Assistant Professor of Finance
UCLA Anderson School of Management
"Optimal Securitization with Moral Hazard" with Tomasz Piskorski and Alexei Tchistyi, Journal of Financial Economics, 104 (2012) 186-202
Abstract: We consider the optimal design of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in a dynamic setting in which a mortgage underwriter with limited liability can engage in costly hidden effort to screen borrowers and can sell loans to investors. We show that (i) the timing of payments to the underwriter is the key incentive mechanism, (ii) the maturity of the optimal contract can be short, and that (iii) bundling mortgages is efficient as it allows investors to learn about underwriter effort more quickly, an information enhancement effect. Finally, we demonstrate that the optimal contract can be closely approximated by the “first loss piece.”
"Reputation and Signaling in Asset Sales" (Revised November 2013).
Abstract: Static adverse selection models of security issuance show that informed issuers can perfectly reveal their private information by maintaing a costly stake in the securities they issue. This paper shows that allowing an issuer to both signal current security quality via retention and build a reputation for honesty leads that issuer to misreport quality even when owning a positive stake—the equilibrium is neither separating nor pooling. An issuer retains less as reputation improves and prices are more sensitive to retention when the issuer has a worse reputation.
"Dynamic Agency and Real Options" with Sebastian Gryglewicz (2013).
Abstract: We present a model integrating dynamic moral hazard and real options. A risk-averse manager can exert costly hidden effort to increase productivity growth of a firm. In addition, risk-neutral owners of the firm can irreversibly increase the firms capital stock. In contrast to the literature, moral hazard can accelerate or delay investment relative to the first best. When the agency problem is more severe, the firm will invest earlier than in the first best case because investment acts as substitute for effort. This mechanism provides an explanation for over-investment that does not rely on "empire-building'' preferences. Moreover, when the growth option is large, the firm will invest later than in the first best.