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7y ArgDiaP

Siódma Konferencja
ArgDiaP 2010/11

„Cognition and Argument: An Insight into Real-Life Practice”

18 czerwca 2011
Warszawa, ul. Wóycickiego 1/3, sala 321, Auditorium Maximum, UKSW**

Siódma konferencja ArgDiaP będzie poświęcona tematyce argumentacji w kontekście procesów kognitywnych. Procesy kognitywne stają się argumentatywne w sytuacji niezgody. Opozycja zakłada rozważenie argumentów za i przeciw konfliktowej opinii. Jednak jak należałoby postąpić, jeżeli niezgoda jest tak znacząca, że wydaje się niemożliwa do rozstrzygnięcia? Innym fascynującym problemem jest język argumentacji. Stało się jasne, że argumenty z rzeczywistej praktyki operują w ramach niezwykle wieloznacznego, nieostrego i entymematycznego języka, ale czy argumentacja może być wyrażona za pomocą języka wizualnego?
W ciągu ostatnich kilku lat, nastąpiła istotna zmiana w metodologii badań nad poznaniem i językiem -- nastąpiło przesunięcie z filozofii teoretycznej na badania eksperymentalne. Popołudniowa sesja spotkania ArgDiaP będzie temu poświęcona. W teorii argumentacji metoda eksperymentalna stanowi nadal rzadkość. Przyjrzymy się możliwościom przeniesienia doświadczeń z eksperymentalnych badań nad poznaniem na grunt teorii argumentacji. Więcej szczegółów dotyczących tematyki konferencji można znaleźć w streszczeniach wystąpień.
 
Organizatorem spotkania jest Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie oraz Samorząd Doktorantów UKSW. Gospodarzem spotkania jest dr Katarzyna Budzyńska (kontakt: k.budzynska (at) uksw.edu.pl).


Szczegółowy program:

10.45 – 11.00 Kawa i Przywitanie.
Przewodniczący sesji: Chris Reed

11.00 –  12.00 Leo Groarke (UoW) Images and Argument: Theories of Visual Argument 12.00 – 12.15 kawa
12.15 – 13.00
Steven Patterson (MC) The Usefulness of Deep Disagreement 

13.00 – 14.30 przerwa obiadowa

Przewodnicząca sesji: Magdalena Kacprzak  
14.30 – 15.15 Lucas Champollion (UoT) Unifying aspect, measurement, distributivity and cumulativity
15.15 – 16.00 Justyna Grudzińska (UW) & Julien Musolino (RU) Cumulative readings: an experimental approach
16.00 – 16.15 kawa
16.15 – 16.45 Jakub Szymanik (UoG) Logic and Cognition


Streszczenia

Leo Groarke, Images and Argument: Theories of Visual Argument.
Fifteen years ago, I defended an account of "visual argument": the notion that arguments (in the traditional premise and conclusion sense) can be conveyed in images instead of words.  My own views -- and those of other commentators (among them, Blair, Birdsell, and Roque) -- have provoked much discussion and debate.  In my keynote, I will examine some of the central issues that have been identified in this discussion.  They include questions about:

  • the meaning of images in argument;
  • the (propositional?) nature of arguments and images;
  • the claim that images cannot negate;
  • the relationship between images and words in "multi-modal" (and verbal and visual) argument;
  • the significance of image genres -- from graphs and illustrations to cartoons, films, and tattoos, etc.;
  • the emotive force of images; and
  • the implications that visual arguments have for the theory of argument.

I argue that a fully developed account of visual argument has a great deal to contribute to traditional accounts of argument.

Steven Patterson, The Usefulness of Deep Disagreement.
In this paper I begin by examining Fogelin's account of deep disagreement and show that this account is so deeply flawed as to cast doubt on the possibility that such deep disagreements actually happen. Nevertheless, I contend that the notion of deep disagreement itself is a useful theoretical foil for thinking about argumentation. The second part of this paper makes this case by showing how thinking about deep disagreements from the perspective of rhetoric, Walton-style argumentation theory, computation, and normative pragmatics can all yield insights that are useful no matter what one's orientation within the study of argument. Thus, I conclude that deep disagreement--even if it were to turn out that there are no real-world occurrences of it to which we can point--is theoretically useful for theorists of argumentation.  In this wise, deep disagreement poses a theoretical challenge for argumentation theory not unlike that posed by radical skepticism for traditional epistemology. 

Lucas Champollion, Unifying aspect, measurement, distributivity and cumulativity Why can I tell you that I 'ran for five minutes' but not that I 'ran to the store for five minutes'? Why can you say that there are 'five pounds of books' in this package if it contains several books, but not five pounds of book' if it contains only one? What keeps you from sing 'sixty degrees of water' to tell me the temperature of the water in your pool when you can use 'sixty inches of water' to tell me its eight? And why can I not say 'all the safari participants saw thirty zebras' if I want to report that each safari participant saw some zebras and that thirty zebras were seen overall?
This talk answers the questions above within the framework of mereological formal semantics. While formal semanticists tend to view these questions as exemplifying diverse research categories within their field, namely aspect, distributivity, cumulativity and measurement, I will instead develop a unified perspective on these domains, and use this perspective to formulate a single answer to all of the questions above. In doing so I will also link to Justyna Grudzinska's talk on cumulativity. Finally, time permitting I will offer some thoughts on the style of argumentation used in theoretical linguistic research such as the present one, and relate it to argumentation theory more generally.
Optional background reading (I won't presuppose this in the talk itself):
M. Krifka. The origins of telicity. In S. Rothstein, editor, Events and grammar, pages 197–235. Kluwer, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1998.
R. Schwarzschild. The role of dimensions in the syntax of noun phrases . Syntax, 9(1):67–110, 2006.

Justyna Grudzińska & Julien Musolino, Cumulative readings: an experimental approach.
In the presentation, I will give an overview of the controversies surrounding the semantics for sentences involving two numerical quantifiers (Three boys are holding two balloons) and talk about the experimental work by Dr. Musolino and his team related to those controversies. The main focus of the presentation will be on cumulative readings and the question raised in the literature whether cumulative readings should be distinguished from other readings in the grammar. Roberts (1987), Link (1998) and Schwertel (2005) argue that we do not need to complicate the grammar with cumulative readings, because we can regard them as instances of group-group readings (the group/group view). The grammar only generates the group-group reading and the context sometimes (but not always) creates the cumulative effect. Landman (2000), on the other hand, claims that cumulative readings are real and should not be reduced to group-group readings. In my presentation, I will talk about our experimental work designed to help resolve this controversy.

Jakub Szymanik, Logic and Cognition
I will survey my recent work on the intersection of logic and cognitive science. I will mostly talk about two research project I have been involved in: computational semantics for generalized quantifiers in natural language and logical models for higher order social cognition. I will also discuss how logical studies can improve our understanding of cognition by proposing new methodological perspectives in psychology. The major focus will be computational complexity and its interplay with "difficulty" as experienced by subjects in cognitive science.

 

Komitet organizacyjno-programowy

Uczestnictwo w konferencji jest bezpłatne, jednak ze względów organizacyjnych prosimy o zgłoszenie chęci uczestnictwa w konferencji przesyłając mail do dr Katarzyny Budzyńskiej na adres:

k.budzynska (at) uksw.edu.pl

 

** Wskazówki dotyczące dojazdu

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  • Autobusem 114 w kierunku *UKSW Młociny* - należy wsiąść na przystanku oznaczonym na mapie numerem 01 (prawy dolny róg mapy) i wysiąść na ostatnim przystanku (mini pętli)
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