Department of Economics, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)
Center for the Study of Democratic Citizenship (CSDC), McGill University and Université de Montréal
Legislative Informational Lobbying -- Under Revise and Resubmit at the Journal of Economic Theory.
Rank Voting and Polarization: An Experiment (with Christoph Vanberg)
How Do People Vote under Preferential Voting? An Experiment on Voting Behavior and Computational Complexity (with Philippe Chabot and Sabine Kröger)
Objectifs, défis et réalité des engagements du gouvernement Legault dans une économie tourmentée (with Alain Paquet)
Does Party Polarization Affect the Electoral Prospects of a New Centrist Candidate?, Games, forthcoming.
Subpoena Power and Informational Lobbying (with Mandar Oak), Journal of Theoretical Politics 32(2), 2020, 188-234.
Informational Lobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint (with Mandar Oak), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 35(3), 2019, 579-618.
Endogenous Candidacy in Plurality Rule Elections: Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and their Polarization (with Damien Bol and Mandar Oak). Published in French: "Candidatures endogènes dans les élections pluralitaires : quelques explications du nombre de candidats et de leur polarisation", L'Actualite Economique 93(1-2), 2017, 141-171.
Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections Under the Alternative Vote Rule (with Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile and Mandar Oak), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 173, 2017, 565-590.
Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy (with Damien Bol and Mandar Oak), in: "The Political Economy of Social Choices", Maria Gallego and Norman Schofield (eds), 2016, Springer, 21-54.
Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion (with Christopher Cotton), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 32, 2016, 762-793.
Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization (with Mandar Oak), Social Choice and Welfare 46, 2016, 1-38.
The two-party system under alternative voting procedures, Social Choice and Welfare 40, 2013, 263-284.
Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment (with Sean D’Evelyn and Katarina Sherstyuk), Social Choice and Welfare 37, 2011, 171-200.
Weak undominance in scoring rule elections, Mathematical Social Sciences 59, 2010, 110-119.
Policy moderation and endogenous candidacy in Approval Voting elections, in “Handbook on Approval Voting”, Jean-François Laslier and Remzi Sanver (eds), 2010, Springer, 431-451.
Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?, Journal of Economic Theory 144, 2009, 772-801.
The salient issue of issue salience, Journal of Public Economic Theory 11, 2009, 203-231.
Policy convergence under Approval and Plurality Voting: the role of policy commitment (with Mandar Oak), Social Choice and Welfare 29, 2007, 229-245.
Blame-game politics in a coalition government, Journal of Public Economics 91, 2007, 77-96.
Approval voting with endogenous candidates (with Mandar Oak), Games and Economic Behavior 54, 2006, 47-76.
Economic growth and population growth (with Pierre Pestieau), in: “Demography: Analysis and Synthesis III”, Graziella Caselli, Jacques Vallin and Guillaume Wunsch (eds), 2006, Academic Press, 361-372.
Micro-modeling of retirement in Belgium (with Raphaël Desmet, Alain Jousten and Sergio Perelman), in: “Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: Microestimation”, Jonathan Gruber and David Wise (eds), 2004, NBER and University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 41-98.
Family size and optimal income taxation (with Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau), Journal of Population Economics 16, 2003, 37-54.