David Allen Hamburg (October 1, 1925 – April 21, 2019)^[1] was an American psychiatrist. He served as president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York from 1982 to 1997.^[2] He also served as the President of the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences and President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.^[3] He had previously been chair of the department of psychiatry at Stanford. His wife, Beatrix Hamburg, followed a similarly successful career path. Their daughter, [Margaret Ann "Peggy" Hamburg (born 1955)], is a physician who has followed their footsteps into public service becoming Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration in 2009. His son, Eric Hamburg, is an author, attorney and film producer in Los Angeles.

Hamburg was born in Evansville, Indiana. He was awarded the Public Welfare Medal of the National Academy of Sciences in 1998, its most prestigious award, and the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1996.^[4][5] In 2007 he and his wife received the Rhoda and Bernard Sarnat International Award in Mental Health from the Institute of Medicine for their long careers in medicine and public service.^[6][7] He died in Washington, D.C. on April 21, 2019 from ischemic colitis at the age of 93.^[8]

References

• ^ Harvey V. Fineberg: David A. Hamburg (1925−2019). Science, 07 Jun 2019: Vol. 364, Issue 6444, pp. 940, doi:10.1126/science.aay0501
• ^ "Carnegie Corporation of New York: Presidents 1911-Today".
• ^ "About David A. Hamburg". Archived from the original on 2011-07-24.
• ^ "David A. Hamburg to Receive 1998 Public Welfare Medal, Academy's Highest Honor".
• ^ "Rosa Parks among 11 to get Presidential Medal of Freedom". CNN. 2009-04-06.
• ^ "Margaret Hamburg". Changinging the Face of Medicine. U.S. National Library of Medicine. Retrieved 10 September 2011.
• ^ Gold, Lauren Gold (Oct 25, 2007). "Sarnat Award recognizes David and Beatrix Hamburg". Cornell Chronicle. Cornell University. Retrieved 11 September 2011.
• ^ https://www.fredericknewspost.com/public/ap/david-hamburg-honored-for-efforts-to-end-global-violence-dies/article_da4308a3-ced0-58ba-ad93-41464fd14331.html

External links

• Appearances on C-SPAN
• David A. Hamburg at Carnegie Corporation of New York
• A film clip "The Open Mind - America's Children . . . And Its Political Leadership (1993)" is available at the Internet Archive
• A film clip "The Open Mind - America's Giant Philanthropies: Mission Impossible? (1993)" is available at the Internet Archive
• AAAS Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy Welcomes Security and Public Health Expert David Hamburg

He took deep satisfaction in discovery—and then raising the next question, and the next, and challenging the scientific community to pursue many ramifications.

This interrelated set of attributes characterized him all his life and had much to do with his great accomplishments.

One dramatic feature of his career: he was a school dropout—medical school, that is. He entered medical school with his typical intense curiosity and sense of discovery. This was a learning moment: the emergence of the new biology. He shifted to graduate school in biology to pursue the frontiers of knowledge. There began a line of inquiry that led before long to the Nobel Prize.

This was groundbreaking, highly imaginative work on the nature of microorganisms, especially their mechanisms of inheritance. He opened up bacterial genetics, including the momentous discovery of genetic recombination. This work was one of the crucial foundations for subsequent discoveries in cellular and molecular biology. Many of us stood on his shoulders. He won the Nobel Prize in 1958 at the age of 33—one of the youngest winners in any field from any nation.

Another attribute was his remarkable capacity for institutional innovation. He created a department of genetics in the medical school at Stanford University. Until then, genetics had been marginal—or nonexistent—in medical schools. There was a widely shared assumption in the middle of the twentieth century that genetics might be intrinsically interesting but that it would never have much practical significance for medicine. How wrong that assumption was! While actively stimulating and fostering basic research, Josh also sought applications, and he helped to create the biotechnology industry. In teaching and in institution building, he emphasized the mutually beneficial interplay of basic and clinical research.

In this context, he was very generous in helping to establish new clinical departments and new kinds of clinical departments. At Stanford, he helped with psychiatry, pediatrics, medicine, and neurology. He inspired us with the classic experiments of Oswald Avery, Colin MacLeod, and Maclyn McCarty at Rockefeller University in the 1940s. Their clinical inquiry into pneumonia led to a great discovery on the most basic level: DNA is the genetic material. He helped us to build on basic components and to create interdisciplinary groups. He also helped us to identify research opportunities and promising lines of innovation. He was a wide-ranging mentor. The world is full of people grateful to Josh for his powerful insights, creative suggestions, and generosity of spirit.

Within his own remarkable department at Stanford, he fostered many lines of inquiry: molecular genetics, cellular genetics, clinical genetics, population genetics, exobiology (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s [NASA’s] Mariner and Viking missions to Mars), immunology, and neurobiology.

He always had a worldwide view and brought in superb people, not only from the mysterious east of the United States, like New York City, but also, for example, Walter Bodmer (United Kingdom), Luca Cavalli-Sforza (Italy), Gus Nossal (Australia), Eric Shooter (United Kingdom), and others from afar—all of whom were major contributors. His global outlook, long-term vision, intense curiosity, and unfailing kindness inspired all of us seeking to create new kinds of clinical departments. Moreover, he did much to strengthen the scientific capability of the World Health Organization (WHO).

Thus, his rare capacity to range widely with open eyes and an open mind— and also to dig deeply into a specialized topic, and to combine these capacities in research, education, and intellectual synthesis—led to fruitful stimulation in a variety of fields and nations.

His knowledge, curiosity, and imagination have been expressed in many ways. For example, he was instrumental in the creation of a highly innovative undergraduate major at Stanford, now past its thirty-fifth year as one of the most sought after majors at Stanford, drawing in faculty from across the university. It is broadly integrative across the life sciences, linking basic science, hands-on experience (including field research), biological aspects of behavioral science, and in the senior year, applications of the life sciences to policy (e.g., in health and environmental problems). He even found a way to make this a permanent program by insisting that we find a way to get endowed chairs.

Early in the computer era his interest in computer science grew and he became a pioneer in artificial intelligence, especially in relation to biochemistry, genetics, and medicine.

He believed deeply in education of the broad public, opening complex and emotionally charged topics for informed public discussion. One major vehicle was a column in The Washington Post during the 1970s, in which he interpreted science for the public and for several years produced fascinating, highly informative columns.

He was a pioneer in the scientific assessment of the human impact on the environment—and especially on the health implications of environmental conditions.

All of this rich experience, knowledge, skill, and wisdom were brought to bear on Rockefeller University under his presidency, where he broadened the scope of its great faculty, opened new opportunities for young people, and greatly improved the facilities. His deep respect and concern for the well-being of faculty—young and not so young—was remarkable. This was a crucial aspect of his leadership.

Josh was a pioneer in biological warfare and bioterrorism, applying his farsighted vision in efforts to understand the danger and find ways to cope with it. He strongly influenced the negotiation of the biological weapons disarmament treaty.

He advised the U.S. government in many agencies, including: the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF), NASA, the Navy Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the Department of Energy, the Defense Science Board, and others. So too on the world stage. In addition, his deep sense of science’s contributions to the well-being of humanity was expressed in his role as co-chair of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, producing multiple publications on most branches of government, strengthening their science and technology capacities and their decision-making processes. He served with distinction on the National Academies’ Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), heading its efforts in biology.

Altogether, I know of no eminent scientist who produced so much serious analysis of public policy and social problems, giving wise advice and stimulating new lines of inquiry. Our country and the world are in his debt. Those of us here today profoundly appreciate what he did for humanity. His life exemplified the finest attributes of the great institution in which we meet today, and we honor his magnificent legacy.

[...]

Preface

The Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), part of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), today is a product of bold and innovative thinking in the early 1990s by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, and a cadre of practical academic thinkers. The broader framework they established, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, was conceived as a valuable tool to address a particular set of challenges associated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The program has since evolved and transformed in scope and mission, engaging more widely in other parts of the globe beyond the former Soviet Union to prevent the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction, including by enhancing biosecurity and disease outbreak identification. More recently, the CTR Program has once again focused concern on state-level threats.

Throughout the lifetime of the program thus far, biosecurity incidents, both in the United States and abroad, have occurred much less frequently than either biosafety incidents or naturally occurring disease events. But technology, connectivity, and the erosion of norms against the use of unconventional weapons all contribute to making these biological risks and threats ever more complex and the timelines to address them shorter. Our study committee was asked to recommend a new strategic vision for health security in a setting of rapid changes in biotechnology and geopolitics, by considering which forms of engagement have been successful, what else is needed, and how future work may be more effective. In short, how should BTRP engage partners in the United States and around the world to help make the world safer for the U.S. military forces, for the United States, and thus for other countries; that is, safe from intentional misuse of biological materials, laboratory accidents, natural outbreaks, and technical surprise?

The Committee on Enhancing Global Health Security through International Biosecurity and Health Engagement Programs wrestled with how to advise BTRP with a strategic vision when an effective strategy must include other parts of the U.S. government and, for that matter, other governments and organizations in the United States and abroad. Furthermore, we, the co-chairs, are from distinct professional backgrounds (Keusch from global health and Franz from the military) representing a broad range of tensions between distinct communities, each of which emphasizes different parts of the same problem set often called global health security. These communities sometimes draw conceptual mission boundaries based on the origin of a threat (accidental, natural, or intentional), which enables them to limit the scope of their work so that while the two may overlap, mission conflict is minimized. This made the study process challenging but ultimately resulted in a stronger report. We see this as a metaphor for BTRP itself. CTR is about building human relationships and capabilities, and opening lines of communication— primarily in the health and research sectors—to reduce risks and threats across the biological space. Public health engagement has also historically reduced threats, but typically not as its first priority, which is to improve health.

To the uniformed military and DOD, it is essential to recognize that the work of BTRP and CTR more broadly is a defense mission, and it requires coordination. Guidance from the White House and from the Secretary of Defense reaffirm the need for coordination within the U.S. government and for partnerships outside of it—coordination is easy to speak about but hard to deliver. Whether for protection of deployed U.S. military forces and U.S. interests overseas, or for protection of the homeland, DOD will only be fulfilling this aspect of its mission if it works with partners to anticipate, prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from biological risks and threats, whatever their origin. We may not know whether an outbreak is a result of intentional, accidental, or natural events during the timeframe in which action must be taken. And DOD needs to recognize that BTRP, if given sufficient flexibility to identify and develop programs on emerging risks, can strengthen each action taken to counter threats and mitigate risks. But it is even more complicated, as the current and ongoing Ebola outbreak in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo demonstrates. Like this one, future outbreaks may occur in unstable areas where armed civilian and ideological militias willing to engage in violence against healthcare workers, both domestic and international, where citizen distrust of government and the international community is equally dispensed, and where there may be no support for a foreign military or civilian effort to engage and deliver much-needed infrastructure, diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccines, and other support. BTRP should be strategically suited to systematically build the relationships and community engagement ultimately necessary for acceptance in the country.

For the public health sector, it is essential to recognize that DOD has enormous resources and capabilities, medical and logistical, to prevent and respond to emerging infectious disease. Its logistical reach alone is unmatched, but it can also engage more easily with some governments. In places, public health organizations will be the most effective partner to engage internationally, but in others it will be the military that can provide the entrée. By working within an effective interagency mechanism, BTRP can serve as a bridge between these communities and facilitate their cooperative efforts globally.

In this report, we describe the history of CTR and BTRP as well as the dynamic technological and geopolitical worlds of today so that the reader can better understand what needs to change and where BTRP must go. The middle chapters examine context and cases to illustrate what has been effective, where there are gaps and shortcomings, and what new obstacles might block the way to further success. The committee offers recommendations that we believe will significantly enhance the impact and efficiency of BTRP for the next 5 years and beyond. We conclude that global engagements resulting from relationships of respect and trust between and among professionals are needed—indeed, it may be needed now as much as or more than at any previous time—that BTRP is an essential component of the nation’s options for addressing current and future needs, that there are potential improvements to how it is implemented, and that it remains one of the most cost-effective arrows in the quiver of DOD and the U.S. government.

Gerald T. Keusch and David R. Franz, co-chairs

Committee on Enhancing Global Health Security through

International Biosecurity and Health Engagement Programs

Executive Summary

The Committee on Enhancing Global Health Security through International Biosecurity and Health Engagement Programs was asked to articulate a 5-year strategic vision for international health security programs and provide findings and recommendations on how to optimize the impact of the Department of Defense (DOD) Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) in fulfilling its biosafety and biosecurity mission. Because BTRP is just one of several U.S. government programs conducting international health security engagement, both the strategic vision and the success of the program rely on coordinating actions with the U.S. government as a whole and with its international partners.

Ongoing revolutions in the life sciences, ease of access to information, rapid transportation of people, and widespread trade in animals and plants all point toward novel threats from new actors, shorter timelines, and less geographic protection. As a result, there are greater risks now than ever before to deployed U.S. military forces, U.S. interests overseas, and to the homeland. International engagement is one of the most cost-effective tools available to prevent adverse events rather than to respond to them after they occur. BTRP’s engagements are a critical component of DOD’s mission to protect the United States’ national security by reducing the likelihood that a natural, accidental, or intentional outbreak from outside of the United States will cause significant harm to the United States or its allies and interests. BTRP should be given as much geographic and programmatic flexibility as possible to understand and address broadly the biosafety and biosecurity needs of its partner nations as the program serves U.S. interests. Mutually beneficial programs increase the likelihood of adoption and sustained ownership by partners, and if the program builds trusted relationships then communication with U.S. partners may continue even after DOD funding ends.

There are advantages to addressing natural, accidental, and intentional incidents or outbreaks as different manifestations of the same family of challenges. They may have ambiguous origins but the capabilities needed to address them overlap. An integrated view of biological threats also prevents bureaucratic boundaries from interfering with partnerships and progress. Furthermore, the overall mission encompasses anticipation, deterrence, prevention, detection, response, mitigation, and recovery. Action or intervention is possible at every stage and different components of the U.S. government effort (DOD, Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and others) have advantages in one or another part of the mission or in different partner countries, and so may be better able to intervene and eliminate, reduce, or mitigate risks at the most opportune and effective stage of development in different contexts. The U.S. government will be most effective and efficient if it identifies and prioritizes the threats it wishes to counter and applies resources through the channels that are best poised to address the associated needs. Strong interagency coordination must drive these prioritization and resource allocation efforts if the needs are to be effectively addressed.

No U.S. government program currently has or should be expected to have the authority or the capability to act on every aspect of the challenge of global health security. To address that challenge, BTRP and other agencies need to be part of a durable interagency coordination mechanism that addresses the full set of biological threats and risks, wherein the agencies best suited to each task are given the necessary tools. An effective mechanism will provide BTRP with greater geographic and programmatic flexibility, will allow BTRP to demonstrate better awareness, prevention of threat development, and more timely response, and will enhance BTRP’s ability to partner effectively within DOD, with other U.S. government agencies, with other nations, as well as with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and academia.

In this report, the committee (See Appendix A for committee member biographies) provides several recommendations for optimizing BTRP success in its current mission and the wider-looking strategic vision proposed by the committee.

1. A 5-YEAR VISION : In the next 5 years, BTRP, working with its many DOD partners, should encourage, engage, support, and co-lead the U.S. government’s development of a durable interagency mechanism to address the full set of biological threats and risks to deployed U.S. military forces, U.S. interests overseas, and to the homeland. This mechanism should seek to intervene and eliminate, reduce, or mitigate risks at the most opportune and effective stage of development and identify the agency or agencies best suited to engage and advance the mission. An effective interagency mechanism will provide for: (1) greater geographic flexibility; (2) demonstrably better awareness and prevention of threat development; (3) more timely response; and (4) effective partnerships within DOD, with other U.S. government agencies, with other nations, as well as NGOs, the private sector, and academia. Likewise, an effective interagency mechanism will avoid unnecessary duplication, identify and close gaps, and explore possible synergies.

2. Embrace an Integrated View of Biological Threats : There are advantages to addressing natural, accidental, and intentional incidents or outbreaks as different manifestations of the same family of challenges. They have functional similarities and common prevention, detection, response, and recovery initiatives. They may have ambiguous origins but the capabilities needed to address them overlap. Ultimately, needs of force protection and national health and safety may be similar or the same in virtually all cases. An integrated view of biological threats prevents bureaucratic boundaries from interfering with partnerships and progress.

3. Identify Needs and Opportunities : Effective disease surveillance extends beyond detection of disease outbreaks to noting and responding to the conditions that feed and lead to infectious disease risks and threats. Such risks include inadequate domestic diagnostic laboratory infrastructure or poor domestic disease surveillance and public health capabilities, and inadequate subject-matter expertise to prevent and respond to infectious diseases. Effective disease surveillance must also be paired with input and analysis from the security sector and analysis to evaluate opportunities to intervene.

4. Select International Partners : Foreign governments (hosts and non-hosts), NGOs, the private sector, academia, international organizations, and networks including the Global Health Security Agenda and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction provide both resource synergies and information networks vital to preparedness and early warning.

5. Select Partners in the United States : To enhance efficiencies and leverage scarce human and physical resources, BTRP should draw broadly on CDC, DOD, Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Agriculture, NGOs, private sector, academic partners, and subject-matter experts.

6. Strengthen Relationships and Build Networks Within the Department of Defense : BTRP must establish working relationships within DOD before they are needed. Particularly, regular open and frank communication must be ongoing between BTRP and combatant commands, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, and other relevant DOD partners.

7. Evaluate and Refine : BTRP should regularly evaluate progress and refine its approaches. It should add or subtract partners, create new networks, and share lessons learned and best practices. It should support and value human relationships between experts within the relevant scientific, technical, and health sectors and thoughtfully terminate unproductive partnerships.

[...]

In Remembrance

Dr. David Hamburg, 1925-2019

Senator Richard Lugar, 1932-2019

In April 2019 as this National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine committee deliberated about the future of the Biological Threat Reduction Program, Dr. David Hamburg and Senator Richard Lugar, two of the architects of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, passed away. They were among a select group of individuals who, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, sought to address the enormous proliferation threats posed by unemployed scientists and unsecured offensive nuclear and chemical weapons, and later, biological weapons (Ford, C., 2016). Informed by years of scholarship on nuclear security and U.S.–Russia relations—such as the International Peace and Security Program established in 1983 by Dr. Hamburg during his time as President of the Carnegie Corporation of New York—security and foreign policy experts saw a clear need to address a significant emerging nonproliferation challenge. This nonproliferation program laid the foundation for CTR, specifically by supporting the Prevention of Proliferation Task Force that produced the seminal report, Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union (Campbell, 1991), that ultimately led to the development of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 19911 which was co-sponsored by Senator Lugar and Senator Sam Nunn (Rosenberg, 2004). Three years later, in 1994, the CTR Program evolved to include the former Soviet biological weapons program and a decade later global biological threats and risks more broadly, and evolved to focus on reducing threats through partner-country capability building. The reduction of biological threats via the CTR Program has continued ever since, and now engages partners beyond the originally authorized geographic areas of the former Soviet

Union. Along with other eminent figures such as Senator Nunn and Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter, Dr. Hamburg’s and Senator Lugar’s vision and leadership in reducing nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation threats will be felt for years to come as the world grapples with both old and new threats from state-level programs, naturally occurring and accidentally released pathogens, and scientific and technological advances that exacerbate existing risks and/or present new risks.

This committee is honored to contribute to continuing the efforts initiated by Dr. Hamburg, Senator Lugar, and their partners in ensuring a world secure from harms caused by biological agents and malevolent exploitation of peaceful research.

[...]