This paper explores how Syria's authoritarian governance system was built and sustained through a highly centralized model of hierarchical multilevel governance (MLG). Drawing from Syria’s modern history and the legacies of Ottoman, French Mandate, and post-independence periods, the authors critically analyze how state power was structurally concentrated in Damascus through a complex web of formal and informal institutions, while local institutions remained administratively thin and politically incapacitated.

The central thesis of the paper is that centralization was not merely a bureaucratic outcome, but a foundational strategy of authoritarian control. The Baath Party regime constructed dense institutional power at the center—through executive ministries, the presidency, security apparatuses, and fiscal instruments—while actively hollowing out the autonomy and capacity of governorates, municipalities, and intermediary structures. This design enabled control over territories substituting genuine representation at the local level with political patronage and cooptation of local elites.

Following the 2011 uprising and subsequent conflict, the collapse of centralized governance produced a fragmented territorial landscape. New localized governance arrangements emerged in different parts of Syria—each shaped by conflict dynamics, external actors, and varying degrees of institutional innovation. Despite this, the remnants of centralized governance, and its logic, continue to influence decision-making even in opposition or semi-autonomous zones.

Using the concept of “institutional thickness,” the paper argues that the lack of robust, interconnected institutions at the mezzo (regional) and local levels has undermined Syria’s governance resilience and limited local problem-solving. Rather than reinforcing central power in post-conflict reconstruction, the authors advocate for a principled and balanced reimagining of governance between the central and local levels. This includes recognizing Syria’s rich governance experiences, investing in subnational institutional capacities, and embedding guarantees of local agency while aiming to protect Syria’s territorial unity.

The authors offer a clear policy message: the reconstruction of Syria must not repeat the mistakes of centralization. A sustainable transition requires empowering local actors, enabling regional coordination, and fostering dialogue across fragmented territories. Multilevel governance, if designed with contextual sensitivity and inclusiveness, can serve as both a political framework and a peacebuilding mechanism—ensuring that governance becomes a shared, representative, and stabilizing force for post-conflict Syria.