I am Justin Lillge (LEE-hey), a Ph.D. student in the philosophy department at the University of Arizona.
My primary research interests are in metaphysics (esp. the metaphyics of agency), ethics (broadly construed), and epistemology (esp. formal epistemology).
My dissertation research focuses on developing a functionalist account of morally responsible agency whose conditions are equally met by individuals as well as by some groups. The account roughly parallels Michael Bratman’s strategy in Gricean creature construction, though differences abound. Foremost among them is my contention that responsibility attributed to a collective does not reduce to the responsibility attributed to individual members of the collective. This contention rests on views I develop about what is required for morally responsible agency, what it is for a collective to act, what are conditions for membership in such a collective, how a collective must be structured so as to satisfy plausible conditions for morally responsible agency, and how theoretical reductions can fail, even absent spooky metaphysics. I draw from recent work in the cognitive sciences, the free will and moral responsibility literature, and reflections on intriguing work taking place at University of Arizona Phil Trek workshops and at a new program under development at the Kennedy Institute for Ethics at Georgetown.
email: lillge -an - at - sign- email[dot]arizona.edu
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