position is that he has now succeeded in bringing about a rapprochement with the Sikhs, he has in hand a proposal for placating the urban population by means of further concessions relating to the Sales Tax Act, and the only other remaining menace which he fears as being likely to impede the War effort of the Province is the controversy for and against Pakistan. He believes that his present formula has a good chance of relegating the Pakistan issue to the background till the War is over; the action for  which the formula provides would not come into operation until the Central constitutional issue has been decided; Sikander hopes that during the next few years his formula will have the effect of laying the Pakistan controversy to rest.

Sikander has asked me to let you know what his intentions are, so that you may judge, before he takes action, whether the move which he now contemplates would be likely to prove an embarrassment in the light of the all-India political situation.

Should you see no objection to his proceeding with his plan, he would in the first instance consult the Muslim members of his party, after that he would lay the proposal before the Sikh members of the party, then he would consult the pary as a whole and, if the the reactions remain favourable, the Provincial Assembly would be invited to pass a resolution endorsing the scheme.

The formula evolved by Sikander appears to me, as I have told him, to have much to commend it so far as those who are inclined to be reasonable and fair-minded are concerned. Unfortunately the proportion of reasonable men is lamentably low, and I am very doubtful as to the effect which the scheme is likely to produce on Jinnah. Sikander agrees with me that Jinnah's personal feelings will be seriously offended, because the scheme does not emanate from himself as the head of the Muslim League. I am inclined to think that, apart from his personal feelings, Jinnah may be genuinely opposed to the whole idea as amounting in effect to an exposure of the weakness of Pakistan. Whether Jinnah genuinely believes in Pakistan as a practical proposition may be open to doubt; but he appears to be consistently reluctant to explain its detailed workings, and the term "Pakistan" has become so sacred and mystic that any attempt to analyse and define its consequences would appear to be little short of profanity.

Sikander is disposed to the view that Jinnah will not oppose the scheme, as he is already committed to the principle of self-determination; I doubt this personally, since many people, like for instance the inhabitants of southern Ireland, are liable to hold inconsistent opinions as regards the doctrine of self-determination when applied to themselves and when applied to others. Sikander also thinks that Jinnah may be inclined to regard the scheme as indicating that Pakistan is thereby proved to be a practical proposition in regard to one of the most vital and important parts of India, thus strengthening Jinnah's chances of pressing for a high proportion of Muslim representation at the Centre.

Here again I have my doubts; it appears to me not unlikely that Jinnah may look upon this exposure as a detraction from the value of the Pakistan bogey designed for the terrorisation of Congress and the British Government. There would seem to be a distinct possibility that Jinnah may raise the cry that Sikander's formula places Islam in danger and that confusion may become worse confounded. But I must admit that Sikander knows Jinnah a great deal better than I do, and I can make no kind of pretence to be able to fathom the workings of Jinnah's mind. If Sikander's plan of campaign is carried out, Jinnah will presumably come to know, through the Nawab of Mamdot(the head the the Provincial Muslim League) or through other informants, what is afoot as soon as the Muslim members of the Unionist Party have been approached; it is difficult to say in this event how long it would take him to make this reactions plain.

I shall be grateful if Your Excellency will be good enough, as soon as you conveniently can, to let me know whether you would prefer Sikander to proceed with his intentions or to hold his hand.
       
Yours sincerely,     
 B.J. GLANCY


Enclosure to No. 243

A TENTATIVE FORMULA FOR SOLVING THE COMMUNAL PROBLEM

(a) If not less than 75 per cent. of the total strength of the elected members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly pass a resolution either in favour of or against non-accession to the Indian Federation, that verdict shall be regarded by all the communities of the Punjab as final and binding.

(b) If neither a resolution advocating nor a resolution negativing non-accession is moved, or if such resolution, when moved, fails to be passed by majority indicated in (a) above, but a demand for non-accession continues, then the wishes of the Muslim community as a whole shall be ascertained by means of a referendum in which all the Muslim electors on the electoral roll of the Punjab Legislative Assembly shall have the right to vote provided such a referendum is claimed in a formal resolution passed by the vote of not less than 60 per cent. of the Muslim members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly.

(c) If as the result of a referendum suggested in (b) above the Muslim community gives its verdict in favour of non-accession, Indian non-Muslims will, for the ascertainment of the wishes of their community as a whole, have the right to claim, whether with a view to accession to the Indian Federation or formation of a separate sovereign State by themselves or in mutually agreed upon combination with other contiguous territories bordering on the east, a referendum, in which all the non-Muslim Indian electors on the electoral roll of the Punjab Legislative Assembly shall have the right to vote, for the separation from the present Punjab Province of those contiguous portions of it in which non-Muslims constitute a majority provided that such a referendum is claimed in a formal resolution passed by the vote of not less than 60 per cent. of the total strength of the non-Muslim Indian members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly.

(end excerpts)

Comment
Sikander Hayat Khan passed away on 26 December 1942. Khizr Hayat Khan was his successor as Punjab Premier and head of  Unionist Party.
(end comment)

669, page 918 (full text)
Note on the proceedings of the session of the All-India Muslim League at Delhi,
24 to 26 April 1943

{Enclosed in the letter of 11 May 1943 from the Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State.}


1.    Taken against previous reports, the proceedings of the All-India Muslim League Session have caused no surprise.   Jinnah’s speeches both in the meetings of the Working Committee and the Subjects Committee (held in camera) and in the Open Session have confirmed impressions that of late his mind has been passing through a certain process of change.  He has become more aggressive, more challenging and more authoritative.  The reason appears to be “consciousness of power lately acquired and of certain old injuries which can now be avenged therewith”.

It cannot be denied that he is today more powerful than he ever has been.  Sir Sikander’s death and the consequential disappearance of the fear of a strong rival Muslim organization being created, the formation of League Ministries in various Provinces,  the spinelessness of the new Punjab Premier which circumstance has for the first time exposed that vital part of the Pakistan organism to his direct encroachments,  the recent successes in bye-elections and the deterioration of the Congress power constitute a set of circumstances which have lent an unusual lustre to Jinnah’s leadership and augmented his strength and striking power to a degree never before attained.

On the other hand four years of close study of the British attitude towards the Muslims appear to have forced on him the final conclusion that the British are not prepared to give to the Muslims anything material beyond the few barren references to the “greatness” of the Muslim community with which British Statesmen have lately been embellishing their speeches in [on?] India.  “If”, he argues, “the Congress has gone astray, why are the British not inviting us to form a government at the Centre?   If the Congress did not accept the Cripps proposals,  what then has prevented the British from conceding the Muslim right to self-determination immediately and independently of the Congress?”

Jinnah was quiet so long as he lacked the power to assert himself and have this unpromising situation altered.  But now he has developed the necessary power and sanctions.

2.    These considerations have been uppermost in Jinnah’s mind while he has been addressing the various Committees and the Open Session.  He has clearly indicated that he is determined no longer to take things lying down.  As a matter of fact, he has tried to go through all the preliminaries with which the new storm of his making must be prefaced.   He has finally warned the British;  he has expressed his profound dissatisfaction with their attitude; he has urged Provincial Leagues now to place themselves on a war footing in preparation for what is to come; he has castigated the Capitalists and pampered the masses (on whose sympathy and goodwill he has to base his future struggle) by his references to “social justice” and “economic reorganization”;  he has tried to impress upon the Provincial Premiers the fact that their own future lies only in following his lead and above all he has, in order to show his bona fides to the neutral world, extended an open and almost final invitation to the Congress to approach him for a settlement if it so desires.  Inevitably the next stage will be “preparation for the inevitable struggle” and after that the “struggle” itself.

3.    In amplification of this point, Jinnah spoke to the Working Committee, where he was able to expose his mind more
freely, something as follows :—

“About the future, there are two sets of suggestion[s];
(1)    to take direct action here and now to force Britain to accept the Muslim demands, and
(2)    to wait and watch.

The extremists would wish the League forthwith to declare war on Britain, and one of them, Mr. G.M. Syed even recommends that as a token of Muslim resentment, members of the Working Committee should in the first instance court imprisonment and at the same time Muslim Leaguers should be called upon to withdraw from the War Committees.

Then there are the Moderates who maintain that the League should rest satisfied over the formation of Ministries in Bengal, Sind, Assam and the Punjab.  No one, however, takes a balanced and realistic view of the situation.

The situation is this: the Congress is determined to defy the Muslims.  But it has now paid the penalty.  It has been crushed and it has ceased to claim that it also represents the Mussalmans.  It may not act as we would wish, but at the same time it is not longer capable of substantially harming us.   The wounds it has received will take some time to heal and so we are for the time being free from its terror.  Besides it is not under the present circumstances in a position to give us anything.  We want Pakistan and that commodity is available not in the Congress market but in the British market.  In other words, the Congress danger has ceased to exist for the time being.  Let us, therefore, not bother too much about it but maintain a watchful attitude.

Then comes our second enemy, the Britisher.  How do we stand in relation to him?   Well, he is as useless for our purpose as the Congress and he is as callous and defiant as any enemy can be.  His anxiety throughout has been to court the Congress, and he feels that his Imperialist interests demand that he should permanently keep the Mussalmans down. He is gravely suspicious of the Mussalmans.  In the rise of the Muslim power, he sees the end of his own supremacy in the East.   Therefore, beyond soft words, the Muslims can expect nothing from him.

Nor can the Muslims associate any high hopes with the so-called Post-war New World Order.   The end of this war is going to leave the Britisher so powerful that he will be able to defy the world opinion wherever it conflicts with his own Imperialistic designs.   At the end of the war the Britisher will be more powerful than any of his Allies.  And if he is really powerful and if he has successfully emerged at the expense of his Allies, why should he listen to the counsels of his weak allies or even to the world?  He has not been fighting this war to enable visionaries to advise him as to how he should liquidate his own power.  Therefore, neither now nor henceforth is there any possibility of the British willingly conferring upon us the boon of Pakistan.

On the contrary, in the post-war period, there is every likelihood of a British-Muslim conflict on a grand scale.  There are various issues which may give rise to such a conflict, e.g., Palestine or Syria, or the withdrawal of the British from Iran, Egypt and Baghdad.  Collectively these issues form but part of the general world problem and when it comes to the point, the Muslims of various countries will have to sink or swim together.  It is impossible for British Imperialism to yield to Muslim opinion in all these fields.  On one issue or the other, there is bound to be an open clash.

We must prepare ourselves to play our part in that major clash.  Naturally, we shall require elaborate arrangements.   None of the small mercies show to us recently by the Provincial Governors in Sind or Bengal can lull us into a false sense of security.  These favours have not been granted because the British love us.  It is in order to expose us before the masses to whom we have been making extravagant promises that we have been saddled with this responsibility.   

The same trick was played with the Congress when they were given a long rope in the shape of Ministries to hang themselves.  Had this not been done, there would have been no Hindu-Muslim bitterness such as now exists.  If Congress had not accepted office, it would not have lost its former hold over the agrarian and labour populations, or its former popularity with certain sections of Muslims.  The British have brought League Ministries into existence so that our promises to our people are put to the test, so that we feel and thereby stand self-condemned and so that there should arise local and internal complications within the League.  I am genuinely afraid that the British will not allow the League to do anything substantial for the Muslim masses in order that the Muslim League shall stand discredited in the eyes of its own people. Therefore, let us not lay down our tools merely because seventeen or twenty of our men have been provided with seats in Provincial Cabinets. 

What are we to do?  Are we to acquiesce or fight?   As far as I am concerned, that we should fight is a foregone conclusion. All that remains if how and when.    We cannot fight unless everything is placed on a perfect war footing. By giving us Ministries, the enemy feels that he has sealed our doom.  But let us seal his doom with the same instruments.   

Let us use this opportunity to consolidate our position in the Provinces.   Let the Ministries function in such a manner that instead of discrediting themselves, they popularize the League among the masses from whom we are mainly to draw when we are on the war path.  Collect funds.  Consolidate the National Guards. Consider from what side we are going to launch our attack.  Let us exploit these Ministries so that when we attack, the very fact that we are giving up our seats in the Government in order to launch such an attack will add to our prestige.

When should we attack?  I think I should be ready with my plans by about next December. [Note in original: The agent explains that the month of December is specifically stated because in the acceleration of League activity, December has been chosen as the month for the annual session which is usually held during Easter.  By December also Jinnah will have judged more definitely how the war situation stands and the annual session will provide an opportunity for his plans to be reviewed.   A special session will probably be convened in the Punjab in April for further consideration.]

Meanwhile, our Provincial Ministries and Leagues will have completed the work of organization in the Provinces and prepared themselves for the fight.  Also we will have seen how the war goes during the summer.  In December we meet in Sind.  In April we meet in the Punjab.  There we decide when to strike, where to strike and how to strike.

Personally I think that unless unforeseen circumstances force us to act otherwise, we should begin our offensive immediately on the termination of the war.  Then everybody will be in a state of exhaustion and unwilling to face a new ordeal.  It is true that the Britisher will by then be strong than anyone else.  But that strength of his will be confined only to this that he shall stand no dictation from his Allies who would be comparatively weaker than him. But for that reason alone he dare not court fresh trouble on a large scale.

All we have to do to wrest our ideal from his unwilling hands will be to create trouble on a large scale, and thus compel him to surrender.  How did Afghanistan win her independence?   She declared war when the World War had just ended. England was exhausted and her pleasure-loving people would allow no new wars to be fought.  We should, if necessary and if matters can be delayed till then, copy Afghanistan.

That, however, does not mean that we should stay our hands, if provocation comes earlier.   We have already killed the Congress.  Now it is the turn of the British.  The war in my opinion may last another three years and we should use that period to put our house in order.

“In this connection, here are the few points which should be borne in mind –

(1)    Now that we are in the Ministries, we should try to retain them as long as possible so that we are able to use them  as an instrument for consolidating our position in the Provinces for the purposes of the impending fight.

(2)    We should, if possible, avoid conflict with the British until the arrival of the psychological moment and until our preparations are completed.

(3)    In order to popularize the League with the masses, we should pass some good legislation in the Provinces where Ministries are functioning.  This will stand us in good stead in due time.

(4)    Meanwhile discourage anything that will create dissensions in the Muslim Camp.   For instance, discussion or determination of fundamental rights for citizens of Pakistan, or production of a cut and dried scheme for Pakistan must create controversies and differences of opinion and should, therefore, be avoided for the present.

(5)    The fight being inevitable, we must make our preparations flawless.”

It was on account of this speech that the various resolutions of which notice had been given were withdrawn, and the official resolution, which was meant to serve only as a smoke-screen was passed.

4.    Other features of the Session were—

(1)    Rs. 29,000 were contributed by Sind members and an equal sum by Punjab members towards the Jinnah fund.  The Punjab Premier promised, on condition that his name would not be announced, a donation of Rs. 7,000.  Shaukat Hayat Khan offered Rs. 3,000, but his offer was not accepted as it was thought that its acceptance at this stage, when he had just been given the League ticket, would create misunderstandings.  Other donors were—


                                                                                                                       Rs.
The Nawab of Mamdot in his own name, in the name of his
brother, &c.    . .    . .    . .    . .    . .    . .    . .     . .    . .   . .    .  . 17,000
Mir Ghulam Ali of Sind    . .    . .    . .    . .    . .   . .    . .    . .     10,000
Mir Bundeh Ali of Sind    . .     . .     . .     . .     . .    . .    . .    . . 5,000
K. B. Khuro of Sind    . .     . .     . .    . .     . .     . .     . .    . .    . . 5,000
Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah    . .     . .     . .     . .   . .   . . 1,000
Gazdar, Law Minister, Sind    . .     . .     . .     . .     . .   . .    . .  1,000
K. B. Jalal-ud-din of Sind    . .     . .     . .     . .     . .    . .    . .     1,000
Pir Ellahi Bux    . .     . .     . .     . .    . .     . .     . .    . .    . .  . .      1,000
Sir Maratab Ali of the Punjab    . .     . .     . .     . .    . .    . .     5,000
Hassan Bux Shah of Sind    . .     . .     . .    . .    . .   . .    . .        2,500

The rest paid lesser sums.  The total amounted to some Rs. 60,000 (approx..).  The Jinnah Fund now stands at rupees six lakhs.

(2)    The Sind League quarrel, Jagirdars versus Jagirdar Tenants, had its echoes in Delhi.  Both the parties tried to get the support of Jinnah.  With a view to win Jinnah’s sympathies, the Mirs of Sind, who are Jagirdars, were this time unusually generous in their contributions.  G.M. Syed, the exponent of the other side is, however, unyielding.  For the present, however, Qazi Isa and Nawab Ismail Khan are going to Sind to look into these matters.

(3)    Shaukat Hayat has been given the League ticket for his bye-election by the Central League Parliamentary Committee on his placing his resignation in the hands of Jinnah to be used if and when necessary.   Meanwhile, both sides have contracted to treat this matter with the utmost secrecy.  Shaukat Hayat is believed to have made it clear to Jinnah that, if it comes to a fight with the British, Jinnah must release him from his obligations, because of his father’s long connections with the British and because he is an Army officer, Shaukat Hayat will not go against the British.  Jinnah has seen his point of view and agreed to let him out when necessary.   For the present Jinnah appreciates that a combination of Shaukat’s group with the Hindus and the Sikhs is a matter to be reckoned with.

(4)    A resolution was passed urging the termination of Martial Law in Sind and the restoration of Pir Pagaro’s property. Pir Ellahi Bux, tried to oppose it, but was hooted down, thanks to the excellent arrangements made by Yusif Haroon and G. M. Syed.  It is most unlikely that the Sind League Ministry will resign on the Pir Pagaro issue or the issue of the lifting of Martial Law.

(5)    Resolutions were passed on the food problem, the South African affair, Collective fines, Mr. Jinnah’s emergency powers, &c., &c.


681 page 935  2-4 May 1943 (excerpts)
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)


                                                                                                                                            THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 2-4 May 1943


19. You have had I think a copy of Jinnah's address to the annual meeting of the Muslim League a few days ago. He dealt out full justice to us all, though I am told that the strain of a speech lasting 3 hours and starting at midnight was thought by the correspondents present to be a heavy one and hardly justified by the substance of the Qaid-e-Azam's oration!

And now I am sorry to say that he apparently feels that insufficient publicity has been given by the Indian Press and insufficient sympathy by the Press at home to what he said, for he has come out this afternoon with a long and damnatory statement in the course of which  His Majesty's Government, the Viceroy, and those citizens of India who fail to recognise that the flag of progress is hoisted only over the Muslim League headquarters, all come in for their share of vituperation.

Not that I blame him-this is all politics and Jinnah has shown himself to be a really first-class politician. But to turn for a moment to the more serious aspects of his speech, it has a certain value as bringing it out again perfectly clearly(not that there was any necessity for that) the growing intransigence of the Muslims, and the exceedingly small prospect of any sort of accommodation being reached between them and the Congress, who of course are if anything more intransigent on their own side. All that is closely related to the post-war discussion, and all of it goes to confirm my own fear that there can be no post-war discussions on a basis of agreement; while equally we must take it for granted that there can be no imposing of a settlement on this country against the will of the majority, or of a very substantial minority such as the Muslims.

20. As you know I have never believed in the sincerity of Jinnah's public claims, and my own feeling continues to be that it suits the Muslims so well to have His Majesty's Government in charge of law, order, defence, foreign relations, commerce, &c. in this country, charged in addition with responsibility for seeing justice done between the Muslim minority and the Hindu majority in every area of the field and the like, that they have nothing to gain by any change. For any change must mean that they will have to face up themselves to an adjustment with the majority in respect of tariffs, income-tax, defence expenditure, communal proportions, the safeguarding of Muslim minorities in Hindu majority provinces and the rest- and that with a team in intellectual capacity much below that of the sort of team that the Hindu majority can at any time produce.

But there it is- we have to face the facts in this business unpleasant though it may be, and what I am sure is true is that Pakistan, that simple slogan which the meanest intelligence can understand, is taking very deep root among the Muslims. Khizar Hayat, the new Premier of the Punjab, who came down to see me a couple of days ago was clearly profoundly uneasy at the Punjab position so far as Pakistan is concerned, and told me that he felt that Pakistan, deeply tinged as it was with religious prejudice, was getting to a point at which it could not be resisted. Khizar of course has not either the standing or experience of Sikander, who by methods which did not always commend themselves to you or to me, managed to hold his own against Jinnah, and I suspect that his life is not going to be too happy a one; while a trial of strength may come at any time if Jinnah support the opposition to the young Shaukat Hayat Khan, who is now standing (on the Muslim League ticket it is true) for a Punjab constituency against three opponents.

Khizar was so depressed that he said to me that he did not quite know how they were going to carry on in face of the growing appeal of Pakistan in the Punjab, and that the only proposal he could put to me was that His Majesty's Government should ask Jinnah to define exactly what Pakistan was, so that if his proposals were unreasonable they should be on strong ground to turn them down. I told him that I did not see any prospect of advance on those lines; that our attitude was that we must keep entirely out of this business, and take the line that while Pakistan or any other solution was a matter for consideration by Indians themselves at the post-war conference, His Majesty's Government were entirely unbiased one way or the other. Were we to act as he had suggested, we should play right into Jinnah's hands. And indeed I could imagine no greater encouragement to Jinnah(and no greater discouragement to the Mahasabha and Hindu opinion generally, and particularly in the Punjab) than that we should lead Jinnah to think that we were taking him so seriously that we wanted him to define his proposition more precisely.

From his own point of view half the strength of his position is that he has refused to define it: and I am quite certain that he would refuse to define it now if asked to, save on quite unacceptable conditions! while in any event if he were to define in response to a request from us, he would be bound to pitch his claims preposterously high. Thus I have no doubt that the famous corridor by which he proposes to link north-west Pakistan with north-east Pakistan, a corridor which would presumably run via Delhi, Lucknow, Allahabad and Patna, cutting off the area north of the corridor from the Hindu majorities in the south of it would almost inevitably figure; and he would be a fool if he did not make all sorts of excessive demands in respect of tariffs, defence, the use of ports, and the like. I fear that Khizar and his friends will have trouble with the Muslim League, and Khizar may be, as I have said above, much less well qualified to deal with it than Sikander. But they will have to take their chance about that.


760 page 1042, 3 June 1943(excerpts)
Sir M. Hallett(United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow


3 June 1943

My dear Lord Linlithgow,
Some information has come to my knowledge which I think desirable to pass on to you in continuation of my telegram No. G/335 of May 31st about reactions to the withholding of Gandhi's letter to Jinnah. I had also referred to the position in my last fortnightly.

2. The report that Chaudhari Khaliq-uz-zaman was bitterly critical was obviously wrong, for Mudie has recently had an interview with the Chaudhri and has sent me the following note:-
"We first talked about the withholding by the Government of India of the letter of Mr. Gandhi to Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Jinnah's statement. I asked Khaliq-uz-zaman whether the latter surprised him. He said not. That the League was not to be embroiled with the British Government was the agreement at the discussions at the last meeting of the Working Committee. He did not think that Jinnah would ever come to an agreement with the Congress to which the British Government were not also a party. Khaliq did not agree with the attitude taken up by Lari in an article in the Leader."

3. A somewhat similar report comes from my C.I.D. who tell me that though Muslim League supporters at first feared that this was an affront to their leader, they were cautioned by the Chaudhri Sahib to reserve opinion pending Jinnah's reception of the Government action. The report goes on:-

"In an interview with a friend today he (Ch. Khaliq-uz-zaman) expressed his joy at Mr. Jinnah's reply which he said was welcomed by the League. With Muslim League Ministries now in several Provinces the League felt itself in a strong position. He considered that their relations with the British Government were good and response over the Pakistan issue was encouraging. This being so it was most undesirable at this juncture to enter into a conflict with the British Government particularly over an issue of gain to the Congress, when Mr. Gandhi's letter was itself so vague and inconsequential."

4. There is little doubt in my view that these two corroborative reports represent the correct state of affairs. Jinnah and the League are obviously happy over securing the Muslim League Ministries and do not want to fall out with the Government.  After all Jinnah did regard Gandhi's fast as an attack[more?] on the Muslims than on Government and his recent statement shows that he still hates him.

5. I think it right to include a further extract from Mudie's note of this interview:-
"He said that one thing that rankled with Jinnah and was apt now and again to make him bitter was the exclusion of the League from the Central administration where there were a certain number of League Ministries in the Provinces. I gathered that the present Muslim members of the Viceroy's Council would probably be acceptable as League representatives except Sir Sultan Ahmed. The Viceroy's telegram to condole Sir Sikandar's death apparently still rankles and Jinnah appears to think that the Viceroy will not send for him before he goes which also rather rankles. Khaliq thought something might be done if the new Viceroy, when he arrives, sends for Jinnah as the representative of the party which controls a number of provincial administrations."

There is probably also a good deal of truth in this; Jinnah like all Indians is all out for prestige. It will enhance his position as against Gandhi.
..

769 page 1052, 10 June 1943(excerpts)
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr. Amery


                                                                                                                                                                VICEROY'S CAMP, SIMLA, 10 June 1943

2. In paragraph 2 of your letter you comment on Jinnah's attitude. I think he probably looks a little more alarming from London than he does here. I do not however think he wants a row with Government, though on the other hand(like unfortunately all these Indian leaders) he exists on being as rude to Government (and to his political opponents) as he thinks he dares.

I doubt if anyone takes it seriously, and his threats do not cause me any sleepless nights! As I have consistently felt and said both to Zetland and to you, Jinnah would be quite as bad a master as Gandhi. But Jinnah is not in as strong a position as Gandhi and Congress, and he is never likely to be, in the near future, since he represents a minority, and a minority that can only effectively hold its own with our assistance. Nor, of course, is his organisation anything like as deep-rooted as is that of Congress. I would expect him to be likely to continue to be not merely non-constructive, but positively destructive, and to endeavour to play his hand as to get the maximum in the way of commitments favourable to his community, and the maximum in the way of hurdles to be taken by Hindus, but without facing a show-down with Government, unless they had managed their business so very badly as to put him in a position from which he could take the risks which it involves.

 


Home

CMP(1) -  From Ayesha Jalal's 'The Sole Spokesman'

CMP(2) -  Congress and Muslim League positions on 12 May 1946

CMP(3) -  The Cabinet Mission Plan 16 May 1946

CMP(4) - Jinnah  and ML  responses to the CMP 22 May  and June 6 1946

CMP(5) -  Jinnah's meeting with Mission Delegation on 4 April 1946

CMP(6) -  Jinnah's meeting with Missiion Delegation on 16 April 1946

CMP(7A) - Maulana Azad's meeting with Mission Delegation on 17 April 1946

CMP(7) -  The Congress unease with parity  8-9 May 1946

CMP(7B) - Jinnah and Azad responses to preliminary proposals 8-9 May 1946

CMP(8A) - Simla Conference meetings on 5 May 1946 on the powers of the Union

CMP(8) -  More exchanges on parity, Simla Conference meeting  11 May 1946

CMP(9) -  Jinnah and Wyatt(1) on Pakistan and CMP, 8 Jan. and 25 May 1946

CMP(10) -  Jinnah and Wyatt(2) on the interim government, 11 June 1946

CMP(11) -   Congress opposition to grouping. Gandhi, Patel and Azad, May 1946

CMP(12) - Congress Working Committee resolutions, May-June 1946

CMP(12A) - Arguments over inclusion of a Congress Muslim, June 1946

CMP(12B) - Behind the scenes-Gandhi, June-July 1946

CMP(12C) - Behind the scenes-Jinnah, June-July 1946

CMP(13) - Jawaharlal Nehru's press conference on the Plan, 10 July 1946

CMP(14) - League rejected Plan, called Direct Action,  July-August 1946

CMP(15) - Viceroy strong-arming Nehru, Gandhi on compulsory grouping, Pethick-Lawrence to Attlee, Aug -Sept 1946

CMP(16) - Intelligence assessment on Jinnah's options and threat of civil war, Sept. 1946

CMP(17) - League Boycott of the Constituent Assembly Dec. 1946

CMP(17A) - Congress "climbdown" on grouping and Jinnah's rejection, January 1947

CMP (A1) - Plain speaking from Sir Khizr Hayat, Abell on the Breakdown plan, Wavell

CMP(A2) - North West Frontier Province, Oct-Nov 1946 and Feb-March 1947

CMP(A3) - Bengal and Bihar, August - November 1946

CMP(A4) - Punjab, February - March 1947

CMP (18) - My take

CMP (19) - What did parity and communal veto mean in numbers?

CMP(20) - Another take -with links to reference material

CMP(21) - Mountbatten discussing CMP with Patel and Jinnah, 24-26 Apr 1947

CMP(22) - A reply on the Cabinet Mission Plan

Extra(1) - Jinnah's speech in March 1941 on independent sovereign Pakistan

Extra(1A) - Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1941-1942

Extra(1B) - Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1938-1940

Extra(1C) - Jinnah's speeches and Statements from 1943-45

Extra(2) - Gandhi-Jinnah talks in 1944 on defining Pakistan

Extra(3) - BR Ambedkar quoted from his book 'Pakistan or the Partition of India'

Extra(4) - Congress and Muslim parties' on the Communal question 1927-1931

Extra(4A) - Excerpts of Motilal Nehru Committee Report 1928

Extra(4B) - Nehru, Bose, Jinnah Correspondence 1937-38

Extra(5) -  BR Ambedkar on Communal Representation 1909-1947

Extra(6) - Gandhiji's scheme of offering the Prime Ministership to Jinnah in 1947

Extra(6A) - Jinnah on Congress's offers of Prime Ministership 1940-43

Extra (6B) - Apr-Jul 1947 Negotiations on Pakistan between Mountbatten and Jinnah

Extra(7) - M.A.Jinnah and Maulana Azad on two nation theory

Extra(8) - On Separate electorates, Joint electorates and Reserved constituencies

Extra(9) - Links to cartoons on Indian constitutional parleys from the Daily Mail, UK, 1942 and 1946-1947, by L.G. Illingworth


Extra(10) -Nehru Report 1928 (10 MB pdf)
Extra(11) -Iqbal's letters to Jinnah, May-June 1937

Extra(12) -Jinnah, Linlithgow, Sikander Hayat, Pakistan rumblings 1942-43

Durga Das (1) 1919-1931, Jallianwala Bagh to Bhagat Singh

Durga Das (2) 1931-1936, Crescent Card: Jinnah in London to Fazli Husain in Punjab

Durga Das(3) 1937-1940, Provincial Autonomy to Jinnah gets the veto

Durga Das(4) 1940-1945, The War Years: India's War Effort-Pakistan on a platter

Durga Das(5) 1945-1947, The Cabinet Mission to Divide and Quit

1937-1940(2)  Congress and Jinnah fall out in U.P., Jinnah's anti-Congress campaign and the Viceroy gives Jinnah a Veto: Ayesha Jalal, Sarvepalli Gopal and Stanley Wolpert


1937: Congress-Jinnah tussle over coalition government in U. P., M.J. Akbar

1937: Nehru, Jinnah and Coalition Governments, Bimal Prasad

1939-1940: India and the War, Anita Inder Singh

1945-1946: The Elections of 1945-46, Anita Inder Singh

1857-1938 Glimpses of British policy in Punjab: Ian Talbot and David Page

1930-1939 Congress Decline in Bengal, John Gallagher

Glendevon (1) 1937: Congress's Office Acceptance Saga over Governor's Powers

Glendevon (2) 1937-1940: Federation, Jinnah, Congress activism in Princely States

Glendevon (3) 1939-1942: Linlithgow, Congress, Jinnah,War-time Realignments

1939-1947: Jinnah and the Anglo-Muslim League Alliance, Narendra Singh Sarila

1944: Gandhi-Jinnah talks, Jaswant Singh

1830s-1898: British Forward Policy(1)


1899-1947: British Forward Policy(2)


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