David Storrs-Fox

I am an Early Career Research Fellow at the University of Oxford's Institute for Ethics in AI, and a Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Jesus College, Oxford. I am also a Research Associate at the Institute for Ethics in Technology, Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH). 

I received my PhD in Philosophy from NYU. I have a BPhil in Philosophy and a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, both from Oxford.

I work in the philosophy of AI, moral and political philosophy, metaphysics, and the philosophy of action. I currently have two main research projects. The first explores the thought that there is nothing whatsoever that agents in our world (including us, and AI agents) are infallibly able to do, no realm of actions insulated from the risk of failure. In my view, this idea has important and underappreciated implications for ethics. The second relates AI to group agency, especially the agency of corporations. I argue that many of the most consequential group agents in our world will likely soon become (or be replaced by) mixed human-AI group agents. In my view, mixed group agents are different from human-only group agents in ethically significant ways. Broadly, these projects are tied together by an interest in how an agent's internal structure and composition affect its agent-level features.

I am also interested in early modern philosophy (particularly Hume) and the metaphysics of time.

My email address is david.storrs-fox@philosophy.ox.ac.uk. My teaching page is here.

Peer-Reviewed Publications

• 'Graded Abilities and Action Fragility' (Erkenntnis 90, 2025)        [abstract | draft | published]

• 'Explanation and the A-theory' (Philosophical Studies 178, 2021)       [abstract | draft | published]

In 2022 Philosophical Studies published a reply to this article, by Olley Pearson (here). 

• 'Hume's Skeptical Definitions of 'Cause'' (Hume Studies 43:1, 2020 [issue backdated to 2017])       [abstract | draft | published]

The relation between Hume’s constructive and skeptical aims has been a central concern for Hume interpreters. Hume’s two definitions of ‘cause’ in the Treatise and first Enquiry apparently represent an important constructive achievement, but this paper argues that the definitions must be understood in terms of Hume’s skepticism. The puzzle I address is simply that Hume gives two definitions rather than one. I use Don Garrett’s interpretation as a foil to develop my alternative skeptical interpretation. Garrett claims the definitions exhibit a general susceptibility to two kinds of definition that all “sense-based concepts” share. Against Garrett, I argue that the definitions express an imperfection Hume finds only in our concept of causation. That imperfection is absent from other sense-based concepts, and prompts skeptical sentiments in Hume’s conclusion to the Treatise’s Book 1. I close by comparing my interpretation with those of Helen Beebee, Stephen Buckle, Galen Strawson and Paul Russell.

Under Review

• [Paper on group agency and AI]    [removed in line with journal guidelines; email me for draft]

• [Paper on the normative theory of risk]      [draft]

• [Paper on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities]   [draft]

Other Writing

• 'How to Hold Mixed Human-AI Groups Responsible' (Oxford Institute for Ethics in AI Blog, 2024) [link]