Department of Economics, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)

Subpoena Power and Informational Lobbying (with Mandar Oak), Journal of Theoretical Politics 32(2), 2020, 188-234.

Informational Lobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint (with Mandar Oak), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 35(3), 2019, 579-618.

Endogenous Candidacy in Plurality Rule Elections: Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and their Polarization (with Damien Bol and Mandar Oak). Published in French: "Candidatures endogènes dans les élections pluralitaires : quelques explications du nombre de candidats et de leur polarisation", L'Actualite Economique 93(1-2), 2017, 141-171.

Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections Under the Alternative Vote Rule (with Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile and Mandar Oak), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 173, 2017, 565-590.

Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy (with Damien Bol and Mandar Oak), in: "The Political Economy of Social Choices", Maria Gallego and Norman Schofield (eds), 2016, Springer, 21-54.

Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion (with Christopher Cotton), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 32, 2016, 762-793.

Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization (with Mandar Oak), Social Choice and Welfare 46, 2016, 1-38.

The two-party system under alternative voting procedures, Social Choice and Welfare 40, 2013, 263-284.

Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment (with Sean D’Evelyn and Katarina Sherstyuk), Social Choice and Welfare 37, 2011, 171-200.

Weak undominance in scoring rule elections, Mathematical Social Sciences 59, 2010, 110-119.

Policy moderation and endogenous candidacy in Approval Voting elections, in “Handbook on Approval Voting”, Jean-François Laslier and Remzi Sanver (eds), 2010, Springer, 431-451.

Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?, Journal of Economic Theory 144, 2009, 772-801.

The salient issue of issue salience, Journal of Public Economic Theory 11, 2009, 203-231.

Policy convergence under Approval and Plurality Voting: the role of policy commitment (with Mandar Oak), Social Choice and Welfare 29, 2007, 229-245.

Blame-game politics in a coalition government, Journal of Public Economics 91, 2007, 77-96.

Approval voting with endogenous candidates (with Mandar Oak), Games and Economic Behavior 54, 2006, 47-76.

Economic growth and population growth (with Pierre Pestieau), in: “Demography: Analysis and Synthesis III”, Graziella Caselli, Jacques Vallin and Guillaume Wunsch (eds), 2006, Academic Press, 361-372.

Micro-modeling of retirement in Belgium (with Raphaël Desmet, Alain Jousten and Sergio Perelman), in: “Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: Microestimation”, Jonathan Gruber and David Wise (eds), 2004, NBER and University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 41-98.

Family size and optimal income taxation (with Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau), Journal of Population Economics 16, 2003, 37-54.