Media: Wall Street Journal
Best paper award winner at the FMA 2015
"The Anatomy of Financial Frictions: New Evidence from Private Firms" w/ Jamie Brown, Tony Cookson, and Ivan Ivanov, FRA Early Ideas Session
Local financial development causes long-lasting improvements in consumer financial health. We use credit panel data and variation in financial development across Native American reservations caused by Congressionally imposed differences in court enforcement of civil contracts. Young consumers on reservations with more financial activity more quickly engage in formal credit markets, an effect that leads to greater long-run financial health.
Finalist for best paper award in Asset Pricing at the 2015 SFS Cavalcade
R&R, Journal of Financial Economics
Retail traders perform worse when they apply more leverage to their trades. Evidence of a causal relation comes from comparing the effects of CFTC regulation capping the maximum permissible leverage available to U.S. retail traders to unregulated European traders. I furnish evidence that traders escalate commitments to trading mistakes when the stakes are elevated via the use of leverage.
Norman Award Grant for creative projects in the Social Sciences,
Webinar for the Retirement Income Industry Association
Subjective mortality beliefs flip from underestimation to overestimation over the life-cycle, thereby affecting consumption/savings decisions. A run-of-the-mill life-cycle model calibrated to subjective mortality beliefs can explain under-saving while young and under-consumption while retired. We provide evidence that the salience of causes-of-death is the primary source of mortality belief distortions over the life-cycle.
Consumer credit access falls when local politicians gain power. We use changes in Senate sub-committee leadership to identify the effect on consumer credit outcomes. Increased political power reduces the propensity for sub-prime and minority consumers in the state to obtain credit. The effects are strongest in counties with politically active financial institutions and constituencies that make fewer campaign contributions.
The patterns of communication between traders supports the growth of active strategies. Using novel data from a social network linked to individual investment accounts, traders broadcast their own successes, while recipients trade more when their peers perform well.