Art Shneyerov

Professor of Economics

Concordia University, Montreal , Canada 

CIRANO and CIREQ Research Fellow

Associate Editor, IJIO

Ph.D. Northwestern University, 2002


Working Papers

"Inference for First-Price Auctions with Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong's estimator", with Vadim Marmer and Jun Ma, revise and resubmit, Journal of Econometrics

"Foreclosure Auctions", with Andras Niedermayer and Pai Xu, submitted

"Bid rigging and entry deterrence:Evidence from an anti-collusion investigation in Quebec", with Decio Coviello, Rob Clark and Jean-Francois Gauthier, submitted

"Identifying Collusion in English Auctions", with Vadim Marmer and Uma Kaplan, submitted


"An Optimistic Search Equililbrium", with Dip Majumdar and Huan Xie, forthcoming, Review of Economic Design

"For-Profit Search Platforms", with Andras Niedermayer, International Economic Review, August 2014, Volume 55, Issue 3, pages 765-789. 
  • This paper is a starred item on the reading list of Jean Tirole's graduate IO course at TSE. 

"An Optimal Slow Dutch Auction"Economic Theory, 2014, Volume 57, Issue 3 , pp 577-602 

"A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky Model"Economics Letters, Volume 124, Issue 2, August 2014, Pages 314–317

"What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach", withVadim Marmer and Pai Xu, , Journal of Econometrics

Vol. 176(1), 2013, pp. 46-58

 Supplemental Appendix
"The Role of Private Information in Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: Can It Be Good For Efficiency?", with Adam Chi Leung Wong, Economics Letters, Vol. 112(1), 2011, pp. 128-131. 

"Identification in First Price Auctions when the Number of Potential Bidders is Unobservable", with Adam Chi Leung Wong, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 72(2), 2011, pp. 574-582

"Quantile-Based Nonparametric Inference for First-Price Auctions", with Vadim Marmer,  Journal of EconometricsVol. 167(2),  2012, pp. 345–357 Technical Supplement

"The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of Matching and Bargaining  Mechanisms", with Adam Chi Leung Wong,  Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 145(3), 2010, pp. 1164–1187. Mathematica notebook

"Bilateral Matching and Bargaining with Private Information", with Adam Chi Leung Wong, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 62(2), 2010, pp. 748-762.

"Convergence to Perfect Competition of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information and Exogenous Exit Rate", with Mark Satterthwaite, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol 63(2), 2008, pp. 435-467.

"Dynamic Matching,Two-sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition" with Mark Satterthwaite, Econometrica, Vol 75(1), 2007, pp. 155-200. 

"An Empirical Study of Auction Revenue Rankings: The Case of Municipal Bonds", The Rand Journal of Economics, Vol 37(4), 2006, pp. 1005-1022.Working paper version
  • Read the discussion of this paper and related empirical papers on auctions in Chapter 6 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 3, edited by K. Hendricks and R. Porter. The draft of the chapter is available here.

"Path Independent Inequality Measures", with J. Foster, Journal of Economic Theory,91, 2000

General Class of Additive Decomposable Inequality Measures", with J. Foster, Economic Theory, 14, 1999.