I'm an associate professor in the Philosophy Department at Simon Fraser University, in Burnaby, British Columbia. I work in philosophy of science and in metaphysics and epistemology broadly construed. Much of my work relates in one way or another to causation: causal explanation, application of causal methodology to case studies in philosophy of science, problems related to mental causation, and recently, in the metaphysics of causation. 

You can find preprints and electronic versions of my work online here at PhilPapers. Many items, including online proceedings items, are available for download on PhilSci Archive. A moderately recent CV can be found hereInformation on courses I have taught and some material for courses can be found here.  In Current Research, there is info on selected items in progress or forthcoming, and upcoming talks that might be of interest.

To get in touch with me, email me at handerse [at] sfu [dot] ca.

The core of my central project, Patterns, Information, Causation, is now forthcoming at J Phil. I am deeply appreciative of all the helpful discussion, questions, and feedback I have gotten over the last several years on this project, which resulted in a much better paper, and view. Preprints will be uploaded shortly.

I am editing a very focused volume, The Pragmatist Challenge, with chapters that have emerged from the talks and discussions in the PragMaPS workshops (see Other Professional Info tab). It will be available through OUP late 2017 or early 2018. The volume will lay out a vision of pragmatist approaches to contemporary philosophy of science, especially topics at the intersection of metaphysics and phil of science, and will hopefully be rich territory for future discussions to explore further. 

Nota Bene: I've been asked to put a photo of myself here, so that e.g. people citing my work in a presentation can put my face up there next to the text. This is a common practice, and seems to be growing more common as powerpoint grows more ubiquitous.

So, I post a photo, but only if you read this rant first. Short version: don't put anybody's face up there. Get more creative. Even if you use my not-male face, the whole practice still skews male because of philosophy's past and current gender distribution. Don't deepen the philosophy=male association by enforcing the sexism of philosophy's past on present audiences. 

Longer version: I make a practice of not using anybody's faces when going over their views (not even favorite faces like Carnap and Neurath!) but use some other kind of visual imagery instead. 1), this usually isn't that hard given an extra couple seconds of thought and some creative googling. It also often improves the point I am making, because there are ways to illustrate a point that are more suggestive to the audience of what is going on philosophically than some person's face. 2), and this one is the important one: We know the history of Western philosophy to be a very gender-biased and racially-biased trajectory. Putting up pictures of people next to their views is going to result in an overwhelming dominance of large male faces staring down at audiences. This matters because implicit associations are formed in exactly this way - by repeated viewings of images like faces in association with fields like philosophy. 

We could not have designed a better practice to take the past sexism of the field and use it to deepen and strengthen the association between men and philosophy in the present. Even if you use lots of faces of women in presentations, this practice will still involve a heavy skew towards men in terms of percentages. Don't reinforce on audiences today the incredibly skewed gender distributions of philosophy's past. 

That said, a face: