Years‎ > ‎2016‎ > ‎

Program

Monday, June 27

8:30 – 9:00 Welcome, Coffee & Registration – Room 116

9:00 – 11:00 Room 117 – Chair: Alessandro Citanna, Yeshiva University

Hervé Crès, New York University in Abu Dhabi
Why so much consensus? Reciprocal aggregation and duality between persons and groups (with M. Tvede)

Sebastián Cea-Echenique, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne – CES & PSE
Generalized trust does not necessarily improve efficiency (with A. Marinovic)

John K.-H. Quah, Johns Hopkins University
A revealed preference theory of monotone choice and strategic complementarity (with N. Lazzati and K. Shirai)

11:00 – 11:25 Coffee Break – Room 116 

11:25 – 12:45 Room 117 – Chair: Zied Lachiri,
National Engineering School of Tunis ENIT

Jacqueline Morgan, University of Naples Federico II & CSEF
Inner regularizations and viscosity solutions for pessimistic bilevel optimization problems (with M.B. Lignola)

Hedy Attouch, University Montpellier
Modeling resource dynamics from a conservation of resources perspective. An application to psychological health at work (with J.-P. Neveu)

12:45 – 14:00 Lunch Break – Room 116

14:00 – 16:00 Room 117 – Chair: Nizar Allouch, Queen Mary University of London

Itzhak Gilboa, HEC Paris & Tel-Aviv University
Weighted utilitarianism, Edgeworth, and the market (with R. Argenziano)

Franz Dietrich, CNRS – CES & PSE
Savage’s theorem under changing awareness

Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University
The subgame-perfect core (with P. Chander)

16:00 – 16:20 Coffee Break – Room 116 

16:20 – 17:40 Room 117 – Chair: Erik J. Balder, University of Utrecht

Prajit K. Dutta, Columbia University
Asyncronous games with transfers: Uniqueness and optimality; Part I - finite horizon (with P. Siconolfi)

Olivier Guéant, ENSAE ParisTech - CREST/LFA, and Jean-Michel Lasry, Ceremade & Institut Louis Bachelier
Mean field games in economics and finance
 
19:30   Social Dinner of the Workshop

Restaurant Bouillon Racine

3 rue Racine, 75006 Paris
Phone: 00 33 1 85 15 21 33
Website: http://www.bouillon-racine.com/
Métro: Cluny - La Sorbonne
Parking Ecole de Médicine: 21 rue de l’Ecole de Médecine


Tuesday, June 28

9:00 – 9:30 Welcome & Coffee – Room 116

9:30 – 10:50 Room 117 – Chair: Yiannis Vailakis, University of Glasgow

Paolo Siconolfi, Graduate Business School of Columbia University
Designing constrained efficient markets under moral hazard or hidden information (with A. Citanna)

Lukasz Wozny, Warsaw School of Economics
Repeated moral hazard with costly self control

10:50 – 11:20 Coffee Break – Room 116

11:20 – 12:40  Room 117 – Chair:
Pascal Gourdel, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne – CES & PSE

Annamaria Barbagallo, University of Naples Federico II
Advances in oligopolistic market equilibrium with variational inequality arguments (with P. Mauro)

Herakles Polemarchakis, University of Warwick
Rational dialogs

12:40 – 14:00 Lunch Break – Room 116

14:00 – 16:00 Room 117 – Chair: Pawel Dziewulski, University of Oxford

Mich Tvede, Newcastle University
Regulation of trades based on differences in beliefs (with H. Crès)

Philippe Bich, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne – CES & PSE
Ambiguity aversion and pure-strategy equilibrium refinement in discontinuous games

Frank Page, Indiana University
Systemic risk and the dynamics of financial networks (with R. Gong)

16:00 – 16:30 Coffee Break – Room 116 

16:30 – 17:50 Room 117 – Chair: Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne – CES & PSE

Jan Werner, University of Minnesota
The envelope theorem, Euler and Bellman equations, without differentiability (with R. Marimon)

Nicholas Yannelis, University of Iowa, and Maria Gabriella Graziano, University of Naples Federico II & CSEF
Stable sets for exchange economies with interdependent preferences (with C. Meo)