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PROF.  MARCO A. MARINI  
(Ph.D. London School of Economics)                                                                     
Economics (SSD: SECS/P01 Economia Politica)   
Department of Social and Economic Sciences
Università di Roma La Sapienza, Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5
00185 - Rome - ITALY 
Contacts: Office:  Room 307, 3rd floor Faculty of Statistics, 
tel +39 06 49910843 (int. 20843). 
Email: marco.marini@uniroma1.it 
Twitter: @MarcoMariniuni


Main Research Fields: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Public Economics,  Industrial Organization, Development Economics. 
                                                                                                                 
In 2011 I joined the University of Rome La Sapienza, where I currently teach Economics (BSc in Management Engineering), Environmental Economics (MSc in Environmental Engineering) and Economics of Information (MSc in Data Science).  I have previously taught at the University of Urbino, IMT Lucca and London School of Economics.

I hold a B.Sc. and a Doctorate in Economics at the University of Rome La Sapienza, a  M. Sc. in Economics at the Université Catholique de Louvain and a M. Phil and a Ph.D. in Economics at the London School of Economics.

Since January 2016 I am  Editor-in-chief of Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics a journal published by Wiley-Blackwell.  

sponsored by CIRIEC International.

Since 2014 I am in the organizing committee of the international workshop on Oligopoly and Game Theory, the Oligo Workshop
Oligo Workshop 2014Oligo Workshop 2015, Oligo Workshop 2016, Oligo 2017.

I am member of CREI, member of the Scientific Commitee of CIRIEC International for Social Economy, fellow of the Game Theory Society and of the European Economic Association for Industrial Economics and of Societa Italiana degli Economisti.

My research is at the crossroads between Game Theory, Microeconomics,  Industrial Organization and Public Economics. My most recent papers focus on the stability of cooperation among coalitions and goups, on the effects of firms' collusive agreements in vertically differentatiated markets and on the cooperation between non-profits organizations.


Subpages (4): CV Didattica Meetings Research