Nathan Nobis

This page is moving to

Thank you for visiting!

Nathan Nobis, Ph.D.

Writings | Teaching | Links | CV

"The ultimate measure of a man is not where he stands in moments of comfort and convenience, but where he stands at times of challenge and controversy." - Martin Luther King, Jr. ('48)



Philosophy & Religion Department, Sale Hall

830 Westview Drive SW

Atlanta, Georgia 30314

404-825-1740 cell (preferred email), (redirect URL)

Research and teaching interests:

  • applied and practical ethics: bioethics, ethics & animals, abortion;.

  • critical thinking / argument analysis in ethics;

  • ethical theory;

  • intersections of ethics/meta-ethics/value theory and epistemology;

  • science and values;

  • philosophy, critical thinking and psychotherapy.



Some new things and things in progress:


  • On March 5, 2010, I created a survey to try to identify which topics are most commonly addressed in introductory ethics courses that have a contemporary moral issues or problems component. If (and only if) you teach a course that focuses on practical issues (with little to no discussion of moral theory) or has a mix of theory and problems (either a unit on theory and then problems or a mix of theory and problems throughout), please fill out this survey below:

  • Rational Animals: Critical Thinking & Animal Ethics

  • Why Think That? Reason, Argument and Ethics: A Guide To Making Moral Progress. A short book on logic and critical thinking that focuses on how to think (not what to think) about ethical questions that is geared toward students and scientists, called (see The book is designed to bridge the 'gap' between how philosophers / logicians often think about moral issues -- especially the methods they use -- and how non-philosophers often address moral issues, and address some of common cognitive, emotional and social barriers to using philosophical methods in addressing moral questions.

  • A Short Introduction to Philosophy of Race

  • "Teaching African American Philosophy of Religion and the Many Problems of Evil" (LINK HERE)

Dissertation (2005): Truth in Ethics and Epistemology: A Defense of Normative Realism

Synopsis: I argue that common reasons to think that no moral judgments are true suggest that epistemic judgments, e.g., that some belief is rational, justified or should be held, are not true either. I argue that these epistemic anti-realisms are rationally unacceptable and that the major premises that entail them are false. Thus, I undercut the case against moral realism, which rests on these premises. Chapters:

1. Moral & Epistemic Realisms

2. Defending Epistemic Deontologies

3. Ayer and Stevenson's Ethical and Epistemological Emotivisms

4. Hare's Epistemological Universal Prescriptivism

5. Mackie's Epistemic Nihilism

6. Harman's Epistemic Relativism

7. Contemporary Moral and Epistemic Irrealisms

Articles & Presentations:

Commentaries & letters:


Other writings:

Courses and teaching / advising materials:


Since January 18, 2001, there have been visitors to this page.

Note: This page is not a publication of Morehouse College. It has not been edited or examined for content by Morehouse College. The author of the page are solely responsible for the content. See for my old page and older papers.