M. Bumin Yenmez
Professor of Economics
Market and Mechanism Design
Affirmative Action and Diversity
Intradistrict and Interdistrict School Choice
Externalities and Peer Effects
Fair Resource Allocation
Mini Lecture on Matroids and Matching:
I gave a mini lecture entitled "Matroids and Matching" in Fall 2022. I got several requests for the lecture slides. I am posting them here in case anyone finds them helpful. Lecture 1 is based on classical papers in matching with a new proof on the existence of stable matchings using path independence of choice rules (for path independence see Chambers and Yenmez (2017)). Lecture 2 is mostly based on a recent work with Battal Dogan and Kenzo Imamura. Lecture 3 is based on another recent paper with Isa Hafalir, Fuhito Kojima, and Koji Yokote (I was asked to emphasize my earlier related work on distributional constraints in this presentation). You can find both working papers below. Please let me know if you have any comments.
Lecture 1: Theory of Stable Matchings: A Brief Review
Lecture 2: Matroids and the Greedy Rule in Matching
Lecture 3: Design on Matroids: Diversity vs. Meritocracy
Challenges of executing EWS reservation efficiently (Hindi version: लेख )
We introduced an affirmative action policy based on reserves in Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2013). Reserves have been implemented in practice in a variety of settings listed below. We also study more general/other reservation policies in Ehlers, Hafalir, Yildirim, and Yenmez (2014) (which incorporates Ehlers (2007)), Echenique and Yenmez (2015), and Pathak, Sonmez, Unver and Yenmez (2020).
1. Pre-K to 12 student assignment in New York City has reserves (discussed in this website, see, e.g, District 15 website for the implementation of reserves),
2. Pre-K to 12 student assignment in Chile implements a reserve for different groups (discussed in this paper),
3. After the circulation of our paper (Pathak, Sonmez, Unver, and Yenmez, 2020), the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) has recommended a ten percent reserve for the most vulnerable populations in the society (see the webpage) and various states have implemented reserves in practice (e.g., Massachusetts)
4. A reserve mechanism has also been implemented in Israel (discussed in this paper).
5. After the circulation of our paper, Sonmez and Yenmez (2019), the Supreme Court of India has revoked the previously used allocation method for the joint implementation of the so-called horizontal and vertical reservations in India and endorsed the allocation rule that we earlier advocated in our paper (see the judgement Saurav Yadav v State of U.P. (2020)).
Together with Lars Ehlers, I am co-organizing an online seminar series called Frontiers of Economic Design. Check out the webinar webpage and sign-up for more information.
“Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives” with Isa Hafalir and Fuhito Kojima (see also: kudos for more information)
“Constitutional Implementation of Reservation Policies in India” with Tayfun Sonmez
“Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing” (forthcoming at Management Science) with Parag Pathak, Tayfun Sonmez, and Utku Unver
“When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment?” (forthcoming at Economic Theory) with Battal Dogan
“Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations” with Tayfun Sonmez - Econometrica, 90(3): 1143-1176, May 2022 (Published Version) (WP Version). This paper supersedes
“Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations” with Tayfun Sonmez and
“Affirmative Action with Overlapping Reserves” with Tayfun Sonmez
“Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment” with Isa Hafalir and Fuhito Kojima - Journal of Economic Theory, 201: 105441, April 2022 (WP Version)
“Incentivized Kidney Exchange” with Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver - American Economic Review, 110(7): 2198-2224, July 2020
“Consistent Pareto Improvement over the Student Optimal Stable Mechanism” with Battal Dogan - Economic Theory Bulletin, 8: 125-137, May 2020
“Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago” with Battal Dogan Games and Economic Behavior, 118: 366-373, November 2019 (WP Version)
“Incentive Compatible Market Design with Applications” – (Previously part of "Incentive Compatible Market Design with an Application to Matching with Wages") - International Journal of Game Theory, 44(3): 543-569, August 2015 (WP Version)
“School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds vs. Soft Bounds” with Lars Ehlers, Isa E. Hafalir and Muhammed A. Yildirim – Journal of Economic Theory, 153: 648-683, September 2014 (WP Version) (incorporates Ehlers (2007) that introduces floor constraints)
“Pricing in Position Auctions and Online Advertising” - Economic Theory, 55(1): 243-256, January 2014 (WP Version)
“Incentive Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions” – American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(4): 120-141, November 2013 (Previously part of "Incentive Compatible Market Design with an Application to Matching with Wages") (WP Version)
“The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings” with Federico Echenique, SangMok Lee, and Matthew Shum – Econometrica, 81(1): 153-171, January 2013 (Web Appendix) (WP Version)
“A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues” with Federico Echenique - Games and Economic Behavior, 59(1): 46-71, April 2007 (WP Version)