I received my Ph.D. in philosophy from St. Louis University in May 2016 under the supervision of Eleonore Stump, John Greco, and Daniel Haybron.
My general research interests include moral responsibility, ethics, metaphysics, moral psychology, and philosophy of religion. In the dissertation, I argue that luck can partially determine desert of praise and blame. To make this thesis concrete, consider some examples. Two reckless drivers manage their vehicles in the same way, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two corrupt judges would each take a bribe if one were offered. Only one judge is offered a bribe, and so only one takes a bribe. In terms of these examples, I defend the view that the killer driver is more blameworthy than the merely reckless driver, and that the bribe-taker is more blameworthy than the mere would-be bribe-taker. You can read more about it here.
In recent news, Philosophical Studies has published "Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility," which was Chapter 3 of my dissertation, and Journal of Philosophical Research has accepted for publication "Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism," which was the Appendix of my dissertation.