Alina Arefeva

PUBLICATIONS

1. Revealing Information in Auctions: the Optimal Auction versus the Second-Price Auction (with Delong Meng). 2021. Economic Letters, 204, 109895.

Working Paper Versions: Information Disclosure in Housing Auctions (extended), Revealing Information in Auctions: the Optimal Auction versus the Second-Price Auction (short).

We study the optimal information disclosure policy in the optimal auction and the second-price auction when the seller has information that additively adjusts the independent private values of the bidders. In this setting, information revelation could change the allocation of the good in both types of auctions. However, in the optimal auction, the change in allocation makes the revenue function convex in the additive adjustments, so the seller should always reveal information. In contrast, in the second-price auction, the change in allocation makes the revenue function non-convex, in which case the seller might benefit from withholding information.

WORKING PAPERS

1. Job Growth from Opportunity Zones (joint with Morris Davis, Andra Ghent, and Minseon Park). 2020.

Media Mentions: Brookings, Pew Trusts

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 established a new program called Opportunity Zones (OZs) that created tax advantages for investing in businesses or real estate in a limited number of low-income Census tracts. We use a census of establishment-level data on employment to identify the effect of the program on job creation. We show that in metropolitan areas, the OZ designation increased employment growth relative to comparable tracts by between 3.0 and 4.5 percentage points and new jobs were created across many different industries and education levels. The OZ designation did not create jobs in rural areas.

2. How Auctions Amplify House-Price Fluctuations. 2020. Under revision.

I develop a dynamic search model of the housing market in which prices, determined by auction, exhibit greater volatility than prices in the search and matching model with Nash bargaining from the literature. This helps solve the puzzle of excess volatility of house prices. The outcomes of the two models differ in hot markets when buyers' house values are heterogeneous. With Nash bargaining, a buyer who gets a house is chosen randomly among interested buyers, so prices are determined by the average house values. In auctions, competition among buyers drives up prices to the willingness to pay of the buyer with the highest value. In hot markets, the highest values fluctuate more than the average values, making the auction prices more volatile than the negotiated prices. This high volatility is constrained efficient in the sense that the equilibrium allocation decentralizes the solution of the social planner problem constrained by the search frictions.

3. Conventional Monetary Policy Re-Estimated (joint with Nikolay Arefyev) 2021.

We propose a new method of identification of the monetary policy rule. Using this method, we argue that, before the Great Moderation, the Federal Reserve implemented the Friedman policy of steady money growth as could be interpreted and adopted by the policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s. During the Great Moderation, the monetary policy follows the Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing instead, where the type of smoothing is more general than discussed in the literature. The estimated impulse response functions for the monetary policy shock are large and significant, even when they are estimated on the Great Moderation data.

WORK IN PROGRESS

1. Impact of COVID-19 on Residential Real Estate (with Lu Han).

2. Impact of COVID-19 on Commercial Real Estate.

3. Bidding Wars in the Norwegian Housing Market: Evidence from Millions of Bids (joint with André K. Anundsen and Erling R. Larsen Erling R. Larsen).

4. Asymmetric Information and Search Frictions in Housing Markets (joint with Shiyan Wei).

5. The Skyline Model of an Innovative City (joint with Nikolay Arefyev).