Associate Professor of Economics (with Tenure)

Ph.D. (Economics), University of Pittsburgh, 2002
M.A. (Economics), University of Pittsburgh, 2001
M.P.A. (Public Policy), University of Pittsburgh, 1996
B.Sc. (Economics), Universidad del Pacifico, 1992

Henry Marshall Tory Building 7-25
780-492-2553                         landeo@ualberta.ca                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              SSRN Discussion Papers

Curriculum Vitae (PDF)

Short Bio

Professor Landeo received her Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pittsburgh in May 2002, where she was the recipient of the Andrew W. Mellon Award and the Reuben E. Slesinger Research Award. She accepted a tenure-track position at the Department of Economics of the University of Alberta in January 2002. She was Granted Tenure and Promoted to Associate Professor of Economics in July 2008, and Honored with a Faculty Retention Offer in June 2010.  She has served as a Research Scholar in Law and Economics at Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management, and as both a Visiting Associate Professor of Economics and a Research Scholar in Behavioral Law and Economics at Carnegie Mellon University John H. Heinz School. More recently, she has served as a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law, and as a Senior Research Scholar in Law at Harvard Law School and Yale Law School. Dr. Landeo was awarded a three-year National Science Foundation Research Grant ($205,000; with K. Spier) for her work on bargaining and contracts in December 2011. Professor Landeo's work has been published in leading economics journals such as the The American Economic Review and The Rand Journal of Economics, and top law journals such as The Yale Journal on Regulation and The University of Chicago Law Review.

Dr. Landeo's  research is conducted at the interface between Economics and Law. She applies legal analysis, game-theoretic modeling, and experimental economics methods to the assessment and design of legal institutions. Her work is characterized by technical accuracy, methodological innovation, and strong public policy implications. First, Professor Landeo has studied the efficiency properties of bargaining institutions in legal settings including partnership dissolution provisions and pretrial bargaining mechanisms. Second, she has analyzed how various legal rules influence potential defendants (firms) to invest in product safety, plaintiffs to file lawsuits, and litigants' decision to settle or go to court; whether these legal rules generate socially desirable outcomes; and, the implications of cognitive biases on the effectiveness of these legal rules. Third, her work has contributed to better understanding of the behavioral factors that affect the design and use of contracts with stipulated damages by incumbent sellers as rent-extracting mechanisms. Her research has also provided insights about the use of vertical restraints by incumbent monopolists to exclude potential entrants, and the factors that might enhance the exclusionary power of these business practices. Finally, Dr. Landeo has written on topics related to financial institutions including the role of financial intermediation in highly-dollarized economies. She is currently working on methodological aspects of experimental economics methods applied to the study of law. Part of this work will be presented at the 1st Workshop on Experimental Economics and Legal Research (Landeo and Zeiler, co-organizers and presenters), sponsored by the Society for Empirical Legal Studies.  She is also working on third-party financing of litigation, long-term contracts and incentives for teams, and debiasing through law mechanisms.

Professor Landeo's teaching expertise (graduate and undergraduate levels) is in the areas of game theory and economic applications, microeconomic theory, applied economic analysis to public policy, business strategy,corporate law, and experimental economics methods.

Areas of Interest

  • Law and Economics
  • Industrial Organization
  • Experimental and Behavioral Economics
  • Contract Law, Corporate Law, Business Associations, and Antitrust

Representative Publications

  • Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 99, 2009, pp. 1862-1892 (with K. Spier).
  • Shotguns and Deadlocks, THE YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, forthcoming (with K. Spier).
  • Exclusionary Vertical Restraints and Antitrust: Experimental Law and Economics Contributions, in Kathryn Zeiler and Joshua Teitelbaum, eds., THE RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.
  • Settlement Escrows: An Experimental Study of a Bilateral Bargaining Game, the journal of Economic Behavior and 0rganization, 53, 2004, pp. 401-417 (with L. Babcock).

  • Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, forthcoming (with K. Spier).
  • Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts, THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 24, 2010, pp. 69-89 (with R. Brooks and K. Spier).