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Philosophy of Logic Workshop "Logicality"

September 7-8, 2015. Institute for Philosophical Research, UNAM


Axel Arturo Barceló-Aspeitia: "Heterogeneous argumentation and heterogeneous logic"
In my (2012) paper "Words and Images in Argumentation", I argued that words and images play essentially the same role in argumentation: exploiting information from the context, they both help to convey the propositions that play the roles of premises and conclusion. I also claimed that we can keep our traditional conception of arguments as composed of propositional premises and conclusion —and the theoretical apparatus built around it—, while also broadening it to include visual arguments. In general, the way we interpret words and the way we interpret images are so similar that whether an argument is purely verbal or not should make little difference for argumentation theory or logic. Recently, however, Leo Groarke and Georges Roque (2014) have challenged my bold claim. In this talk,I will try to develop my ideas from (2012) against the need of a new heterogenous logic in light of Roque and Groarke’s comments.

Jean-Yves Béziau: "Logic is not logic"
In this talk I will strongly emphasize the distinction between logic as reasoning and logic as a theory about reasoning that I characterize as a differance between "Logic" and "logic", similar to the differance between "History" and "history". In this perspective I will deal with central questions about the development and very nature of logic, studying in which sense we can consider Aristotle as the first logician, Descartes‘s rejection of syllogistic as logical, Boole rather than Frege as the initiator of modern logic. 
    I will also examine in this light the unfolding of logic into logic and metalogic, the proliferations of logic systems, the questions of relativity and universality of logic and the position and interaction of logic with regards to other sciences such as physics, biology, mathematics and computer science.

Mario Gómez-Torrente: "On Carrollian arguments and logical consequence"
This is a miscellany of remarks about Carrollian regress arguments, their limits and scope. One main conclusion will be that Quine’s celebrated Carrollian argument against conventionalism about logical truth in “Truth by Convention” is irrelevant to a certain extreme form of conventionalism about logic that I will characterize and call “radical conventionalism”. Another theme will be the construction of a Carrollian argument that, though it doesn’t refute radical or other forms of conventionalism (including Quine’s own), shows in my view that these forms of conventionalism give rise to an explanatory lacuna concerning the justification for logical inferences.

Graham Priest: "Thinking the impossible"
Can one conceive things that are logically impossible? The talk will answer ‘yes’. To  arrive at an answer it will be necessary understand impossibility more clearly. Much of the talk will therefore be constituted by a discussion of the nature of impossible worlds.

Gillian Russell: "Could there be no logic?"
Logical pluralists and monists disagree about how many correct logics there are; the pluralists say there are many, the monists that there is only one. But could it turn out that there is no correct logic? This paper develops the argument for what I’ll call logical nihilism by presenting new counterexamples to laws sometimes thought to be quite safe such as conjunction elimination and identity. Then it argues on general methodological grounds that the best response to this nihilist threat is to relinquish commitment to complete generality in logic.