Elizabeth Tropman

Research Interests

ethics and metaethics, with special emphasis on moral realism, moral intuitionism, and the epistemology of moral judgment

Publications

"Fair Consent Transactions and Ethical Pluralism,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, forthcoming.

“How to be an Aesthetic Realist,” Ratio 35 (2022): 61-70. DOI: 10.1111/rati.12324.

“Meta-Ethics,” A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy. Graham Oppy ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2019), pp. 343-354. DOI: 10.1002/9781119119302.ch23.

“Formulating Moral Objectivity,” Philosophia 46, no. 4 (2018): 1023-1040. DOI: 10.1007/s11406-017-9942-9.

“Intuitionism in Moral Epistemology,” Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett eds. (Routledge, 2017), pp. 472-483. DOI: 10.4324/9781315213217-31.

“Moral Realism and Ethical Naturalism in Media Ethics Theorizing,” with Patrick Lee Plaisance, Ethical Space, 13, no. 4 (2016): 11-17.

“Varieties of Moral Intuitionism.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 48, no. 2 (2014): 177-194. DOI: 10.1007/s10790-014-9423-3.

“Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Moral Realism, Constructivism, and Explaining Moral Knowledge.” Philosophical Explorations 17, no. 2 (2014): 126-140. DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2013.855807.

“Why Cornell Moral Realism Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Moral Knowledge.” Theoria 80, no. 2 (2014): 184-190. DOI: 10.1111/theo.12044.

“Making Sense of Explanatory Objections to Moral Realism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 50, no. 1 (2013): 37-49. JSTOR

“Idealization in Ethics.” International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hugh LaFollette, ed. (Blackwell Publishing, 2013), pp. 2531–2533. DOI: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee747.

“Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge.” Disputatio 4, no. 33 (2012): 459-467. DOI: 10.2478/disp-2012-0011.

“Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?” Theoria 78, no. 1 (2012): 26-46. DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01118.x.

“Review of Sabine Roeser’s Moral Emotions and Intuitions.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 11.27 (2011). NDPR page.

“Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge.” Acta Analytica 26, no. 4 (2011): 355-366. DOI: 10.1007/s12136-011-0126-0.

“Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 44, no. 1 (2010): 31-45. DOI: 10.1007/s10790-009-9173-9. DOI: 10.1007/s10790-009-9173-9.

“ ‘S Knows that P’ Expanded: Apology 20D-24B,” with Patrick McKee, Social Epistemology 24, no. 1 (2010): 29-43. DOI: 10.1080/02691721003632800.

“Renewing Moral Intuitionism.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 6, no. 4 (2009): 440-463. DOI: 10.1163/174046809x12464327133096.

“Naturalism and the New Moral Intuitionism.” Journal of Philosophical Research 33 (2008): 163-184. DOI: 10.5840/jpr_2008_1.