Statements of DFA Spokesperson For Maritime Affairs

Statement of the DFA Spokesperson

on Maritime Affairs

MANILA 23 March 2026 - The Department of Foreign Affairs addresses recent public commentary regarding discussions on a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the China Coast Guard (CCG).

The PCG and CCG entered into an MOU on the Establishment of a Joint Coast Guard Committee on Maritime Cooperation in 2016. Since 2024, both parties have been engaged in discussions to amend and update that agreement.

The proposed amendments are limited in scope. They are focused on re-establishing the Joint Coast Guard Committee, which is intended to serve as a formalized channel of communication between the two coast guards. The MOU does not contemplate cooperation in sensitive operational areas, joint patrols foremost among them.

These discussions are consistent with President Marcos's standing directive to maintain open lines of communication and engagement with China, even as the Philippines firmly upholds its sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction under international law.

The negotiations have been conducted through proper diplomatic channels and are not confined to Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) meetings. They have been duly reported to, and are known by, all relevant principals — including the National Security Adviser in his capacity as NTF-WPS Chair, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the PCG Commandant.

The Department reaffirms that engagement and vigilance are complementary, not contradictory. The Philippines will continue to pursue practical maritime cooperation where appropriate, while remaining steadfast in the defense of its national interests. END

Statement of the DFA Spokesperson for Maritime Affairs on Sovereignty of the Philippines over Bajo De Masinloc

MANILA 16 March 2026 - In response to the Chinese Embassy’s erroneous and misleading statement issued on Saturday, 14 March 2026, the Department of Foreign Affairs firmly underscores the Philippines’ indivisible, incontrovertible and longstanding sovereignty over Bajo de Masinloc and the Kalayaan Island Group.

The historical and legal foundations of Philippine sovereignty over Bajo de Masinloc are unassailable. The Murillo Velarde map of 1734 clearly portrays the high-tide feature as Philippine territory, and all subsequent cartographic records affirm the same. More critically, the Philippines has exercised continuous, uninterrupted sovereignty and jurisdiction over Bajo de Masinloc for centuries — demonstrated through detailed hydrographic surveys, official government correspondences, and decisive acts of administration, including its designation as a target range by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the demolition by Philippine authorities of illegal structures erected on the shoal by foreign smugglers. Sovereignty is not merely claimed — it is exercised. The Philippines has done precisely that, consistently and without interruption.

The Philippines flatly rejects China's assertion of indisputable sovereignty over the entire South China Sea. This claim has no basis in fact, no basis in history, and no basis in international law. Full stop.

As regards the recent letter posted by the Chinese Embassy in Manila, the DFA will not engage in conjecture or speculation over a document of uncertain origin and authenticity, and certainly without value. There is no merit in debating supposed documentary artifacts produced by third parties and presented as posts on social media, especially if these third parties have vested interests and willfully misconstrue and misrepresent established facts. 

China must be reminded that maritime and territorial claims are subject to established international legal procedures and dispute settlement mechanisms — not to unilateral proclamations or social media posts. China's persistent evasion of proper international legal scrutiny speaks volumes: it betrays the utter baselessness of its positions. A state confident in the legality of its claims does not shy away from international adjudication. China's conduct is a tacit admission that its claims cannot withstand legal scrutiny.

The Philippines, on the other hand, duly proved and established its maritime claims through the 2016 Arbitral Award, which has become an integral part of international law.  The Philippines likewise consistently exercised and upheld sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its archipelago and other territories, including Bajo de Masinloc and the high-tide features of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), which is incontrovertible and firmly founded on international law and effective administration.

Finally, while the Department welcomes the resumption of dialogue mechanisms with China as critical platforms for effective diplomacy, consistent with the guidance of President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., the Philippines makes one thing unequivocally clear: engagement is not concession. Our pursuit of dialogue reflects a calibrated and principled commitment to peaceful dispute settlement — it does not, in any manner, dilute or qualify the Philippines' firm, unequivocal positions in the West Philippine Sea. Our sovereignty is non-negotiable. Our resolve is absolute. END

Statement of the DFA Spokesperson

on Maritime Affairs 

MANILA 04 March 2026 – Members of the DFA Press Corps,

A pleasant day to all of you. 

Let me begin by making a rejoinder to recent statements that question the Philippines’ incontrovertible and indivisible sovereignty over Bajo de Masinloc.

Bajo de Masinloc, then known as “Panacot”, was portrayed by the Murillo Velarde map published in 1734. Subsequent maps reflected the same information. The Philippines' then colonial rulers exercised jurisdiction over the feature as evidenced by detailed surveys, official correspondences, and other acts of administration. In fact, the first official survey took place in 1800 and was carried out by the Santa Lucia, a Spanish frigate, on behalf of the Spanish colonial government.

This was further emphasized following the ceding of the Philippines by Spain to the US in the 1898 Treaty of Paris and the 1900 Treaty of Washington. While the Treaty of Paris described the Philippine Islands as comprising all the islands within an irregular polygon, Spain also had sovereignty and jurisdiction over islands and places outside of the lines of that polygon. These islands and places were clarified to have also been transferred to the United States under the terms of the Treaty of Washington.

Following the birth of the Republic of the Philippines, Bajo de Masinloc continued to be subject of Philippine sovereignty and jurisdiction. These included the 1963 discovery and disassembly of a smuggler’s base by the Philippine Navy, and the subsequent declaration of the shoal as a target and bombing range of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. All these exercises of sovereignty were uninterrupted and conducted peacefully and openly, without protest from any country until as late as 1997 when NAMRIA conducted a GPS survey of the shoal as part of its effort to identify points to be used to create the archipelagic baseline system under UNCLOS.

The Philippines, through the DFA, has since continued to firmly protest and challenge the illegal assertion of sovereignty by other states over the feature, especially following China’s unlawful actions in 2012 when they illegally took over and occupied Bajo de Masinloc as a response to the Philippines’ lawful arrest of poachers in the area. 

Ladies and gentlemen,

The Department also informs the public that it has held talks with Chinese foreign ministry counterparts in Beijing on 27-28 February 2026. Both sides had an open and candid exchange of views on prevailing bilateral concerns, including in the maritime domain, and explored possible areas of mutually-beneficial cooperation.

These recent meetings are yet another demonstration of the Department’s unwavering commitment to protecting  national interest. This is consistent with the second core dynamic of maritime statecraft – the proactive effort to keep bilateral and regional channels open. This shows our commitment to managing the situation at sea peacefully, further reflected by our mandate to assert and uphold Philippine interests while also seeking common ground where possible.

One good example of the Department’s efforts in this regard is the Provisional Understanding on the Rotation and Resupply Mission to the BRP Sierra Madre. The Provisional Understanding is a set of principles and approaches observed by both sides in order to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation in the conduct of the Philippines’ routine rotation and resupply (RORE) missions to the BRP Sierra Madre in Ayungin Shoal.

This Provisional Understanding has now facilitated thirteen (13) routine RORE missions since its inception in July 2024. All these missions had no reports of untoward incidents.

Nevertheless, the success of the Provisional Understanding and the safe rotation and reprovisioning of our personnel has been subjected to uninformed criticism, flawed analysis and a narrow understanding of both international law and of national objectives.

Allow us to clearly address the erroneous points that have been raised in the public sphere on the matter.

First, there have been mistaken attempts at equating the Provisional Understanding with Provisional Arrangements under UNCLOS. To be clear, the Provisional Understanding is not nor has ever been a Provisional Arrangement under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS. Rather, it is an understanding between the Philippines and China with the aim of conflict prevention and conflict avoidance, which is well contemplated in international law and not just in UNCLOS. To portray the Provisional Understanding as a singular application of UNCLOS provisions demonstrates either a fundamentally unfounded interpretation of international law, or a malicious attempt to deliberately misconstrue the Philippine position and government efforts.

Second, it is a basic principle of governance and international relations that states have the prerogative to ensure the confidentiality of documents involving matters of great importance, particularly national security and international relations. 

DFA Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro and her team carefully crafted the Provisional Understanding, which was then approved by the highest officials of the Philippine Government, particularly National Security Adviser Eduardo Año.

Indeed, where the country is looking to secure the safety and welfare of Philippine personnel, with the active participation of all national security agencies, the Philippine Government must exercise maximum discipline and focus, with minimum diversion and interference.

Third, we reiterate the clear, firm and enduring position of the Philippines that the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award has definitively settled that UNCLOS already defined the scope of maritime entitlements of the Philippines and China in the South China Sea, and that these entitlements may not extend beyond the limits imposed therein. There are no valid overlapping maritime claims between the Philippines and China in the West Philippine Sea, and the historic rights derived from the so-called “9-dash line” are without legal effect. 

The Provisional Understanding takes full note of the foregoing, and was drafted specifically to be without prejudice to the Philippines’ national position. The Provisional Understanding does not require the Philippines to seek permission to undertake RORE missions, nor does it allow boarding and inspection of Philippine vessels, and, above all, it does not concede the Philippines’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction.

Indeed, there is an inherent inconsistency and dullness of reasoning when critics criticize a document that they have not even seen.  

The Philippines will continue to implement the Provisional Understanding as agreed. We expect China to do the same.

The DFA assures the Filipino people that it will firmly and consistently uphold the Philippines’ national interest, and remain vigilant in protecting our sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction. The DFA will continue to use effective diplomacy as the bigger tool in the Philippine government’s toolbox in order to peacefully manage the situation at sea, uphold the welfare of our naval and maritime personnel and artisanal fishermen, and avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation in the conduct of the Philippines’ routine maritime operations in all its maritime zones, including in the West Philippine Sea.

Thank you very much. END

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Statement of DFA Spokesperson for Maritime Affairs 

13 February 2026

Magandang umaga po sa inyong lahat.

Good morning!

Vice Admiral Eduardo Mario R. Santos AFP (Ret.), Chairman and President of the Maritime League,

Vice Admiral Emilio C Marayag Jr,

Vice President, Vice Admiral Ed Tan, Trustee and Corporate Secretary,

Rear Admiral Margarito V. Sanchez, trustee and Treasurer of the Maritime League,

Ambassador Evan P. Garcia, Filipino Chair elected by the International Organization on Migration Council,

Commodore Eduardo B Gongona PCG (Ret), former National Director of  BFAR, 

Mr John Paul D Agustin, Trustee & Assistant Corp Secretary,

The Maritime Leagues trustees. 

Commodore Mariano S. Sontillanosa AFP and Captain Oscar D. Orbeta PN, 

Ms. Adelaida Almajar, Secretariat,  and Ms Blanca Bustamante, President, IntelleVision Events Philippines,  

Members of the Maritime League present,  

Fellow DFA personnel,  

Colleagues and friends from the Foreign Service Posts and other government agencies,  

Good morning. 

The Department of Foreign Affairs is pleased to host the 204th Maritime Forum, the first Forum for the year 2026. It is also timely as the Philippines is taking on the heavy responsibility as ASEAN Chair this year.

The Maritime Forum aims to foster discussions that help spur  progress in the maritime sector and advance the interest of the maritime  profession and the maritime industry as a whole in the Philippines. 

The DFA fully supports the Maritime League's core mission, especially the regular Maritime Forum which traces its origins to a small breakfast get-together in 1995 but has since become an important venue for the exchange of ideas and best practices aimed at tackling issues in the maritime industry.  

As one of the regular hosts of the Forum, the DFA has always been keen to engage stakeholders in the maritime industry, business sector and relevant government agencies. Today’s Forum tackled the Philippine ASEAN Chairship, Domestic Implementation of the BBNJ, and Critical Undersea Infrastructure. 

In addition to those, the DFA also talked about the Philippines’ perspectives and positions in the West Philippine Sea. And this is what I would like to share with you this morning.  

Let me begin by reaffirming the DFA’s commitment to protecting the Philippines’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction. The DFA will continue to champion the Philippine position in the maritime domain through the use of effective diplomacy to facilitate responsible and principled approaches that lead to positive outcomes. To help achieve this, we will continue to engage our counterparts in a firm and professional manner, consistent with the mutual respect that must prevail in all diplomatic interactions.

The DFA will continue to be guided by the President’s directive as the chief architect of Philippine Foreign Policy, and not allow ourselves to be sidetracked by the jeers of some casual commentators, non-practitioners and self-styled experts. There were those who wrongly thought that the letter of Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro to Senator Risa Hontiveros was leaked, when in fact the Secretary gave permission to the good Senator to release it to the public.

The DFA’s professional diplomats ensure that the substance, intricacies and nuances that drive diplomatic interactions are not trapped within inflexible walls that offer no meaningful alternatives, only immediate gratification, and are inimical to the national interest in the long-term.  

While performative rhetoric is a reality in modern public discourse, the DFA has long ago resolved to conduct our work with the national interest as the sole consideration. Not for fanfare, not for followers and certainly not for likes, but solely for the national interest and the welfare of the Filipino people. 

To this end, allow me to highlight the twin anchors of Philippine maritime policy, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award. They provide certainty, stability and clarity through the often rough seas.  This year is in fact the 10th anniversary of the final and binding 2016 Arbitral Award, and the country looks forward to commemorating it in a manner befitting its significance not only to the Philippines, but to the entire international community. 

I also take this opportunity to emphasize that our sovereignty over the Philippine archipelago and other territories, including Bajo de Masinloc (BDM) and the high-tide features of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), and the maritime entitlements of the Philippines under UNCLOS and clarified by the 2016 Arbitral Award is incontrovertible and firmly founded on international law, legal principles, effective control, and recognition through international treaties and agreements. 

We recall the speech delivered by President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. during his keynote address at the 2024 Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore where he underscored our sovereignty over these territories, and I quote: "The Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States crystallized our islands into a cohesive whole. The Treaty of Washington clarified that the extent of our sovereignty and our patrimony transcends the lines set by international powers."

The abovementioned treaties along with other agreements such as the 1930 United States-Great Britain Treaty clearly and firmly state the extent of Philippine territory as well as their meaning derived from the concrete and consistent demonstrations of sovereign authority and jurisdiction exercised by the Philippines over its territory through the centuries. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions of the Philippines, taken together, are clear on the legal bases and extent of the Philippine national territory. 

With respect to maritime entitlements derived from our territory, we likewise strictly adhere to international law. In connection with certain misconceptions in the public sphere, the DFA clarifies that maritime entitlements arise from territory, and sovereignty over high tide features are not contingent on whether or not they fall within the maritime zones of other landmasses. 

In this regard, we should keep in mind that the Philippine Maritime Zones Act (Republic Act 12064), which is consistent with UNCLOS, set forth that “The maritime zones of the Philippines on the western side of the Philippine archipelago, including the Luzon Sea and the territorial seas of Bajo de Masinloc and the maritime features of the Kalayaan Island Group, shall be collectively called the West Philippine Sea.” Furthermore, “The high-tide features covered by the Kalayaan Island Group in the West Philippine Sea shall have a territorial sea of twelve (12) nautical miles from its baselines as determined above.” 

As such, the extent of what constitutes the West Philippine Sea, as well as our sovereignty over KIG and the territorial sea of its high-tide features, are already explicity established, and are not contingent on whether or not they fall within the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me now expound on the four core dynamics of our maritime statecraft. First, we pursue a dynamic commitment to international law, most notably and the Arbitral Award. We find ways to translate treaty provisions and legal principles into actual policies and practices that are not only incorporate into our engagements with other states but also ensure that our activities are consistent with international law across the full breadth of our archipelago and all our maritime zones.

Second is our proactive efforts to keep bilateral and regional channels open. We at the Department are often asked why we continue to engage China amid their continued illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive activities. The answer is because we are committed to managing the situation at sea peacefully. It is our mandate to uphold Philippine interests while seeking common ground where possible. And it is our  duty to adhere to the President’s directive to give primacy to diplomacy and dialogue as a means to resolve differences. And together with China, we also are working closely with our fellow ASEAN member states to conclude a substantive and effective Code of Conduct in the South China Sea within the year.  

Third is our active leveraging of alliances, partnerships and multilateralism. Cooperation with like-minded countries is meant to deter escalation and fosters peace and stability, and demonstrates a united front with other responsible states in upholding a rules-based order governed by international law. To this end, we have 11 bilateral maritime dialogues, a trilateral maritime dialogue, multiple multilateral diplomatic initiatives, increasing visiting forces agreements, deepening defense cooperation frameworks, and a growing number of participants in our multilateral maritime cooperative activities.

The last core dynamic is our energetic support for domestic capacity-building through targeted foreign engagements. It is the DFA that keeps the doors open for concrete defense and security collaboration to flourish. Diplomacy and national security make each other stronger by reinforcing the respective institutions and capabilities that are key to asserting our rights and interests in the maritime domain.  

Ladies and gentlemen,  

As part of one government, the DFA will always stand ready to support other agencies' credible, coherent, disciplined and professional initiatives that properly advance the national interest and adhere to the President’s directives.  

We respect the mandates and expertise of our partner agencies, including in operational matters and strategic messaging outside of the ambit of foreign policy. Our lines of communication with each other are open and will remain collaborative, especially in crucial times.

We have also made it clear that all our efforts must be viewed in the greater lens of achieving the Philippines’ strategic objectives. We recognize that tactics such as Strategic Messaging and Transparency serve their purposes, but if used by themselves may fall short of actually changing state behaviour and derail the bigger effort to produce outcomes that advance the Philippines' positions. 

Instead, all policy instruments of government must work together and build on each other. As we have previously said, defense capabilities, messaging and transparency are all important tools, but diplomacy is the bigger tool in the maritime toolbox and remains indispensable for securing the country’s strategic priorities.

Indeed, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s directive is to place diplomacy at the center of state-to-state engagement. As PCO Undersecretary Clare Castro stated just the other day, the government is unified on this front. “Nagkakaisa naman po tayo, aligned naman kung ano ang gusto ng Pangulo – firm but diplomatic.” 

To this end, the Department will continue to issue protests and make firm representations of serious concern to the Chinese Embassy at appropriate times, and we will consistently assert to them and the entire world the Philippines’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea.    

The Filipino public can continue to count on the DFA to be a credible and authoritative voice for the Philippines’ positions and interests. We will sustain the hard push to keep the space open for constructive engagement and pragmatic measures that duly serve our nation’s interests, and implement the President’s vision for peace and prosperity in the region.

Thank you!

END

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