David Storrs-Fox

I am an Early Career Research Fellow at the University of Oxford's Institute for Ethics in AI, and a Junior Research Fellow in AI Ethics at Jesus College, Oxford. I am also a Research Associate at the Institute for Ethics in Technology, Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH).

I was previously a Distinguished Postdoctoral Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Sciences (UCAS), and a Lecturer in Philosophy at St Catherine's College, Oxford. I received my PhD in Philosophy from NYU, where I was subsequently a Philosophy Futures Postdoctoral Lecturer. I have a BPhil in Philosophy and a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, both from Oxford.

I work in moral philosophy, metaphysics and the philosophy of action. The central idea of my recent research is that there is nothing whatsoever that agents in our world (including us, and AI agents) are infallibly able to do, no realm of actions insulated from the risk of failure. I argue that this idea has important implications for the ethics of risk, the metaphysics of abilities, and moral responsibility. My current project applies the central idea to group and AI agency, where I believe the implications are even more significant.

I am also interested in early modern philosophy (particularly Hume) and the metaphysics of time. 

My CV is here, and my email address is david.storrs-fox@philosophy.ox.ac.uk. My teaching page is here.


Publications

Note, 26 April 2024: the version on the Erkenntnis website contains significant typographical errors. Until those are fixed, it is better to read the draft here.

The relation between Hume’s constructive and skeptical aims has been a central concern for Hume interpreters. Hume’s two definitions of ‘cause’ in the Treatise and first Enquiry apparently represent an important constructive achievement, but this paper argues that the definitions must be understood in terms of Hume’s skepticism. The puzzle I address is simply that Hume gives two definitions rather than one. I use Don Garrett’s interpretation as a foil to develop my alternative skeptical interpretation. Garrett claims the definitions exhibit a general susceptibility to two kinds of definition that all “sense-based concepts” share. Against Garrett, I argue that the definitions express an imperfection Hume finds only in our concept of causation. That imperfection is absent from other sense-based concepts, and prompts skeptical sentiments in Hume’s conclusion to the Treatise’s Book 1. I close by comparing my interpretation with those of Helen Beebee, Stephen Buckle, Galen Strawson and Paul Russell.

Under review