AUCTIONEERS FURNITURE. AUCTIONEERS

AUCTIONEERS FURNITURE. DISCOUNT KINCAID FURNITURE.

Auctioneers Furniture


auctioneers furniture
    auctioneers
  • A person who conducts auctions by accepting bids and declaring goods sold
  • An auction is a process of buying and selling goods or services by offering them up for bid, taking bids, and then selling the item to the highest bidder. In economic theory, an auction may refer to any mechanism or set of trading rules for exchange.
  • (auctioneer) an agent who conducts an auction
  • (Auctioneer (Another Engine)) Fables of the Reconstruction, or Reconstruction of the Fables, is the third studio album by the American alternative rock band R.E.M., released on the I.R.S. Records in 1985.
    furniture
  • Large movable equipment, such as tables and chairs, used to make a house, office, or other space suitable for living or working
  • A person's habitual attitude, outlook, and way of thinking
  • furnishings that make a room or other area ready for occupancy; "they had too much furniture for the small apartment"; "there was only one piece of furniture in the room"
  • Small accessories or fittings for a particular use or piece of equipment
  • Furniture + 2 is the most recent EP released by American post-hardcore band Fugazi. It was recorded in January and February 2001, the same time that the band was recording their last album, The Argument, and released in October 2001 on 7" and on CD.
  • Furniture is the mass noun for the movable objects ('mobile' in Latin languages) intended to support various human activities such as seating and sleeping in beds, to hold objects at a convenient height for work using horizontal surfaces above the ground, or to store things.
auctioneers furniture - The Auctioneer
The Auctioneer
The Auctioneer
“A well-made piece of dynamite. . . . For all their talk, the author seems to be saying men will permit their souls to be carried away bit by bit and auctioned off to the highest bidder. Samson has written a suspenseful, engrossing novel with the most gripping and violent ending we’ve encountered in some time.”—Newsday
“Really one of those books that once started you won’t be able to put it down. You’ll tell yourself that it couldn’t happen here, but Joan Samson is such a skillful and convincing writer that it will hold you as spellbound as are the novel’s characters themselves.”—St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Harrowing tensions explode in a series of events that could happen anywhere, to anyone, just as they do to John Moore—whose days of freedom run out, who is stripped of his possessions, his courage, and his hopes, by the ominous presence of an insidious stranger impossible to resist.
Published to wide acclaim in 1976, but almost neglected since then, The Auctioneer is a bona fide classic of American literature. The story of John Moore, his wife Mim, and his mother, it is a gripping tale of greed in a small town being quietly overrun by auctioneer Perly Dunsmore. Acclaimed by writers including Stephen King, and an influence on King’s Needful Things, The Auctioneer is here reprinted for the first time in thirty years.
Joan Samson (1937–1976) wrote The Auctioneer, her only novel, and was working on her second when she died of cancer.

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Bristol Estate Agents - Auctioneers & Surveyors
Bristol Estate Agents - Auctioneers & Surveyors
A firm which did very well in Bristol’s Victorian housing boom were the estate agents, auctioneers and appraisers, like the firm of Tricks and Wallop, now known as Osmond Tricks, set up in St. Nicholas Street in 1858. William Tricks, great-great-grandfather of the present principal, George Tricks, took advantage of the boom in trade from the 1850’s to service the new industries, shops and housing springing up. He was joined, by his son Charles in 1875, and he was succeeded by his son Frederick, who was devoted to the Prince’s Theatre in Park Row; he was secretary to the theatre in the time of James Macready Chute, and became a director. He had great plans for the rebuilding and restoring of the Prince’s, after its destruction in 1941, but died before his dream could be achieved.The firm had another theatre connection: in 1940 Dennis Tricks, also a director of the Prince’s, purchased the Theatre Royal in King Street on behalf of a philanthropic client who wished to remain anonymous. This rescued the building, which at that time was destined to be turned into a banana warehouse. Thus the finest 18th century theatre in the country was saved to become a home for the Bristol Old Vic. Another Tricks actually trod the boards. Nancy, daughter of Frederick, was a popular soprano and the leading lady in many amateur productions. In 1968 the firm amalgamated with the auctioneers, Victor Osmond, who had been in business in the city for more than half a century, first at Small Street and then in Queen Square. The modem firm of Hoddell Pritchard has its origins in two very old firms: Alouzo Dawes and Hoddell started in Clevedon in 1865, and Pritchards can trace their roots back to at least 1785. In the late 18th century, when houses were going up rapidily, a John Alexander set up in Broadmead as a broker and auctioneer, getting his licence in 1785. His first deal was the sale of William Russell’s brewery and effects at Temple Back, and an advertisement of the period shows him selling “A messuage or dwelling house situated at Lower Church Lane in the parish of St. Michael.” Estate agent’s prose was around even then, for he described it as having “an extensive prospect of the whole city and country round, and well worth ?14 p.a. clear of taxes.” After several moves, the firm ended up in Corn Street, and merged with Pritchards in 1910. The other half of the story begins in Clevedon in 1865 where Alonzo Dawes had a strange combination of trades; he was an auctioneer, valuer, and coal and salt merchant. He also helped to form Clevedon’s Fire Brigade. In 1896 he was joined by his son Edward, who had the idea of opening a saleroom, which still exists, in Clevedon. Their main rivals were the Bristol firm of Hoddells, founded by a surveyor, James Hoddell, who began his practice in 1874, styling himself an architect as well as auctioneer, estate agent and coal merchant. He designed villas in Clevedon besides several houses in Bristol, including 1-9 Pembroke Vale, Clifton. James Hoddell’s son Herbert succeeded him, and his son Robert married Margery Dawes, making another merger inevitable. Another firm which joined up was that of George Nichols Hunt and Co., who had the house at Quay Head with the s. s. Demerara figurehead outside — sadly it disintegrated when it was taken down. Pritchards and Alonzo Dawes and Hoddell merged in 1982, and later became a member of the General Accident Group, operating as Hoddell Pritchard Ltd. As the name suggests, Lalonde is of French origin. In the early 1870s, Emile and Mary Lalonde left France in one of their family’s ships for Southampton; there they sold the vessel and made their way to Weston-super-Mare. With six children and in straitened circumstances, Emile started teaching French, while his son Emile Gustave went to work for Samuel Norton, auctioneer and valuer of West Street. In 1886 the younger Emile married Kitty Norton and was made a partner; his brother Septimus joined him in 1894, and a third brother, William, who had opened a furniture shop, married into an estate agent’s family. So between the four of them they had in one family an auctioneer, valuer, furniture remover and estate agent. In 1898 they all joined forces and opened their new firm, Lalonde Bros and Parham, in Bristol. In the early years they were also a big removals firm, using “horseless wagons, steam road locomotives and road trains,” which were a series of three linked wagons, pulled by a traction engine, but on roads, not rails. They claimed in 1908 that this new method of transport “effects great economy over Horses or Rail, combined with Comfort and Expedition. Our vans are built after our own designs, embodying the Latest Improvements to ensure easy riding and safe transit of the most delicate furniture.” In the Thirties they began to handle the selling of the new housing estates which mushroomed in the city, and in 1938 they took on the first outside partner, setting a trend for the futur
Auctioneer Paul
Auctioneer Paul
Paul in his 1st Auctioneer role - and yes, he even sold the shirt from off his back!! LtR : Richenda Bridge, Paul Lawler, Anni Philp - at the Up Front Club, Maleny, SE Qld.

auctioneers furniture
auctioneers furniture
Directors as Auctioneers: A Concise Guide to Revlon-Land
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), the Delaware Supreme Court explained that when a target board of directors enters Revlon-land, the board’s role changes from that of “defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”

Unfortunately, the Court’s colorful metaphor obfuscated some serious doctrinal problems. What standards of judicial review applied to director conduct outside the borders of Revlon-land? What standard applied to director conduct falling inside Revlon-land’s borders? And when did one enter that mysterious country?

By the mid-1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court had worked out a credible set of answers to those questions. The seemingly settled rules made doctrinal sense and were sound from a policy perspective.

Indeed, my thesis herein is that Revlon and its progeny should be praised for having grappled—mostly successfully—with the core problem of corporation law: the tension between authority and accountability. A fully specified account of corporate law must incorporate both values. On the one hand, corporate law must implement the value of authority in developing a set of rules and procedures providing efficient decision making. U.S. corporate law does so by adopting a system of director primacy. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (2008).

In the director primacy (a.k.a. board-centric) form of corporate governance, control is vested not in the hands of the firm’s so-called owners, the shareholders, who exercise virtually no control over either day-to-day operations or long-term policy, but in the hands of the board of directors and their subordinate professional managers. On the other hand, the separation of ownership and control in modern public corporations obviously implicates important accountability concerns, which corporate law must also address.
Academic critics of Delaware’s jurisprudence typically err because they are preoccupied with accountability at the expense of authority.

In contrast, or so I will argue, Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence correctly recognizes that both authority and accountability have value.

Achieving the proper mix between these competing values is a daunting—but necessary—task. Ultimately, authority and accountability cannot be reconciled.

At some point, greater accountability necessarily makes the decision-making process less efficient. Making corporate law therefore requires a careful balancing of these competing values. Striking such a balance is the peculiar genius of Unocal and its progeny.

In recent years, however, the Delaware Chancery Court has gotten lost in Revlon-land. A number of Chancery decisions have drifted away from the doctrinal parameters laid down by the Supreme Court. In this monograph, I argue that they have done so because the Chancellors have misidentified the policy basis on which Revlon rests. Accordingly, I argue that Chancery should adopt a conflict of interest-based approach to invoking Revlon, which focuses on where control of the resulting corporate entity rests when the transaction is complete.

In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), the Delaware Supreme Court explained that when a target board of directors enters Revlon-land, the board’s role changes from that of “defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”

Unfortunately, the Court’s colorful metaphor obfuscated some serious doctrinal problems. What standards of judicial review applied to director conduct outside the borders of Revlon-land? What standard applied to director conduct falling inside Revlon-land’s borders? And when did one enter that mysterious country?

By the mid-1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court had worked out a credible set of answers to those questions. The seemingly settled rules made doctrinal sense and were sound from a policy perspective.

Indeed, my thesis herein is that Revlon and its progeny should be praised for having grappled—mostly successfully—with the core problem of corporation law: the tension between authority and accountability. A fully specified account of corporate law must incorporate both values. On the one hand, corporate law must implement the value of authority in developing a set of rules and procedures providing efficient decision making. U.S. corporate law does so by adopting a system of director primacy. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (2008).

In the director primacy (a.k.a. board-centric) form of corporate governance, control is vested not in the hands of the firm’s so-called owners, the shareholders, who exercise virtually no control over either day-to-day operations or long-term policy, but in the hands of the board of directors and their subordinate professional managers. On the other hand, the separation of ownership and control in modern public corporations obviously implicates important accountability concerns, which corporate law must also address.
Academic critics of Delaware’s jurisprudence typically err because they are preoccupied with accountability at the expense of authority.

In contrast, or so I will argue, Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence correctly recognizes that both authority and accountability have value.

Achieving the proper mix between these competing values is a daunting—but necessary—task. Ultimately, authority and accountability cannot be reconciled.

At some point, greater accountability necessarily makes the decision-making process less efficient. Making corporate law therefore requires a careful balancing of these competing values. Striking such a balance is the peculiar genius of Unocal and its progeny.

In recent years, however, the Delaware Chancery Court has gotten lost in Revlon-land. A number of Chancery decisions have drifted away from the doctrinal parameters laid down by the Supreme Court. In this monograph, I argue that they have done so because the Chancellors have misidentified the policy basis on which Revlon rests. Accordingly, I argue that Chancery should adopt a conflict of interest-based approach to invoking Revlon, which focuses on where control of the resulting corporate entity rests when the transaction is complete.

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