Berit (Brit) Brogaard
Professor, University of Miami
Director of Brogaard Lab for Multisensory Research

 

Email: brit@miami.edu

 

Curriculum Vitae Brogaard Lab for Multisensory Research  Media Presence  |  Mainstream Articles  | Personal Information | University of Miami |Lemmings | Psychology Today Blog 

New Papers (email for copies)

  1. "Cognitive Penetrability and High-Level Properties in Perception: Unrelated Phenomena?" w. B. Chomanski, special issue of Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, edited by Jack Lyons and Indrek Reiland 
  2. "Is the Auditory System Cognitively Penetrable?" W DE Gatzia
  3. "Ignorance and Incompetence," Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw (eds.), Ignorance, Cambridge University Press.
  4. "Induced cross-modal synesthesia and multisensory perception," w Dimitra Gatzia.
  5. "Romantic Love for a Reason," Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Love, Christopher Grau & Aaron Smuts, eds.
  6. "Do Synesthetic Colors Grab Attention in Visual Search?", with K. Marlow and K. Rice, The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, In Press.
  7. "Deaf Hearing: Implicit Discrimination of Auditory Content in a Patient with Mixed Hearing Loss." In Progress. (w. Marlow, Overgaard, Tomson, Neufeld, Sinke, Owen, Eagleman)

Books

  1. Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions, Oxford University Press, March 2012.
  2. On Romantic Love: Simple Truths about a Complex Emotion, Oxford University Press, Jan 2015.
  3. Does Perception Have Content? Edited Volume. Oxford University Press, 2014.
  4. The Superhuman Mind, Hudson St. Press, An Imprint of Penguin, The Penguin Group, August, 2015.
  5. Seeing and Saying. Manuscript Complete. Under Consideration.
  6. Cognition without Content. In Progress.
  7. Parental Love. In Progress.

Articles

  1. "Psilocybin, LSD, Mescaline and drug-induced synesthesia," w. Dimitria Electra Gatzia, in Victor R. Preedy (ed.), The Neuropathology Of Drug Addictions And Substance Misuse, Academic Press, Elsevier, In Press.
  2. "Against Naturalism about Truth", in Kelly Clark, ed. Blackwell Companion to Naturalism.
  3. "Time and Tense", in ed. Bob Hale, Alex Miller, Crispin Wright, Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language.
  4. "Virtue Epistemology in the Zombie Apocalypse: Hungry Judges, Heavy Clipboards and Group Polarization", in Epistemic Situationism, Oxford University Press.
  5. "Staying Indoors: How Phenomenal Dogmatism Solves the Skeptical Problem Without Going Externalist", in M. Bergmann, ed., Internalism, Oxford University Press.
  6. "A Semantic Framework for Aesthetic Expressions", in J. Young, ed. Semantics and Aesthetics, Oxford University Press.
  7. "Synesthesia as a Challenge for Representationalism", Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy, W. Buckwalter and J. Sytsma, eds.
  8. "The Self-Locating Property Theory of Color", In Press, Mind & Machines.
  9. "Is Color experience Cognitively Penetrable?", w. Gatzia, Topics in Cognitive Science.
  10. "What Can Neuroscience Tell Us About Reference?" In: Handbook on Reference, Barbara Abbott and Jeanette Gundel (eds.), Oxford University Press.
  11. "Perception without Representation? On Travis’ Argument against the Representational View of Perception", Topoi, In Press.
  12. "Type 2 Blindsight and the Nature of Visual Experience", Consciousness and Cognition 32 (2015) 92–103.
  13. "An Empirically-Informed Cognitive Theory of Propositions", Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 43, (2014). 534-557.
  14. "Color Synesthesia and its Philosophical Implications," The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, eds. Derek Brown and Fiona Macpherson. 
  15. "A Partial Defense of Extended Knowledge", Philosophical Issues, 2014.
  16. The Long-Term Potentiation Model for Grapheme-Color Binding in Synesthesia”, with K. Marlow and K. Rice, in David Bennett and Chris Hill, (ed), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, MIT Press. In press.
  17. "Do Synesthetic Colors Grab Attention in Visual Search?", with K. Marlow and K. Rice, The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, In Press.
  18. “Does Perception Have Content?”, in Brogaard, B (ed.), Does Perception Have Content?, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. In press.
  19. "Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm", in ed. C. Littejohn and J. Turri, Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, 2014, Oxford University Press.
  20. "Time and Time Perception", w Gatzia, Topoi.
  21. "What is This Thing Called Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind", in D. Pritchard, What is This Thing Called Philosophy.
  22. Synesthetic Binding and the Reactivation Model of Memory”, In O. Deroy and M. Nudds (eds.), Sensory Blendings: New essays on synaesthesia, Oxford University Press. In Press.
  23. "Seeing mathematics: Perceptual experience and brain activity in acquired synesthesia", with S. Vanni and J. Silvanto, Neurocase, 2013 Dec;19(6):566-75.
  24. "Serotonergic Hyperactivity as a Potential Factor in Developmental, Acquired and Drug-Induced Synesthesia", Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:657, 2013. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00657.
  25. "Is the Relativity of Simultaneity a Temporal Illusion?", with K. Marlow, Analysis, (2013) 73: 635-642.
  26. "Unconscious influences on decision making in blindsight", with K. Marlow and K. Rice, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2013.
  27. Do we Perceive Natural Kind Properties?“, Philosophical Studies 162, Issue 1 (2013): 35-42.
  28. "It’s not what it seems. A semantic account of ‘seems’ and seemings” Inquiry 56/2-3 (2013), 210-239.
  29. "Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism", In C. Tucker, ed. Seemings and Justification, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 270-289.
  30. "Vision for Action and the Contents of Perception", Journal of Philosophy, Volume 109, Issue 10, October 2012, 569-587.
  31. Disputatio's Symposium on Transient Truths, Oxford University Press, 2012. 1. Precis. 2. Replies to critiques: Giuliano Torrengo, Dan Zeman and Vasilis Tsompanidis.
  32. "In Search of Mentons: Panpsychism, Physicalism and the Missing Link", Panpsychism, Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (eds), Oxford University Press.
  33. "The Phenomenal Use of 'Look' and the Contents of Perception", Philosophy Compass. In press.
  34. Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings”, Analytic Philosophy. In Press.
  35. The Status of Consciousness in Nature, in ed Steven Miller, The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness. Toward a Science and Theory, volume 2, S. Miller, ed. John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2015, 330-347.
  36. "Varieties of Synesthetic Experience," In: Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, Studies in Brain and Mind, Volume 6, Synthese Library, 2014, pp 409-412.
  37. "Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case from Synesthesia and Visual Imagery," In: Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, Studies in Brain and Mind, Volume 6, Synthese Library, 2014, pp 377-394.
  38. "Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief", in Jonathan Matheson and Rico Vitz, eds. The Ethics of Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, 130-145.
  39. "Towards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology", In: Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Naturalizing Virtue Epistemology, Synthese Library, 2013. In Press.
  40. "An Emotion Ontology Based on the Perceived Response Theory", 
  41. "Presentism, Primitivism and Cross-Temporal Relations: Lessons from Holistic Ersatzism and Dynamic Semantics", in Roberto Ciuni, Kristie Miller and Giuliano Torrengo, eds. New Papers on the Present: Focus on Presentism, Philosophia Verlag, 2013, 2503-280.
  42. Color Synesthesia, in Kimberly A. Jameson (ed.), Cognition & Language, Encyclopedia of Color Science and Technology, Springer. 2013.
  43. Remarks on Counterpossibles”, with J. Salerno, in J. van Bentham, V. Hendricks, J. Symons, and S. A. Pedersen (eds.) Between Logic and Intuition: David Lewis and the Future of Formal Methods in Philosophy, Synthese: Volume 190, Issue 4 (2013), Page 639-660. Online link.
  44. What do We Say When We Say How or What We Feel” Philosophers Imprint 12 (11), June 2012.
  45. "Non-Visual Consciousness and Visual Images in Blindsight", Consciousness and Cognition, 21, issue 1 (March, 2012), p. 595-596. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.003
  46. "Perceptual Reports", In Mohan Matthen, ed. Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. In Press.
  47. "Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism", In: Dan Zeman and Max Kölbel, eds. Relativism about Value, 50 year’s anniversary issue of Southern Journal of Philosophy 50, Issue 4 (2012), 538–56.
  48. "Color Eliminativism or Color Relativism?", A Re-Reading of C.L. Hardin's Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow, Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1988, Re-Readings in Philosophy, W. Jones, ed. Philosophical Papers.
  49. Are Conscious States Conscious in Virtue of Representing Themselves? (2012). Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.
  50. Proceedings of the fourth Annual Interontology Meeting, Tokyo, Feb 23-24, 2012.
  51. Are There Unconscious Perceptual Processes?Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2011): 449-63. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.002.
  52. Conscious Vision for Action Vs. Unconscious Vision for ActionCognitive Science 35 (2011),1076–1104.
  53. Color Experience in Blindsight? Philosophical Psychology, 24 (2011):767 -786.
  54. Context and Content: Pragmatics in Two-Dimensional Semantics”, Keith Allan and Kasia Jaszczolt, eds. Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics (2012). Context and Content: Final Version of Manuscript.
  55. Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Philosophical Issues 21 (2011): 45-73.
  56. Colour”, in D. Pritchard, ed. Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (2011).
  57. Disjunctivism”, in D. Pritchard, ed. Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (2011).
  58. Descriptions”, in D. Pritchard, ed. Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (2011).
  59. Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception”, Blackwell Companion to Relativism, Steven Hales, ed., Oxford: Blackwell (2011): 137-158. Presents four arguments in favor of the view that perceptual content possesses a truth-value only relative to a centered world, viz. the argument from primitive colors, the argument from the inverted spectrum, the argument from dual looks, and the argument from duplication.
  60. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account”, Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, J. Bengson and M. Moffett eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011): 136-160.
  61. “ 'Stupid People Deserve What They Get': The Effects of Personality Assessment on Judgments of Intentional Action”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, (2010), 332-334.
  62. Strong Representationalism and Centered Content”, Philosophical Studies 151 (2010), 373–392. DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9437-z.
  63. Perspectival Truth and Color Primitivism”, C. Wright and N. Pedersen, eds. New Waves in Truth (2010), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 249-266.  Color Primitivism: Short Version.
  64. Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth: On Cappelen and Hawthorne's Relativism and Monadic Truth”, Philosophical Books Vol. 50 No. 4 October 2009 pp. 213–226.
  65. Color in the Theory of Colors? Or: Are Philosophers' Colors All White?”, The Center Must Not Hold: White Women on The Whiteness of Philosophy, George Yancy, ed. New York: Lexington Books (2009), 131-152.
  66. Fitch's Paradox of Knowability,” with J. Salerno, in E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Summer 2009 Edition). Survey of proposals to resolve the knowability paradox. 
  67. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78.2 (2009), 439-467.  Reductionists about knowledge-wh hold that 's knows-wh' (e.g. 'John knows who stole his car') is reducible to 'there is a proposition p such that s knows that p, and p answers the indirect question of the wh-clause'.  Anti-reductionists hold that 's knows-wh' is reducible to 's knows that p, as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh-clause'.  I argue that both of these positions are defective.  I then offer a new analysis of knowledge-wh as a special kind of de re knowledge. 
  68. Introduction to Relative Truth”, in Relative Truth, Special Issue of Synthese, Brogaard, ed. (2009).  Contributors: David Capps, Andy Egan, Michael Glanzberg, Steven Hales, Max Kolbel, Peter Lasersohn, Michael Lynch, John MacFarlane, Daniel Massey, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Duncan Pritchard, Brian Weatherson and Crispin Wright.
  69. The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism.  Or How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth”, In A. Haddock, A. Miller and D. Pritchard, ed. Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), 284-308.
  70. Descriptions”, The Encyclopedia of the Mind, (2009). Hal Pashler, ed. Editorial Board: Tim Crane, Fernanda Ferreira, Marcel Kinsbourne, Rich Zemel.  Descriptions", the short version that will actually appear in the encyclopedia.
  71. On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay. A Case Study on Fitch's Paradox”, in J. Salerno, ed. New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2009, 241-251. 
  72. Inscrutability and Ontological Commitment”, Philosophical Studies 141 (2008), 21-42.
  73. Fitch's Paradox of Knowability,” with J. Salerno, in E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Winter 2008 Edition). Survey of proposals to resolve the knowability paradox.
  74. Sea Battle SemanticsThe Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), 326-335.  The final version is available for subscribers on Blackwell Online EarlyUncorrected pre-proofs
  75. Knowledge-The and Propositional Attitude Ascriptions”, in F. Lihoreau, ed. Knowledge and Questions (2008).
  76. In Defense of a Perspectival Semantics for 'Know' ”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008), 439-459. Uncorrected Proofs.
  77. Counterfactuals and Context”, with J. Salerno, Analysis 68 (2008), 39-46.
  78. Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism”,Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), 385-409.
  79. Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap?”, Philosophy Compass: Epistemology 3 (2008), 93-118.   Blackwell Online Early.
  80. That may be Jupiter: A Heuristic for Thinking Two-Dimensionally”, American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2007), 315-328.  Uncorrected Proofs.
  81. The But Not All: A Partitive Account of Plural Definite Descriptions,” Mind and Language 22, 4 (2007), 402-426.  Uncorrected proofs.
  82. Span Operators, Analysis 67 (2007): 72-79. The paper argues that Lewis and Sider are too quick to deny the presentist the right to employ span operators.  Official published version
  83. Number Words and Ontological Commitment”, The Philosophical Quarterly 57, 1 (January 2007), 1-20.
  84. Descriptions: Predicates or Quantifiers?”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2007), 117-136.
  85. A Puzzle about Properties,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXIV, 3 (May 2007), 635-650.  Uncorrected proofs.
  86. Sharvy's Theory of Definite Descriptions Revisited”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2007), 160-180.
  87. Knowability, Possibility and Paradox,” with J. Salerno, in V. Hendricks and D. Pritchard (eds.) New Waves in Epistemology, Palgrave Macmillan (2007), 270-299.
  88. Two Modal -Isms: Fictionalism and Ersatzism,” Philosophical Perspectives 20, Metaphysics, John Hawthorne, ed. (2006), 77-94.
  89. Tensed Relations,” Analysis 66 (2006), 194-202.Official published version.
  90. Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle”, with J. Salerno, American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2006), 261-270. 
  91. Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2006), 335-354.  In translation in Philosophical Alternatives 3 (2008). Reprinted in MIT Virtue Epistemology Reader, 2012. 
  92. The 'Gray's Elegy' Argument, and the Prospects for the Theory of Denoting Concepts Synthese 152 (2006), 47-79.
  93. The Moral Status of the Human Embryo”, Howard B. Rades, ed., Biomedical Ethics: Humanist Perspectives of Humanism Today, Prometheus Books, 2006.  The article first appeared in the magazine Free Inquiry. It argues that 4-5 days old embryos do not have the moral status of human beings and was cited in A Report of the President's Council on Bioethics -- Washington D.C. 2004.  Apparently, President Bush wasn't convinced.  The Government Citations to the article can be found here and here.
  94. Anti-Realism, Theism, and the Conditional Fallacy,” with J. Salerno, Nous 39 (2005), 123-139.
  95. On Luck, Responsibility and the Meaning of Life”, with B. Smith, Philosophical Papers 34 (2005), 443-58, special issue edited by Thad Metz, featuring solicited papers on the meaning of life.
  96. Fitch's Paradox of Knowability,” with J. Salerno, in E. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2002 and Summer 2004 Editions. Survey of proposals to resolve the knowability paradox.
  97. Species as Individuals", Biology and Philosophy 19/2 (2004), 223-42. 
  98. Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem,” Synthese 139 (2004), 367-386.   Reflections on contextualism, sensitivity, safety, and all that.
  99. Epistemological Contextualism and the Problem of Moral Luck,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2003), 371-83.
  100. Sixteen Days”, with B. Smith, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (2003), 45-78. In translation: "Die Ontologie des Embryos: Wann beginnt menschliches Leben?" Ludger Jansen, Barry Smith, eds. Biomedizinische Ontologie.  Eine Kooperative Einfuhrung.
  101. A Unified Theory of Truth and Reference,” with B. Smith, Logique et Analyse 169-170 (2003), 49-93, special issue edited by Peter Forrest, featuring solicited papers on truth.  The paper deals with the problem of the many and other issues which threaten to undermine substantial theories of truth and reference.  When I co-authored the paper with Barrry in 2000, I was rather sympathetic to substantial theories of truth.  Since then I have been more sympathetic to less substantial theories.  In translation: J.-M. Monmoyer, ed. La Structure du Monde: Objets, Proprietes, Etats du choses, Paris, Vrin, (2001)
  102. Adhoccery in Epistemology”, Philosophical Papers 32 (2003), 65-82. 
  103. Clues to the Paradoxes of Knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant,” with J. Salerno, Analysis 62 (2002), 143-150. The paper develops some new paradoxes of knowability that, unlike Fitch's original paradox, are not blocked by the restricted brands of semantic anti-realism advocated by Dummett and Tennant.
  104. “Quantum Mereotopology”, with B. Smith, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 35/1-2 (2002), 153-175.
  105. Living High and Letting Die", with B. Smith, Philosophy 76/297 (2001), 435-42. 
  106. Presentist Four-Dimensionalism.The Monist 83 (2000), 341-356.   An attempt to combine two theses I rather liked back in 1999, viz. presentism and perdurantism.  I still find presentism exceedingly intuitive and have spent some of my time defending it in print and elsewhere. 
  107. The Coup de Grace for Mechanistic Metaphysics”, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 36/1 (2000), 75-108.
  108. “A Peircean Theory of Decision”, Synthese 118/3 (1999), 383-401.
  109. “Peirce on Abduction and Rational Control”, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35/1 (1999), 129-155. 
  110. “Mead's Temporal Realism”, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35/3 (1999), 563-593. 
  111. Glucagon and glucagon-like peptide 1: selective receptor recognition via distinct peptide epitopes”, with S.A. Hjorth, K. Adelhorst, O. Kirk and T.W. Schwartz, J. Biol. Chem. Vol. 269, Issue 48, (1994), 30121-30124. Glucagon and glucagon-like peptide 1 (GLP-1) are homologous peptide hormones that are recognized by likewise homologous, but highly selective receptors.  We argue that the selective recognition of the glucagon and GLP-1 receptors is determined by residues located at opposite ends of the homologous peptide ligands.


Edited Collections

  1. Special Issue of Philosophical Studies on impossible thoughts and counterpossibles (for Stew Cohen).
  2. The Epistemology of Perception, Under consideration.
  3. Special Issue of Topoi on Epistemic Modals
  4. Special Issue of Inquiry on the Semantics of Aesthetic Expressions (for Herman Cappelen).
  5. Being of Two Minds, w. Gatzia. In progress.
  6. Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press, In Press.
  7. Special Issue of Topics in Cognitive Science. Edited with Kathleen Akins.
  8. Special Issue of Philosophical Studies, Perception and High-Level Properties (for Stew Cohen), 2013.
  9. Philosophical Issues, A supplement to Nous, The Epistemology Perception (for Ernie Sosa), volume 2011.
  10. Special Issue of Synthese on Relative Truth.  Spring of 2009.  Contributors include David Capps, Andy Egan, Michael Glanzberg, Steven Hales, Max Kolbel, Peter Lasersohn, Michael Lynch, John MacFarlane, Daniel Massey, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Stephen Neale, Duncan Pritchard, Brian Weatherson and Crispin Wright.
  11. Rationality and Irrationality, with Barry Smith, Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, (2001), including contributions by David Armstrong, Michael Beaney, Herbert Hochberg, Nicholas Rescher, John Searle, Barbara Tversky.
  12. Rationality and Irationality (Constributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 8), Kirchberg: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, (2000), 2 Vol.
  13. The Ontology of Fields: Report of the Specialist Meeting held under the auspices of the NSF Varenius Project, Bar Harbor, Maine, June 1998, with D. Peuquet and B. Smith, Santa Barbara: NCGIA.


Short Notes and Reviews

  1. Review of Jonathan Cohen and Mohan Matthen,eds. Color Ontology and Color Science, MIT Press, 2010, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  2. Review of Francois Recanati, Truth-Conditional Pragmatics, Oxford University Press, 2010, Analysis Reviews 72 (4):846-849.
  3. Subjective Consciousness Reduced? Review of Uriah Kriegel. Subjective Consciounsess: A Self-Representational Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009, ProtoSociology.
  4. Article Review of Patterson, "Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, for Philosopher's Digest.
  5. Book Review for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:  Nicholas Griffin and Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "On Denoting", Routledge, 2009, 384 pp. Contributors: Urquhart, Stevens, Pelletier, Linsky, Klement, Makin, Nasim, Bostock, Marek, Jacquette, Griffin, Loptson, Contessa, Landini, Nelson, Salmon.
  6. “Milic Capek”, in Nicholas Rescher, Johanna Seibt and Michael Weber, eds, A Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought, Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt. 
  7. Commentary on Philippe Schlenker's 'Be Articulate!  A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition Projection' ”, The Rutgers Semantics Workshop October 2007.
  8. A Counterfactual Account of Essence”, with J. Salerno, The Reasoner vol. 1, no. 4 (2007).  Jon Williamson, ed.
  9. Williamson on Counterpossibles”, with J. Salerno, The Reasoner vol. 1, no. 3 (2007).  Jon Williamson, ed.  We discuss Timothy Williamson's defense of the vacuous treatment of counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents) and reply to Alan Baker.Official Version.
  10. Why Counterpossibles are Non-Trivial”, with J. Salerno, The Reasoner vol. 1, no. 1 (2007).  Jon Williamson, ed. Subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents (or counterpossibles) are standardly treated as vacuously true, the lore being that if an impossibility were to obtain, anything would follow.  Daniel Nolan (1997) and others have argued that there are several good reasons to steer clear of the standard reading.  In this note we provide further reasons.  Official Published Version.
  11. Book Review for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:  Andrea Bottani and Richard Davies (eds.), Modes of Existence: Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic, Ontos, 2006, 237 pp. Contributors: Mulligan, Raspa, Kroon, van Inwagen, Varzi, Reicher, Barbero, Orillo, Spolaore.
  12. Book Review for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Thomas Sattig, The Language and Reality of Time, Oxford UP, 2006


Talks, Travel, etc.

  1. Stockholm, April 29, 2016.
  2. Superhuman Mind, Books & Books, April 13, 2016, 8 pm.
  3. Inclusiveness Conference, University of Miami April 7-8, 2015.
  4. Keynote, Brainday, University of Waterloo, April 6, 2015.
  5. SSPP, Kentucky, March 10-12, 2016.
  6. Symposium on Romantic Love, Eastern APA, Washington D. C., January 6-9, 2016.
  7. Oslo, December 3-5, 2015.
  8. TBA, Neuroethics and Neurolaw Seminar, Porto Alegre, Brazil, November 23-29, 2015.
  9. University of Miami Alumni SpeakerNovember 6, 2015.
  10. UB department talk, October 8, 2015.
  11. UB neurology talk, October 7, 2015.
  12. NC State Logic and Cognitive Science Initiative Conference on Perception, September 25-26, 2015.
  13. Book events, Houston and St. Antonio, September 19-22, 2015.
  14. Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy, Azores, September 10-12, 2015.
  15. Rutgers-Columbia-Bernard Mind Workshop, August 20-22, 2015.
  16. 37th Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting, (CogSci 2015), July 23-25 in Pasadena, California, USA.
  17. Inference and Consciousness conference, University of Oslo, July 2-4, 2015.
  18. Cognitive Penetration workshop, Bergen, 24-26 June.
  19. Comments on Trenton Merricks' Propositions, Author-Meets-Critics Workshop, University of Ghent, June 16, 2015.
  20. "Auditory Perception and Cognitive Penetration", University of Ghent, June 15, 2015.
  21. "The neural bases of acquired and drug-induced synesthesia and savant syndrome," Keynote address, Atypical Minds, Cognitio, the Université du Québec à Montréal, June 8-10, 2015.
  22. University of Oslo, June 1-June 30, 2015.
  23. Panel Discussion, HowTheLightsGetIn Festival, "Down The Rabbit Hole" on the subject of whether perception is a creative response to the world or gives us direct access to reality, Wales, May 30, 2015, 12:00pm.
  24. The Rationality of Love, Open Platform breakfast, HowTheLightsGetIn Festival, Wales, 30th May, 9 am.
  25. Panel Discussion, HowTheLightsGetIn Festival, "The Reality of Feeling" on the subject of whether feelings can operate as a "true guide" to reality, Wales, May 29, 2015, 1:15pm.
  26. "Beautiful Minds", HowTheLightsGetIn Festival, Wales, 29th May, 2015, 11 am.
  27. Academy course on Romantic Love, HowTheLightsGetIn Festival, Wales, May 28, 2015, 10 am.
  28. SCLARR, St. Louis, May 15-17, 2015.
  29. Friends of Philosophy Talk, University of Miami, April 30, 2015.
  30. Keynote address, SUNY Oneonta’s Twentieth Annual Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, April 17-18, 2015. 
  31. Love as a reason-responsive, UCF, Orlando, April 9, 2015.
  32. "Auditory Perception and Cognitive Penetration", Presidential address, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology", Hotel Monteleone, New Orleans, April 2-4, 2015.
  33. Philosophy of Cognitive Science workshop, Loyola, April 1, 2015.
  34. Brain Day, Miami Science Museum, March 21, 2015.
  35. Brain Day, Miami Science Museum, March 19, 2015.
  36. Central APA, St. Louis, February 18-21, 2015.
  37. Romantic Love, Books & Books, February 13, 2015.
  38. Department talk, University of California, Merced, January 26, 2015.
  39. Trans* Conference, St. Louis, Nov. 21-22, 2014.
  40. Third World Online Neuroscience Conference, June 19, 2014.
  41. NYU workshop, June 12-14, 2014.
  42. St. Andrews workshop, June 5-6, 2014.
  43. Keynote, PhilMiLCog, Western's grad conference in philosophy of mind, language, and cognitive science, May 29-31.
  44. CPA, May 25-28, 2014.
  45. SLACRR, May 18-20, 2014.
  46. Stanford, Department Talk, May 15, 2014.
  47. Conscious Thought and Thought about Consciousness, Organized by Donovan Wishon, April 27-30, 2014.
  48. Modality Workshop, Rutgers, April 4-5, 2014.
  49. "Who's afraid of Qualia?", TCU's Ronald E. Moore Humanities Symposium, March 27 - 29, 2014.
  50. Critic, Author-Meets-Critic, Bill Brewer, Perception and Its Objects, The Central Division Meeting of the APA, Chicago, February 26-March 1, 2014.
  51. SSPP, Feb 6-9, 2014
  52. "Emotions as Perceptual States", University of Miami, Jan 24, 2014.
  53. "Synesthesia and Savant Syndrome", Talk in the Biology and Beyond Series, Washington University, St. Louis, January 13, 2014.
  54. TBA, Saving safety? - Problems and Prospects of Safety-Based Accounts of Knowledge. Organized by Elke Brendel and Thomas Grundmann, University of Bonn, Germany,  September 30 - October 2, 2013.
  55. Department Talk, Carnegie Mellon, September 19-20, 2013.
  56. "Synesthesia", Talk at the Academy of Science of St. Louis, Thur Aug 22, 2013.
  57. "Phenomenal Looks and Perceptual Representation", Columbia/Barnard University Workshop on Perception, New York, July 25-26, 2013.
  58. TBA, Workshop on external world scepticism, organized by Luca Moretti, the Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy, July 9-10, 2013.
  59. Tense, Modality and Semantic Value Workshop, Oslo, Norway, June 17, 2013.
  60. "A Semantic Account of 'Seems' and Seemings", Keynote Address, Semantics and Mind Conference, St Petersburg  June 10-14, 2013.
  61. Type 2 Blindsight Workshop, Dublin, May 27-29, 2013.
  62. Author-Meets-Critic session on my book Transient Truths (Oxford), Pacific APA, San Francisco, March 27-31, 2013.
  63. "The LTP Model for Grapheme-Color Binding in Synesthesia", Talk at St. Louis Area Philosophy of Science Association, March 16, 2013.
  64. "Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings", Symposium on Herman Cappelen's book Philosophy Without Intuitions, London, December 15, 2012.
  65. "Attention and Metric Properties", Attention & Consciousness, London, December 14, 2012.
  66. Time & Consciousness Workshop, NYU, December 8, 2012.
  67. "Perceptual Content and Phenomenal Seemings", Department Talk, Department of Philosophy, Duke University, December 6-7, 2012
  68. "Perceptual Content and Phenomenal Seemings", Department Talk, University of British Columbia, November 30, 2012.
  69. "Deaf Hearing: Implicit Discrimination of Auditory Content in a Patient with Mixed Hearing Loss", Department Talk, Biology Department, University of Missouri, St. Louis, November 13, 2012.
  70. "Perceptual Content and Phenomenal Seemings", Department Talk, Department of Philosophy, University of Southern California, November 9, 2012
  71. "What does it mean to be human? From Neanderthals to the technological singularity," Big History Lecture, University of Missouri, St. Louis, October 23, 2012.
  72. Harvard Perception Workshop, September 15, 2012.
  73. "Deaf Hearing: Implicit Discrimination of Auditory Content in a Patient with Mixed Hearing Loss", Attention conference, Antwerp, September 1-2, 2012.
  74. "Perception and Brain Activity in a Case of Acquired Synesthesia", World Neuroscience Online Conference, June 14-16.
  75. "Two-Dimensionalism, Cognitive Significance and Context-Sensitivity Broadly Construed", Relativism and Contextualism Conference. Organizer: Stewart Shapiro, jointly sponsored OSU/Maribor/Rijeka Philosophy and Linguistics Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia, June 11-16, 2012.
  76. "Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief", Getrude Bussey Lecture, Northwestern University, May 3-4, 2012.
  77. "The Nature of Jealousy: Ownership and the Irrational Sex", Gender Studies Colloquium, University of Missouri, St. Louis, April 18, 2012.
  78. "Visual Imagery in the Absence of V1 Activation", Toward a Science of Consciousness, Tucson, April 9-14, 2012.
  79. "An Element of Objectivity in Aesthetic and Moral Relativism", Aesthetics and Relativism Symposium, Victoria, Canada, April 9 - 11, April 2012.
  80. "Synesthesia as Automatic, High-Level Visual Memory", Invited Symposium on Synesthesia, Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Seattle, April 4-7, 2012.
  81. "The Nature of Jealousy: Ownership and the Irrational Sex", Feminist Metaphysics Symposium, The Society for Analytic Feminism, the Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, April 4-7, 2012.
  82. The Role of Vision for Action in Cognitive Task Performances", Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Savannah, GA, March 22-24, 2012.
  83. "Seeing mathematics: perceptual experience and brain activity in acquired synesthesia", Department of Mathematics, Department of Physics and the Center for Neurodynamics", University of Missouri, St. Louis, March 15, 2012.
  84. "Centered Properties and Phenomenal Seemings", Keynote, St. Louis Philosophy Graduate Conference, March 11, 2012.
  85. Centered Properties and Color Primitivism", Color and Philosophy Conference, Auburn University, March 2-3, 2012.
  86. "The Status of Consciousness in Nature", Department talk, Union College, March 1, 2012.
  87. "What Does it Mean to be Human? From Neanderthals to the Technological Singularity" Big History Lecture, University of Missouri, St. Louis, February 28, 2012.
  88. "Seeing mathematics: perceptual experience and brain activity in acquired synesthesia", Department of Philosophy, Keio University, Tokyo, February 25, 2012.
  89. "An Emotion Ontology Based on the Perceived-Response Theory", Department of Philosophy, Keio University, Tokyo, February 22-25, 2012.
  90. "Perceptual Content and Phenomenal Seemings", Department talk, University of Texas, Austin, February 17, 2012.
  91. "Perspectivality in Perceptual Content", Seminar Talk, University of Texas, Austin, February 16, 2012.
  92. "Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism", Department talk, Colorado, Boulder, February 3, 2012.
  93. "Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism", Department Talk, University of Vermont, January 27, 2012.
  94.  "The Superhuman Mind", Philosophy Salon, University of Missouri, St. Louis, January 20, 2012.
  95. The Ethics of Love and Sex, with John Brunero and Eric Wiland, Symposium, University of Missouri, St. Louis, November 15, 2011.
  96. Unity of Consciousness Panel, Brown University, November 5-6, 2011.
  97. "Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm", Presidential Address, The Annual Meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association, St. Louis, September 16, 2011.
  98. "Writing for Publication", Annual Graduate Student Professional Development Conference, UMSL, August 15, 2011.
  99. "Conscious Color Processing in Blindsight?", Cortical Color Workshop and Conference, Vancouver, August 3-7, 2011.
  100. "Do 'Looks' Reports Reflect the Contents of Perception?", The Language of Consciousness workshop, ANU, Australia, July 28-29, 2011.
  101. "Degrees of Consciousness", Consciousness at the Beach, ANU Coastal Campus at Kioloa from Friday July 22-25, 2011.
  102. "A Common Flaw in the Empirical Study of Consciousness", Annual Meeting of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, New Zealand, July 3-8, 2011. 
  103. "A Common Flaw in the Empirical Study of Consciousness", Workshop, Department of Philosophy, University of Copenhagen, June 5, 2011.
  104. "Do 'Looks' Reports Reflect the Contents of Perception?", Department talk, Munich, Germany, May 19, 2011.
  105. "Degrees of consciousness", Workshop on the Ontology and Epistemology of Consciousness, Southern Danish University, May 13, 2011.
  106. "The Status of Consciousness in Nature", Department Talk, Southern Danish University, May 12, 2011.
  107. Brain Research Unit, Low Temperature Laboratory, Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland, May 8 -11.
  108. "The Superhuman Mind: From Synesthesia to Savant Syndrome", with Jason Padgett, Towards a Science of Consciousness, Stockholm, May 2 - 8, 2011.
  109. "The Superhuman Mind: From Synesthesia to Savant Syndrome", Synesthesia symposium, Towards a Science of Consciousness, Stockholm, May 1, 2011. 
  110. Pacific APA, April 20-24, 2011.
  111. "Color in Blindsight", BBOB Presentation, Psychology, UMSL, April 6.
  112. "A Common Flaw in the Empirical Study of Consciousness", Joint PNP/Medical School talk, East Building of Medical School Campus, Washington University St. Louis, March 9, 2011
  113. "A Case of Acquired Synesthesia and Savant Syndrome after A Brutal Assault", Med school talk, Washington University St. Louis, March 7, 2011.
  114. "What Does it Mean to be Human? From Neanderthals to the Technological Singularity" Big History Lecture, University of Missouri, St. Louis, February 28, 2011.
  115. Commentary on Nemira Gasiunas's "Grapheme-color synesthesia as perception without awareness", The Third Online Consciousness Conference, Feb 18 - March 4, 2011.
  116. Perception workshop, Harvard Dec 4, 2010.
  117. "Does Color Synesthesia Differ Phenomenally from Visual Imagery", NYU, New York, Nov 20, 2010. Abstract: Color synesthesia differs from visual imagery along a number of dimensions, for example, in terms of how it is triggered. But how does it differ in phenomenal quality from visual imagery? Neuro-imaging has found that both color synesthesia and visual imagery activate areas in striate (V1) cortex and the V4/V8 color complex. Studies from blindsight and achromatopsia have provided suggestive evidence that V1 is systematically involved in computing brightness, brightness contrast and chromatic contrast, whereas the V4/V8 complex is involved in computing hues and saturation. Since current neuro-imaging results show that both color synesthesia and visual imagery activate these two major color areas of the brain, the current data from neuro-imaging do not provide us with any good insight into the question of whether there is a phenomenal difference between synesthesia and visual imagery. In a series of studies we asked lower color synesthetes, in which the trigger is sensory, higher color synesthetes, in which the trigger is cognitive, and non-synesthetes to compare their synesthetic experiences or visual imagery to photographs that varied in brightness or brightness contrast. We found that the synesthetic experiences of lower synestetes differ from the visual images of non-synesthetic subjects in having a greater brightness and brightness contrast than the visual images of non-synesthetes. No such difference was found in higher color synesthesia. As V1 is involved in computing brightness and brightness contrast, the studies provide suggestive evidence that lower synesthesia involves greater V1 activation than visual imagery.
  118. “Degrees of Consciousness”, SpaWN conference, Metaphysics, Syracuse, July 25-27, 2010.
  119. Color Experience in Blindsight?, department talk, Aarhus University, May 20, 2010. 
  120. “What is an Unconscious Mental State?”, Towards a Science of Consciousness, Tuscon April 12-18, 2010.
  121. Comments on Uriah Kriegel's Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory, Author Meets Critics Session, Pacific Division Meeting of the American philosophical Association, San Francisco, April 1, 2010.
  122. Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties?”, Colloquium talk, Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, March 31, 2010.
  123. Hawthorne & Cappelen author meets critics session, Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Chicago, February 20, 2010. 
  124. “An Alternative to Color Relationalism”, Colloquium talk, Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, New York, Dec 29, 2009.  Commentator: Jonathan Cohen.
  125. Perception Beyond Vision, Perception workshop, Harvard University, Nov 14, 2009.
  126. “Towards a Theory of the Long-Lasting Emotions”, Department Talk, University of Missouri-Columbia, Nov 6, 2009. 
  127. “Kaplan's Paradox and the Semantic Values of Predicates”, Issues in Contemporary Semantics and Ontology: Predicates and Properties, org. Eleonora Orlando, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra and Ezequiel Zerbudis, Bueno Aires, Argentina, August 26-28, 2009.
  128. “Reasonable Disagreement and Entitlements to Trust”, Feldman workshop on disagreement, org. Klemens Kappel, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, August 14, 2009. 
  129. “Some Kind of Seeing", AAP, Melbourne, July 6, 2009. 
  130. “Do We Perceive High-Level Properties?”, Philosophy Program, Australian National University, May 14, 2009.
  131. Disjunctivism and Primitive Knowledge”, Pacific Meeting in Vancouver, April 8, 2009. 
  132.  “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Kansas State University, March 26, 2009.
  133. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Russell V Workshop, The Bishop's Ranch, Healdsburg, CA, March 12-15, 2009.
  134. “Propositions as Hyperintensions”, Hyperintensionality and Impossible Worlds Workshop, org. David Chalmers, The ANU, November 25-26, 2008.
  135. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Univeristy of Aarhus Oct 24, 2008. 
  136. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, University of Copenhagen Oct 24, 2008. 
  137. “Knowledge-How: A Unified Account”, Epistemology Workshop, Copenhagen Oct 23, 2008. 
  138. “Disjunctivism and Primitive Knowledge”, The Second Annual Midwest Epistemology Workshop, October 17-18, 2008, The University of Nebraska in Lincoln, Nebraska.
  139. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Philosophy RSSS, ANU, September 2008. 
  140. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Auckland, NZ, August 2008. 
  141. “On Luck, Responsibility and the Meaning of Life", Wellington, NZ, August 2008.   
  142. “Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism”, Otago, Dunedin, NZ, August 2008. 
  143. “Knowledge without Belief”, Australian Association of Philosophy, Melbourne 2008.
  144. “On the Knowledge Argument”, The Epistemology at the Beach Conference, Feb. 15-18, 2008, ANU's Kioloa Coastal Campus, hosted by Dave Chalmers' Centre for Consciousness and and Daniel Stoljar's Basic Knowledge grant and organized by Declan Smithies.
  145. “Counterpossibles, Impossible Worlds, and Essence”, with Joe Salerno, Arizona Ontology Conference, Arizona, January 2008.  Organizer: L. A. Paul.  Commentator: Gillian Russell.
  146. “An Extensional Approach to Quantifier Domain Restriction”, The Eastern Meeting of the APA, Baltimore, December 27-30, 2007.  Commentator: Jason Stanley.
  147. “Making Sense of Ontological Commitment”, Ontological Commitment Conference, Sydney, November 30 - December 1, 2007.
  148. Perceptual Reports and Intensional Verbs, PhilSoc, Philosophy RSSS, Australian National University, October 23, 2007.
  149. Comments on Philippe Schlenker's "Be Articulate!", Rutgers Semantics Workshop, October 5-7, 2007.  Organizers: Lepore and Stanley. 
  150. “Remarks on Counterpossibles”, with Joe Salerno, Synthese Annual Conference: Between Logic and Intuition: David Lewis and the Future of Formal Methods in Philosophy, Carlsberg Academy, Copenhagen, October 3-5, 2007.  Program Committee: Johan van Benthem, Vincent F. Hendricks, John Symons, and Stig Andur Pedersen.
  151. “Structured Content”, Philosophy RSSS, Australian National University, September 13, 2007. 
  152. What Mary Did Yesterday: Remarks on Knowledge-wh,” Copenhagen Epistemology Conference, May 26-26, 2007, organizer: Klemens Kappel and Danish Epistemology Network.  Speakers: Duncan Pritchard, Erik Olsson, Nikolaj Nottelman, Erik Carsson, Kristoffer Ahlstrom, Berit Brogaard, and Esben Nedenskov.  Discussants (among others): Lars Bo Gundersen, Eline Busck Gundersen, Jesper Kallestrup, Klemens Kappel, and Anders Schoubye.
  153. Public Lecture, Henrik Gade Jensen, org.  May 23, 2007, Palace Hotel, Raadhuspladsen, Copenhagen.
  154. Adjectives Conference, St. Andrews, May 19-20, 2007, invited participant.  Organizers: Herman Cappelen and Jason Stanley.  Keynote addresses: Delia Graff Fara, John Hawthorne, Chris Kennedy, Peter Ludlow, Paul Pietoski, Daniel Rothschild, Jonathan Schaffer, Gabriel Segal, and Jason Stanley.
  155. “Remarks on Counterpossibles”, with Joe Salerno, Epistemology Conference, University of Edinburgh, May 15, 2007.  Organizers: Jesper Kallestrup and Matthew Chrisman.  Speakers: Berit Brogaard, Ram Neta, Duncan Pritchard, Joe Salerno and Jonathan Schaffer.  Abstract: On David Lewis' theory of subjunctive conditionals, subjunctives with impossible antecedents are familiarly treated as vacuously true.  But as Daniel Nolan and others have argued, there are several good reasons to steer clear of a vacuity treatment of counterpossibles.  In this essay we provide further reasons in support of the thesis.  We then raise a problem for Nolan's treatment and argue that the problem requires for its solution a theory of subjunctives that treats subjunctive contexts as opaque.  We conclude by offering such a theory.
  156. What Mary Did Yesterday: Remarks on Knowledge-wh,” , the Linguistics and Epistemology Conference, Aberdeen, UK, May 12-13 2007, organized by Martijn Blaauw.  30 min talk.  Keynote speakers: Kent Bach, Peter Ludlow, Jonathan Schaffer, and Jason Stanley.  Abstract: reductionists about knowledge-wh hold that 's knows-wh' (e.g. 'John knows who stole his car') is reducible to 'there is a proposition p such that s knows that p, and p answers the indirect question of the wh-clause'.  Anti-reductionists hold that 's knows-wh' is reducible to 's knows that p, as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh-clause'.  I argue that both of these positions are defective.  I then offer a new analysis of knowledge-wh as a special kind of de re knowledge.
  157. Donkey Sentences and Quantifier Variability,” the Central Division of the APA in Chicago, April 19-21 2007. Commentator: Jessica Rett, Department of Linguistics, Rutgers. The paper proposes an account of conditional donkey sentences, such as 'if a farmer buys a donkey, he usually vaccinates it', which accommodates the fact that the adverb of quantification seems to affect the interpretation of pronouns that are not within its syntactic scope. The analysis defended takes donkey pronouns to go proxy for partitive noun phrases with varying quantificational force. The variation in the interpretation of donkey pronouns, it is argued, is determined by the linguistic environment in which the pronouns occur. A longer version of this paper can be found in the works in progress section below.
  158. Sea Battle Semantics” the Pacific Meeting of the APA in San Francisco, April 3-8, 2007. Commentator: Peter Ludlow, University of Michigan. Macfarlane has argued that our intuitions about future contingents motivate a shift from standard semantics to relativistic semantics. In this paper I defend standard semantics against MacFarlane's criticism. A longer version of the paper can be found in the works in progress section below.
  159. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh”, Philosophy Department Colloquium, St. Louis University. March 30, 2007.
  160. “What Mary Did Yesterday: Remarks on Knowledge-wh”, Knowledge and Questions Workshop, 15-16 March 2007 at the Archives H.-Poincaré, Nancy, France.  Keynote speakers: Berit Brogaard, Maria Aloni, Paul Egre, Pascal Engel, Christopher Hookway, Ian Rumfitt, Jonathan Schaffer, Claudine Tiercelin.
  161. Commentator on Delia Graff's "Coincidence By Another Name", Arizona Ontology Conference. Jan 18-21, 2007. Speakers: Ted Sider, Carolina Sartorio, David Chalmers, Delia Graff, Mike Rea, Cian Dorr, John Hawthorne, Sarah McGrath, and Ned Hall.  Preliminary draft of comments.
  162. The But not All: A New Account of Plural Definite Descriptions,” the Eastern Division of the APA in Washington D.C., December, 2006. Commentator: Zoltan Szabo, Yale University.  The paper argues against the view that the semantic import of plural descriptions is existential quantification. Then it argues that plural descriptions have the semantic import of partitive constructions with variable quantificational force. You can find a longer version of the paper in the works in progress section below.
  163. Rutgers Semantics Workshop, Sep 29-30, 2006, invited participant.  Speakers: Mark Baker, Sarah Jane Leslie, Martin Hackl, Peter Lasersohn, Richard Larson. 
  164. In Defense of a Perspectival Semantics for 'Know'”, Philosophy department colloquium. Syracuse. September 22, 2006
  165. In Defense of a Perspectival Semantics for 'Know'”, NAMICONA Epistemology Workshop, University of Copenhagen, August 22, 2006.
  166. The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism.  Or How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth”, Stirling Conference on Epistemic Value, August 2006. Commentator: Mikkel Gerken, University of California, Los Angeles.  Invited speakers: Jason Baehr, Berit Brogaard, Pascal Engel, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Mark Kaplan, Martin Kusch, Alan Millar, Christian Piller, Wayne Riggs, Matt Weiner, W. Jay Wood.
  167. Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism", Aberdeen Conference on Moral Contextualism, July 2006.  Organized by Peter Baumann and Martijn Blaauw.  Commentator: Lars Binderup, University of Southern Denmark.  Keynote speakers: Berit Brogaard, John Greco, John Hawthorne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Alan Thomas, Ralph Wedgwood.  The paper argues that a version of non-indexical contextualism is preferable to genuine moral relativism.
  168. “Adverbs and Quantifier Domain Restriction,” the Central Division of the APA in Chicago, April, 2006. Commentator: Andy Egan, University of Michigan.
  169. Knowability, Possibility and Paradox”, with J. Salerno. Book launch event for V. Hendricks and D. Pritchard's New Waves in Epistemology. Pacific Division of the APA. March 24, 2006.
  170. Russell's Theory of Descriptions vs. the Predicative Analysis: a Reply to Graff,” the Eastern Division of the APA in NY, December, 2005. Commentator. Delia Graff Fara, Princeton University.  A longer version of this paper has been accepted for publication in Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
  171. “Anti-Realism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy,” with J. Salerno, the Central Division of the APA in Chicago, April, 2003. Commentator: Michael Rea, Notre Dame.  A longer version of this paper appeared in Nous 2005.
  172. “To Be is to Be Considered”, with J. Salerno, the Society for Realist and Anti-Realist Discussion, Pacific Division of the APA in Seattle, WA March 29 - March 30, 2002.
  173. “The Meaning of Life”, with Barry Smith, Philosophy Department, SUNY Brockport, April 12, 2001.
  174. “Elusive Reference, Grounded Truth”. The 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, August, 2000.
  175. “Quantum Mereotopology”, American Association for Artificial Intelligence-2000 Workshop on Spatial and Temporal Granularity. The American Association for Artificial Intelligence, Austin, Texas, July 30, 2000
  176. “Should We Be Afraid of Human Cloning?”, Department of Philosophy, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, April 27, 2000.
  177. “Brain Death and Technological Development”, Brain Death and Human Identity - An Ad Hoc Symposium, University of Hamburg, Germany, March 9, 2000.
  178. “Presentist Four-Dimensionalism”, the Hamburger Kreis, University of Hamburg, Germany, February 10, 2000.
  179. “Mereology and Causation”, Winter Symposium, University of Aarhus, Denmark, January, 2000.
  180. “The Ontology of Fields”, NCGIA Annual Meeting 1999, Santa Barbara, CA, December 3, 1999.
  181. “The Ontology of Species”, Technical University of Dresden, Germany, October 8, 1999­.
  182. “Spaces of Representation”, in the round-table discussion: Catastrophe Theory Based Models of Meaning, The Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, Mass, August 10, 1998.
  183. “Language and Time”, University at Urbino, Italy, July 1998.
  184. “The Ontology of Fields”, The Ontology of Fields, Specialist Meeting of the NSF Varenius Project, Bar Harbor, Maine, June 1998.
  185. “Intentionality”, 6th Congress of the IASS-AIS, Guajadelaja, Mexico, July 15, 1997.
  186. “An Aristotelian Approach to Animal Behavior”, 6th Congress of the IASS-AIS, Guajadelaja, Mexico, July 14, 1997.

 Unpublished Works

  1. I Know. Therefore, I understand” (2005)
  2. Donkey Sentences and Quantifier Variability” (2006)
  3. Do 'Looks' Reports Reflect the Contents of Perception?”(2009)
  4. Degrees of Consciousness, (2010)
  5. Perception without Awareness: Blindsight, Higher Synesthesia and Vision for Action, (2011).
  6. A Case of Acquired Synesthesia and Savant Syndrome Following a Brutal Attack, CAS Grant Report, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 2011.

  Follow BritHereNow on Twitter