Andrej Gill

Professor for Corporate Finance

Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz

PhD Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt, 2013

Diploma Business Administration, Goethe University Frankfurt, 2007

Mainz Faculty of Economics and Business

Chair for Corporate Finance

SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe

Frankfurt Laboratory for Experimental Economic Research (FLEX)

Center for Leadership and Behavior in Organizations

LinkedIn


Publications

Eufinger, Christian and Andrej Gill. "Incentive-Based Capital Requirements"

Management Science, Volume 63, Issue 12, 2017

This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on executive incentive schemes. We argue that excessive risk-taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate governance failures within banks. The idea behind the proposed regulatory approach is thus that the more the compensation structure decouples bank managers' interests from those of shareholders by curbing risk-taking incentives, the higher the leverage the bank is permitted to take on. Consequently, the risk-shifting incentives caused by government guarantees and the risk-mitigating incentives created by the compensation structure offset each other, such that the manager chooses the socially efficient investment policy.


Gill, Andrej and Uwe Walz. "Are VC-backed IPOs delayed Trade Sales?"

Journal of Corporate Finance, Volume 37, April 2016

We investigate the role of venture-backing at the time of the initial public offering for the decision to subsequently be taken over and leave the exchange. We show, controlling for firm characteristics as well as the endogeneity of the involvement of VC, that VC-backed firms are significantly more likely to leave the exchange in the course of a take over. Our analysis sheds new light on decisions to go private, and even more so on the process of going public for VC-backed firms. Our findings suggest that, in a significant number of cases, VC-backed IPOs can be interpreted as delayed trade sales.

Gill, Andrej and Nikolai Visnjic. "Performance Benefits of Tight Control"

Journal of Private Equity (2015), Volume 18, Number 3

This study investigates the transition from being a listed company with a dispersed ownership structure to being a privately held company with a concentrated ownership structure. We consider a sample of private equity backed portfolio companies to evaluate the consequences of the corporate governance changes on operational performance. Our analysis shows significant positive abnormal growth in several performance ratios for the private period of our sample companies relative to comparable public companies. These performance differences come from the increase in ownership concentration after the leveraged buyout transaction.

Working Papers

Gill, Andrej, Heinz, Matthias and Heiner Schumacher. "Social Preferences and Selection into the Financial Industry"

We examine the social behavior of business and economics students with varying professional preferences and experiences. To gather data on professional experience, we collect subjects’ résumés before the experimental game is played. In trust and public goods games, subjects with high interest in working in finance act more selfishly than subjects with other professional goals. We find no evidence that the extent of experience in finance changes behavior. In a prediction game strategically equivalent to the trust game, first-movers’ trust was significantly smaller when the second-mover indicated a high interest in working in finance. These results suggest that the financial industry attracts more selfish individuals, which may contribute to the lack of trust in its employees.

Gill, Andrej and David Heller

This paper shows how important the role of intangible assets is in determining capital structure decisions. We argue that firms can use their patent stock as collateral and thereby relax possible debt financing restrictions. Using data from the European Patent Office and balance sheet data of European companies, we find that larger patent stocks are associated with higher debt-ratios - controlling for well-established capital structure determinants. We further show that patent portfolios with a high estimated market value mainly drive this effect. Drawing on a legislative change in EU-law, allows us to establish a causal relationship between firms' patent portfolio and their use of debt.

Work in Progress

Gill, Andrej, Hett, Florian and Johannes Tischer. "Present Bias and Commitment in Financial Decision Making"

Gill, Andrej and Michael Kosfeld. "Are Apple Users charged higher Prices?"

Gill, Andrej. "Don't you remember...? Cognitive Memory and Strategic Behavior"

Gill, Andrej and Nikolai Visnjic. "Insight Private Equity"

Other Publications

Andrej Gill. "Aktuelle Entwicklungen und Ausblick in die Zukunft der individuellen Finanzplanung und des Forderungsmanagements"

(Zeitschrift für Forderungsmanagement (2018))

Gill, Andrej, Juranek, Steffen, Lizarazo, Christian, Visnjic, Nikolai and Uwe Walz. "Anreize, systematische Risiken und Intransparenz. Lehren aus der Finanz- und Staatsschuldenkrise"

(Studie im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung, Center for Financial Studies Working Paper, 2013/01)

Cumming, Douglas, Gill, Andrej and Uwe Walz. "Valuation and Financial Disclosure in the Private Equity Industry"

(Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business (2009), Volume 29, Number 3)