Elizabeth Tropman

Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Colorado State University
Ph.D., Indiana University, 2006
970-491-5216 (phone), e-mail

Research Interests

ethics and metaethics, with special emphasis on moral realism, moral intuitionism, and the epistemology of moral judgment


“Formulating Moral Objectivity,” 2018, Philosophia, in press.  DOI10.1007/s11406-017-9942-9.

“Metaethics,” forthcoming in A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy, ed. Graham Oppy. Wiley-Blackwell.

“Intuitionism in Moral Epistemology,” Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, eds. Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett, Routledge, 2017, pp. 472-483.

“Moral Realism and Ethical Naturalism in Media Ethics Theorizing,” with Patrick Lee Plaisance, Ethical Space, 2016, 13 (4): 11-17.

“Varieties of Moral Intuitionism,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2014, 48 (2): 177-194, DOI: 10.1007/s10790-014-9423-3.

“Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Moral Realism, Constructivism, and Explaining Moral Knowledge,” Philosophical Explorations, 2014, 17 (2): 126-140, DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2013.855807.

“Why Cornell Moral Realism Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Moral Knowledge,” Theoria, 2014, 80 (2): 184-190, DOI: 10.1111/theo.12044.

“Making Sense of Explanatory Objections to Moral Realism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 2013, 50 (1): 37-49. (Journal site)

“Idealization in Ethics,” The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. H. LaFollette, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, pp. 2531–2533, DOI: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee747.

“Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge,” Disputatio, 2012, 4 (33): 459-467. (pdf)

“Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?” Theoria, 2012, 78 (1): 26-46, DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01118.x.

“Review of Sabine Roeser’s Moral Emotions and Intuitions.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 11.27, 2011. (full text)

“Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge,” Acta Analytica, 2011, 26 (4): 355-366, DOI: 10.1007/s12136-011-0126-0.

“Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2010, 44 (1): 31-45, DOI: 10.1007/s10790-009-9173-9.

“ ‘S Knows that P’ Expanded: Apology 20D-24B,” with Patrick McKee, Social Epistemology, 2010, 24 (1): 29-43, DOI: 10.1080/02691721003632800.

“Renewing Moral Intuitionism”, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2009, 6 (4): 440-463. (Journal site)

“Naturalism and the New Moral Intuitionism”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 2008, 33: 163-184. (Journal site)



“In Defense of Reading Quizzes,” International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, 2014, 26 (1): 140-146. (Journal site)


Philosophy 103—Moral and Social Problems (Fall 2017)

Philosophy 205—Introduction to Ethics (Fall 2018)

Philosophy 206—Knowledge and Existence (Fall 2016)

Philosophy 447—Ethical Theory (Fall 2018)

Philosophy 547—Seminar in Metaethics (Spring 2018)