David G. Pearce

Professor of Economics at New York University

David Pearce   
Department of Economics
New York University
19 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012

Phone: (212) 992-8667
Fax: (212) 995-4186
E-mail: david.pearce@nyu.edu

Published research

Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
David Pearce
Econometrica, 52 (4), pp. 1029-1050, 1984.

On the Inconsistency of Certain Axioms on Solution Concepts for Non-Cooperative Games
Dilip Abreu and David Pearce
Journal of Economic Theory, 34, pp. 169-174, 1984.

Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring
Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Journal of Economic Theory, 39, pp. 251-269, 1986.

Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality
John Geanakoplos, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Games and Economic Behavior, 1, pp. 60-79, 1989.

Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Econometrica, 58 (5), pp. 1041-1063, 1990.

Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
Dilip Abreu, Paul Milgrom and David Pearce
Econometrica, 59 (6), pp. 1713-1733, 1991.

A Perspective on Renegotiation in Repeated Games
Dilip Abreu and David Pearce
in Game Equilibrium Models II, edited by Reinhard Selten, Springer Verlag, 1991.

Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality
David Pearce
in Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress, edited by J. J. Lafont, 1992.

Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games
Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Journal of Economic Theory, 60 (2), pp. 217-240, 1993.

A Bound on the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games
Faruk Gül, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Mathematics of Operations Research, 18 (3), pp. 548-552, 1993.

Forward Induction and Public Randomization
Faruk Gül and David Pearce
Journal of Economic Theory, 70 (1), pp. 43-64, 1996.

Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive Goals
David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Journal of Economic Theory, 72 (2), pp. 282-305, 1997.

The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency
David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Games and Economic Behavior, 23, pp. 75-96, 1998.

Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
Dilip Abreu and David Pearce
Econometrica, 75 (3), pp. 653-710, 2007.

Nonpaternalistic Sympathy and the Inefficiency of Consistent Intertemporal Plans
David Pearce
in Foundations in Economic Theory: A Volume in Honor of Hugo F. Sonnenschein, edited by Matthew O. Jackson and Andrew McLennan, Springer, 2008.

One-sided Uncertainty and Delay in Reputational Bargaining
Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
forthcoming in Theoretical Economics.

Working papers

A Problem with Single Valued Solution Concepts
David Pearce
Mimeo, Princeton University, 1983

Renegotiation-proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation
David Pearce
CFDP 885, Yale University, 1987; revised 1991.

Arrow's Theorem on its Head: A Bayesian Perspective on Social Choice
David Pearce
Yale University, 1995.

A Behavioral Theory of Bargaining with Endogenous Types
Dilip Abreu and David Pearce
CFDP 1446, revise and resubmit JET, 2003.

Implementing the Nash Program in Stochastic Games
Dilip Abreu and David Pearce
Mimeo, 2013.