"For-Profit Search Platforms", with Andras Niedermayer, accepted, International Economic Review
"What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach", withVadim Marmer and Pai Xu, forthcoming,, Journal of Econometrics,
Vol. 176(1), 2013, pp. 46-58Supplemental Appendix
"Are There Common Values in First-Price Auctions? A Tail-Index Nonparametric Test",with Jonathan B. Hill, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 174(2), 2013, pp. 144-164.
"The Role of Private Information in Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: Can It Be Good For Efficiency?", with Adam Chi Leung Wong, Economics Letters, Vol. 112(1), 2011, pp. 128-131.
"Identification in First Price Auctions when the Number of Potential Bidders is Unobservable", with Adam Chi Leung Wong, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 72(2), 2011, pp. 574-582
"Quantile-Based Nonparametric Inference for First-Price Auctions", with Vadim Marmer, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 167(2), 2012, pp. 345–357, Technical Supplement
"The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of Matching and Bargaining Mechanisms", with Adam Chi Leung Wong, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 145(3), 2010, pp. 1164–1187. Mathematica notebook
"Bilateral Matching and Bargaining with Private Information", with Adam Chi Leung Wong, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 62(2), 2010, pp. 748-762.
"Convergence to Perfect Competition of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information and Exogenous Exit Rate", with Mark Satterthwaite, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol 63(2), 2008, pp. 435-467.
"Dynamic Matching,Two-sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition" with Mark Satterthwaite, Econometrica, Vol 75(1), 2007, pp. 155-200. This paper is on the reading list and in lecture notes of a micro theory course at Yale University.
"An Empirical Study of Auction Revenue Rankings: The Case of Municipal Bonds", The Rand Journal of Economics, Vol 37(4), 2006, pp. 1005-1022.Working paper version. Read the discussion of this paper and related empirical papers on auctions in Chapter 6 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 3, edited by K. Hendricks and R. Porter. The draft of the chapter is available here.
"Path Independent Inequality Measures", with J. Foster, Journal of Economic Theory,91, 2000
General Class of Additive Decomposable Inequality Measures", with J. Foster, Economic Theory, 14, 1999.
"An Optimistic Search Equililbrium", with Dip Majumdar and Huan Xie, revise and resubmit
"Revenue Management by a Patient Seller", revise and resubmit
"Price Setting with Interdependent Values", with Pai Xu, submitted
"A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky Model", submitted