Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion (with Christopher Cotton)
Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization (with Mandar Oak)
The two-party system under alternative voting procedures, Social Choice and Welfare 40, 2013, 263-284.
Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment (with Sean D’Evelyn and Katarina Sherstyuk), Social Choice and Welfare 37, 2011, 171-200.
Weak undominance in scoring rule elections, Mathematical Social Sciences 59, 2010, 110-119.
Policy moderation and endogenous candidacy in Approval Voting elections, in “Handbook on Approval Voting”, Jean-François Laslier and Remzi Sanver (eds), 2010, Springer, 431-451.
Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?, Journal of Economic Theory 144, 2009, 772-801.
The salient issue of issue salience, Journal of Public Economic Theory 11, 2009, 203-231.
Policy convergence under Approval and Plurality Voting: the role of policy commitment (with Mandar Oak), Social Choice and Welfare 29, 2007, 229-245.
Blame-game politics in a coalition government, Journal of Public Economics 91, 2007, 77-96.
Approval voting with endogenous candidates (with Mandar Oak), Games and Economic Behavior 54, 2006, 47-76.
Economic growth and population growth (with Pierre Pestieau), in: “Demography: Analysis and Synthesis III”, Graziella Caselli, Jacques Vallin and Guillaume Wunsch (eds), 2006, Academic Press, 361-372.
Micro-modeling of retirement in Belgium (with Raphaël Desmet, Alain Jousten and Sergio Perelman), in: “Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: Microestimation”, Jonathan Gruber and David Wise (eds), 2004, NBER and University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 41-98.
Family size and optimal income taxation (with Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau), Journal of Population Economics 16, 2003, 37-54.