My research is focused on modeling how market frictions affect investment behavior and prices of financial assets in equilibrium.
Some frictions, like restrictions on capital flows across markets, or short-selling restrictions, are exogenously imposed. Others are rather intrinsic features of reality, like information asymmetry or transaction costs. In general, however, the frictions imposed on markets or investors by institutions are attempts to circumvent or mitigate the problems created by an imperfect reality - sometimes for the better, but almost certainly creating their own side effects.
In the MBA programme I teach Corporate Financial Policy, studying firms' optimal financing and payout policy. Uncertainty, asymmetric information and moral hazard affect how contracts can be written - between the borrowing firm and its lenders, the owners and the managers, and existing owners and new investors. The course studies how incentives arising from these contracts - desired or not - affect firm value.
I also teach a PhD core course on Continuous Time Finance in the second year of the programme and a shorter PhD elective on International Finance.