Professor of Economics at New York University
Department of Economics
New York University, 19 West 4th Street, 6th Floor New York, NY 10012 Phone: (212) 992-8667 Fax: (212) 995-4186 E-mail: david.pearce@nyu.edu
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
Author: David Pearce
Econometrica, 52 (4), pp. 1029-1050, 1984.
On the Inconsistency of Certain Axioms on Solution Concepts for Non-Cooperative Games
Authors : Dilip Abreu and David Pearce
Journal of Economic Theory, 34, pp. 169-174, 1984.
Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring
Authors: Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Journal of Economic Theory, 39, pp. 251-269, 1986.
Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality
Authors : John Geanakoplos, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Games and Economic Behavior, 1, pp. 60-79, 1989.
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Authors : Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Econometrica, 58 (5), pp. 1041-1063, 1990.
Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
Authors : Dilip Abreu, Paul Milgrom and David Pearce
Econometrica, 59 (6), pp. 1713-1733, 1991.
A Perspective on Renegotiation in Repeated Games
Authors : Dilip Abreu and David Pearce
in Game Equilibrium Models II, edited by Reinhard Selten, Springer Verlag, 1991.
Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality
Authors : David Pearce
in Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress, edited by J. J. Lafont, 1992.
Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games
Authors : Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Journal of Economic Theory, 60 (2), pp. 217-240, 1993.
A Bound on the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games
Authors : Faruk Gül, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Mathematics of Operations Research, 18 (3), pp. 548-552, 1993.
Forward Induction and Public Randomization
Authors : Faruk Gül and David Pearce
Journal of Economic Theory, 70 (1), pp. 43-64, 1996.
Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive Goals
Authors : David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Journal of Economic Theory, 72 (2), pp. 282-305, 1997.
The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency
Authors : David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Games and Economic Behavior, 23, pp. 75-96, 1998.
Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
Authors : Dilip Abreu and David Pearce
Econometrica, 75 (3), pp. 653-710, 2007.
Nonpaternalistic Sympathy and the Inefficiency of Consistent Intertemporal Plans
Authors : David Pearce
in Foundations in Economic Theory: A Volume in Honor of Hugo F. Sonnenschein, edited by Matthew O. Jackson and Andrew McLennan, Springer, 2008.
One-sided Uncertainty and Delay in Reputational Bargaining
Authors : Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Theoretical Economics, 10, pp. 719-773, 2015.
A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining with Endogenous Threats
Authors : Dilip Abreu and David Pearce
Econometrica, 83 (4), pp. 1641-1655, 2015.
Relational Contracts : Reputation and Renegotiation
Authors : David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economicsm vol 179, No. 3-4, 2023.
Individual and Social Welfare: A Bayesian Perspective
Author : David Pearce
Frisch Memorial Lecture of the Econometric Society, 12th World Congress, forthcoming 2024.
A Problem with Single Valued Solution Concepts
Authors : David Pearce
Mimeo, Princeton University, 1983
Renegotiation-proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation
Authors : David Pearce
CFDP 885, Yale University, 1987; revised 1991.
Arrow's Theorem on its Head: A Bayesian Perspective on Social Choice
Authors : David Pearce
Yale University, 1995.
A Behavioral Theory of Bargaining with Endogenous Types
Authors : Dilip Abreu and David Pearce
CFDP 1446, revise and resubmit JET, 2003.
Implementing the Nash Program in Stochastic Games
Authors : Dilip Abreu and David Pearce
Mimeo, 2013.
Reputation and Information Design
Authors : Laurent Mathevet, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti
Mimeo, 2019