Lina Dencik et al.’s Data Justice (2022) provides a crucial theoretical foundation for understanding the normative dimensions of data use in public governance. The authors argue that contemporary data practices are not neutral or purely technical, but rather deeply political processes that shape and reproduce existing social inequalities. Whereas many AI adoption frameworks emphasize efficiency, risk reduction, or innovation, Data Justice calls for a deeper evaluation of whose interests are served and whose voices are excluded in data-driven decision-making.

Silvia Masiero’s Unfair ID (2023) extends the discourse of data justice into the terrain of digital identification systems, revealing how algorithmic infrastructures can reproduce structural inequities through processes of exclusion and misrepresentation. Masiero’s work contributes to understanding how predictive systems in legal settings might inadvertently replicate the same forms of bias and procedural exclusion Masiero identifies in welfare technologies 

"Recognition" has become a veritable keyword of our time, but its relation to "redistribution" remains undertheorized. This volume remedies the lacuna by staging a sustained debate between two philosophers, one North American, the other European, who hold different views of the matter. Highly attuned to contemporary politics, the exchange between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth constitutes a rigorous dialogue on moral philosophy, social theory, and the best way to conceptualize capitalist society.

In 'Scales of Justice', Nancy Fraser revises her widely discussed theory of redistribution and recognition and introduces representation as a third, "political," dimension of justice, which permits us to re-conceive scale and scope as questions of justice.

The principles of justice that Rawls set forth in this book are those that free and rational people would accept in an “original position” of equality. In this hypothetical situation, which corresponds to the state of nature in social contract theory, no one knows their place in society; their class or social status; their fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities―their intelligence, strength, and the like―or even their conception of the good. Deliberating behind this “veil of ignorance,” people naturally determine their proper rights and duties. Thus, as Rawls writes, “each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.”

Incorporating the ideas of Rousseau, Kant, Emerson, and Lincoln, Rawls’s theory is as powerful today as it was when first published in 1971. For more than half a century, A Theory of Justice has been taught and debated, celebrated and translated into more than thirty languages. This revised edition includes changes, discussed in the preface, that Rawls considered to be significant, especially to the discussions of liberty and primary social goods. 

A study which aims to demonstrate that people comply with the law not so much because they fear punishment as because they feel that legal authorities are legitimate and that their actions are generally fair.