Language mapping

14.3.2(c). Language. The assumption that some abstract deep-structure base 
characterizes long-term memory first arose within psycholinguistics. We can briefly 
review this development, concentrating on evidence demonstrating that there are 
two stages in language processing, one involving the serial ordering of a linear 
string of symbols, the other consisting of an underlying non-linear structure from 
which this ordered string is generated. The similarities between these processes, and 
those just described for imagery, will become clear in the course of our discussion. 
As there is considerably more information available concerning deep structure in 
language than there is for imagery, we can go into some more detail here; the 
features of deep structure demonstrated for language are probably also to be found 
in the imagery system. 
The existence of a deep structure. One approach to language, as to any form of 
behaviour, is to attempt to explain it solely on the basis of its observable linear 
structure. This approach, associated with the behaviourist school, suggests that each 
element of a sentence is generated in response to preceding elements, or in response 
to a stimulus in the environment, and that the whole sentence can be thought of as a 
Markov chain. Given the first word of a sentence, any other word has a finite 
probability of being produced, depending upon the number of times in the past that 
the word followed the first. Thus, a word like `smelly' would be followed quite 
often by `feet' or `cheese', less frequently by `music' or `airplane', and virtually 
never by `for' or `thinks'. Higher-order Markov chains would take into account not 
just the previous word but the previous two words, three words, and so on. 
Language, on this model, is generated solely by a system which produces strings of 
symbols in an ordered left-to-right linear sequence. Highly practiced sequences 
would be run off without recourse to decisions, ideas, etc. From this point of view 
there is nothing unusual about Lashley's colleague who claimed that '... he could 
arise before an audience, turn his mouth loose and go to sleep. He believed in the 
peripheral chain theory of language' (Beach et al. 1960, pp. 510-11). 
Another aspect of language emphasized by the behaviourists is the 
∗ There was some evidence in Lea (1975) that certain starting sites in a spatial array are more easily accessed than others; this seemed related to either top-to-bottom scanning methods or to some subjective impact of the objects located at those sites. This is, as Lea points out, an area requiring further research. Lea also failed to find any relationship between the reaction time required to scan from one site to another, and the real-world distance captured by the image of those sites; this is in disagreement with results reported by Kosslyn (1973). It is not necessarily the case, however, that a failure to find an increase in reaction times indicates that the image does not represent increased distances. There is no reason to assume, within a neural 
mapping structure, that real-world distances would be correlated with neural distances in a fashion which would produce orderly changes in reaction times with changes in imaged distances. 

referential nature of meaning; that is, the way words refer to things or events and appear to derive their meanings from this reference. This connection comes about as 
the result of a simple conditioning process; a sound experienced in the presence of an 
object will, when later heard by itself, call up the same, or some of the same, 
responses as the object itself. The meaning of a sequence of sounds or words would 
then be given by the sum total of the conditioned meanings of each individual sound 
or word. In the face of harsh criticisms, to be mentioned below, this strong position 
has been progressively modified and weakened. In one recent formulation (Osgood 
1971) meaning was seen as dependent upon some sort of internal response (rm) 
which was derived from the total external response to the object. Words are not 
conditioned to the external responses but to these rms. The meanings of more abstract 
words, such as justice, are derived in a secondary fashion from the rms associated 
with actual objects or events. 
This simple behavourist approach, which emphasizes the observable aspects of 
language, does seem to explain adequately many of the stereotyped features of 
language and some of the simpler referential features of meaning. It fails, however, 
in the language sphere in exactly those places where it fails in its explanation of 
behaviour in general, human or infra-human; it ignores or denies the purposeful 
variability and originality of behaviour, the novel behaviour not obviously due to 
generalization, the flexible use of behaviour learned in one situation but applied for a 
different purpose in another, and the underlying similarity amongst superficially 
different behaviours. These aspects of behaviour become acutely obvious in language 
and it is here that the deficiencies of the behaviourist account are most glaring. As 
pointed out by Lashley (1951), Chomsky (1957 and elsewhere), and Fodor (1965): 
(1) Novel sentences constitute a large proportion of all utterances. 
(2) The related words in a sentence often are not contiguous. The sentence 'the 
man who lived in the house sneezed' derives its meaning from the 
noncontiguous elements 'the man ... sneezed' and not from the contiguous 
elements 'the house sneezed'. 
(3) Superficially different sentences such as the active `the boy hit the dog' and 
the passive `the dog was hit by the boy' have the same meaning. 
(4) The same sound can have more than one meaning.
It is hard to see how reference to any response, or partial response, or hidden partial 
response will remove the ambiguity associated with the use of sounds with two 
different meanings. Disambiguation almost always depends on the context within 
which the sound occurs. It is to explain the existence and importance of these 
features of language that Chomsky 

* It is not clear whether one should speak of one word with two meanings or two words which sound alike 
(homophones). 

and most subsequent writers on linguistics have postulated the presence of a deep 
structure in addition to the more superficial one which generates the left-to-right 
temporally ordered pattern of the observed behaviour. 
The form of the deep structure. The deep structure was designed to account for 
the creative aspects of language, the connectedness between non-contiguous surface 
elements, the different meanings of a sound depending on its context, and the 
relationship between such superficially different sentences as the active and passive 
forms. In Chomsky's (1957, 1965) systems the deep structure consists of a complex 
set of rules which operate on symbols or strings of symbols, as well as the 
structures which the application of the rules generates. Chomsky's grammar has 
three sets of rules: the most important of these are syntactic, the others are semantic 
and phonological. The syntactic rules were seen as the creative part of the system, 
generating the basic sentence structure; the other rules acted passively on the inputs 
they received from the syntactic component to generate meaning and phonological 
representations. 
Let us briefly consider the rules of the syntactic component of Chomsky's 
grammar and the structures that they generate. There are two different types of 
syntactic rule, phrase-structure rules and transformational rules. The 
phrase-structure rules operate upon symbols for grammatical categories such as 
noun phrase (NP) and verb phrase (VP), rewriting them as strings of symbols. Fig. 
33 gives some examples of the operation of these rules. Note that these rules 
operate on individual symbols, and that no account is taken of the history of that 
symbol or of the derivation of the string in which it is embedded. A noun phrase 
receives the same treatment wherever it appears. The structure generated by the 
operation of the phrase structure rules is often portrayed as a tree diagram called a 
phrase marker (see Fig. 34); this seems to be viewed by Chomsky as a static 
structure, all parts of which exist simultaneously in the base component of the 
grammar. 
Transformational rules were introduced when it was seen that although 
phrase-structure rules could generate simple active sentences, by themselves they 
could not account for such things as passive sentences or questions. The 
transformational rules are applied to the deep structures generated by the base 
component and differ from the phrase-structure rules in that they apply to strings of 
symbols, are applicable only in a fixed order, and take into account the history or 
derivation of the string upon which they operate. This last property means that, in a 
sense, they operate upon whole phrase markers. By allowing for the optional 
(Chomsky 1957) or obligatory (Chomsky 1965) addition, deletion, or re-ordering of 
elements within a string, they easily provide for the transformation of sentences 
from, for instance, active to passive or declarative to interrogative (see Fig. 35).

Rewrite SENTENCE as NOUN PHRASE (NP)+VERB PHRASE (VP) 
 S NP + VP 
Rewrite NOUN PHRASE as DETERMINER (DET)+NOUN (N) 
 NP DET + N 
Rewrite VERB PHRASE as VERB (V)+NOUN PHRASE (NP) 
 VP V + NP 
Rewrite NOUN (N) as dog, boy 
 N dog, boy 
Rewrite DETERMINER (DET) as the 
 DET the 
FIG. 33. Examples of phrase-structure rules for the sentence `The dog bites the boy'. 

394 Extension of the theory to humans 
Rewrite SENTENCE as NOUN PHRASE (NP)+VERB PHRASE (VP) 
 S NP + VP 
Rewrite NOUN PHRASE as DETERMINER (DET)+NOUN (N) 
 NP DET + N 
Rewrite VERB PHRASE as VERB (V)+NOUN PHRASE (NP) 
 VP V + NP 
Rewrite NOUN (N) as dog, boy 
 N dog, boy 
Rewrite DETERMINER (DET) as the 
 DET the 
FIG. 33. Examples of phrase-structure rules for the sentence `The dog bites the boy'. 

 


FIG. 34. An example of a phrase marker for the same sentence as in Fig. 33. 
DETI
 + NI
 + V + DET2 + N2
The dog bites the boy 
DET2 + N2 + BE + V + EN + BY + DETI
 + NI
 The boy is bitten by the dog 
FIG. 35. An example of the transformation rule for converting active to passive sentences. 
Same sentence as in Fig. 33. 

In Chomsky's theory the meaning of a sentence is assigned to it by a separate 
component, the semantic component. This acts passively on the terminal string of 
the phrase marker, fitting meanings to each of the elements. Meanings are fully 
determined by the nature of the input from the syntactic component to the semantic 
component. Katz and his colleagues (Katz and Fodor 1963, Katz and Postal 1964, 
Katz 1972) have constructed a theory for this kind of semantic component, 
envisaging it as composed of two parts: a dictionary of meanings, and a set of 
projective rules allowing for, and providing meanings of, combinations of items.
Chomsky's system succeeds in doing what it set out to do. It accounts for many 
of the interesting features of languages which fall outside the province of simple 
behaviourist models; it permits the generation of an infinite number of sentences 
from a finite number of rules; it explains why distant elements of a sentence can 
have strong relationships; it answers to our intuitive feeling of a similarity between 
syntactically different sentences by identifying a common deep structure. However, 
as Chomsky himself noted (1965, p. 162), it fails in one important respect; it does 
not capture the still deeper semantic relationships which can exist between 
syntactically different sentences. Thus, the grammar fails to capture the similarity 
between sentences A and B, or C and D: 
(A) I liked the play. 
(B) The play pleased me. 
(C) John bought the book from Bill. 
(D) Bill sold the book to John. 
This failure to account for paraphrases would appear to be due to the narrow 
definition of the semantic component of the system. As we have seen, it is purely a 
passive feature of the grammar, whose function is to ascribe meaning to the deep 
structures generated by the base component. Intuitively, this seems to be an 
unnecessary restriction on the role of the semantic component. The meaning of a 
sentence is not only the sum total of the meanings of the words but includes the 
way in which they are put together. In this broader sense of semantic the base 
structure itself should be included in the semantic, and not in the syntactic, 
component. 
This broader usage of semantic requires some elaboration, for it embodies an 
important shift in thinking about language comprehension. The behaviourist 
emphasis upon the elements of speech meant that most research was concerned with 
individual items; how they were processed, 
∗ The dictionary operates on the basis of componential analysis, specifying the meaning of a lexical element 
as the set of categories within which it is included (semantic markers) together with those features which 
separate it from other lexical items in the same categories (distinguishers). The technique of componential 
analysis has also been applied to verbs, in particular by Bendix (1966, 1971). He examined a number of verbs 
and showed that they could all be paraphrased by combinations of a few basic verbs such as have, cause, 
change, etc.
 
In Chomsky's theory the meaning of a sentence is assigned to it by a separate 
component, the semantic component. This acts passively on the terminal string of 
the phrase marker, fitting meanings to each of the elements. Meanings are fully 
determined by the nature of the input from the syntactic component to the semantic 
component. Katz and his colleagues (Katz and Fodor 1963, Katz and Postal 1964, 
Katz 1972) have constructed a theory for this kind of semantic component, 
envisaging it as composed of two parts: a dictionary of meanings, and a set of 
projective rules allowing for, and providing meanings of, combinations of items.
Chomsky's system succeeds in doing what it set out to do. It accounts for many 
of the interesting features of languages which fall outside the province of simple 
behaviourist models; it permits the generation of an infinite number of sentences 
from a finite number of rules; it explains why distant elements of a sentence can 
have strong relationships; it answers to our intuitive feeling of a similarity between 
syntactically different sentences by identifying a common deep structure. However, 
as Chomsky himself noted (1965, p. 162), it fails in one important respect; it does 
not capture the still deeper semantic relationships which can exist between 
syntactically different sentences. Thus, the grammar fails to capture the similarity 
between sentences A and B, or C and D: 
(A) I liked the play. 
(B) The play pleased me. 
(C) John bought the book from Bill. 
(D) Bill sold the book to John. 
This failure to account for paraphrases would appear to be due to the narrow 
definition of the semantic component of the system. As we have seen, it is purely a 
passive feature of the grammar, whose function is to ascribe meaning to the deep 
structures generated by the base component. Intuitively, this seems to be an 
unnecessary restriction on the role of the semantic component. The meaning of a 
sentence is not only the sum total of the meanings of the words but includes the 
way in which they are put together. In this broader sense of semantic the base 
structure itself should be included in the semantic, and not in the syntactic, 
component. 
This broader usage of semantic requires some elaboration, for it embodies an 
important shift in thinking about language comprehension. The behaviourist 
emphasis upon the elements of speech meant that most research was concerned with 
individual items; how they were processed, 
∗ The dictionary operates on the basis of componential analysis, specifying the meaning of a lexical element 
as the set of categories within which it is included (semantic markers) together with those features which 
separate it from other lexical items in the same categories (distinguishers). The technique of componential 
analysis has also been applied to verbs, in particular by Bendix (1966, 1971). He examined a number of verbs 
and showed that they could all be paraphrased by combinations of a few basic verbs such as have, cause, 
change, etc.
stored, interpreted, and generated. Thus, standard experiments involved the learning
of lists of words or paired associates. When organizational factors were allowed (cf.
Mandler 1967), they were generally restricted to the meaning relationships between
isolated words. This accounts for the notion of categories and the host of
experiments on the role of categorial relations in the learning of word lists and paired
associates. Chomsky's critique partly embodied the notion that lexical items were not
the central elements in language comprehension. However, in moving to higher-order
units Chomsky did not expand the semantic component to include the meaning of
these larger units.
Most of the recent work concerned with semantic deep structures, then,
concentrates upon the mechanisms for comprehending and storing these higher-order
verbal units, beginning with the recognition that what is remembered of sentences,
paragraphs, or even stories is the sense of the discourse as a whole. Before turning to
a brief discussion of some of this work it is worth digressing momentarily to discuss
Tulving's (1972) notion of semantic memory. In view of the shift we have just
described, it is unfortunate that Tulving chose to apply the term semantic in its older
usage to a system representing the meaning of individual words, independent of
context. The confusion arising from this usage has led some (e.g. Schank 1975) to
reject the notion of semantic memory entirely in favour of a system including only
the lexicon and episodic memory. According to Schank, the meaning of individual
words is stored in the lexicon, while any relations between individual items must be
stored in terms of some event in which they took part. We cannot agree with Schank
on this point, though we find his model for semantic deep structure (see p. 398) one
of the most attractive in the field. While we do not accept Tulving's separation in
toto, we think there is strong evidence for a separation between some form of
context-free memory, using (in the old sense) semantic categories, and a
context-dependent memory, using something like a spatio-temporal framework. As
we shall see in the next chapter, the data from amnesic patients supports this
distinction.
Semantic deep structure. The work of Bransford, Franks, and their colleagues (e.g.
Bransford and Franks 1971, Bransford, Barclay, and Franks 1972, Bransford and
Johnson 1973, Bransford and McCarrell 1974, Franks 1974) provides important clues
to the nature of memory for higher-order verbal units. Their early work demonstrated
that, given a set of related sentences, subjects formed something like a prototype
sentence which, though never actually seen, was more readily recognized as familiar
than sentences which had been seen. Later work extended this observation by
showing that the remembered representation for a sentence depended upon the
context within which it was seen, as well as upon various inferences and assumptions
the subjects could make about the material, 
presumably based on some prior knowledge of the contexts within which the events
described could obtain. In fact, given an inappropriate context, a sentence which
would have been understood in isolation was often judged incomprehensible.
Similarly, they argued, some sentences which would be meaningless in isolation
can be given some sense by the context within which they occur.
This work on sentence comprehension requires a model which provides for some
deep structure that codes the relationship between the various elements in the
sentence or between several sentences. Studies of semantic deep structure have
concentrated upon such models, in the hope of specifying the form within which
these relationships could be coded such that the meaning of a sentence as a whole
could be stored, paraphrases of that sentence recognized, sentences could influence
one another's representations, and prior information could be brought to bear on
comprehension of inputs (and, hence, the meaning attached to these).
Early work on the basis for a semantic deep structure (e.g. Bendix 1966, 1971,
Fillmore 1968, 1971, McCawley 1968, 1971, Lakoff 1971) spoke primarily to the
first two of these requirements, concentrating upon sentence comprehension in
isolation. Though superseded by later models, we shall describe Fillmore's system
as it presents some of the basic features of those which superseded it. According to
Fillmore, a case system, in which items were unordered though identified as to
function, would provide a more appropriate base than the ordered set of
grammatical categories proposed by Chomsky. In Fillmore's system the sentence is
represented by its modality, which specifies such conditions as tense, negation, and
mood of the sentence as a whole, and proposition, which identifies the verb and its
permissible cases. These latter are given as an unordered set, with each case
defining the relationship between the item in that case and the verb. Fillmore
specified eight deep-structure cases:
(a) Agent―the instigator of the event
(b) Counter-agent―the resistance against which the action occurs
(c) Object―the entity acted upon or under consideration
(d) Result―the entity that ensues from the action
(e) Instrument―the immediate cause of the action
(f) Source―the place from which some entity moves
(g) Goal―the place to which some entity moves
(h) Experiencer―the entity receiving, accepting, undergoing, or experiencing the
effect of an action
In the sentence John opened the door with the key, John is the agent, door the
object, and key the instrument. The deep structure of each simple sentence would
consist in a verb plus its obligatory and optional cases. Open, for example, always
requires an object, but takes an agent and an instrument as options. The
transformational rules in Fillmore's system, as
in Chomsky's, are concerned with generating surface sentences from deep structures.
However, since the cases in Fillmore's semantic deep structure are unordered, there is
no need for rules which transpose elements. Instead, the rules establish a hierarchy
amongst the cases associated with a verb, specifying which grammatical role each
case will play in the surface sentence. For open, the instrument is the subject if it
occurs alone, but the object of a prepositional phrase (with the key) if there is an
agent. Fillmore's grammar does require deletion rules, because cases are represented
in the deep structure by prepositional phrases which, in most circumstances, do not
appear in the surface structure. Thus, the agent in our example would be represented
in deep structure as by John. The preposition would survive in the surface sentence
only in the passive case; in the active form the by would be deleted by a
transformation rule.
This type of semantic deep structure, important for its emphasis upon functions
and actions, can account for many of the facts of sentence comprehension. However,
it remains silent on the more complex problems delimited by Bransford, Franks, and
others, and those represented by the retention of the sense of paragraphs or entire
stories. Three recent models which are specifically pitched at this level seem
particularly interesting, those of Schank (1972, 1975), Norman and Rumelhart (1975)
and Jackendoff (1976). Common to these approaches is the assumption that the deepstructure
representation for language is some form of propositional or conceptual
network which codes meaning through the interaction of elements. Thus, for Schank
(1975) the basis of human memory is the conceptualization, which is 'action-based
with certain specified associative links between actions and objects' (p. 259).
Similarly, for Norman and Rumelhart (1975) the basis is the active structural
network, which is a semantic network representing the underlying propositions in any
stored event. Both systems rely on a set of primitives which define the forms of
interaction between the elements in the memory structures; here they follow in the
path of Bendix's componential analysis of verbs. Further, both argue that sentence
after sentence can be 'added' to the memory structure, in some cases being influenced
by what is already there, in other cases influencing it. Thus, they provide models for
the comprehension of sets of sentences. More recent work by Rumelhart (1975)
attempts to provide the basis for a representational network which would describe the
structure of an entire story without building sentence upon sentence.
While we cannot explore these models in detail, it is worth emphasizing the fact
that they insist upon a network-like propositional representation where the elements
within the network are related to one another through the action of a primitive set of
operators. The meaning of such a network, or conceptualization, is the totality of the
relationships embodied within it. We find it particularly heartening that Norman and
Rumelhart
emphasize the essential non-linguistic character of their networks; they apply their
analysis to imagery phenomena as well as to linguistic deep structure. Here, they
also stress the view that imagery depends, not on a pictorialization within memory,
but rather upon some propositional deep structure which captures the relationships
embodied in the image and from which the image can be reconstructed.
We will conclude this section on deep structure models with a discussion of
Jackendoff's system (Jackendoff, 1976) which is, for us, the most interesting and
exciting of the recent proposals. Jackendoff, expanding an original suggestion by
Gruber 1965, has proposed that all sentences have deep semantic structures which
are formally analagous to the subset of sentences describing events or states of
affairs in physical space. First he shows how an analysis similar to the one by
Fillmore described above will provide a deep structure for sentences about the
location and movement of entities in physical space and, second, he shows how
modifications and extensions of this purely spatial system can account for the
meanings of non-spatial sentences.
In his analysis of spatial sentences, he starts with examples like:
(1) The train travelled from Detroit to Cincinnati
(2) The hawk flew from its nest to the ground
(3) The rock fell from the roof to the ground
and shows how their meanings can be captured by a deep structure which specifies
the thematic relations between the verb and the nouns or noun phrases. Thus (1)
would be represented by the deep structure function, GO; the theme of the function,
train; the source or place from which the movement started, Detroit; and the goal
or place where the movement ends, Cincinnati. Notice the similarity to Fillmore's
case system described above. Spatial sentences (2) and (3) above would have
similar deep structures with suitable additional information such as the manner of
the motion. Other spatial sentences such as
(4) Max is in Africa
(5) The cat lay on the couch
(6) The bacteria stayed in his body
(7) Bill kept the book on the shelf
describe not the motion of the object or theme but its location and are represented
by the deep structure function BE (4 and 5) or STAY (6 and 7).
Thus all states of affairs and events in physical space can be represented in
Jackendoff's system by three functions GO, BE, and STAY, together with the things
and places which these functions relate. Agency and causation are added to the deep
structure by the higher order functions CAUSE and LET which apply not to entities
but to events. Thus if sentence (3) above would be represented by GO (THE
ROCK, THE ROOF, THE GROUND), then
(8) Linda threw the rock from the roof to the ground
(9) Linda dropped the rock from the roof to the ground
would be represented as CAUSE (LINDA, GO (THE ROCK, THE ROOF, THE
GROUND)) and LET (LINDA, GO (THE ROCK, THE ROOF, THE GROUND))
respectively.
At this point Jackendoff takes a crucial step. He claims that nonspatial sentences
have exactly the same representation except that the functions GO, BE, and STAY
do not refer to the spatial location of entities but to the possessive, identificational,
or circumstantial 'location' of entities. Let us look at possessive GO. While spatial or
positional GO signifies the movement of an entity from one physical location to
another, possessive GO signifies the movement of an entity from one possessive
location to another. The sentence
(10) Harry gave the book to the library
is represented as possessive GO (THE BOOK, HARRY, THE LIBRARY). Similarly
(11) The book belonged to the library
(12) The library kept the book
are represented by possessive BE (THE BOOK, THE LIBRARY) and possessive
STAY (THE BOOK, THE LIBRARY). The analysis of sentences about continuing
states of identity or changes of identity, or continuing or changing circumstances, are
given a similar treatment. Jackendoff shows, for example, that the semantic analysis
of the sentence
(13) Linda kept Laura from screaming
is exactly parallel to the sentence about physical prevention
(14) Linda kept Laura (away) from the cookie jar
except that the avoided location is a circumstance in example (13). Thus, for
example, the same rules of inference allow us to conclude that Laura did not scream
(13) nor did she get to the cookie jar (14).
Jackendoff has not extended his analysis into the domain of completely abstract
concepts nor to verbs referring to internal states or beliefs, but he sees no
insurmountable obstacle to such a programme, nor do we. It is also reasonable to
assume that this type of analysis can be extended to deal with units of speech longer
than a sentence, thus incorporating the recent work on discourse and narrative
comprehension. In summary, Jackendoff says:
'I consider it a striking property of the present system that simple principles, framed in terms
of physical space, can be stated formally in such a way as to generalize to domains that bear
no a priori relation to physical space' (Jackendoff, 1976 p. 121).

On linguistic grounds, then, it appears necessary to postulate the existence of
several different mechanisms underlying the production and understanding of
language. In addition to those mechanisms which select the appropriate words and
sentence frames to produce the temporal left-to-right ordered structure of the surface
aspects of language, there must be a deeper, more abstract level which carries the
sense of a sentence or a set of sentences.∗ The common element that all deep
structures share is their non-temporal aspect; put another way, they can all be
represented by purely static spatial structures. The sense of an item is derived from
its relation to other items within the structure, the overall sense of the sentence
follows from the total configuration, while the interaction between such
configurations allows for higher-order messages such as stories.
In terms of our model all of these deep-structure elements are identified with
maps in the locale system (or their activation). The surface structure of the
grammar, transformational processes, the syntactic structures, and the lexicon are
those parts of the taxon system which provide the means by which maps in one
person's locale system are transferred to another's.∗∗ These taxon systems are
analogues of the route systems of lower animals. They are based on the operations
of categorization and the formation of linkages between frequently associated items
to yield route statements. These routes, which take discourse from one substantive
to another, would appear to be the basis for the tone groups described by Laver
(1970, see footnote below). The rules which govern the generation of a set of routes
from the underlying semantic map are analogous to the transformational component
of a Chomsky-type grammar. As we shall see these rules can be much simpler than
those specified by Chomsky or Fillmore, since the form of the surface sentence can
be read directly from the directions traversed in the map.
Types of semantic maps. In developing the notion of a semantic map we shall
build on Jackendoff's insights and follow his general methods. First we shall
describe how semantic maps can be used to provide semantic deep structures for
sentences about entities and events in physical space. Using one of these spatial
semantic maps as an illustration,
∗ Studies of language generation, which occurs in small segments called tone groups according to Boomer
and Laver (1968) and Laver (1970), indicate that there are three separable processes involved (Goldman-Eisler
1968): (1) an idea or determining tendency; (2) the transformation of this idea into a sequential chain of
symbols; (3) the selection of appropriate lexical items. One function for the verbal short-term memory system
noted before (p. 388) could be the retention of a group of surface elements during the elaboration of the entire
tone group. In contrast to the appearance of lexical elements in a short-term holding system, both at input and
output, long-term memory for language is clearly concerned with the meaning of an utterance (e.g.
Johnson-Laird 1970, Bransford and McCarrell (1974).
∗∗ From an evolutionary point of view, language could have developed as a means of transferring
information about the spatial aspects of the environment: how to get somewhere, how to find food, etc.
we shall outline some of the syntactic transformation rules for transcribing all or part
of this map into a surface 'route' sentence or phrase. Following Jackendoff's method,
the next step will involve a discussion of how non-spatial maps similar to these
spatial maps can be formed and how the same transformation rules operate to
generate sentences about non-spatial entities and events. Instead of mapping physical
space, these non-spatial maps depict surfaces on which the locations represent
possession (or, as we shall call it, influence), identity, and circumstances. In this
section we will also introduce the notion that maps or parts of maps can be 'named'
and these names can be entered into locations on other maps.
A semantic map for spatial sentences. Sentences about the location of objects or
the occurrence of events in physical space have an obvious and natural representation
within a spatial map structure. Let us use Jackendoff's sentence (3) as an example
(3) The rock fell from the roof to the ground
The map of this event has three phases (see Fig. 36). The first (a) depicts the unstated
presupposition that an entity (E) the rock was in a place (P) the roof up to some unknown past time t1. 
'.


 
The second (b) depicts the action at time t1 in
which an entity the rock moves from the place the roof to the place the ground. In
the third phase (c), the rock is in the location the ground from time t1 onwards. Thus
there are two places, an entity which either stays in these places or moves from one
to the other, and time markers which specify the time of the movement and the
beginning and end of the period spent in a location. These time markers may refer
to times attributed to the external world or they may be entirely internal to the map.
The entire map is shown in Fig. 36(d).
Notice how the mapping system incorporates the three fundamental functions of
Jackendoff's system, GO, BE, and STAY. BE is represented by the location of an
entity in a place without a time marker. If there were no time marker on the first
phase (a) of our three phase representation, this would depict the BE function: the
rock is on the roof and, as far as we know, always was and always will be. The
STAY function is represented by the third phase (c) where the time marker t, limits
the duration of the state in the past direction but there is no time marker to limit it in
the future direction. The second phase of our semantic map (b) represents
Jackendoff's GO function, the movement of an entity from one location to another
at some specific time.
A variety of sentences can be generated from our simple spatial semantic map by
a set of transformation rules. We will assume that there are no obligatory points of
entry into a semantic map nor are there obligatory directions of movement within
the map. Thus although the map may have been originally constructed from a
simple active sentence, it can be entered at any entity, event, place, or movement
and read in part or in whole in any direction. The order of reading and the
relationships between the successive items read determines the syntactic role of
each item in the surface sentence. Maps containing nothing but spatial entities and
events can only generate sentences in the active voice. We shall discuss the passive
voice shortly. If the map of our example (Fig. 36) is entered at the entity rock and
this is read first, it becomes the syntactic subject of an active sentence. If the
movement is read next it becomes the verb, and the place of origin and the place of
termination of the movement are made the objects of the prepositions from and to
respectively. With this order of selection, we have generated our active sentence
from which the map was created.
(15) The rock fell from the roof to the ground
If after reading the entity the rock, we had read first the place of origin the roof and
then the movement and place of termination, our sentence would read:
(16) The rock was on the roof and (then) it fell to the ground (from there

Similarly:
(17) The rock was on the ground where it had fallen from the roof
The natural expression of the relationship between an entity and its location is
(Entity) is  in/on (location)
We might have entered the map at one of the places and read the entity next.
(18) The roof had a rock (on it) and (then) the rock fell to the ground
(19) The ground has a rock (on it) which fell from the roof
The natural expression of the relationship between a location and its entity is
(Location) have (entity)
Similarly:
(20) The roof had something fall from it on to the ground and that was the rock
(21) From the roof, the rock fell to the ground
Finally the map can be entered at the movement itself
(22) The falling of the rock from the roof to the ground
In which case the movement is nominalized as a gerund or a noun (fall) and the entity
becomes the object of the preposition of as a subjective genitive. It is clear, therefore,
that any of the parts of a map can be the subject of the sentence derived from that
map and that the parts of the map can be read in any order or direction. Finally the
syntactic function of a representation in the map is determined partly by its role in the
map and partly by the order in which the parts of the map are read.
The simple physical semantic map can embody all three of the deep structure
functions (GO, STAY, BE) which were discussed in the previous section. Note that
there are no rules necessary to derive inferences from the deep structure since these
are built into the map when it is constructed in the first place. Our map of sentence
(15) contains the unstated information that the rock was on the roof for some
undetermined time, that it fell through the places between the roof and ground before
falling to the ground, and that it remained on the ground for some undetermined time
after the event.
Semantic maps for non-spatial sentences. Sentences about entities and events in
physical space constitute only a small proportion of the language. Non-spatial
sentences represent notions such as possession, causation,
responsibility, identity, and category inclusion to name a few. Jackendoff
introduced the higher order functions CAUSE and LET into his linguistic system to
deal with causation and permission in spatial sentences. More importantly he
suggested that non-spatial sentences conveying information about possession,
identity, and circumstances had the same formal structure as spatial sentences. We
will draw upon this insight and introduce the notion of non-spatial maps. Following
Jackendoff, we will consider three types of non-spatial map: maps of influence or
possession surfaces, maps of identity surfaces, and maps of circumstance surfaces.
We do not have room here to go into great detail about each of these non-spatial
maps so we will concentrate on the influence or possession type and only briefly
comment on the other two.
One important concept not captured by a purely spatial mapping system is that
which is common to the notions of causation, control, power, instrumentality, and
possession. These notions represent a relationship between entities and/or events in
which one is under the influence of the other. Some of these relationships are
represented in semantic systems such as Fillmore's by the deep semantic cases
agent and instrument (see above). We will postulate that all of these relations are
represented on one surface which we shall call an influence surface. Influence
relations on this surface are represented by entities in particular locations and
changes in influence are portrayed as movements between places. Expanding on our
previous notation, places in our influence map will be labelled Pinfl while places in
our physical spatial map will be labelled Pphys.
Entries in different maps (entities, places, and movements) which have the same
name are considered to be connected so that the activation of one entry also
activates all the other entities. For example, if Harry were the name of a place in
influence space and an entity in physical space, activation of one would activate the
other.
Before we discuss an example of a map portraying relations and events in an
influence space, it will be useful to introduce the concept of map nesting or
embedding. Maps or parts of maps can be labelled with names and these names can
then be represented as entities or locations in other maps. The names of maps can
appear not only in maps of the same type but of other types as well. Thus the name
of an influence map could appear as an entity in a physical spatial map. This notion
of map embedding will become clear in the next example which illustrates both the
movement of an entity in an influence space and the embedding of this influence
event in a second influence map. Our example is sentence (10) taken from
Jackendoff (see above).
(23) Harry gave the book to the library
This means that the book moved into the possession of the library
and that this event was caused by Harry. In the system we are proposing both the
transfer of possession and the causation of that event would be represented in an
influence map. The transfer of possession is represented as a movement from some
unknown location into the location (the library). This event is given the name
transfer of possession and entered into the location (Harry) in the influence map. The
interpretation given to the relationship in an influence map between a location and its
content depends on the nature of the content. When the content is a primitive entity
drawn from a taxon store such as the rock or the book then the relationship is
interpreted as a possession where the location possesses the content. When the
content is the name of another map (i.e. an event), then the relationship is one of
causation, the event is caused by the location. Entities possess other entities, entities
or events cause events.∗ We will leave open for the moment what the interpretation
of an entity in an influence location of an event might be.
Fig. 37 shows the influence map of sentence (23). Notice that the sentence does
not specify whether the book belonged to Harry before the event described or
whether the book actually physically moved to the library. These are left ambiguous.
Consider the related sentences:
(24) Harry gave his own book to the library
which disambiguates the book's former possessor.
(25) Harry gave the book to the library- after it had been displayed on loan there
for several years.
and
(26) Harry gave the book to the library but won't be sending it to them until next
year.
The map representation of the event in sentence (23) is given in Fig. 37 (a)-(d).
Notice the similarity to Fig. 36 except that the relationships and the event take place
in an influence space. In order to represent the rest of the sentence, namely, that
Harry caused the event portrayed in Fig. 37(d), this influence map is given a name
and entered into the influence location called Harry (Fig. 37(e) and (f)). Fig. 37(g)
shows the map of the whole sentence. As we stated earlier, entities are possessed by
influence locations (e.g. Fig. 37(c)) but events are caused by influence locations (e.g.
Fig. 37(f) ).
More than one entity can be represented in an influence location. For example, if
our influence map had represented sentence (24) instead of
∗ Strictly speaking, only events cause other events. When an event is entered into the influence space of an
entity this is interpreted as an instrumental relationship. We will not go into this complication but assume for
the present that agentive entities can cause events. It does not change the basic arguments set out here.



 
FIG. 37. Schematic for an influence map of the sentence 'Harry gave the book to the library'.

sentence (23) then the location Harry would have been substituted for the unknown
location of the book in Fig. 37(a) and this location would have contained both the
book until time t1 , and the transfer at time t1.
Let us look at some of the transformation rules for reading route sentences from
influence maps. Here we will continually refer to the rules developed for physical
spatial maps to show the similarities. As with physical spatial maps, influence maps
can be entered at any point and read in any direction. Let us start with the event in
influence space and compare it with the event in physical space mapped in Fig. 36.
Consider the following pairs of sentences:
(15) The rock fell from the roof to the ground
(27) The book went from (the possession of) someone to (the possession of) the
library
(16) The rock was on the roof and (then) it fell to the ground
(28) The book was in the possession of someone (or was someone's) and (then) it
went to the library
(17) The rock was on the ground where it had fallen from the roof
(29) The book was in the possession of the library whence it had come from
some unknown person
The natural syntactic expression of the relationship between an entity and its location
in influence space is the same as in physical space. Conversely the natural expression
of the relationship between an influence location and its content is
(Location) have (entity)
(18) The roof had a rock (on it) and (then) the rock fell to the ground
(30) Someone had a book and (then) the book went to the library
(31) Harry had the book given to the library
(32) Harry had someone give his book to the library
As examples (31) and (32) show the have transformation holds irrespective of
whether the content of the influence location is an entity possessed or an event
caused.
Two important syntactic features which must be introduced into the transformation
rules for influence maps do not exist for physical spatial maps. These are the
active/passive voice distinction and the genitive of possession. Both of these are
necessary to transcribe readings in which the contents of an influence location are
read before the name of the location itself. Thus, in our example, reading the
locations first in Fig. 37(c) and (g) gives, respectively
(33) The library's book
(34) Harry had the book given to the library
while reading the contents of those locations first gives
(35) The book of the library
(36) The book was given to the library by Harry
If the influence location is read after its contents, it becomes the object of the
preposition by in a passive sentence or the object of the preposition of. Notice that
instead of (34) one could have read (37) or (38):
(37) Harry's giving (of) the book to the library
(38) Harry's gift of the book to the library
In addition to a mode expressing possessional relations and changes in
possessional relations, Jackendoff postulated identificational and circumstantial
modes whose syntax was analogous to the physical spatial mode in much the same
way that that of the possessional mode was. We have not attempted to work this out
in detail or to construct maps of these spaces∗ but see no insurmountable problem in
doing so. Note, for example, the similarities between the identificational sentence
(39), the circumstantial sentence (40), and the physical sentence (15) above.
(39) The rock went from smooth to pitted
(40) The librarian went from laughing to crying
To conclude this section, let us briefly mention what seems to us the main
weakness of the semantic map idea. Maps of physical space which use a Euclidean
metric allow inferences to be drawn about the relationships amongst entities in
those maps which go beyond the usual laws of logic. This was, of course, what
Kant meant when he called space a synthetic a priori. Thus we can say that the rock
in its fall from the roof to the ground must pass through the intervening places. Our
map did not specify whether these places were occupied or not. If it had then we
could conclude that the rock must bump into, or pass through, whatever occupied
those places. Some of the work of Bransford and Franks and their colleagues seems
to be based on inferences of this type. Now it is not immediately obvious that the
same kinds of inferences can be drawn from our non-physical semantic maps. Part
of our difficulty here is that we do not know what the axes of the non-physical
semantic maps are or even whether the maps can be considered Euclidean. These
objections notwithstanding we think that the work of Jackendoff opens up exciting
possibilities for investigating the use of maps of physical and non-physical spaces
as the basis for deep semantic structures.
14.3.3. CONCLUSION
The above sections outline a possible way in which the cognitive-mapping system
could function as a deep structure for language. The representations in this deep
structure have all the properties we have attributed to maps.
∗ Whether these maps are irreducible primitives or will on further examination be found to be reducible to
various combinations of physical spatial and influence maps remains to be seen.
Items are entered into a semantic map not on the basis of the order in which they are
received or their position in a left-to-right linear string but in accordance with their
semantic relationships to other items in the map. Maps do not incorporate
information about the way that they were constructed or the 'route' surface sentence
from which they were constructed. Items in the map and their relationship can be
read in any order and a large number of different sentences can be generated from
the same map. Once a semantic map exists, additional information can be added or
changes in the existing information can be made. The resulting large semantic
structures embody the ideas expressed in paragraphs or whole stories. We locate
these semantic maps in the left human hippocampus. Taken together with the
representations of physical occurrences in the right hippocampus they form the
basis for what is generally referred to as long-term, context-specific memory for
episodes and narratives. In the next chapter, this assertion will be 'tested' against the
known facts of the amnesic syndrome.
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