World War II (WWII ou WW2) , La Seconde Guerre mondiale ,RAPPORT du Général BEZIERS-LAFOSSE,Commandant l’I. D. 22 et provisoirement la 22° D.I.sur les événements qui se sont déroulés pendant la période du 1° Mars au 18 Mai 1940.

The 22 ° D.I. has been located since 1 March 1940 in the region between RETHEL in the South and RUMIGNY in the North.

As Commander of the I.D.22, I received on 30 March 1940 the command of a detachment comprising an R.I., an artillery group and a reconnaissance group.

This detachment, known as the "Givet detachment," was installed along the MEUSE, from the Franco-Belgian border (Prince's ferry) until the Vireux-Molhain crossing, where it was linked to the 61 ° D. I. (265 ° R. I.).

This detachment consisted of troops of the 22 ° D. I., which, in the event of a violation of Belgian territory by the enemy, had to cover the whole area and also extend beyond the Belgian border to the "Rock of the Patriots," after HASTIÈRE, in connection with 18 ° D. I., with the mission: "prohibit the enemy from crossing the MEUSE."

On 30 March 1940, after rotation from I.D. 18, the GIVET detachment was composed of 19 ° R.I. (Lt-Colonel BRETILLOT), 1 ° group of 18 ° R.A.D. (Cdt BADOUARD) and G.R. 24 of 22 ° D.I. (Lt-Colonel)

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75 and six 155 cannons served by infantry of the 19 ° R.I. under the orders of a non-commissioned officer of artillery, all distributed in the fort of CHARLEMONT.

My P.C. was at the main barracks in GIVET.

The arrangements for the installation of troops were as follows: each battalion of 19 ° R.I. was to occupy the location where, in the event of the execution of the DYLE manoeuvre, would be installed one of the three infantry regiments of the D.I. and each battery, similarly, the future location of a group of 18 ° R.A.D. The subsector on the left, being in Belgian territory and not capable of being occupied before violation of Belgium by the enemy, its terrain had been represented on a plan in relief which was being studied, in a GIVET barracks, 19 ° R.I. and 1 ° group of 18 ° R.A.D., responsible for this occupation.

The distribution of the regiments was to be as follows: on the left, in Belgian territory, from the 'Rocher des Patriotes' to the BAC DU PRINCE (1), on 19 ° R.I. and an artillery group; in the centre, 116 ° R.I. and an artillery group; or a front of about 20 kilometres. The reconnaissance group which, from day D 1, was made available to General Cdt. the 1st Cavalry Division, stationed at PETIT GIVET.

Each artillery battery commander had to look for battery positions suitable for the installation of a group (each in its subsector) and for the mission of that group.

(1) In case of execution of the DYLE manoeuvre, the 18 ° D.I. should be to the left of the 22 ° D.I. and raise the units of the 19 ° R.I. from the

"Rock of the Patriotes" until the village of "HASTIÈRES" inclusive but she did not.

In addition the troops forming the GIVET detachment, contained in GIVET and nearby the 1st Cavalry Division, (General of ARRAS) whose P.C. was in MAUBERT - FONTAINE.

His Brigade on horseback (General ALAIN D'HUMIERES) at GIVET: P.C., the 1 ° Régiment de Chasseurs (Colonel d'AMONVILLE) and at CHOOZ, the 19 ° Dragons (Colonel BÉLIAN BELVAL) his motorised brigade (General MOULIN ROI C. GIVET 1 ° Machine Gun Car Regiment (LT - Colonel de LANNURIEN) and REVIN (5 ° Dragon Bearing Regiment) (Lt. Colonel de VILLIERS).

         The GIVET Detachment Command depended directly on:

1940 Normally:

1 °/of General Cdt the IX ° Army (VERVINS) from the tactical point of view.

2 °/of General Cdt. the XI Corps (ÉTRÉAUPONT) with regard to the execution of the work.

3 °/from General Cdt on 41 ° C.A. (SIGNY L'ABBAYE) for his material requests.

4 °/of General Cdt the 22 ° D. I. (RUMIGNY) as to discipline.

From the day D1: 1940

5 °/du Gal. Cdt. 1 ° D.C. (MAUBERT - FONTAINE) from D1 until the time of the online arrival of 2 ° C.A. motorized.

6 °/of General Cdt. the 2 ° C.A. motorized from that moment until the online arrival of the XI ° C.A.

7 °/from General Cdt. the XI ° C.A. from that moment until the online arrival of the 22 ° D.I.

8 °/finally, of General Cdt. the 22 ° D.I., its direct leader, from that time.

It is easy to see how insufficient the means available to an E.M. D'I.D. were for this: only the liaison with these different authorities, all very far away from each other and GIVET, absorbed all the means of liaison and transport of I. D...

Sending daily mail, in particular, was a major problem to be solved.

From day J1, the link was practically non-existent, until the arrival at ROMEDENNE of the General Staff of the 22 ° D. I., who, by my order (1), preceded the prescriptions: the order of operations of General Cdt on the XI ° C.A., settled there from May 11.

The command of General Cdt. the GIVET detachment were his own (I.D. 22) very insufficient for such an important mission, reinforced by an Engineer Officer and a transmission staff of the 22 ° D.I. to command and constitute his transmission detachment.

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As soon as I arrived in GIVET, my first concern was to do in detail, with an Officer of my Staff, with Lt. Colonel Cdt. the 19 ° R.I. and its battalion commanders, full and detailed reconnaissance of the position, automatic weapons locations and work to be done. The battalions, moreover, had begun to work according to the programme of work left by our predecessors.

My impression was bad; it was also Lt - Colonel Cdt's. 19 ° R.I.

This sector was far from resembling those which had already been organized and equipped by the infantry of the 22 ° D. Work little related to the importance of the mission requested; locations of automatic weapons and 25-gun to be taken over and modified; finally, the considerable extent of the front (20 kms.) in a delicate area, having only a markedly insufficient artillery.

I immediately made a request for the reinforcement of workers, considering it necessary to send a regiment of pioneers as a matter of extreme urgency, and I began to organize my work sites: the organization of the workers into units formed, supervised and commanded by all their usual leaders, each with its own mission and its own site, of which the commander was the site manager.

For example, G.R. 24 was responsible for organizing GIVET's bridgehead; the 19 ° Dragons, from that of VIREUX - MOLHAIN etc...

(1) I then ordered the 22 ° D.

Already the General of ARRAS, Cdt la 1 ° D.C., had answered my call: 600 riders of the brigade of HUMIÈRES came to strengthen as workers my riders of the G.RD. and my infantry of the 19 ° R.I.

In the meantime, I had been introduced to General Cdt. the XI ° C.A. to ETRÉAUPONT, giving him an account of my painful impression, of the fact that only a main resistance position was provided, without any stop line, nor trenches, nor casings.

The General showed me a project to build casemates and small blockhouses which awaited the approval of General Cdt. the Army.

I then confirmed my request for a pioneer regiment and added two engineering companies for the construction of the planned concrete.

I never received the slightest pioneer, but after a few days I received a company of the Genius of the XI ° C.A.; then a company of the Engineers of the 22 ° D. At my request, Lt-Colonel Cdt. the Genius of the 22 ° D. I was appointed to coordinate and command, under my command, the work of these units.

As soon as possible I had seconded to my P.C. a Captain of the 19 ° R.I. with mission to control the worksites, coordination of efforts, verification of manpower, supply of tools: shovels, pickets, spare sleeves, barbed wire etc...

This officer had an office and a car. This measure was very effective and simplified many things.

The Commander of the GIVET detachment had at his disposal a detachment of mobile guards and customs officers commanded by a captain of the mobile republican guard.

This officer, summoned by me the day after I arrived in GIVET, informed me of the abnormal situation in which the country found itself as to the ease with which espionage could be exercised: open border, which allowed the circulation of many automobiles between Belgium and France and vice versa.

 These men returned in the evening under the same conditions.

Spies were reported in houses near the border, especially cafés, and even in GIVET.

Some could have been arrested.

I instructed the Captain of the Guard to exercise the greatest activity and inexorable severity on the whole front of the detachment.

Periodically, the German Ambassador to Belgium came to inspect the Belgian-French border and never failed to reproach the Belgians for the absence of barricades or works intended to prohibit access to their territory, to such an extent that each time one of these inspections is announced, the Belgians had become accustomed to a defensive system which was carefully removed after the passing of the Ambassador.

All the above makes it possible to assume that, without any difficulty, the German intelligence service knew with great accuracy the composition of the French units located along the MEUSE de GIVET and may be the mission of each of them.

From the beginning of my stay in GIVET, General d'ARRAS, Cdt. 1 ° D.C. had come to my PC, to speak with me about the possibility of the execution of the maneuver DYLE, to let me know his conception of the maneuver and to examine with me the measures to be taken on our common front, to execute the orders of General Cdt. the IX ° Army.

By common agreement, we considered the gap "BEAURAING - GIVET - CHIMAY" as the possible, if not probable, invasion zone in front of our front and the orders, accordingly, were given to Lt-Colonel Cdt. the G.R.D. 24 for its action at BEAURAING, MESNIL SAINT BLAISE and beyond at L.-Colonel Cdt. 19 ° R.I. for the occupation of the GIVET bridgehead and, possibly, the retreat of the riders of the G.R.D. 24.

A garrison exercise was set up to check all the planned measures, in the event of an enemy attack on the axis BEAURAING - GIVET.

In summary, the greatest activity reigned in the area when April 15, around 18 o'clock.

Captain ORGIVAL, acting provisionally as Chief of Staff from 22 ° D.I. to P.C. from D.I. to RUMIGNY, replacing Lt. -Colonel SALAÜN, evacuated for acute appendicitis crisis and in treatment at the hospital of RETHEL, after surgical intervention, informed me by telephone of a serious automobile accident of which General HASSLER, Cdt la 22 ° D.I., had just been victim, and of the evacuation of the latter to the hospital of RETHEL.

Captain ORCIVAL asked me to come to RUMIGNY to replace General HASSLER in his P.C.

So on the evening of the 15th of April I took the Provisional Command of the 22 ° D. I, after a conference with the Lt.-Colonel LANIER, Cdt. On 116 ° R.I., my best commander, I sent him in my place, to GIVET, the Provisional Command of the GIVET detachment and the Infantry of 22 ° D.I.

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"I open here a parenthesis regarding the Command of the D.I. and the replacement of its Chief of Staff.

Obviously, the General HASSLER s unfortunate accident was serious and inevitably had to force him to a rather long absence; the removal of the Chief of Staff was also to be of a certain duration.

In circumstances as serious as previous warnings feared further escalation in the near future, I believe that a new and immediate organization of command should have taken precedence over any other consideration and that there was an urgent need for new officer assignments to Division Command and to the post of Chief of the Defence Staff.

In particular, given the importance of the mission entrusted to the D.I., the appointment of a general officer, a confirmed Major General and, if possible, familiar with the Bretons and Vendées, was undoubtedly necessary.

On the contrary, from the first day, the most complete silence was made on the accident and if one insisted to have information or know the consequences, one always met the same slogan: "Accident Benin, ten to fifteen days of unavailability."

In fact, if the German offensive of May 10 had not occurred, General HASSLER who after 15 days of hospital and a few days of rest spent at his headquarters in RUMIGNY, had left on convalescence leave for a month, would not have joined his post until the first days of June.

And, for one arm and two broken ribs, one in two different places, not to mention the other less serious injuries to the head and lower belly, it is however the shortest absence that can be made.

But in reality, the broken arm recovered badly and we were forced to break it again. The duration of the absence could therefore be unlimited. "

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After settling several questions with the corps leaders, the Cdt. from the anti-tank divisional battery and the C.I.D. 22 that had just arrived, I went to VERVINS around 20 April 1940 to present myself to General Cdt. the IX ° Army.

All the maintenance concerned the detachment of GIVET.

I reported to the General on the exact situation of the detachment, on the work carried out and in progress, on my fears regarding the corridor BEAURAING - GIVET - CHIMAY.

The General wished to inform me of his intention to considerably strengthen the defense of the MEUSE North and South of GIVET and to build quantities of concrete and, in addition, casemates for 75 guns.

He told me that until then this detachment of GIVET had been of less importance, because only the "ESCAUT" manoeuvre, that is to say, the defence on national territory, had been envisaged.

But that now, on the contrary, the maneuver "DYLE," that consequently the role of detachment GIVET became considerable, because pivot of the whole maneuver and that, as soon as he had decided his choice on this or that concrete model, they would begin to be built.

After this visit, I passed into the office of the Chief of Staff of the IX ° Army to ask him to reinforce the detachment of GIVET of the anti-tank battery of my Division, this would have the great advantage of putting it in place and allowing its leader to recognize and quietly choose good shooting locations according to his mission, to prepare carefully his fire plan.... But the Chief of Staff replied, "So do you think they're going to jump the MEUSE? and did not respond to my request.

(1) On July 19, 1940, in a speech to the REICHSTAG, Adolf HITLER, in setting out his campaign plan, made it clear how important he considered the passage of the MEUSE BETWEEN NAMUR and CARIGNAN d' for him, hence the order he gave: 'Vor allem aber mit den massierten Angriffskräften des linken Flügels, die Maas zu Prague, den Übergang zwischen NAMUR und CARIGNAN mit dem Schwergewicht der Panzer und Motor Divisionen bei SEDAN zu erzwingen.... ».

This does not seem to have been understood by us, that is what was declared to me in captivity, by a superior officer of the 3rd office of the E. M. de la IX ° Armée who said to me: "We had not, in fact, thought that they would pass the MEUSE through there we made a psychological error."

And the conclusion was that in the face of these massive German attacks on land and in the air, appeared before the MEUSE de GIVET only divisions of series A (reserve) and B, some tired by long steps on foot, not fully armed, without tanks and without aviation, who knew their land to defend only when they arrived, that is to say at the same time as the opponent, powerfully armed and armed, to whom our men had only their naked breasts to offer.

I was sorry for this answer, because I felt so much in myself the need to bring the whole division closer to GIVET if not even to install all the fighting elements there... (since we were seriously considering the maneuver "DYLE" (1) that as soon as I returned to RUMIGNY, P.C. of the D.I., I had LTS reconnaissance organized. Colonels Cdt. Infantry and artillery regiments, Battalion Cdts and Group Cdts. company and battery which went to GIVET to study the terrain of their future action and to make all the necessary arrangements and instructions to the units of the detachment of GIVET (fire plan, installation of troops etc.).

In this way, the cadres, if not the troops, were at least aware of the role they would have to play a few days later.

These troops (62 ° R.I., 116 ° R.I., A.D. 22, all services of 22 ° D.I.) were confined to the villages between RUMIGNY, AOUSTE, in the north, and RETHEL, in the south, and were conducting training.

The Division seconded a battalion near LAUNOIS, at the disposal of the Cdt.

Relaxing permits were widely granted.

Garrison exercises were organized in accordance with General Cdt's orders. the IX ° Army, in particular "Infantry Battalion and Direct Support Group" exercises to study infantry-artillery connections with exchange of officers on both sides, so as to obtain full agreement between the battalion and its artillery group.

10 MAY 1940

This instruction (1) had already given good results when abruptly, without the slightest notice, without the slightest warning from the S.R. was received on May 10 at about six o'clock at the General Staff of the 22 ° D. I. THE TELEGRAM PRESCRIBING: "Alert 3 -Execution of the manoeuvre DYLE."

Precisely that morning, both in GIVET and RUMIGNY, all the troops had, early on, left their cantonments to carry out a garrison exercise.

It was in these conditions that they had to be recalled and prepared for the departure which, of course, could only be made quite late in the morning and by a very high heat.

This walk was very hard, the stages were long.

To my calls to transport the infantrymen in trucks, the head of the 3rd Board of the XI ° C.A. replied that the C.A. did not have the slightest truck.

How much would have been simplified if the troops of the 22 ° D. I had already been in place along the GIVET MEUSE!

Not only had these great tiredness of our troops been spared, but they would have already known their terrain, their fire plan; the links would have been established; Resistance to the enemy attack could have been effective, at least during the first days, which could have allowed the arrival of reinforcements and the occupation of the 2nd position.

11 MAY 1940

On May 10, I installed the D.I. P.C. at CUL DES SART in accordance with the orders of General Cdt. XI ° C.A.; then on the 11th, in accordance with the orders of General Cdt. XI ° C.A.; then on the 11th, I arrived at ROMEDENNE at about 10 o'clock.

While the P.C. was settling there, I went to VODELEE (2 kms 500 to the east) to see Lieutenant-Colonel Commander temporarily I.D. 22 and Lt. Colonel Commandant on 19 ° R.I., who both informed me of the situation.

In the afternoon, I left for HASTIERES to inspect in Belgian territory, the 1st Battalion of 19 ° R.I., Chief of Battalion ARGOUACH and, of which the P.C. was at the farm DUCHATEAU.

Excellent morale, perfect installation, but the commander conveyed to me his concerns about the population which seemed to him clearly hostile; shady individuals were circulating. I then went to examine the connection to my left with the 18 ° D. I on the MEUSE where the 1/19 ° was well in connection with the 77 ° R. I. whose men were placed from far away, from the Rock of the Patriotes, on the road along the MEUSE.

1) Leaving the hospital of RETHEL on April 22, General HASSLER went to RUMIGNY, to Q. G. of D. I. to spend a few days there. He then left on the evening of 8 May in a 1-month convalescence at St. MAIXENT (DEUX SÈVRES); and I take over the Division Command

12 MAY 1940

On the 12th, the elements of the D.I. were in place, the 19 ° R.I. in the north, the 116 ° R.I. in the centre and the 62 ° R.I. in the south of the device; artillery at previously selected group locations.

The walk had been very painful, the heat being strong; a group of 18 ° R.A.D. which was subjected to machine-gun fire from an enemy aircraft during part of its march.

In the afternoon, by order, the 1st Cavalry Division returned to the west of the MEUSE, training the reconnaissance group of the 22nd D.I. which had, with a great deal of notch, been able to contain the first enemy elements armored towards BEAURAING and MESNIL SAINT BLAISE.

It seemed that no resistance was put up against them by the Belgian army.

The Ardennes hunters did not fight (1).

Sitting on the road slopes, they smiled at the passage of the riders of the 1 ° Régiment de Chasseurs à cheval (1 ° D.C.) and shouted "Vive la France."

Under the pressure of the enemy, whose infantry began to appear on the plateau of MESNIL SAINT - BLAISE and who were under the artillery of D. I., I blew up the bridges in front of my forehead, and immediately returned the last soldiers occupying the bridgeheads of GIVET and VIREUX - MOLHAIN.

Already the shells fell on Givet and, without stopping, the enemy planes bombed and machine-gun the troops, the cantonments and the P.C. especially at ROMEDENNE and VODELEE where an artillery battery in motion was partially destroyed, all his horses having been killed, in the streets of the village

13 MAY 1940

The first passages of the MEUSE by the enemy, if my information is correct, took place to my left on the night of 12 to 13 May, first using the island of HOUX in front of 2 ° C. A. motorized (39 ° R.I.), then the bridge of ANHE, in front of the right of 18 ° D.I.

(2). It had been realized to me that this D.I., upon her arrival on the MEUSE, had not raised the 19 ° R.I. of my D.I. in its part HASTIERES le Rocher des Patriotes, as she should have done.

The 1st Battalion of 19 ° R.I. was for this reason far too stretched to the left and the right regiment of 18 ° D.I. (77 ° R.I., P.C. from Lt-Colonel MAZOYER to ONTRAYE on DINANT's road), on the other hand, tended to be on its left in its movements.

This is what facilitates, I think, the infiltrations of the opponent between the two divisions, 18 ° and 22 °, towards the Southwest, after his passage from the MEUSE to ANHEE; so that 1/19 ° was quite quickly in contact on his front and left with these enemy elements and that 19 ° R.I. was, from the beginning, in difficulty.

I then sent to Lt. Colonel commanding the Regiment my reserve battalion, on 1/62 ° (Btn LE GUERN) after having given the Cdt of this battalion the mission to provide the link between 19 ° R.I. and 116 ° R.I. (Btn COTTIEREAU 1/116) on the right by blocking the road coming from GIVET and I asked the CDET. the XI ° C.A. to hand over to me the battalion of 19 ° R.I. which constituted its reserve.

This battalion was also given to Lt. Colonel the 19 ° which was thus to the north of my device, with under his command a battle group of 4 battalions and 2 artillery groups.

But on this side, the enemy became more and more pressing and arrived near the battery sites of the Group of the 21 ° Artillery Regiment from which the commander blew his pieces, after having fired until the last moment.

Without news of his 1 ° Btn. (Btn. ARGOUACHE) Lt. Colonel Cdt. the 19 ° R.I. began its withdrawal, in order, by Battalions.

In the center, in front of my front, the first passages of the MEUSE took place on the 13th by the peninsula of CHOOZ, which was unoccupied because of the departure of the 19 ° DRAGONS which contained there (the bridge of CHOOZ had jumped the 12 like the others) and this, in spite of the fires of our infantrymen and gunners, hindered elsewhere by the enemy aviation which ended up terrifying them all the more easily since no French or English aircraft appeared in the sky during these tragic days and the D.C.A. was almost zero.

The enemy arrived in compact masses and the 1 ° and 3 ° Battalions of 116 ° R.I. in conjunction with the 19 ° R.I. on their left also began their withdrawal in steps, in order and discipline.

1) Information given by Colonel D'AMONVILLE, Cdt le 1 ° Chasseurs.

(2) Information given in captivity, by General MOULIN, Cdt the Motorised Brigade of the 1 ° D.C. which, after returning to the West of the MEUSE, was in this region.

It is impossible here for me to give details of the movements of these battalions which will be specified in the reports of their leaders (1). The connections were precarious, perilous and difficult to achieve, given the intensity of the fires.

But these battalions energetically commanded by senior officers such as the YOU, ARGOUACH, CHARTON, DARDANT, BLANLOEIL, LE KERANGUEVEN, GUERN, COTHEREAU, RUAUX, all active Battalion Chiefs, knowledgeable in the trade, having to their credit fine states of war services, maneuvered without haste and did not stop fighting.

However, the very device that had been imposed for the occupation of the MEUSE, because the division had a far too large front, a linear device, deprived the chiefs of bodies of all possibilities of command, because without sufficient personal reserves, without their own artillery.

So what was to happen happened.

In a short time, the Corps Chiefs lost all contact with and action on their battalions; and under the pressure of the enemy who threatened to encircle them in their P. C., they themselves were forced to maneuver not to be caught (2).

For, from the beginning, despite the incessant bombing of the enemy air force, the regiments of the 22 ° D.I. had marked a great resistance, whereas to their right 61 ° D.I., 102 ° D.I. and Colonel MARC's SPAHIS Brigade had been severely tested and folded and to their left, 18 ° D.I. and most of 1 ° D.C. (3) had retreated westward towards FLORENNES, without maintaining the connection to the South with the 22 ° D. I., thus creating a vacuum used by the enemy.

14 MAY 1940

As a result, on the 14th, enemy infiltrations became more important on all sides; they had even, in the North, exceeded the height of the P.C. from 22 ° D.I. to ROMEDENNE. I brought the P.C. to MARTAGNE LA PETITE in the evening, the enemy planes having continued to machine-gun us, having cut off our telephone communications and having destroyed with their bombs the railway and part of the railway station of ROMEDENNE.

In the night of the information from my right, (Btn. BLANLOEIL, III/62) told us that any connection with the 61 ° D. I. (265 ° R. I.) was lost, the enemy who had passed the MEUSE to CHOOZ, progressed to his right and threatened to encircle us.

To my left, Lt - Colonel BRETILLOT, Cdt on 19 ° R.I. had been able to reach with his group the wood of PHILIPPEVILLE from where he had made contact with the Battalion CHARTON (II/116) at the western edge of the trough of CHIMAY.

15 MAY 1940

At about two o'clock in the morning, on May 15, I brought the Father C. of the D.I. to FORGES les BOURLERS.

I report to General Cdt. the XI ° C.A. which was at COLD CHAPEL, on our left, and with which we had never ceased to be in contact, thanks to the liaison provided by the Officers of the D.I. (Captain of MARCILLAC, in particular), and by Lt. Colonel of RANCY, Deputy Chief of Staff of the XI ° C.A. and the Captain of MAUREPAS, (of the E.M. of this Army Corps).

On arriving at FORGES the BOURLERS, I organized a bridgehead at N. E. de CHIMAY, with the 3 Infantry regiments and the Artillery of the D.I. to delay the advance of the enemy and forbid him an advance by the trough of CHIMAY, with my highest density to the right and left of the great "road coming from GIVET and that could use enemy armoured cars.

The movement could begin in the early afternoon.

At about 14 o'clock, General HASSLER, who was on convalescent leave at St. MAIXENT, arriving abruptly in the P.C., took over the command of the D. I. (4) and I went to BAILEUX to take over that of I.  There was also the Father C. of 62 ° R.I.

(1) Nor can I quote as I wish, village names, wood etc... Indeed, I no longer have any card, all those that I had been withdrawn from me at the time of my departure in captivity or having been burned; and no longer reminds me of these names; mainly those on Belgian territory.

(2) Commander QUINQUETTE, Cdt. temporarily the 116 ° R. I. was thus twice encircled and managed both times to clear and join me.

(3) General Information MOULIN. 4) In fact, because of the circumstances described below, he kept this command for only a few hours and the fighting elements of D. I did not cease to be under my command throughout the critical period of 10 to 18 May 1940.

This village had just received many bombs from the enemy aviation, causing casualties among the soldiers of 62 ° R.I. who were buried in the cemetery of BOURLERS.

In the evening, around 17 h 30, a group of A. D.22 crossed BOURLERS to take position to the south of the village, when suddenly emerged from the woods of the East, enemy infantry attacked him with machine gun and rifle and the village was in a few moments, caught under fire (1).

Very bravely, the officers, secretaries and plantons of the I.D. and the 62 ° R.I., standing in front of the enemy, retaliated and a street fight began which cost the latter dearly (2).

Feeling resistance he did not insist, which allowed us to take the direction of the P.C. of the D. I.

 there was no longer a single civilian or military.

The D.I. P.C. had moved, without having received his order to withdraw and I no longer knew where to take it.

Believing that a stop might be ordered on the 2 ° so-called "ANOR position" which the 22 ° D.I. would have occupied in the event of a "ESCAUT manoeuvre," I decided to leave for MONDREPUIS where the P.C. of the I.D. would have been in this case and, in fact, it was there that, at about 22 o'clock, the captain of MARCILLAC came to pick me up from General Cdt. the D.I. who himself had installed his new P.C. at WIMY (south of the great "MEZIÈRES - LA CAPELLE ROAD).

The I.D. staff consisted of only two Officers, Captain DESCHAMPS and Lieutenant GAUMÉ, and four secretaries and plantons: Sergeant - Chief BOUCARD, Corporal MARGAT, Soldiers BOURGET and BOMAL.

A corporal encryptor also joined us later; everything else had disappeared during the attack on BOURLERS, in particular the Lieutenant the COUNTRY of the TEILLEUL,father of seven children, whom it was impossible to find.

At MONDREPUIS riflemen of 25 ° R.T. A. Non - commissioned officers of this regiment began to arrive there to prepare the P.C. of their Colonel.

Led by Captain de MARCILLAC, my two officers and myself arrived at about midnight in WIMY, where the General HASSLER gave me the order to go and organize and command the resistance in the state forest of SAINT-MICHEL, occupation of the main line of resistance and the stop line. All the fighters of the 22 ° D.I., the survivors, recovered and lost men of all units, arms or services, were now sent by the Presidium of the D.I. and placed under my orders by the General Commander of the D.I.

An officer of the General Staff, Captain ORCIVAL, was already in place to channel all these men and distribute them; I had to take my three Lts. Colonels with me; already the Lts. Colonels Cdt. 19 ° and 62 ° R.I. had been notified and I had Lt. Colonel Cdt on 116 ° R.I. and his Chief of Staff.

I therefore left WIMY at midnight ½ with an order of "resistance without a spirit of retreat," P.C. from I.D. to the village of Saint Michel.

Going back by MONDREPUIS to take Lt. Colonel Cdt. the 116 ° R.I. and the Commander QUINQUETTE, his Chief of Staff - Major arrived in the forest of SAINT-MICHEL where, in fact, we found Captain ORCIVAL.

The organization of the defence and the distribution of personnel, in the middle of the night, between the three regiments, supplemented by quantities of unknown, were not easy.

Lieutenant GAUME of I.D. 22, in accordance with the orders of General Cdt la D.I., was placed at the disposal of Captain ORCIVAL, to assist him in his mission. The P.C. of the I.D. was installed in the village of SAINT-MICHEL.

(1) As I said above, we no longer had the link to the right with the 61 ° D. D. General Cdt. this D.I. had brought his P.C. on May 15 at noon to MAUBERT FONTAINE; after making a reconnaissance, he returned at about 15 p.m. to his P.C. telling his Officers that he had not found any element of his D.I.

The enemy arriving from CARIGNAN by the great "road CHARLEVILLE - LA CAPELLE, reached MAUBERT-FONTAINE on 15 May, around 18 o'clock. (information from the Cdt. DEMONET, E. M. de la 61 ° D. I.)

(2) I note the conduct of Private BOMAL Léon of 116 ° R. I., planton at I.D. 22 who managed to shoot down, with his carabiner, an enemy infantryman, whose precise shot was very annoying and who had concealed himself at the corner of a house.

I took command of all the troops in the state forest.

On the morning of the 16th, General HASSLER came by car and I informed him of the situation; he immediately left for his P.C. of WIMY (1), visibly suffering much of his plastered arm and other injuries caused by his automobile accident.

He had difficulty walking and the greatest difficulties getting out of his car and up there.

Returning to the P.C. from the I.D. to St. MICHEL at about 10 a.m., I spent my time collecting, with my staff, the isolated of all kinds who no longer knew where to go and who, in general, had no weapons and directing them to the position after giving them a rifle.

We had found a car garage where a number of rifles had been assembled.

I made successive contact with Lt. Colonel GAILLARD d'AILLIÈRES, Cdt on 18 ° R.A.D., of which two groups were also there and I gave him the missions of these two groups which were going to take a position; and with the Lt. de CHARETTE of the G.R.D. 24, the 22 ° D.I. whose platoon was south of the village, holding the exits towards the station and the road of HIRSON. Meanwhile, at about 11 o'clock, Captain SAIDI SADOK, of the 25 ° regiment of Algerian riflemen, detached in liaison with the 4 ° D.I.N.A. to the 22 ° D.I., sent by the E.M. of the 22 ° D.I., brought in trucks about a hundred men, isolated or fleeing, collected at W.M.I. Colonel LE BARILLEC, Cdt. 62 ° R.I. at junction 256, in the forest of St. MICHEL.

About noon, Captain ORCIVAL and Lieutenant GAUMÉ returned to us in the P.C. of the I.D., having completed their mission in the forest.

Captain ORCIVAL left us a few moments later in a car of the I.D. after having also confirmed that the mission of the D.I. was a mission of "resistance without spirit of retreat" and, by getting in by car, he added while leaving: "resistance until death."

We then received, successively, from the D.I. opinion that the 4 ° D.I.N.A. would soon relieve us by reinforcement and that a counter-attack was to leave "on the 16th about noon" from HIRSON towards the East to clear us, counter-attack conducted by the 1 ° Division of Cavalry with its armour; P. C. of the General of ARRAS in HIRSON.

But we never saw the 4 ° D.I.N.A. nor the 1 ° D.C.

And the reason was that the road CHARLEVILLE - HIRSON was occupied by the opponent, who cut us to the South (2).

 the 22 ° D.I. by the motorcyclist who had brought me the information concerning the counter - attack of the 1 ° Cavalry Division.

Having understood, in fact, that the mission which had been given to me was all of sacrifice, I wanted my troops to be able to see me in the midst of them at such a moment (3).

1) The P. C. de WIMY was too far from the state forest of St. MICHEL to be a combat post;

He was soon separated from the D.I. fighters who were in the forest, no longer having any communication with them, which made it impossible to exercise command.

(2) The enemy who had arrived at MAUBERT - FONTAINE on 15 Mai at 18 h continued westward and reached at 20 h the regulatory station of LIART located a few kilometers beyond MAUBERT - Fontaine.

(3) Former Colonel of 65 ° R.I. to NANTES, former Director of the P.M.I.C.R. to NANTES, former General Cdt the G. S. de NANTES, it is I who among many other units, had set up the 22 ° D. I knew most of the Officers and many of the Non - Commissioned Officers who had taken my courses in the various training schools of the VENDÉE, the LOIRE BASSE and MORBIHAN; and many soldiers. Those of 116 ° R.I., among others, had for the most part done their active service under my orders at 65 ° R.I. to NANTES. I knew a lot of them but above all I was very well known to them, because, since the beginning of the war, it was I who had always commanded the forwards - posts or advances of the position, the D.I. troops in contact with the enemy.

They had given me, on several occasions touching marks of respectful affection, especially in January and February 1940, by a cold going up to -23 in the sector of HOMBOURG - BUDANGE which the division occupied for 2 months with a British brigade and where it was able to impose its will on the opponent by pushing him beyond the French-German border.

I had to not leave them at the time of the final outcome and share their fate. They would certainly not have understood if they had not seen me in their midst at such a time.

Fighting elements of the 22 ° D.I., we were locked by order in a real deaf ear.

We were facing the North stopping the enemy that had been following us since GIVET, while it was the enemy coming from the East by the great "road CHARLEVILLE - MÉZIÈRES - HIRSON - LA CAPELLE that closed the door to the South.

But thanks to the delaying action that I had taken since GIVET, since the beginning of the withdrawal; I had been able to clear the D.I. and if, instead of imprisoned in the night of May 15-16 in the forest of St. MICHEL, we had continued this delaying action, we could have regrouped from the 16th, the D.I. towards VERVINS or GUISE and it would have fought again somewhere on the AISNE or the SOMME. In any case, he would have been prevented from being captured and sent into captivity.

At about 16 o'clock, I put the P.C. of the I.D. with that of Lt. Colonel Cdt on 62 ° R.I. in an unfinished casemate of the stop line.

There also came Lt. Colonel d'AILLIÈRES, Cdt. 18 ° R.A.D. and the Head of Btn. QUINQUETTE du 116 ° R.I. son chef de Corps, le Lt. Colonel LANNIER (1), having disappeared since the morning during a reconnaissance to the "ANOR Pass."

In the evening we inspected the positions and checked the command with the Lts. Colonels Cdt on 19 ° and 62 ° R.I. and the Lieutenant of CHARRETTE, Cdt the platoon of the G.R.D.

Lt. Colonel d'AILLIÈRES specified to his two Group Commanders the missions and positions of the batteries.

During this time I received an order from the 22 ° D.I. informing me that the same evening, around 8 pm, a reinforcement of 400 riflemen of the 4 ° D.I.N.A. would be sent to me and delivered out east of MONDREPUIS where I would have to place an officer of my staff to take him and drive him. For this purpose, I designated an officer by R.I. and Captain DESCHAMPS (E.M.I.D. 22).

Captain DESCHAMPS took Sergeant BOUCARD of the E.M.I.D. 22 with him.

These Officers and Deputy Officers went in the evening, in due time to the point indicated.

They spent the night there in vain, no reinforcements arrived.

At approximately 18 o'clock, Captain SAÏDI SADOK of the 25 ° R.T.A. who was still in liaison with the 4 ° D.I.N.A. at the 22 ° D.I. General Staff; brought us two trucks of water that he handed over, at crossroads 256, Lt. Colonel de BARILLEC.

The two times to come from WIMY to the state forest of SAINT-MICHEL, this Officer could still pass through WIMY, the four BRAS, MONDREPUIS, PAS BAYARD, crossroads 225, crossroads 256 (crossroads AMELIE).

(2) In the afternoon and evening, patrols, reconnaissance, various inspections were carried out on the positions to ensure liaison, check the Command and the installation of the men in the tank ditch near the stop line. And this confirmed the information that to our right, that is to say to the East, nobody was at the edge of the forest (recognition of Lt. GUENNEC, 116 ° R.I.). This should have been, in connection with us, 18 ° D.I., according to the information given to us by 22 ° D.I.; so, in reality, we were completely discovered on the right.

About midnight the Colonel of LALANDE, Cdt the A.D. 22, came to my Father C. to tell me that the situation in which I found myself was "ridiculous," was not tenable, that I was surely going to be taken by the enemy and that as a comrade he had just told me not to stay there and to leave.... to which I replied that "my order was to resist on the spot without a spirit of retreat"; whereas I therefore refused to leave; that I wanted to recognize a withdrawal route and organize a departure, but that I would only execute it if General Cdt la D.I. sent me the order to leave my position. "

17 MAY 1940

Meanwhile, the 17 at one o'clock in the morning, was held at the P.C. of the 22 ° D.I. at WIMY, a War Council during which General Cdt. the D. I., the Chief of Staff and a Staff Officer decided after discussion to leave immediately (3).

And, in fact, Colonel d'AMONVILLE, Cdt. 1 ° Régiment de Chasseurs à cheval (1 ° division de cavalerie du Général d' ARRAS)  (West of WIGNEHIES) named the Pied du Terme (crossroads of roads LA CAPELLE -TRÉLON and LA CAPELLE -AVESNES) he had been asked by General HASSLER, who passed there at about three and a half o'clock in the morning and asked him for his way and information on the roads still open to the North-West.

He was in a car, followed by 6 or 7 other cars and said to Colonel d'AMMONVILLE: "I'm leaving, here's all that's left of my division."

(1) Killed during this reconnaissance by a burst of machine gun the Lt Colonel LANNIER was a true leader, having the most noble conception of military duty.

His loss will be painfully felt by all his comrades and by his regiment which had for him the greatest veneration.

Death for France at La Passe d'ANOR.

Buried in ANOR cemetery.

(2) On his return to WIMY, Captain SAIDI SADOK was kept at the General Staff of the         22 ° D.I. The officers of the E.M. told him that it was not worth returning to the E.M. of the 4 ° D.I.N.A., because this division had the order to come to WIMY on 17 to 7 o'clock.

(3) information given by an officer present at that time at WIMY, E.M. de la 22 ° D.I.; confirmed since by General MOULIN to whom the departure of the E.M. from 22 ° D.I. was reported, and one by an Officer from 19 ° R.I. belonging to the unit responsible for the guard of the P.C. from 22 ° D.I. to WIMY.

To my P.C. from the State Forest of St. MICHEL, I saw Captain DESCHAMPS coming back at about four o'clock in the morning, who told me that no reinforcement detachment had happened: he was returning with the non-commissioned officers who had accompanied him and had left the Chief Sergeant BOUCARD in the unlikely event that the reinforcement arrived (1).

Later, in captivity, I knew by General SANCELME Cdt. The 4 ° D.I.N.A., which this reinforcement detachment, reduced from elsewhere to 200 riflemen, had indeed been taken on board in trucks to be transported to the State Forest of St-MICHEL, but that he had not even been able to leave because of the situation.

Indeed, still in captivity, General BERNARD, Cdt. The Infantry of the 4 ° D.I.N.A. told me that it was he who had given the order not to send out these 200 riflemen, for, at that time, he was in the process of regrouping and reorganizing his regiments.

The night of 16-17 May is without further incidents.

From the dawn of the day, on the 17th, patrols led by officers of all ranks were sent into the forest and, of the three tanks that we had on the outskirts of the resistance position, facing the direction of MACQUENOISE, two were placed facing east, at the edge of the forest, where I had concerns.

I sent Lt. GAUMÉ, from my Staff to the P.C. of WIMY in liaison with the General Commander the 22 ° D.I., whose departure I did not know, by road: Junction 256 - MONDREPUIS, the only corridor left for us to exit westward and I tried to find a tank battalion commander that General Commander 22 ° D.I. had put at my disposal; but that I had not seen yet. They could finally find it and send it to me, but he told me that his tanks had little petrol and insufficient to be used; he intended to attempt a forcible passage through the enemy to flee to VERVINS, where he thought he would find tanks and gasoline, but, after discussion, he put himself at my disposal and offered to put some tanks in working order by taking gasoline from others that he would give up if necessary. But he left and I did not see him again.

Thinking that if we were three quarters surrounded, there might well be reason to consider an exit to the West, as Colonel Cdt had come to tell me. A. D. 22 I gathered my Colonels and told them in secret how I saw them: a single passage, the corridor of MONDREPUIS which would be guarded by five tanks placed on the roads through which the enemy could come, to the right and to the left, and near MONDREPUIS to ensure absolutely the passage. each unit then assembled, beforehand, in order, would pass in turn, framed strongly.

Start at 19 hours, exit West of the Forest to PAS - BAYARD and MONDREPUIS, then, during the night, walk axis: CLAIRFONTAINE, LA CAPELLE and the road to GUISE.

I foresaw that this was absolutely personal and secret and that I fully reserved my decision.

I thought that I would receive an order from General Cdt. 22 ° D.I. by motorcyclist, following the night intervention of Colonel Cdt. A. D. 22, by Lt. GAUMÉ that I had sent in the morning in liaison with General Cdt. 22 ° D. I.

At about 11 o'clock Lieutenant GAUMÉ returned: he had not been able to go until WIMY, the country being already occupied by the enemy, but had been able to go to MONDREPUIS where he had seen Colonel Commandant on 25 ° R.T.A. (4 ° D.I.N.A.) at his P.C.

The latter had told him that he had occupied this village during the night and that he held the Troué d'ANOR firmly.

This precious information completely changed my situation: indeed, I was no longer alone, I was in liaison to the left (West) with the 4 ° D.I.N.A. of which a regiment "held firmly." I only had to keep my regiments where they were and I gave orders to my colonels and Lt. Colonel Cdt. the 18 ° R.A.D. to continue the defense of the position without spirit of retreat, in particular to Lt. Colonel Cdt on 19 ° R.I. who, imprudently, by a personal letter to his battalion commander of the main position, had warned him of a possible evacuation from the position during the night of 17 to 18.

Always in captivity, I learned from General SANCELME Cdt. 4 ° D.I.N.A. that this withdrawal movement would not have been successful; for he and his I.D. Commander, General BERNARD, were captured together on May 17 at 19 o'clock in the P.C. from the D.I. to the CAPELLE by 50 German tanks; the road and the land between HIRSON and LA CAPELLE through which I had thought to make my movement were already on the afternoon of the 17th, crossed by enemy armoured vehicles.

1) This excellent and charming NCO did not join I.  He was killed fighting on May 17 in HIRSON. - Death for FRANCE; he was buried in HIRSON.

Moreover, MONDREPUIS had been in the hands of the enemy since noon, 17.

Therefore, my movement would have clashed, as soon as I passed in MONDREPUIS or north or south of this village, with the enemy forces that would have annihilated or taken prisoner my regiments which did not have the means to defend themselves against such a quantity of tanks and armour.

I was therefore well inspired when I decided to stay in the state forest of SAINT-MICHEL to resist it without a spirit of retreat as I had received the order.

Around 13 h 30; Lieutenant GAUMÉ (1) left again on a motorcycle to try to find the P.C. of the Division of which we had not had the slightest news since the arrival of Colonel Cdt. A. D 22. (2)

The information I collected in captivity made me understand the reason: General Cdt. the 22 ° D.I. and his staff had left their WIMY P.C. during the night, as early as the early hours of 17 May (3).

As on the other hand, as early as noon, MONDREPUIS had been taken by the enemy, Lt. GAUMÉ did not return (4).

And this also explains to me, since we were no longer covered to the left by the 25 ° R.T.A., the reason why in the afternoon and evening of the 17 (5), we had to resist very strong enemy attacks, especially at about 18 o'clock, which caused us losses but during which we inflicted serious ones on the enemy.

According to his custom, he did not insist when he found resistance, a rocket launch of determined color (white, red or green) stopped the fight and he withdrew to try a shot elsewhere.

After each attack, we went out into the forest to try to follow him and attack him in our turn, but in vain, he disappeared with such speed that we can think that he reached his transport cars at a certain point.

This last attack of 18 hours gave way to an incredible and all the more dangerous tranquillity.

So I made special arrangements for the night, with systematic firing of artillery, machine guns, mortars, first every quarter of an hour and then every half hour.

18 MAY 1940

As soon as the day rose, the fire stopped and patrols went out into the forest to look for indications of occupation or the presence of the enemy. Arrangements were made both in the casemates and by the interval troops occupying the anti - tank ditch for a new resistance. (6)

The greatest silence reigned in the forest, but this apparent tranquillity did not tell me anything worthwhile after the attacks of the day before: either the enemy considered us as an island of resistance entirely surrounded and of which he would be right by force of things or, on the contrary, he mounted an attack to finish with us.

And, in fact, we soon received from all sides the first projectiles and machine gun shots and rifles.

Main resistance position and stop line were attacked at the same time; the enemy came from both the West and the East of the region of MACQUENOISE to the North and St. MICHEL to the South.

Our tanks had disappeared, except one placed near the 256 crossroads and which fired as long as it could but was surrounded and put out of combat.

(2) I had no other means of liaison than Officers, Non - Commissioned Officers or Soldiers and I had only two officers of my E. M. of I.D.: that is why Lt. GAUMÉ was forced to return.

(3) The Q.G. was reported on May 24 at SEPTEUIL near VERSAILLES?

(4) I later learned that he was in captivity.

(5) On the afternoon of May 17, in WASSIGNIES, General d'Armée GIRAUD meeting with Lieutenant de BEAUCOURT of 1 ° Rgt. from Hunters to Horse, questioned him and said: "You will tell your Colonel that the order is to hold, resist on the spot. (information given by Colonel d'AMONVILLE) Cdt. 1 ° Regiment of Hunters on Horseback, (1 ° Cavalry Division and Lieutenant de BEAUCOURT, with whom I was in captivity at DULAG XII to MAYENCE).

6) Unaware of the gravity of the general situation, and relying on the reserve divisions that we had been told were behind us, I always hoped for a counter - attack that would deliver us.

At about 10 o'clock I was informed of the first French prisoners on the road from MACQUENOISE to St. MICHEL, therefore coming from the main position of resistance.

On the stop line, where I was, machine gun, gear and rifles fired continuously; but, from the slots, we saw the enemy infantrymen who were advancing in the forest, in ever greater numbers and with unheard of audacity; our troops occupying the tank ditch were beginning to have serious losses, the G.R.D. platoon in particular, inflamed by the admirable lieutenant of CHARETTE, already wounded in the hand during the previous day's fighting.

As the infiltrations continued, we were overwhelmed and the enemy fell on each casemate taking advantage of the dead corners and of the fact that no niche existed in the north facade of the casemates (facade opposite the entrance of the casemate); already several had to surrender.

I had decided to resist the last one, while trying to delay as much as possible the moment (which I knew well for having lived it during the world war) when the enemy taking advantage of the ventilation hole of our shelter, would have thrown inside grenades that would have unnecessarily killed or wounded the Officers and Men who were there.

This moment arrived, however, at about 11 o'clock and we then had to stop the resistance that we had opposed to the stubborn enemy and without a spirit of retreat, as we had been ordered to do (1).

We then reached the rest of the division on the road (2), and as Lt. Colonel Le BARILLEC, Cdt. 62 ° R.I.: "You, my general, have left the last position of the Division."

I could have considered two other solutions: or blow up our shelter with us, but I had no explosives; or make a glorious bayonet ride against the Germans who surrounded us lying behind the trees of the forest and the slopes of the road: I did not think I had the right to have most of the twenty to thirty men around me killed with certainty.

The magnificent courage of which they and the others: Officers,

It was the same as that of their Elders during World War I was also in charge of.

And I replied verbatim: "I don't ask anything for me, but I have the honor to command Bretons and Vendées who were very brave and did all their duty. I ask that they be treated well in captivity. "

"What you tell me is correct," replied the officer: your desire is just and legitimate and what you ask will be done.

Personally, I am proud and more moved than it is possible to say to have lived such hard hours and to have lived them until the end in the midst of my brave soldiers.

The fighters of the 22 ° D. I held on the spot as they had received the order and it was only after having for eight days fought the harshest battles and having, the day before again, twice repelled the opponent, that they were dislodged, literally submerged by fresh troops infinitely greater in number.

The losses of D.I. are significant; we will probably never be able to count them exactly, but what I can say highly is that "Dead for France," alive, wounded or not, all have well deserved the Homeland.

(1) Our resistance until the 18th in the morning had, among other results, that of allowing the 17th, the withdrawal into the region of TRÉLON of the 5 ° R.T.M. and 28 ° R.T.T. which, thus, were not surrounded. (Information given in captivity by General BERNARD, Cdt. the I.D. of the 4 ° D.I.N.A., who told me that during the battle I had received these two regiments under his command.

(2) without any dust, which were clean and fresh as if they had been transported on the spot, in cars, the very morning of the attack.

I later learned about "this was an I.D. considered excellent and recently arrived from POLAND.

The men before us seemed to have been specially chosen: great, vigorous and strong.

(1) On the same day, May 18, the enemy arrived on the AISNE of RETHEL and, the day before, his battled units had reached the sources of the OISE and those of the SAMBRE (German press release).

This simple observation proves to what extent the resistance of the 22 ° D.I. was tenacious and effective; for its complete encirclement had long been realized that it was still fighting.

It is certainly the great unity that in this region, has resisted the enemy the longest.

I guarantee it, having shared with them all their trials and having remained the last on the position. It was in my arms that the 22 ° D.I. expired.

Many have deserved a reward: it will certainly not be possible for me to propose them all individually.

Where will they be when they return from captivity? I would try to get into contact with the Corps Chiefs for this purpose.

But what I solicit wholeheartedly and propose to the righteousness and benevolence of my leaders, as the only fair way to reward all fighters en bloc, it is a quotation at 22 ° D.I. to the order of the Army "for bravery, recognized by the adversary, as demonstrated under my command, during the tragic days of 10 to 18 May 1940. "

General Pierre BÉZIERS-LAFOSSE.

CORRIGENDUM and ADDITIF

to the status of proposals and awards sent on 25 December 1940

to Mr. General BESSON, Director of the Prisoners Service

on behalf of several soldiers of the 22nd D. I.

I.- CORRIGENDUM

Lt. Colonel LANNIER, Cdt 116th R.I. and provisionally I. D. 22, having been killed, there is a need to:

1 )/- annul the proposal made for him for the rank of colonel.

2 )/- to grant, posthumously, that relating to his promotion to the rank of Commander of the Legion of Honour with the award of the war cross to the order of the Army.

*****************

Proposal for the rank of Knight of the Legion of Honour:

Captain MARTINOT RENÉ, Cdt la C.A. 3 of the 19th R.I.

Captain MARTINOT is a young and brilliant officer who emerged at the head of his promotion to Saint-Cyr, having campaigned in MOROCCO as soon as he left the School and having obtained the Cross of War of the T.O.E. for his conduct during the operations in the great Moroccan Atlas in 1933.

A valuable officer who distinguished himself throughout the war 1939-1940 in the command of C.A. 3 of the 19th R.I. and took part in all the fighting fought by his battalion since May 10 on the Givet Meuse, and during the withdrawal until June 18, 1940.

I have the honour to request his promotion to the rank of Knight of the Legion of Honour with the award of the War Cross to the Order of the Army with the following motive:

"The brightest officer who constantly distinguished himself during the war 1939-40. During the withdrawal led his detachment with energy and intelligence despite the worst difficulties, thus avoiding him capture. Embarked for England on 31 May 1940 and disembarked at Brest on 7 June took part in operations in Normandy as a unit commander and was taken prisoner on 18 June in tragic circumstances. "

Already quoted in 1933 in Morocco. "

OFFLAG VIII E, 25 March 1941,

General BEZIER LA PSSE Commander I.D. 22 and pvrt the 22nd D.I.

BEZIERS-LAFOSSE.