M. Bumin Yenmez

Professor of Economics
Boston College

Research Fields:

  • Market and Mechanism Design

  • Choice Theory

Research Topics:

  • Affirmative Action and Diversity

  • Intradistrict and Interdistrict School Choice

  • Organ Allocation

  • Externalities and Peer Effects

  • Fair Resource Allocation

Policy Impact:
Reserves that we introduced in Hafalir, Yenmez, and Yildirim (2013) have been implemented in practice in a variety of settings. We also study more general/other reservation policies in Ehlers, Hafalir, Yildirim, and Yenmez (2014) (which incorporates Ehlers (2007)), and Echenique and Yenmez (2015).

1. Pre-K to 12 student assignment in New York City has reserves (discussed in this website, see, e.g, District 15 website for the implementation of reserves),
2. Pre-K to 12 student assignment in Chile implements a reserve for different groups (discussed in this paper),
3. After the circulat
ion of our paper (Pathak, Sonmez, Unver, and Yenmez, 2020), the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) has recommended a ten percent reserve for the most vulnerable populations in the society (see the webpage) and various states have implemented reserves in practice (e.g., Massachusetts)
4. A reserve mechanism has also been implemented in Israel (discussed in this paper).

Curriculum Vitae


Matching Papers (Published)

  1. Incentivized Kidney Exchange” with Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver (Forthcoming at American Economic Review)

  2. Common Enrollment in School Choice” with Mehmet Ekmekci Theoretical Economics, 14(4): 1237-1270, November 2019 (previously Integrating Schools for Centralized Admissions)

  3. Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago” with Battal Dogan Games and Economic Behavior, 118: 366-373, November 2019 (WP Version)

  4. A College Admissions Clearinghouse” – Journal of Economic Theory, 176: 859-85, July 2018 (WP Version)

  5. Choice and Matching” with Christopher ChambersAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9(3): 126-47, August 2017 (WP Version)

  6. Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms” with Peter Chen, Michael Egesdal and Marek Pycia - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(2): 202-14, May 2016 (WP Version)

  7. Median Stable Matchings in Two-Sided Markets” with Peter Chen, Michael Egesdal and Marek Pycia - Games and Economic Behavior, 97: 64-69, May 2016 (WP Version)

  8. How to Control Controlled School Choice” with Federico Echenique - American Economic Review, 105(8): 2679-94, August 2015 (Web Appendix) (WP Version) (Comment by Battal Dogan)

  9. School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds vs. Soft Bounds” with Lars Ehlers, Isa E. Hafalir and Muhammed A. YildirimJournal of Economic Theory, 153: 648-683, September 2014 (WP Version) (incorporates Ehlers (2007) that introduces floor constraints)

  10. Incentive Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions” – American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(4): 120-141, November 2013 (Previously part of "Incentive Compatible Market Design with an Application to Matching with Wages") (WP Version)

  11. Effective Affirmative Action in School Choice” with Isa E. Hafalir and Muhammed A. YildirimTheoretical Economics, 8(2): 325-363, May 2013 (WP Version) (Note on definition of stability.)

  12. The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings” with Federico Echenique, SangMok Lee, and Matthew ShumEconometrica, 81(1): 153-171, January 2013 (Web Appendix) (WP Version)

  13. Median Stable Matching for Markets with Wages” with Michael Schwarz Journal of Economic Theory, 146(2): 619-637, March 2011 (Web Appendix) (WP Version)

  14. A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues” with Federico Echenique - Games and Economic Behavior, 59(1): 46-71, April 2007 (WP Version)

Choice Papers (Published)

  1. Closure and Preferences” with Christopher Chambers and Alan Miller forthcoming at Journal of Mathematical Economics

  2. On Lexicographic Choice” with Christopher ChambersEconomics Letters, 171:222-224, October 2018

  3. A Simple Characterization of Responsive Choice” with Christopher ChambersGames and Economic Behavior, 111:217-221, September 2018

  4. "Choice and Matching" with Christopher ChambersAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9(3): 126-47, August 2017 (WP Version)

  5. "How to Control Controlled School Choice" with Federico Echenique - American Economic Review, 105(8): 2679-94, August 2015 (Web Appendix) (WP Version) (Comment by Battal Dogan)

Mechanism Design Papers (Published)

  1. Consistent Pareto Improvement over the Student Optimal Stable Mechanism” with Battal Dogan forthcoming at Economic Theory Bulletin

  2. Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms” with Peter Chen, Michael Egesdal and Marek Pycia - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(2): 202-14, May 2016 (WP Version)

  3. Incentive Compatible Market Design with Applications” – (Previously part of "Incentive Compatible Market Design with an Application to Matching with Wages") - International Journal of Game Theory, 44(3): 543-569, August 2015 (WP Version)

  4. Pricing in Position Auctions and Online Advertising” - Economic Theory, 55(1): 243-256, January 2014 (WP Version)

  5. Incentive Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions” – American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(4): 120-141, November 2013 (Previously part of "Incentive Compatible Market Design with an Application to Matching with Wages”) (WP Version)

  6. Dissolving Multi-Partnerships Efficiently” – Journal of Mathematical Economics, 48(2): 77-82, March 2012 (WP Version)

Papers in Special Issues (Published)

  1. Quantile Stable Matchings” with with Federico Echenique, SangMok Lee, and Matthew Shum-
    Games, 12(2): 33, 2021

  2. Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings” with Peter Chen, Michael Egesdal and Marek Pycia-
    Games, 12(2): 43, 2021