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Bio-Terror Agents

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    CRS (Report for Congress)

    BIOTERRORBIBLE.COM: The following whitepapers were published by think-tanks, universities, NGO’s and various governmental agencies and have at the very minimum set the stage psychologically for the impending bio-terror induced pandemic. The simple fact that these whitepapers exists in mass confirms that an upcoming bio-terror attack is in the cards and may be played in a last ditch effort to regain political, economic and militarial control of society.

    WHITEPAPERS: Army War College ,  ASM (American Society for Microbiology), CATO Institute, Center for a New American Security, Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, Center for Counterproliferation Research, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, CRS (Report for Congress),  GAO (General Accounting Office), Institute for National Strategic Studies, Institute for Science and Public Policy, Johns Hopkins University, National Academy Of Engineering, National Defence University, PERI (Public Entity Risk Institute),  RIS (Research & Information System), Terrorism Intelligence Centre, The Federalist Society, UNESCO (United Nations), University of Laussane, and the WMD Center.

    Title: Small-Scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical And Biological Agents
    Date:
    May 20, 2004
    Source:
    CRS Report for Congress

    Abtract: This report addresses the potential terrorist use of C/B agents, including toxins. The focus of this report is on small-scale, targeted chemical and biological attacks. In this framework, manufacture and dissemination of modest amounts of material, able to cause significant casualties in a building, subway station or other enclosed space, rather than on a citywide scale, are discussed.

    This approach attempts to analyze the threat posed by various agents if used by small, non-state-sponsored terrorist groups that may lack the technology, expertise, or logistical capability to mount a large mass-casualty attack....In order to compare the impact of different C/B agents, the target is assumed to be the same in each case: a medium-sized enclosed space, such as an office building or subway station...Other experts have cited historical natural outbreaks on public transportation, such as trains, as evidence that individuals with diseases in the contagious stage have been able to travel and infect others (CRS Report for Congress, 2004).

    Title:
    Federal Efforts To Address The Threat of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues For Congress
    Dare: March 18, 2010
    Source: U.S. Congress

    Abstract
    :
    Recent reports by congressional commissions and others, in combination with the inclusion of bioterrorism issues in President Obama’s State of the Union address, have increased congressional attention to the threat of bioterrorism. Federal efforts to combat the threat of bioterrorism predate the anthrax attacks of 2001, but have significantly increased since then. These efforts have been developed as part of and in parallel with other defenses against conventional terrorism. The continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities are insufficient to face the threat.

    The federal government’s efforts to address the perceived threat of bioterrorism span many different agencies and are organized and directed through several strategy and planning documents. These agencies have implemented numerous disparate actions and programs in their statutory areas to address the threat.

    Despite these efforts, many experts, including congressional commissions, non-governmental organizations, and industry representatives, have highlighted weaknesses or flaws in the federal government’s biodefense activities. Recent reports by congressional commissions have stated that the federal government’s efforts to address the bioterrorism threat could be significantly improved.

    Key questions face congressional policymakers in these areas: Are the efforts already underway sufficient to face the threat of bioterrorism? Have the federal investments to date met the expectations of Congress or other stakeholders? Should these existing programs be altered, augmented, or terminated in the current environment of fiscal challenge? What is the appropriate federal role in response to the threat of bioterrorism, and what mechanisms are most appropriate for involving other stakeholders, including state and local jurisdictions, industry, and others? Congressional oversight of bioterrorism crosses the jurisdiction of many congressional committees. As a result, such oversight is often issue-based. Because of the diversity of federal biodefense efforts, a complete view of the complete federal bioterrorism effort is beyond the scope of this report. Instead, this report focuses on four areas critical to the success of the biodefense enterprise that the 111th Congress is likely to consider: strategic planning; risk assessment; surveillance; and the development, procurement, and distribution of medical countermeasures.

    Congress, through authorizing and appropriations legislation and its oversight activities, continues to influence the federal response to the bioterrorism threat. Congressional policymakers will likely be faced with many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs versus creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting such programs may incur additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges while maintaining or shrinking such programs may be deemed as incurring unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack (U.S. Congress, 2010).

    Title: Federal Efforts To Address The Threat Of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues For Congress
    Date: Auguts 6, 2010
    Source: U.S. Congress

    Abstract: Recent reports by congressional commissions and others, the inclusion of bioterrorism issues in President Obama’s State of the Union address, and issuance of executive orders have increased congressional attention to the threat of bioterrorism. Federal efforts to combat the threat of bioterrorism predate the anthrax attacks of 2001 but have significantly increased since then. The U.S. government has developed these efforts as part of and in parallel with other defenses against conventional terrorism. The continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities insufficiently address the threat.

    Several strategy and planning documents direct the federal government’s biodefense efforts. Many different agencies have a role. These agencies have implemented numerous disparate actions and programs in their statutory areas to address the threat. Despite these efforts, many experts, including congressional commissions, non-governmental organizations, and industry representatives, have highlighted weaknesses or flaws in the federal government’s biodefense activities. Recent reports by congressional commissions have stated that the federal government could significantly improve its efforts to address the bioterrorism threat.

    Key questions face congressional policymakers: How sufficiently do the efforts already underway address the threat of bioterrorism? Have the federal investments to date met the expectations of Congress or other stakeholders? Should Congress alter, augment, or terminate these existing programs in the current environment of fiscal challenge? What is the appropriate federal role in response to the threat of bioterrorism, and what mechanisms are most appropriate for involving other stakeholders, including state and local jurisdictions, industry, and others?

    Congressional oversight of bioterrorism crosses the jurisdiction of many congressional committees. As a result, congressional oversight is often issue-based. Because of the diversity of federal biodefense efforts, this report does not provide a complete view of the federal bioterrorism effort. Instead, this report focuses on four areas under congressional consideration deemed critical to the success of the biodefense enterprise: strategic planning; risk assessment; surveillance; and the development, procurement, and distribution of medical countermeasures.

    Congress, through authorizing and appropriations legislation and its oversight activities, continues to influence the federal response to the bioterrorism threat. Congressional policymakers will likely face many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs versus creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting such programs may incur additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges while maintaining or shrinking such programs may pose unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack (U.S. Congress, 2010).

    Title:
    Federal Efforts To Address The Threat Of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues And Options For Congress
    Date: February 8, 2011
    Source:
    U.S. Congress

    Abstract: Reports by congressional commissions, the mention of bioterrorism in President Obama’s 2010
    State of the Union address, and issuance of executive orders have increased congressional attention to the threat of bioterrorism. Federal efforts to combat the threat of bioterrorism predate the anthrax attacks of 2001 but have significantly increased since then. The U.S. government has developed these efforts as part of and in parallel with other defenses against conventional terrorism. Continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities insufficiently address the threat.

    Key questions face congressional policymakers: How adequately do the efforts already under way address the threat of bioterrorism? Have the federal investments to date met the expectations of Congress and other stakeholders? Should Congress alter, augment, or terminate these existing programs in the current environment of fiscal challenge? What is the appropriate federal role in response to the threat of bioterrorism, and what mechanisms are most appropriate for involving other stakeholders, including state and local jurisdictions, industry, and others? Several strategy and planning documents direct the federal government’s biodefense efforts. Many different agencies have a role. These agencies have implemented numerous disparate actions and programs in their statutory areas to address the threat.

    Despite these efforts, congressional commissions, nongovernmental organizations, industry representatives, and other experts have highlighted weaknesses or flaws in the federal government’s biodefense activities. Reports by congressional commissions have stated that the federal government could significantly improve its efforts to address the bioterrorism threat. Congressional oversight of bioterrorism crosses the jurisdiction of many congressional committees. As a result, congressional oversight is often issue-based. Because of the diversity of federal biodefense efforts, this report does not provide a complete view of the federal bioterrorism effort. Instead, this report focuses on four areas under congressional consideration deemed critical to the success of the biodefense enterprise: strategic planning; risk assessment; surveillance; and the development, procurement, and distribution of medical countermeasures.

    Congress, through authorizing and appropriations legislation and oversight activities, continues to influence the federal response to the bioterrorism threat. Congressional policymakers may face many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs or creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting or creating programs may result in additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges. Maintaining or shrinking programs may pose unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack (U.S. Congress, 2011).

    Ċ CRSBioterror2010.pdf
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      203k v. 1 Jan 27, 2012, 6:17 PM David Chase Taylor
    Ċ CRSBioterror2011.pdf
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      213k v. 1 Jan 27, 2012, 6:18 PM David Chase Taylor
    Ċ CRSBioterrorMarch2010.pdf
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      202k v. 1 Feb 3, 2012, 9:38 AM David Chase Taylor