Introduction

Charles Mordaunt, Third Earl of Peterborough and the First Earl of Monmouth, served as a capital and astute military leader during the War of the Spanish Succession, particularly excelling in his military prowess during the allied campaign's battles in Valencia, Altea, and Barcelona. Peterborough’s commission as Commander-in-Chief in Spain occurred in the 1705- 1707 period. Historians often remember Peterborough as being a varied Commander, receiving scholarly praise and criticism for his successes and failures in Spain. The purpose of this essay is to assess the contributing factors that led to Peterborough’s decisions and conduct in Spain. The contributing factors demonstrate that Peterborough’s offensive campaign efforts and his willingness to advance the allied army’s control in Spain in Valencia and Altea were vital to the allies' ability to gain a foothold of defense in Spain. Without Peterborough’s efforts to securitize the Eastern Spanish front, allied operations would have been irreparably hampered.

Consequently, an allied failure to such a degree would have allowed Louis XIV and the French army commanded by General Berwick to re-establish a military foothold in Spain. This essay will survey the scholarship of historians in the early 18^th century, along with later scholars in the 20^th century. Through this academic survey, this essay will defend the claim that Peterborough was a successful Commander-in-Chief from 1705 to 1707 in Spain.

Secondary Source Analysis

The historical records and analysis of the correspondence between Peterborough and Stanhope, The Memoirs of Captain George Carlton, and the Original Manuscripts and Records of General Arthur Parnell serve as the primary focus of this scholarly analysis. The works of Peterborough and Carlton serve to substantiate the claims made herein that not only vindicate the criticisms Churchill has displaced onto Peterborough. Indeed, these works of scholarship also prove that Peterborough's presence was paramount in ensuring allied victory, and his dismissal directly contributed to the horrendous allied defeat at Almanza. The Manuscripts of Parnell serve to provide a base of historical criticism against Peterborough. However, the former two documents serve to annul the claims made by Parnell enough to acquit Peterborough's alleged misconduct.

Churchill, in a similar fashion to Parnell’s claims, provides a critical case against Peterborough. Churchill attempts to deny this supposition, writing that his evaluation “cannot try here to appraise the character and quality of ‘“Earl of Peterborough,”’ but merely to present the reflections cast upon his memorable deeds and misdeeds by Marlborough’s judgment and actions.^[1] Through this lens, Churchill perceives Peterborough, in the words of Hoffmann, as “a thoroughly restless and quarrelsome character, incapable of dealing with anybody.”^[2] Though he attempts to maintain neutrality, Churchill does not eschew away from interpreting Peterborough’s conduct through a familial biased lens prompted by Churchill’s association to the Duke of Marlborough. Such can be seen in Churchill’s evaluation of Peterborough’s quality as a leader, with Churchill stating that, about Peterborough’s military ventures in Spain, that “Probably if Marlborough had been in Peterborough’s shoes in the Lisbon discussions he would have refrained from advocacy of any course.”^[3]

The criticism Churchill places upon Peterborough must be speculated to a degree, considering the heritage Churchill possesses with the centering protagonist in his historical analysis of the War of the Spanish Succession. The best method then, perhaps, is to assess the strategic decisions and correlative correspondence regarding Peterborough’s actions in Spain to determine the actual effectiveness of Peterborough’s military leadership; such is the purpose of this essay in determining this proposition. When evaluating what effect Peterborough had in creating stable and even successful relations in Spain overall, it is apparent that there are varying degrees of both failure and success. Economics and politics are critical factors in the cause of the brevity of the ongoing campaign in Spain overall. One of the most important precursors in understanding is Peterborough’s economic standpoint, which provides an essential context to understand the choices that were made by Peterborough.

Historical Narrative

Peterborough possessed a high degree of popularity with the Spanish peasants in Valencia. Peterborough’s welcome by the people was so incredible that it required Lord Mordaunt “To avail himself of this favorable opening…declaring that he (a true Spaniard, no doubt) had come to deliver the nation from the yoke of foreigners.”^[4] Stanhope documents that after moving from Gibraltar to Altea, Peterborough’s welcome in Altea was “to surpass the most sanguine expectations.”^[5] The people of Spain had grown so wearied of Bourbon control that it “had produced in this province a strong feeling in favor of the Archduke [Charles III].”^[6] This dissent towards French rule provided Peterborough the necessary knowledge to assess what Spanish cities remained willingly under French control, granting him a gauge on anti-allied power and loyalty in Spain. These facts will become important in dispelling the criticism placed on Lord Peterborough in his failing to advance further into Spain and in establishing a more substantial presence.

Despite a strong command of the Military in Valencia and enthusiastic support for Charles III in Altea, Peterborough was not without challenges in his military career in Spain. Carleton’s memoirs document that Peterborough’s forces were half of the 25,000 troops that the Duke of Anjou possessed in Barcelona.^[7] Carlton further records that Peterborough’s methods rendered “All difficulties sunk before the creative power of his genius,” even despite such deficiencies as forbearing “a perilous expedition, in a country ill-affected to the cause, without supplies, stores, artillery, reinforcements, or money; he created substitutes for all these deficiencies –.”^[8] Carlton’s analysis of Peterborough’s economic standing in Spain represents Peterborough as a Commander who was able to maintain success and personal cohesiveness, despite errant external restraints upon his military operations. Such substitutions that partially remedied Peterborough’s military budget disparities included the use of Dragoons to plunder the banks of Genoa. Such a decision was vital to maintain the necessary funds to keep the army fed, clothed, and operational, as Peterborough wrote that “all my friends we could employ in Barcelona, could not obtain 6000l. to keep our troops from starving, either upon bills for Genoa, Leghorn, Lisbon, Amsterdam, or London.”^[9] The correspondence of Peterborough’s to Stanhope regarding his financial burdens in Spain underscore the importance of Peterborough’s operations in Valencia, and his diplomatic efforts in working with the Spanish in guaranteeing additional supplies and resources to relieve the allies’ dire conditions in Spain.

Not only would the acquisition of resources by Peterborough be necessary for his armies' survival, but it was also essential to the allies in their re-assessment of their strategy in Spain. Peterborough, in relaying the extremities he faced to Stanhope, stated he, “cannot get provisions put into a place which must expect a siege; I cannot so much as get the breach of Barcelona repaired…I have no money left; I have no credit…we have no medicines for our sick…we shall perish without being able to get to those places which only desire to be in our hands.”^[10] The financial strain of the war was immensely displaced upon Peterborough in Spain, requiring Peterborough to acquire resources in whatever possible manner he could that was befitting of a General.

The necessity for resources that drove Peterborough to take such forward actions was not without warrant or merit, as Peterborough had been in communication with Godolphin about the state of his financial standing. Peterborough truthfully reported to Godolphin that he had "taken the most proper measures having Bills drawn upon the Paymaster General at Lisbon…upon the Portugueses, who have given me the authority…to procure the money at any rate…"^[11] These resources from the Portuguese never arrived, however, prompting Peterborough to naturally pursue remedies from Genoa, as he had done so. These resources captured from Peterborough’s calculated risks allowed for the successive captures Peterborough retained in Catalonia, Valencia, Arragon, and Majorca. These captures, however, were necessary to provide Galway the luxury of “marching to Madrid without a blow.”^[12] Peterborough’s gamble in pursuing a rushed strategic approach in Spain was crucial to providing Galway the gateway that allowed for an allied forward military presence in Spain.

Historical Disagreements on Peterborough

Nevertheless, despite Peterborough’s success in Spain, critics would quickly assign blame to him for failing to pursue a more expedient assault on Barcelona after the capture of Valencia. Colonel Parnell was among the chief figures to criticize Peterborough’s actions, charging that “that the earl did all in his power to divert the expedition from Spain to Italy, then from Barcelona to Valencia; he held constant councils of war, as even his panegyrists admit –the known and traditional device of a general who does not care to fight…and used the decisions of the councils, which he himself dictated, as pretexts for delay.”^[13] This argument is incorrect for three reasons: First, Parnell even admits that Peterborough “In the actual assault lie seems to have done his duty,” admitting that the Earl did not fail in his endeavors to capture Valencia, indicating an alternative explanation for the Earl’s decision in maintaining and slower pursuit is apparent. Additionally, Peterborough’s calculus of assault was not merely assessing the comparative powers between allied English and Spanish military, but also the degree to which the Spanish citizens would support the de facto emperor of Spain at the time, Charles III of Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor. In Valencia, for example, where Peterborough had successfully led a desirable and successful capture, “Lord Peterborough saw the people friendly, the local authorities dismayed.”^[14] Additionally, support for Charles III remained high to the South in Altea. Where the people, upon learning of Valencia's capture, “came rushing down to Altea with loud proclamations of Viva Carlos Tercero! Viva! (Long life to Charles the Third!) and loaded all kinds of fresh provisions for the use of his army”.^[15]

However, though support in certain areas was high for Charles III, in French Bourbon occupied areas of Spain such as Almanza and Barcelona, there remained a formidable force and French occupation. Stanhope credits Peterborough with his realization that the Duke of Berwick could pose no formidable threat to the allies at Madrid, as Berwick “could not move alone: he must be closely followed by Galway and Das Minas; and while marching to repel one invasion, would undoubtedly draw another into the heart of Spain.”^[16]

This calculated plan led Peterborough and Stanhope to conclude that “on approaching Madrid, he would not only find the English in possession of it, and ready to meet him in front, but would be pressed by a second army from behind, would, therefore, be placed between two fires, and either be beaten in battle, or compelled to a retreat.”^[17] To compound matters even more positively, such a conquest with an anticipated victory would have allowed for Peterborough and the allied forces to establish a forward military presence in Gibraltar.^[18] This presence in Gibraltar would have allowed the allies to possess a base much closer to England in Spain, even if Galway would fail in an attack against Berwick.^[19] Additionally, it would have also allowed safe passage for supplies to ship through Spain. This would not have been a possibility should the French-occupied Barcelona remain under French control. Such a failure to retake Barcelona would open the door to cut allied supplies to the English in Spain, a failure that would make the capture of Spain nearly impossible “without a long and laborious siege.”^[20]

Barriers to Peterborough's Success

What, then, led Charles Mordaunt to refrain from an invasion of Madrid, combined with a successive march from Galway and Das Minas that would have most assuredly guaranteed success in Spain? Why did Peterborough take such expensive and hasty actions that contributed to his ultimate recall and the dismantling of his command in Spain? The answer lies in the Maginot Line and the subsequent Achilles Heel of Peterborough’s campaign: Charles III. Peterborough writes that Charles III’s policies, along with his “arrogant generals proved especially difficult.”^[21] Such were the difficulties that Peterborough faced with Charles’ generals that, in his letters to Stanhope, Peterborough wrote, “God preserve any country from the best of German Ministers! They have spent their whole time in selling places; all the money in the town so disposed of.”^[22]

Not only was Charles’ ministers responsible for Peterborough’s externally seeming lavish lifestyle and tremendous expense, but it is also unfortunately apparent that Charles served as the primary hindrance in Peterborough’s seemingly flawless proposition to occupy Madrid. Dickinson aptly notes that,

It was generally considered that Charles III should make haste to Madrid in order to assume the crown of Spain. The task seemed so hopeful that it appeared all Charles had to do was embark on his coach unto the capital. No considerable force now stood between the allies and Madrid while in western Spain, an Anglo-Portuguese army under the Earl of Galway and the Marquis das Minas was already marching on the capital.^[23]

A pursued campaign through Spain did not come to fruition, however, as the decision not to pursue Madrid came from the directive of Charles III, against the better wishes and advice of Peterborough. As such, Dickinson continues, stating that,

Unfortunately, the recent success in relieving Barcelona and the dazzling prospect of reaching Madrid did little to breach the rift between Lord Peterborough and the Court in Barcelona. The Earl complained to a friend that “the influence of the German ministry is capable perhaps of ruining all our endeavors in Spain though we had able and honest men here…”The King is obstinate in some circumstances beyond expression, where there is nothing but matters of form and pride.^[24]

Peterborough’s criticism of Charles’ decisions ultimately led to a fracturing of relations between the Earl and the German court, as Charles “could neither brook the petulant language in which his general (Peterborough) too much indulged…The royal attendants, in like manner, looked with undisguised abhorrence upon a man who neither courted their interest nor affected to value their opinions.”^[25] It is very apparent, therefore, what attributing factors led to the failure of the allies to maintain a cohesive dominating strategy in controlling and occupying Spain. With regards to Peterborough, especially, one can see that the case for Peterborough being a military commander skewed by bureaucracy is much more self-evident and probable when juxtaposed with the claim that Peterborough was merely a haughty, ill-suited and irrational Commander-in-Chief. Critics would state that the command of the eastern front in Spain was a joint operation “under the direction of Charles III and the Earl of Peterborough,” yet this claim does not do justice to the varying political restraints placed upon Lord Peterborough.

Tragically, the inability of Peterborough to exercise more autonomous control, along with already being strained for resources, indefinitely contributed to the defeat at Almanza in 1707. This defeat inevitably left “Spain in the hands of the Bourbon claimant, Philip of Anjou,” which eventually would lead the English government to have “recalled the Earl of Peterborough to answer charges of misconduct. The stage appeared to be set for another round of partisan finger-pointing with political as well as military reputations hanging in the balance.”^[26] Rather than placing blame upon the Austrian indecisiveness and the lack of Portuguese funding, it was merely much more comfortable for the English Parliament, and certain historians to assign blame to Peterborough, and state his “brief military career is also a tissue of falsehoods.”^[27] These tarnishing claims upon a successful, albeit a challenging and truthfully mired career, demonstrate that Peterborough cannot accept sole blame for his actions in Spain, nor can he be entirely credited with exclusive success, as his initial military successes in Altea and Valencia had mainly relied upon the banner of Charles III behind Peterborough’s command.

Conclusion

While the successes of Charles Mordaunt, Third Earl of Peterborough, remain varied, several conclusions can certainly be drawn that serve to vindicate many claims made against Peterborough when assessing his command in Spain. Overall, Peterborough’s successes are mainly owed to his use of the resources that he had at his disposal. Peterborough faced tremendous financial and political adversity, lacking the proper financial resources necessary to bring his plans to conquer Madrid to fruition individually. Additionally, much of the critical scholars such as Parnell and Churchill place on Peterborough’s character can also be resolved by the fact that Peterborough, though he was immensely limited by bureaucracy, did not act out of the instruction of the King he was pledged to and served in Spain.

Therefore, though his recall of military action in Spain, and his eventual recall from military service overall may have damaged his political image, one can see that Peterborough’s honor and virtue remained intact because of Peterborough’s disposition as a man possessing the virtue of Marlborough. Therefore, Peterborough, restricted by powers beyond his control, should be praised for the successful endeavors he was able to achieve. Also, Peterborough should receive a certain level of leniency, as one can see through the works of Stanhope, Carlton, and Dickinson that Peterborough truly excelled in his position as Commander-in-Chief, despite the aristocratic inhibitions littered throughout his Spanish campaign. In this manner, not only was Peterborough a victorious general, he was a definite strategic necessity for the allied forces' grand strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession.