This is the 9th annual gathering where researchers from the larger New York metropolitan area convene to discuss the interplay between computer science, economics, marketing, and business.

Previous editions: NYCE 2016, NYCE 2014, NYCE 2013

When: Friday, May 19

Where: Stern School of Business, New York University (NYU)

44 West 4th Street, New York NY 10012

Keynote Speakers

• Yiling Chen (Harvard University) : Learning-Aided Peer Prediction
• David Rothschild (Microsoft Research) : Polling the 2020 election
• Emin Gun Sirer (Cornell University) : The New New Blockchains and How They Will Transform The World
• Assaf Zeevi (Columbia University) : Content Dynamics and "Information Marketplaces"

Talk Abstracts and Speaker Bios

Program

8:30-9:00 Check In + Breakfast

9:00-10:00 Plenary Talk 1

• Polling the 2020 election (David Rothschild)

10:00-10:15 Coffee Break

10:15-11:15 Short Talks

• The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering (Rupert Freeman, Duke)
• Bernoulli Factories and Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design (Rad Niazadeh, Cornell)
• Incentives in Blockchain Technologies (Hanna Halaburda, NYU)
• On the Instability of Bitcoin without the block reward (Matt Weinberg, Princeton)
• Monopoly without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System (Jacob Leshno, Columbia)

11:15-11:30 Coffee Break

11:30-12:30 Plenary 2

• The New New Blockchains and How They Will Transform The World (Emin Gun Sirer)

12:30-1:30 Lunch

1:30-2:30 Plenary 3

• Learning-Aided Peer Prediction (Yiling Chen)

2:30-2:45 Coffee Break

2:45-3:45 Short Talks

• Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: Queueing Models and Approximation Algorithms (Thodoris Lykouris, Cornell)
• Probably Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions Via Machine Learning (Ben Lubin, Boston)
• Information Acquisition Costs of Matching Markets (Irene Lo, Columbia)
• Conditional Gradient method for Learning Mixtures of Choice Models (Ashwin Venkataraman, NYU)
• Budget Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions (Anthony Kim, Stanford)

3:45-4:00 Coffee Break

4:00-5:00 Plenary 4

• Content Dynamics and "Information Marketplaces" (Assaf Zeevi)

5:00-6:30

Posters + Networking

Accepted Posters

• A Model-based Projection Technique for Segmenting Customers (Ashwin Venkataraman, NYU Courant)
• A New Bloom Filter Structure for Searchable Encryption Schemes (Xiaowen Zhang, CUNY - Graduate Center & CSI)
• A Study of Compact Reserve Pricing Languages (Saeed Seddighin, University of Maryland)
• Auctions in the Online Display Advertising Chain: A case for Independent Campaign Management (Amine Allouah, Omar Besbes, Columbia University)
• Auctions with Limited Commitment (Qingmin Liu, Columbia)
• Automated Design of Robust Mechanims (Michael Albert, Duke University)
• Bargain Network and the Matchmaker (Jing Xu, University of Pennsylvania)
• Bayesian Dynamic Learning and Pricing with Strategic Customers (Xi Chen, New York University)
• Bayesian Group Decisions: Algorithms and Complexity (Amin Rahimian, MIT Institute for Data, Systems, and Society / University of Pennsylvania)
• Blacklisting the Blacklist in Digital Advertising (Yeming Shi, Dstillery, Inc.)
• Community detection in the hypergraph stochastic block model (Ana-Andreea Stoica, Columbia University)
• Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules (Ariel Schvartzman, Princeton University)
• Effect of selfish choices in deferred acceptance with short lists (Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Cornell University)
• Fair Division via Social Comparison (Rediet Abebe, Cornell University)
• Hypergraph Valuations with Restricted Overlapping (Gianluca Pane, Brown University)
• Large-scale Bundle Size Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis (Tarek Abdallah, NYU Stern School of Business)
• Mechanism Design with Unknown Correlated Distributions: Can We Learn Optimal Mechanisms? (Michael Albert, Duke University)
• Multi-Armed Bandit Problems with Strategic Arms (Jon Schneider, Princeton University)
• Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets (Christian Kroer, Carnegie Mellon University)
• Network Externalities in a Buyer-Seller Search Platform (JING XU, University of Pennsylvania)
• Oblivious Dynamic Mechanism Design (Song Zuo, Tsinghua University)
• On Approximate Welfare- and Revenue-Maximizing Equilibria for Size-Interchangeable Bidders (Enrique Areyan Viqueira, Brown Univeristy)
• On the Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of Strategic Customers (Yiwei Chen, Singapore University of Technology and Design)
• Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning (Zhe Feng, Harvard University)
• Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users (Debmalya Mandal, Harvard University)
• Proportional Rankings (Markus Brill, TU Berlin)
• Rational Proofs with Non-Cooperative Provers (Shikha Singh, Department of Computer Science, Stony Brook University)
• Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations (Pooya Jalaly, Cornell University)
• Simultaneous Communication Complexity of Two-party Combinatorial Auctions (Jieming Mao, Princeton University)
• Social Choice Mechanisms for Agents with General Utilities (Hongyao Ma, Harvard University)
• The menu complexity of ``one-and-a-half-dimensional'' mechanism design (Raghuvansh Raj Saxena, Princeton University)
• Towards Building Cyber Insurance Market Quantitatively: From Data's Perspective (Yang Liu, SEAS, Harvard University)
• Towards Simple Polynomial-Time Optimal Auctions (Takehiro Oyakawa, Brown University)

Call for presentations and posters

NYCE 2016 solicits research work of highest quality in the areas mentioned above. We are looking for work that is unpublished or published recently: no more than two years ago, and preferably in the past year. There will be a few presentation slots for short talks, and a poster session.

Topics of interest to the NYCE community include, but are not limited to, the economics of Internet activity such as search, user-generated content, or social networks; the economics of Internet advertising and marketing; the design and analysis of electronic markets; algorithmic game theory; mechanism design; and other subfields of algorithmic economics.

Due to time and space constraints, we may not be able to accommodate all submissions.

All submissions are due by April 3. Notifications will be sent out by April 15. Submit using this form. Only a title and abstract are necessary for submission. If you have a link to a paper, you may include that as well in the submission.

Registration: Please complete this registration form no later than May 6.

Registration fee is only $25 for professionals and $10 for students and is required for all attendants. Limited on-site registration will be available. However, the number of such slots is limited and could be exhausted rather quickly.

If you change your plans please "unregister" by contacting the organizers. Unfortunately, registration fees are nonrefundable.

Organizing Committee

• Amy Greenwald (Brown University)
• Ilan Lobel (NYU Stern)
• Renato Paes Leme (Google Research)
• James Wright (Microsoft Research)

Steering Committee

• Vahab S. Mirrokni (Google Research)
• Muthu Muthukrishnan (Rutgers University)
• David M. Pennock (Microsoft Research)
• Éva Tardos (Cornell University)