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Published material provided for viewing according to “fair use” laws.   Please refer to the published versions in citations.  Chapters 1 and 5 of The Reflective Life are here with permission from Oxford University Press.

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Moral Psychology:  A Contemporary IntroductionRoutledge 2015

The Reflective Life: Living wisely with our limits.  Chapter 1, Introduction.  Oxford University Press, 2008

The Reflective Life: Living wisely with our limits.  Chapter 5, Self-Awareness. Oxford University Press, 2008

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Well-Being, Values and Improving Lives  in Performance and Progress:  Essays on Capitalism, Business and Society, Subramanian Rangan (Ed.).  Oxford University Press, 2015); pages 339-357.
While large scale crises such as global poverty or climate change require large scale solutions, individual agents – as consumers, activists, voters, and leaders – certainly must play a role.  This chapter proposes a theory of individual well-being that affords a strategy for generating reasons to do better by the world that also promote long-term self-interest.  The theory defended characterizes well-being in terms of value fulfillment over time, and it holds that a person’s current values might be in need of improvement or modification to count as best for the person over time.  After an overview and brief defense of the theory, the chapter turns to the question of how a person’s values might be modified and improved in ways that benefit both the person and the planet. 

Does the New Wave in Moral Psychology Sink Kant?  Forthcoming in
The Blackwell Handbook on Naturalism.  Kelly James Clark (ed.). (Wiley Blackwell).   
Some claim that recent work in moral psychology both undermines Kantian moral theory and supports Humean approaches to morality. Does moral psychology undermine Kantian, rationalistic moral theory?  After distinguishing various Kantian claims and the evidence against them, I argue that the empirical case against Kantianism as a viable moral theory is not conclusive. 

Prudential ValueOxford Handbook of Value Theory edited by Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson.  Oxford University Press, 2015.

Recipes for a Good Life:  Eudaimonism and the Contribution of Philosophy The Best Within Us:  Positive Psychology Perspectives on Eudaimonic Functioning edited by Alan Waterman.  (Washington, D.C.:  American Psychological Association, 2013), pp. 19-38.

Philosophical Methods in Happiness Research The Oxford Handbook of Happiness. David, S., Boniwell, I. and Ayers, A (eds.).  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 315-325.


Constructivism and Wise Judgment . Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, edited by James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer. (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 195-212.
In this paper I introduce a version of constructivism that relies on a theory of practical
wisdom. Wise judgment constructivism is a type of constructivism because it takes correct
judgments about what we have “all-in” reason to do to be the result of a process we
can follow, where our interest in the results of this process stems from our practical
concerns. To fully defend the theory would require a comprehensive account of
wisdom, which is not available. Instead, I describe a constructivist methodology for
defending an account of wisdom and outline its main features. This gives us enough to
see what wise judgment constructivism would look like, why it might be an attractive
theory, and how it is different from other versions of constructivism.


Open-mindedness and Normative Contingency Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 182-204.
Open-mindedness seems to be a virtue because an open mind is more receptive to the truth. But if value judgments are best understood as a human projection, expression, or construction, then it is unclear why open-mindedness is a virtue when it comes to normative judgments. If moral truths are not “out there”, what is the point of an open mind?  What are we being open to?  Further, if oughts and values are, in some way, contingent on us, open-mindedness may put us at greater risk of losing important convictions than in the case of belief about the world. In this paper I defend open-mindedness for normative judgment in the context of meta-ethical theories that makes values mind-dependent.


Wisdom Revisited:  A Case Study in Normative Theorizing with Jason Swartwood; Philosophical Explorations.  Vol. 14, No. 3, September 2011, pp. 277–295.
Extensive discussions of practical wisdom are relatively rare in the philosophical
literature these days. This is strange given the theoretical and practical importance of
wisdom and, indeed, the etymology of the word “philosophy”. In this paper, we
remedy this inattention by proposing a methodology for developing a theory of
wisdom and using this methodology to outline a viable theory. The methodology we
favor is a version of wide reflective equilibrium. We begin with psychological
research on folk intuitions about wisdom, which helps us to avoid problems caused
by reliance on the possibly idiosyncratic intuitions of professional philosophers. The
folk theory is then elaborated in light of theoretical desiderata and further empirical
research on human cognitive capacities. The resulting view emphasizes policies that
the wise person adopts in order to cope with the many obstacles to making good choices.


Well-being.  with Alexandra Plakias, in Doris, J., & the Moral Psychology Research Group. (eds.). The Moral Psychology Handbook. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp. 401-431.


Normative Theory and Psychological Research with Alicia Hall, The Journal of Positive Psychology.  Vol. 5.  No. 3, May 2010, pp. 212-225.
This paper is a contribution to the debate about eudaimonism started by Kashdan,
Biswas-Diener, King, and Waterman in a previous issue of The Journal of Positive
Psychology. We point out that one thing that is missing from this debate is an
understanding of the problems with subjective theories of well-being that motivate a turn
to objective theories. We then argue that a suitably modified subjective theory can solve
these problems and that this is the theory that ought to be favored by psychologists.
 

Appiah and the Autonomy of Ethics  Neuroethics, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2010, pp. 209-214.


Well-Being:  Psychological Research for Philosophers  Philosophy Compass 1/5, 2006, pp. 493-505.


Value Commitments and the Balanced Life Utilitas, Volume 17, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 24-45.
According to critics such as Bernard Williams, traditional ethical theories render it
impossible to lead good and meaningful lives because they emphasize moral duty or the
promotion of external values at the expense of the personal commitments that make
our lives worth living from our own perspective. Responses to this criticism have not
addressed the fundamental question about the proper relationship between a person's
commitments to moral values and her commitments to non-moral or personal values.
In this article, I suggest that we think about this relationship by reflecting on the way
that a prudentially virtuous person who has commitments to both moral and non-moral
values would regard these commitments. I argue that people with the virtue of balance
do have reasons to act in accordance with their moral commitments, but that whether or
not these reasons are overriding depends on the type of commitment in question.



Cultural Differences and Philosophical Accounts of Well-Being. The Journal of Happiness Studies, 5, 2004, pp. 293-314.


Maintaining Conviction and the Humean Account of Normativity Topoi, Volume 21, Nos. 1-2, 2002, pp. 165-173.


Humean Heroism:  Value Commitments and the Source of NormativityPacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 81, No. 4, December 2000, pp. 426-446.
This paper is a contribution to the debate about eudaimonism started by Kashdan,
Biswas-Diener, King, and Waterman in a previous issue of The Journal of Positive
Psychology. We point out that one thing that is missing from this debate is an
understanding of the problems with subjective theories of well-being that motivate a turn
to objective theories. We then argue that a suitably modified subjective theory can solve
these problems and that this is the theory that ought to be favored by psychologists.






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