Cambridge University Press, Elements series. 2026
Abstract: The methodology of metaphysics has come under severe scrutiny from critics who claim that, while metaphysics aims to uncover deep non-conceptual truths regarding reality, its standard methodology is incapable of giving us justified beliefs regarding which metaphysical theses are true. In this Element I investigate whether this criticism of metaphysics is on the right track, by way of an opinionated introduction to the methodology of metaphysics. I give an overview of recent debates concerning the methodology of metaphysics, with special attention paid to the epistemic credentials of appeals to intuitions and non-empirical theoretical virtues. I also examine alternative proposed aims of metaphysics other than that of uncovering deep non-conceptual truths, and with what sorts of methodologies those aims might be associated. These alternative proposed aims of metaphysics include achieving practical benefits, achieving understanding, discovering stable equilibria among possible metaphysical views, and the aim of analyzing and/or engineering our concepts.
Cambridge University Press. 2026
Abstract: 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' is a question that is arguably as old as philosophy itself. Nevertheless, despite the fact that it is of perennial philosophical, scientific, and religious interest, it receives less attention than many other classic questions in philosophy. And despite continued fascination with 'the Question', and its status as one of the great intellectual mysteries, there are few academic book-length discussions of the subject. This book serves as the definitive guide to the Question. It includes a discussion of the proper interpretation of the Question, whether it can be expected to have an answer, an overview of the major answers which have been proposed, and, most significantly, a new and innovative explanation for why there is something rather than nothing.
'Why is There Something Rather than Nothing? might be the deepest of all questions, and is fuel for disputes which can get very heated. Brenner is an expert, open-minded guide to the battlefield and casts interesting new light on it.' John Leslie, University of Guelph and Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada
Cambridge University Press. 2024
Abstract: What are we? Are we, for example, souls, organisms, brains, or something else? In this book, Andrew Brenner argues that there are principled obstacles to our discovering the answer to this fundamental metaphysical question. The main competing accounts of personal ontology hold that we are either souls (or composites of soul and body), or we are composite physical objects of some sort, but, as Brenner shows, arguments for either of these options can be parodied and transformed into their opposites. Brenner also examines arguments for and against the existence of the self, offers a detailed discussion of the metaphysics of several afterlife scenarios - resurrection, reincarnation, and mind uploading -- and considers whether agnosticism with respect to personal ontology should lead us to agnosticism with respect to the possibility of life after death.
'A welcome contribution to an important debate. It brings light to dark areas and never resorts to easy answers. Its treatment of so-called 'no-self' views is especially valuable.' Eric Olson, University of Sheffield
Erkenntnis. Forthcoming
Abstract: In cases of fission a thing or person splits into two things or persons. It is often thought that in cases of fission the thing or person which fissions could not be numerically identical with one result of fission rather than the other, on the grounds that it would be objectionably arbitrary for the thing or person to end up as one result of fission rather than the other. I show that this sort of argument fails. Two fission cases which receive special attention are split-brain transplants (where each brain hemisphere is transplanted into a different body) and monozygotic twinning.
In Philosophical Methodology After Carnap, edited by Darren Bradley (Cham: Springer, 2025), pp.269-293
Abstract: Karen Bennett and Mary Beth Willard have both argued for "dismissivism" with respect to metaphysical disputes, and Darren Bradley, while not a proponent of dismissivism, has given additional arguments on its behalf. The idea is that we lack any very good grounds for deciding between many competing metaphysical theses. Perhaps they’re correct about some metaphysical disputes. But as a claim regarding metaphysical disputes in general, I don’t think that dismissivism is correct. The sort of epistemological impasse described by dismissivists isn’t nearly so widespread within metaphysics as they claim it is, and their arguments to the contrary are not compelling. For example, their contention that empirical considerations have no bearing on the resolution of most or all metaphysical disputes isn’t true of some major paradigmatically metaphysical disputes. Where empirical considerations do not bear on the resolution of a metaphysical dispute (or do not allow us to adjudicate some metaphysical dispute), non-empirical theoretical criteria can provide far more guidance than dismissivists realize. In general, the methodological misgivings dismissivists direct toward metaphysical disputes would, I argue, lead to a much broader skepticism than they may realize. For example, their concerns regarding the underdetermination of (metaphysical) theory by empirical evidence would, if generalized, lead to a very general skepticism which we should be hesitant to accept. Finally, I have concerns regarding the way that dismissivists such as Bennett and Willard characterize the dialectical patterns which they claim inform many metaphysical debates. Here’s what I mean by that. Bennett and Willard claim that partisans in many metaphysical disputes modify their positions to make them more similar to the positions endorsed by their competitors. This is supposed to be one of the main reasons we have so few grounds to decide between competing metaphysical positions: the competing metaphysical positions are, by design, not very far removed from one another. I don’t think that this is an accurate characterization of metaphysical debates in general, and I don’t think that it is an accurate characterization of the particular metaphysical debates cited by Bennett and Willard.
Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 74, Issue 1 (January 2024), pp.68-83
Abstract: In the debate over the existence of composite objects, it is sometimes suggested that perceptual evidence justifies belief in composite objects. But it is almost never suggested that we are perceptually justified in believing in composite objects on the basis of the fact that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences enables us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise. But while the thought that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences cannot enable us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise is commonly taken for granted, it requires some defence, both in light of its importance in shaping the debate and in light of its recently coming under attack by a prominent philosopher of perception. In this paper, I offer such a defence.
Philosophy of Science. Vol. 90, Issue 4 (October 2023), pp.958-973
Abstract: I present new counterexamples to the asymmetry of grounding: we have prima facie reason to think that some conditional probabilities partially ground their inverse conditional probabilities, and vice versa. These new counterexamples may require that we reject the asymmetry of grounding, or alternatively may require that we reject one or more of the assumptions (regarding, e.g., the correct interpretation of probability) which enable the counterexamples. Either way, by reflecting on these purported counterexamples to grounding asymmetry we learn something important, either about the formal properties of grounding, or about the nature of probability (or both).
Erkenntnis. Vol. 88 (April 2023), pp.1661-1681
Abstract: Some facts ground other facts. Some fact is fundamental iff there are no other facts which partially or fully ground that fact. According to metaphysical foundationalism, every non-fundamental fact is fully grounded by some fundamental fact(s). In this paper I examine and defend some neglected considerations which might be made in favor of metaphysical foundationalism. Building off of work by Ross Cameron, I suggest that foundationalist theories are more unified than, and so in one important respect simpler than, non-foundationalist theories, insofar as foundationalist theories allow us to derive all non-fundamental facts from some fundamental fact(s). Non-foundationalist theories can enjoy a similar sort of theoretical unification only by taking on objectionable metaphysical laws.
Synthese. Vol. 201, Issue 2 (February 2023), pp.1-19
Abstract: Metaphysicians often claim that some metaphysical theory should (or shouldn’t) be believed because it exhibits (or fails to exhibit) theoretical virtues such as simplicity. Metaphysicians also sometimes claim that the legitimacy of these sorts of appeals to theoretical virtues are vindicated by the similar appeals to theoretical virtues which scientists make in scientific theory choice. One objection to this methodological move is to claim that the metaphysician misdescribes the role that theoretical virtues play within science. In this paper I defend the metaphysician’s use of theoretical virtues against this objection.
Erkenntnis. Vol.87 (August 2022), pp.1831-1847
Abstract: It is sometimes supposed that, in principle, we cannot offer an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing. I argue that this supposition is a mistake, and stems from a needlessly myopic conception of the form explanations can legitimately take. After making this more general point, I proceed to offer a speculative suggestion regarding one sort of explanation which can in principle serve as an answer to the question “why is there something rather than nothing?” The suggestion is that there may be something rather than nothing in virtue of the truth of certain sorts of subjunctive conditionals.
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Vol. 10 (2022), pp.83-119
Runner-up, 2019 Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Religion
Abstract: Peter van Inwagen's "special composition question" asks, more or less, "what must some objects be like in order for them to compose another object?" In this paper I develop and defend a theistic anti-realist response to the special composition question, according to which God decides when composition occurs. While I do not endorse this theistic mereological anti-realism, I think that it is worth developing. I argue that this theistic mereological anti-realism is preferable to extant non-theistic variants of mereological anti-realism, and that theistic mereological anti-realism receives some motivation from several other sources.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Synthese. Vol.199, Issue 5-6 (December 2021), pp.13643-13660
Abstract: Four-dimensionalists think that we persist over time by having different temporal parts at each of the times at which we exist. Eternalists think that all times are equally real. Deprivationists think that death is an evil for the one who dies because it deprives them of something. I argue that four-dimensionalist eternalism, conjoined with a standard deprivationist account of the evil of death, has surprising implications for what we should think about the evil of death. In particular, given these assumptions, we will lack any grounds for thinking that death is an evil for some individuals for whom we would antecedently expect it to be an evil, namely those individuals who cease to exist at death. Alternatively, we will only have some grounds for thinking that death is an evil for certain individuals for whom we might antecedently be more inclined to think death is not an evil, namely those individuals who survive death, in the sense that they continue to exist after death.
Synthese. Vol. 198, Issue 8 (August 2021), pp.7431-7448
Abstract: Mereological nihilism is the thesis that composition never occurs. Sider has defended nihilism on the basis of its relative ideological simplicity. In this paper I develop the argument from ideological simplicity, and defend it from some recent objections. Along the way I discuss the best way to formulate nihilism, what it means for a theory to exhibit lesser or greater degrees of ideological simplicity, the relationship between the parthood relation and the identity relation, and the notion that we should judge the ideological simplicity of competing theories on the basis of the kinds of ideological commitments required by those theories.
Religious Studies. Vol. 57, Issue 2 (June 2021), pp.301-316
Abstract: Sometimes theists wonder how God's beliefs track particular portions of reality, e.g. contingent states of affairs, or facts regarding future free actions. In this article I sketch a general model for how God's beliefs track reality. God's beliefs track reality in much the same way that propositions track reality, namely via grounding. Just as the truth values of true propositions are generally or always grounded in their truthmakers, so too God's true beliefs are grounded in the subject matters of those beliefs (i.e. God believes that p in virtue of the fact that p). This is not idle speculation, since my proposal allows the theist to account for God's true beliefs regarding causally inert portions of reality.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 50, Issue 8 (November 2020), pp.934-949
Abstract: Many say that ontological disputes are defective because they are unimportant or without substance. In this paper, we defend ontological disputes from the charge, with a special focus on disputes over the existence of composite objects. Disputes over the existence of composite objects, we argue, have a number of substantive implications across a variety of topics in metaphysics, science, philosophical theology, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Since the disputes over the existence of composite objects have these substantive implications, they are themselves substantive.
Philosophy East and West. Vol. 70, Issue 2 (April 2020), pp.543-557
Abstract: Kris McDaniel has recently proposed an interpretation of the distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth, as that distinction is made within Abhidharma metaphysics. McDaniel thinks that the conventional/ultimate truth distinction is closely related to a similar distinction between conventional existence and ultimate existence. What’s more, he thinks that we should interpret the latter distinction along ontological pluralist lines, according to which the difference between things which ultimately exist and things which merely conventionally exist amounts to a difference in the modes of being enjoyed by the things in question. In this paper I present some concerns I have regarding McDaniel’s proposal.
Analysis. Vol. 78, Issue 4 (October 2018), pp.605-614
Abstract: In a number of recent publications Thomasson has defended a deflationary approach to ontological disputes, according to which ontological disputes are relatively easy to settle, by either conceptual analysis, or conceptual analysis in conjunction with empirical investigation. Thomasson's "easy" approach to ontology is intended to derail many prominent ontological disputes. In this paper I present an objection to Thomasson's approach to ontology. Thomasson's approach to existence assertions means that she is committed to the view that application conditions (i.e., conditions which need to be met in order for some existence assertion to be true) associated with any term "K" with non-trivial application conditions must refer to the existence of things other than Ks. Given other components of her meta-ontological scheme, this leads to either an infinite regress or circularity of application conditions, both of which seem objectionable. Accordingly, some part of Thomasson's meta-ontological scheme should be modified or abandoned.
Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 35, Issue 4 (October 2018), pp.447-463
Abstract: Some moral realists have defended moral realism on the basis of the purported fact that moral facts figure as components in some good explanations of non-moral phenomena. In this paper I explore the relationship between theism and this sort of explanationist defense of moral realism. Theistic explanations often make reference to moral facts, and do so in a manner which is ineliminable in an important respect -- remove the moral facts from those explanations, and they suffer as a result. In this respect theistic moral explanations seem to differ from the sorts of moral explanations typically offered by moral explanationists.
Synthese. Vol. 195, Issue 2 (February 2018), pp.657-678
Abstract: Mereological nihilism is the thesis that composition never occurs. Some philosophers have thought that science gives us compelling evidence against nihilism. In this article I respond to this concern. An initial challenge for nihilism stems from the fact that composition is such a ubiquitous feature of scientific theories. In response I motivate a restricted form of scientific anti-realism with respect to those components of scientific theories which make reference to composition. A second scientifically based worry for nihilism is that certain specific scientific phenomena (quantum entanglement, natural selection) might require ineliminable quantification over composite objects. I address these concerns, and argue that there seem to be nihilist-friendly construals of the scientific phenomena in question.
Philosophical Studies. Vol. 174, Issue 11 (November 2017), pp.2687-2707
Abstract: Metaphysicians frequently appeal to the idea that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, in the sense that, all other things being equal, simpler metaphysical theories are more likely to be true. In this paper I defend the notion that theoretical simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, against several recent objections. I do not give any direct arguments for the thesis that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics, since I am aware of no such arguments. I do argue, however, that there is no special problem with the notion that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics. More specifically, I argue that if you accept the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in science, then it would be objectionably arbitrary to reject the idea that simplicity is truth conducive in metaphysics.
The Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 67, Issue 268 (July 2017), pp.464-485
Abstract: Mereological nihilists hold that composition never occurs, so that nothing is ever a proper part of anything else. Substance dualists generally hold that we are each identical with an immaterial soul. In this paper I argue that every popular objection to substance dualism has a parallel objection to composition. This thesis has some interesting implications. First, many of those who reject composition, but accept substance dualism, or who reject substance dualism and accept composition, have some explaining to do. Second, one popular objection to mereological nihilism, one which contends that mereological nihilism is objectionable insofar as it is incompatible with the existence of people, is untenable.
Erkenntnis. Vol. 81, Issue 6 (December 2016), pp.1305-1322
Abstract: Let’s call the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” the Question. There’s no consensus, of course, regarding which proposed answer to the Question, if any, is correct, but occasionally there’s also controversy regarding the meaning of the Question itself. In this paper I argue that such controversy persists because there just isn’t one unique interpretation of the Question. Rather, the puzzlement expressed by the sentence “why is there something rather than nothing?” varies depending on the ontology implicitly or explicitly endorsed by the speaker. In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that other proposals according to which the Question has one uniquely adequate interpretation are false. Second, I give several examples of the way in which the meaning of the Question can vary depending on the ontology to which it is coupled. Third, I explore the implications of my thesis for the manner in which we should approach future attempts to answer the Question.
Analytic Philosophy. Vol. 56, Issue 4 (December 2015), pp.318-337
Abstract: Mereological nihilism (henceforth just "nihilism") is the thesis that composition never occurs. Nihilism has often been defended on the basis of its theoretical simplicity, including its ontological simplicity and its ideological simplicity (roughly, nihilism's ability to do without primitive mereological predicates). In this paper I defend nihilism on the basis of the theoretical unification conferred by nihilism, which is, roughly, nihilism's capacity to allow us to take fewer phenomena as brute and inexplicable. This represents a respect in which nihilism enjoys greater theoretical simplicity than its rivals which has not yet been explored, and which is immune to many of the objections which have been leveled against previous arguments for nihilism from nihilism's theoretical simplicity. Composition as identity might be thought to confer a similar degree of theoretical uni.cation as nihilism. I end the paper by arguing that this is not the case.
Synthese. Vol. 192, Issue 5 (May 2015), pp.1295-1314
Abstract: Mereological nihilism is the thesis that composite objects—objects with proper parts—do not exist. Nihilists generally paraphrase talk of composite objects F into talk of there being “xs arranged F-wise” (for example, while nihilists deny that there are tables, they concede that there are “xs arranged table-wise”). Recently several philosophers have argued that nihilism is defective insofar as nihilists are either unable to say what they mean by such phrases as “there are xs arranged F-wise,” or that nihilists are unable to employ such phrases without incurring significant costs, perhaps even undermining one of the chief motivations for nihilism. In this paper I defend nihilism against these objections. A key theme of the paper is this: if nihilists need to employ such phrases as “there are xs arranged F-wise,” non-nihilists will need to do so as well. Accordingly, any costs incurred by the nihilist when she employs such phrases will be shared by everyone else. What’s more, such phrases are intelligible when employed by the nihilist, as well as when they are employed by the non-nihilist, insofar as analyses of such phrases will not essentially involve mereological concepts incompatible with nihilism.