I'm a PhD candidate in Philosophy at NYU. I previously received a BPhil in Philosophy and a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, both at The Queen's College, Oxford.
- 'Explanation and the A-theory' (under post-R&R review) [abstract | draft]
- 'Non-Cartesian Agency and Normative Theory' (under review) [abstract | draft]
It is now common to reject Cartesianism about epistemology, which says there is something to which we have perfect epistemic access (like sense-data), which serves as a foundation for our imperfect access to other things. But a parallel view of action underlies much contemporary thinking about agency. Cartesianism about action says there is something over which we have perfect control (like decidings or tryings), through which we exercise our imperfect control over other things. This paper argues that there are possible agents for whom Cartesianism about action is false, and that we are likely among them. That matters, because (as I argue) our standard normative theorizing requires that Cartesianism about action be true. This paper advocates a program of non-Cartesian normative theorizing. Contemporary epistemology has taken seriously the thought that we lack perfect epistemic access to anything. Our normative theorizing needs to take seriously our lack of perfect control over anything.