David G. Pearce

Professor of Economics at New York University

Department of Economics

New York University 19 West 4th Street New York, NY 10012 Phone: (212) 992-8667 Fax: (212) 995-4186 E-mail: david.pearce@nyu.edu

Published research

Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection

David Pearce

Econometrica, 52 (4), pp. 1029-1050, 1984.

On the Inconsistency of Certain Axioms on Solution Concepts for Non-Cooperative Games

Dilip Abreu and David Pearce

Journal of Economic Theory, 34, pp. 169-174, 1984.

Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring

Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

Journal of Economic Theory, 39, pp. 251-269, 1986.

Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality

John Geanakoplos, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

Games and Economic Behavior, 1, pp. 60-79, 1989.

Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

Econometrica, 58 (5), pp. 1041-1063, 1990.

Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships

Dilip Abreu, Paul Milgrom and David Pearce

Econometrica, 59 (6), pp. 1713-1733, 1991.

A Perspective on Renegotiation in Repeated Games

Dilip Abreu and David Pearce

in Game Equilibrium Models II, edited by Reinhard Selten, Springer Verlag, 1991.

Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality

David Pearce

in Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress, edited by J. J. Lafont, 1992.

Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games

Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

Journal of Economic Theory, 60 (2), pp. 217-240, 1993.

A Bound on the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games

Faruk Gül, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

Mathematics of Operations Research, 18 (3), pp. 548-552, 1993.

Forward Induction and Public Randomization

Faruk Gül and David Pearce

Journal of Economic Theory, 70 (1), pp. 43-64, 1996.

Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive Goals

David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

Journal of Economic Theory, 72 (2), pp. 282-305, 1997.

The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency

David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

Games and Economic Behavior, 23, pp. 75-96, 1998.

Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts

Dilip Abreu and David Pearce

Econometrica, 75 (3), pp. 653-710, 2007.

Nonpaternalistic Sympathy and the Inefficiency of Consistent Intertemporal Plans

David Pearce

in Foundations in Economic Theory: A Volume in Honor of Hugo F. Sonnenschein, edited by Matthew O. Jackson and Andrew McLennan, Springer, 2008.

One-sided Uncertainty and Delay in Reputational Bargaining

Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

Theoretical Economics, 10, pp. 719-773, 2015.

A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining with Endogenous Threats

Dilip Abreu and David Pearce

Econometrica, 83 (4), pp. 1641-1655, 2015.

Working papers

A Problem with Single Valued Solution Concepts

David Pearce

Mimeo, Princeton University, 1983

Renegotiation-proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation

David Pearce

CFDP 885, Yale University, 1987; revised 1991.

Arrow's Theorem on its Head: A Bayesian Perspective on Social Choice

David Pearce

Yale University, 1995.

A Behavioral Theory of Bargaining with Endogenous Types

Dilip Abreu and David Pearce

CFDP 1446, revise and resubmit JET, 2003.

Implementing the Nash Program in Stochastic Games

Dilip Abreu and David Pearce

Mimeo, 2013.

Reputation and Information Design

Laurent Mathevet, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

Mimeo, 2019