Andrew Mackenzie

I am an Assistant Professor at Maastricht University in the Department of Economics.




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My Erdős number is 3: Paul Erdős - Alan D. Taylor - William S. Zwicker - Andrew K. Mackenzie (calculate)


7B. "Menu mechanisms: discussion."

With Yu Zhou.


We provide conditions under which modifying a menu mechanism, by reducing the information available to agents, results in a strong form of dominant strategy implementation. We also propose viewing implementations as Blackwell experiments to compare privacy. Altogether, we argue that menu-based apps can provide better privacy than direct mechanisms with no cost in terms of implementation.

8. "Subjective expected utility with atoms and a finite set of consequences."


If preferences over acts satisfy Savage's first five postulates and monotone continuity, and if there are n possible consequences, then max{3, n}th-order atom-swarming guarantees probabilistic sophistication and (8n-7)th-order atom-swarming guarantees a subjective expected utility representation.

7. "Menu mechanisms."

With Yu Zhou.


Many social choice rules are described by algorithms where agents iteratively select from menus of possible assignments. We provide simple sufficient conditions for the associated menu mechanisms to provide ex-post perfect, and full subgame perfect, implementations of their rules. Applications include serial dictatorship, top trading cycles along with its generalizations, and deferred acceptance along with its generalizations.


6. "On mechanisms for costly inclusion."

With Christian Trudeau.


Revised February 13, 2019. Replaces "Club good mechanisms: from free-riders to citizen-shareholders, from impossibility to characterization."

Standard objectives are compatible when allocating an object, but incompatible when providing a pure public good. Why? We provide an answer in a general model of costly inclusion that covers these environments and many others. This answer involves a generalization of the second price auction for certain environments with production, where agents endogenously acquire ownership in the production firm.

5. "A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation."

(2017). Revise and resubmit, Games and Economic Behavior.

For obviously strategy-proof implementation, it is safe, in a very strong sense, to restrict attention to extensive game forms where the administrator randomizes once at the start of play, then agents take turns making public announcements about their types.


WIP-1. "Strategy-proofness and perfect mechanisms."

With Yu Zhou.


We consider sufficient conditions for ex-post perfect implementation in more general environments than in "Menu Mechanisms," then use these mechanisms to construct and solve games in which agents have extremely limited information about the economy. We are currently re-writing this paper.


4. "An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave."

Forthcoming, Economic Theory.

Using historical documents and axiomatic analysis, I recommend that the Roman Catholic Church overturn the changes of Pope Pius XII to reinstate the papal election format of Pope Gregory XV. I also present some arguments in favor of randomization in the case of deadlock.

3. "A foundation for probabilistic beliefs with or without atoms."

(2019). Theoretical Economics 14, 709-778.

When can beliefs, which rank events on the basis of relative likelihood, be represented by a probability measure? I provide a new answer that allows for atoms.

This paper was presented at the Jaffray Memorial Lecture at the 2016 Risk, Uncertainty, and Decision (RUD) Conference.

2. "Symmetry and impartial lotteries."

(2015). Games and Economic Behavior 94, 15-28.

When peers nominate one another for a prize (which may be awarded randomly), the voters are the candidates---so what does it mean to treat everyone symmetrically? I propose several symmetry notions, and give two characterizations using impartiality: the requirement that no agent's report should impact whether or not he wins, removing incentives for strategic nomination.

1. "Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings."

With Davide Cervone, Ronghua Dai, Daniel Gnoutcheff, Grant Lanterman, Ari Morse, Nikhil Srivastava, and William Zwicker.

(2012). Mathematical Social Sciences 64, 11-27.

We consider voting rules that can be administered using physical machines: by casting a vote, an agent exerts a pull on the outcome. In particular, we compare new rules involving weights and strings to familiar rules involving rubber bands in order to explore the tradeoffs between resistance to manipulation, decisiveness, and responsiveness.