For decades, Tunisian Islamists, like their brethren in the rest of the Arab world, have preached an economic, social, and educational policy rooted in religious ethics. They taught that adhering to the ideals of Islam would ensure economic and social prosperity. For them, giving up on religious values for economic gains is the foremost cause of Muslims’ backwardness. They reasoned that embracing political expediency over religious righteousness is a betrayal of Muslims’ faith in God’s providence.
As a banned political party, Ennahda (and its predecessor Islamic Trend) ideologues had argued for the existence of an indigenous Islamic worldview that people must follow in order to succeed today and in the hereafter. In their mind, the two worlds were linked. They opposed the regimes of Bourguiba and Ben Ali based on these principles. They promised that an Islamist government would not sacrifice religious ideals for economic gains, but it would accomplish progress through and because of Islamic ideals. In other words, Islamists looked to the heavens to solve problems of earth. Some leaders of this Islamist movement and many of its supporters were imprisoned, tortured, and exiled for their views. The movement was in disarray until the historical revolution offered it a second life—a revolution that they did not plan and certainly did not start.
Non-religious individuals and groups ignited and then realized the Tunisian revolution. Mohamed Elbouazizi, who was not a religious man and whose act of self-immolation was condemned by many religious authorities, is the iconic figure of the Tunisian uprising that started the Arab Spring. But when the dust settled and the first elections were held across Tunisia, Islamists and their allies took the biggest share of the votes—not the likes of Elbouazizi.
Although more than 58% of the voters did not endorse Ennahda, leaders of the Islamist party have acted as if they had an absolute public mandate to govern. Using the institution of the Constituency Assembly, the leaders of Ennahda cobbled together a coalition government headed by a former political prisoner and a historical figure of the Islamist movement. Members of Ennahda controlled the main ministries, including foreign affairs and interior. The first decisions of the government show the speed with which religious idealism gave way to practical realism. One such decision is Prime Minister Hammadi Jebali’s first state visit to Saudi Arabia: a good example of decisive, even cynical, realism.
Saudi Arabia is a wealthy clan-ruled Arab state in the Gulf region. Despite the geographical distance, it has and could influence life in Tunisia in many ways.
First, the Saudi rulers offered sanctuary to the Tunisian dictator, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who has been formally accused of ordering the killing of protesters and stealing public funds. Saudi Arabia could use Ben Ali’s presence on its soil to support loyalists who could destabilize Tunisia. Saudi Arabia so far ignored requests (we are not sure if they were official) to hand him over. The Saudis claimed that they extended him asylum because it is a religious exigency and a cultural ethos for them to protect anyone seeking sanctuary. But there are no guarantees that they would not leverage his presence to meddle in the affairs of a struggling country.
Second, Saudi individuals and organizations are primary sponsors of Salafi groups. They provide them with moral and material support. The Saudi authorities would not shy away from using those groups to exert influence in Tunisian affairs. The presence of the Salafis and the role they could play was displayed by recent events. An armed group was discovered in the southern province of Sfax this month. The interior ministry reported on February 2, 2012, that Tunisian security forces captured one member of the armed group and killed the two others. Mohammed al-Tunsi, a National Guard official, told reporters that “the three gunmen appeared to be Salafis, ultra-conservative Islamists.” On February 4, Mouncef Ben Salim, minister of higher education and member of Ennahda, accused an unnamed foreign country of “pumping large sums of money to destabilize the country."
In addition to armed activities, Salafis have held frequent demonstrations and sit-ins demanding the adoption of shari`ah laws into the new constitution. They blocked entrances to universities demanding segregation of the sexes. And in some isolated towns, they attempted to establish autonomous emirates governed only by their version of Islamic law. They have invited a number of Salafi preachers from Saudi Arabia and Egypt for public programs that promoted Salafi theology and teachings. One such preacher promoted female circumcision, prompting the Health Ministry (run by a member of Ennahda) to issue a statement condemning the practice and describing it as non-Islamic and a risk to women’s health.
Third, Saudi individuals and the government have invested considerable amounts of money in Tunisia during the reign of Ben Ali. That stream of investment dried up after the revolution. The new political leaders want not only to restart the old projects, but also to seek new investors to jumpstart an economy gravely affected by the revolution and mismanagement by the previous regime. For Saudi companies or individuals to invest in Tunisia, the Saudi rulers must authorize those investments. For that to happen, the Tunisian leadership must realign itself with the political agenda of the Saudi rulers in order to secure this economic support. Hosting an anti-Assad meeting on Syria, as is scheduled for this Friday, is a step in that direction.
Indeed, when Jebali landed in Saudi Arabia, he left the movement’s idealism behind. He did not ask the Saudi authorities to hand the former dictator over to face justice. He did not ask the Saudis to pressure its theologians to condemn the terror and extremism practiced by Salafis. And he did not place the dignity of Tunisians above acquiring Saudi handouts. He simply sidestepped all these critical issues to focus on what would encourage Saudi businessmen and Saudi banks to invest in his country again.
In an interview with journalists before leaving the Kingdom, Jebali assured the Saudis that Tunisians are not interested in exporting their revolution or interfering in the affairs of other countries. He made this claim just three days before his country was scheduled to host an international conference to “exert more pressure on the Syrian regime.” More accurately, Jebali should have said that his country is not interested in interfering in the affairs of rich States of Gulf.
In four days, the Islamist leader has proved what I have argued long before religious parties rose to power: Islamists in power could be more successful in ending religious absolutism. They can make organized religion more about social control and group interests and less about theological idealism. In fact, the most significant achievement of the ruling Islamist parties is relativizing the religious discourse.
Existing in the margins and oppressed by the secular elite, Islamists were idealized as a homogenous political entity with a singular worldview about social, economic, and theological matters. Western thinkers and politicians saw a single shade of Islamism. Even some popular Islamist leaders saw themselves as the exclusive expression of political Islam. The Tunisian and Egyptian elections, however, have unveiled the profuse diversity within Islamism. The Muslim Brethren now face formidable competition from at least three other Islamist groups including al-Nur Party which won over 24% of the votes. In Tunisia, Ennahda is under constant pressure by Salafis and al-Tahrir Party Islamists who did not field their own candidates in the October 23 elections. In Morocco, the Islamist party (Justice and Development) won decisive number of seats in the recent parliamentarian elections but remains challenged by the more popular Islamist movement, al-Adl wa-‘l-Ihsan, that shunned elections under the watch of a monarch.
Should these countries embrace electoral processes to establish shared political power, Islamists are likely to break further into smaller political parties along theological, political, and social interests. Regional and international alliances could contribute to the even further fragmentation of Islamic parties. The Syrian uprising, for instance, is believed to be splitting Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Some among the leaders of Hamas would prefer to preserve their alliance with Syrian and Iran. Others want to join the Qatari and Saudi axes.
Despite the short term instability that will accompany the Arab revolutions, the future of the Arab world is promising. Excluding Islamists deprived the peoples of the region of the extraordinary opportunities to develop their societies, preserve human dignity, and take pride in belonging. Their rise to power is moderating their views and teaching them a lesson in humility and realism. The emergence of different Islamist parties is a path towards innovation and reform in modern Islamic thought and practice. The new spread of elections endorses the universal idea that, in political matters, people are the only true sovereign, and should have the opportunity to choose their public servants through fair and transparent elections.
from Asia Times
Exactly two months after Tunisia’s October 23 elections, a peaceful transfer of power took place - a rarity in the Arab world. The outgoing prime minister, Beji Caid el Sebsi, handed the reins to Hamadi Jebali, one of the founding leaders of al-Nahda movement and a former political prisoner. The latter introduced his cabinet to the constituency assembly, which voted largely along political party lines to approve it.
Forming a coalition government was understandably a struggle for a group of novices, many of whom had spent more time in prison
than in government. But in the end, the parties put forth a respectable coalition of 30 ministers and 11 secretaries of state. Three political parties (Nahda, Mu'tamar, and Takattul) and some independents are represented in this coalition government. Several appointments in particular stand out.
The most controversial appointment concerns the foreign ministry, which was entrusted to Rafiq Abdessalam, a former politics and international relations student at the Center for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, London. The 43-year-old academic has no practical experience that would allow him to navigate the complex world of diplomacy, except his personal connections to some of the rulers of the Gulf States.
It is believed that his appointment was meant to reward the historical leader of al-Nahda, Rachid Ghannouchi, his father-in-law. But this very fact did not please many Tunisians who had suffered from the actions of Ben Ali's in-laws. Appointing the son-in-law of the leader of the winning party to a powerful position despite his lack of experience is a painful reminder of the corruption, cronyism, and abuse of power under the old regime. Nahda might suffer politically in next year's elections because of this insensitive and probably foolish move.
Nahda leaders may have a saving grace in the new chief of the interior ministry. For most Tunisians, the interior ministry is a euphemism for police brutality. Under Presidents Bourguiba and Ben Ali, the ministry was used to eliminate political opponents, torture political prisoners, intimidate citizens, and spread fear - it was the tyrants' favorite tool for subjugating the people.
One of the victims of this institution was Ali Laaridh, who was imprisoned for 15 years - 13 years of them in solitary confinement - during Ben Ali's rule. He was sentenced to death under Bourguiba's regime. It is highly unlikely that a victim of torture and abuse would subject others to the same brutality. Consequently, Laaridh might well be the right person to rehabilitate the security forces and reform the institution.
Another reassuring face in the new government is that of Noureddine Bhiri. The 53-year-old lawyer is a moderate who spent years defending political prisoners. He too was imprisoned for his political activities. Many Tunisians, and other human rights activists, hope that his struggles for civil and political rights will serve him well as he leads the critically important ministry of justice.
Governing a country that has suffered years of mismanagement, corruption and abuses of power is never easy. Forming a coalition government was the right choice. The three political parties seem to trust one another, and they all stand to lose a great deal if the coalition fails.
They have months, not years, to deliver on three critical issues: unemployment, political reform, and economic growth. Even more importantly, they have the responsibility of setting new standards for the rest of the Arab world. The new standards must reflect transparency, compassion and just use of power that demonstrates respect for human dignity and rights.
Qatar, Al Jazeera, and the Arab Spring
by Ahmed E. Souaiaia
The leader of al-Nahda movement, Rachid Ghannouchi, made his first visit to a foreign country after the first post-revolution Tunisian elections. His choice was the State of Qatar. Analysts see many messages in this gesture but some Tunisians are troubled by the invitation he had extended to the Emir of Qatar. Although many do not want any foreign leader present during the opening session of the constituent assembly, some Tunisians are singling out the ruler of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, as a persona non grata. They see him as a bully who is using Al Jazeera and his huge wealth to push an agenda that is not necessarily in the interest of their country. From the initiatives in which Qatar has been involved, it is not hard to identify echoes of personal ambitions to amass power and influence. The Qatari officials seem to have found the winning trifecta for success. A quick analysis of their projects shows that they have built a project on three foundations: Arab neo-nationalism, Islamism, and private capital. The single most crucial tool that effectively connects these three elements is information and communication. Al Jazeera, then, became the central piece. Through their petro-wealth, the rulers of Qatar bankrolled Al Jazeera and through Al Jazeera they initiated reciprocal relationships with Islamist and neo-nationalist movements. In this essay, we will examine the conception and function of Al Jazeera in the context of the Arab Spring and regional politics and the way the rulers of Qatar have leveraged it for their advantage.
Al Jazeera satellite channel has been an important source of news for the Arab masses since it was launched in 1996. It built a reputation of fierce independence, professionalism, and focus on the issues that mattered most to the Arab street. The Arab peoples had lost confidence in their national media, which are seen as the mouthpiece of repressive governments. The absence of independent media and the governmental control over information amplified people's cynicism and distrust. The majority of Arab and Muslim countries have had a cabinet position managing information. Such governmental agencies are generally in charge of exerting state control over the press and all media outlets. In the eyes of the Arab masses, then, "Ministry of Information" became a euphemism for censorship and propaganda.
When the Qatari rulers decided to enter the business of satellite television, they wanted their venture to stand out by capitalizing on this public sentiment. In fact, immediately before launching the channel, the Qatari rulers dissolved the Ministry of Information. Many of the employees who worked for the ministry were eventually hired by Al Jazeera and its various subsidiaries.
In 2000, Al Jazeera's general manager, Mohammed Jasim al-Ali, reiterated the Qatari rulers' business philosophy and their vision for Al Jazeera as follows:
Although Al Jazeera was funded by the government of Qatar and investors from the ruling family, initially, its management and journalists enjoyed unprecedented autonomy. For instance, the successor of al-Ali, Wadah Khanfar, was not even a Qatari citizen. During his tenure, Khanfar developed a good relationship with the rulers of Qatar and the religious icon Yousef al-Qaradawi. He rarely allowed negative coverage of his host country but his coverage of the rest of the Arab world did not make him any friends. In fact, on many occasions, a number of governments including the Tunisian, Moroccan, Egyptian, Libyan, and Syrian ones shut down Al Jazeera offices in reaction to what they deemed "libelous," "slanderous," and "poisonous" news stories. The Arab regimes' hostility towards Al Jazeera only increased its popularity among the Arab masses.
Furthermore, the Arab audiences' loyalty to Al Jazeera skyrocketed during its coverage of the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Recognizing the Arab peoples' disapproval of the war, Al Jazeera multiplied its "un-embedded" reporters in the battlefields and beamed countless images of dead civilians to millions of Arabs, prompting then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to call the channel "the mouth piece of al-Qaedah." When the U.S. killed one of Al Jazeera's reporters in an air raid, the place of Al Jazeera as a reliable source of news for the Arab masses was cemented. The arrest and imprisonment of additional reporters, including the Afghanistan reporter whom the United States held in Guantanamo for years, also added to its popularity in Arab countries and around the world.
With this reputation and huge amount of goodwill capital, Al Jazeera has consistently been able to influence public opinion. Many Arab rulers had accused it of inciting protest and dissent. Undoubtedly, the role Al Jazeera played in the Arab Spring was unprecedented, especially during the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings. Many Tunisians credited the channel with speeding the overthrow of Ben Ali's regime. In general, Al Jazeera was loved by the Arab peoples and loathed by the Arab authoritarians -- until the Qatari rulers decided to cash in on their unusual investment. The recent revelations about the foreign and national governmental interference in Al Jazeera's editorial decisions created a new context for the takeover.
It all began when Wikileaks revealed that the U.S. government used "soft pressure" to influence the channel's editorial policy and daily coverage of events. In parallel, many people began to question the neutrality and independence of Al Jazeera when the Arab Spring protests hit the Gulf States and Syria. Many observed that Al Jazeera's coverage of the uprising in Bahrain was timid or nonexistent. The same was said of its stories dealing with the protests in eastern Saudi Arabia and Oman. All the while, Al Jazeera continued its hardnosed coverage of the Syrian uprising, providing ample space to opposition figures and replaying unconfirmed clips about military personnel defections, kidnappings, and murders (some of which turned out to be fabricated).
In retrospect, the Arab Spring was a double-edged sword for Al Jazeera in that it increased the network's popularity but exposed the political and financial strings tying to the Qatari rulers. The fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes and the coverage of those two revolutions helped increase the popularity of the channel. The role of Al Jazeera in inspiring the Libyan and Yemeni protesters is also undeniable. But when protest movements reached the Gulf States (Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia), Al Jazeera's coverage became inexplicably tame. It did not take long before viewers (and readers of the online resources) saw the double standard. Amid these critical moments, Khanfar was forced to resign (although he insisted that it was his choice), and a member of the Qatari ruling clan took over as the new general manager.
Immediately after this change in leadership, Al Jazeera's coverage became noticeably different, and even the comments on the channel's website showed the change in viewers' attitudes. During the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, Al Jazeera's online assets were hacked and in some cases crashed due to high volume of visitors. Since the uprising in Bahrain and Syria, however, online visitors' tracking data show that fewer viewers and online users are relying on Al Jazeera for news and information. The fast decline shows that viewers' loyalty takes decades to build, but only days to lose.
Al Jazeera's role as a political tool became evident during its coverage of the Libyan conflict as well. Some Libyan leaders complained that Al Jazeera routinely covered select groups and individuals who had links to al-Qaradawi, one of the leaders of the global Muslim Brethren movement. He is also the head of self-styled International Union of Muslim Scholars, with which Ali Sallabi, a Libyan Islamist, is also affiliated.
The political role of Al Jazeera came to light again when the Arab League, uncharacteristically, attempted to troubleshoot the Syrian crisis in early November 2011. It was reported that, when the leaders of the organization submitted the proposal to the Syrian regime, its foreign minister insisted that the deal should include a stipulation requiring "certain television channels" stop their "poisonous" reporting.
There is no doubt that Al Jazeera has become a powerful force and many governments have wanted to either limit its influence or arrogate it for political purposes. The Qatari regime is very aware of this asset and they have been using it to raise their profile on the international stage. A tiny state with limited military power, Qatar relied on Al Jazeera to become a major player in the region and around the world. Al Jazeera's popularity and influence among the Arab people meant that Arab governments were invested in controlling, to whatever extent possible, Al Jazeera's coverage of their regimes. The Qatari government was able to leverage this desire for control over media coverage into political advantage -- favorable or unfavorable coverage of the regime became a bargaining chip in regional negotiations.
The rulers of Qatar, who have run their own country like a private business, have involved themselves in the affairs of many countries and organizations from around the world. Just to name a few, they involved themselves in the Lebanese crisis that allowed Hariri to form a short-lived unity government, they played a pivotal role in ending the military conflict between the Yemeni government and the Houthis, they attempted to unite the Palestinian factions, and they tried to mediate the Somali conflict. The Emir and his prime minister, a distant cousin, reportedly visited Israel and secretly met with Tzipi Livni to boast of their pragmatism and ambitious aspirations.
The involvement of the Qatari rulers in too many initiatives, on too many sides, makes it seem like they are engaged in ad hoc diplomacy. Their wide networks of military, political, and diplomatic relations make their strategy seem conflicted and unprincipled. But if we consider self-interest and personal greed as the driving forces, the logic in this multi-dimensional Qatari blitz becomes clear. Ultimately, these diplomatic, economic, and military initiatives would not have been possible without leveraging the influence of Al Jazeera.
In this age of the promise and fragility of virtual realities, new technologies, when backed by bottomless financial pockets, can build ski resorts in desert lands, isolated artificial islands, rooftop golf courses, and endless shopping malls. From tiny offices in Doha, Al Jazeera, as a pet project of the rulers of Qatar, projected itself around the world in style and grandeur, causing fear and paranoia in the hearts and minds of many Arab dictators. The sudden rise of Al Jazeera was matched only by its swift loss of credibility when the Emirs decided to reclaim their prized creation.
Ultimately, however, the Qatari rulers, too, will realize that they are grasping the wind. The end of an independent Al Jazeera will be a traumatizing blow to the Arab street. The Arab masses may revert to their default position for finding reliable sources of information. They will, once again, follow the official media to learn about events but read between the lines for the truth. Alternatively, they may work harder to find and support independent, but financially struggling, voices of bloggers and YouTubers for critical information.
As for the satellite television stations, we must recognize the unfortunate trend of disappearing independent journalism. Wealthy authoritarian regimes are reasserting their control over the means of communication and consolidating the tools of power and influence. This can only negatively impact peoples' access to information, the cornerstone for the foundation of civil society and responsible citizenry.
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
by Dia'a Rashwan
This chapter aims at reviewing and analyzing activities and ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, as an example of a socially oriented political movement with a political platform. This will also include an analysis of the most significant organizational developments the movement has undergone following the September 11 attacks, especially during the year 2002. Actually, there is much interest in the Muslim Brotherhood movement, a concern that is justifiably objective on the grounds that it is the biggest Islamic movement at least in the Arab region. It has always been the greatest influential movement at different ideological, social and political levels in most Arab as well as some non-Arab countries.
Furthermore, Islam in general and Islamic movements in particular have increasingly been in the limelight in the post-September 11 stage in light of the growing linkage between Islam, violence and terrorism and terming Islam as an alternative enemy, not to mention the growing call for the development of an Islamic state model integrating the moderate Islamist trend into the political regime and political life. Such claims concentrated particularly on the socially oriented Islamic movements, including Muslim Brotherhood.
Within this framework, it will probably be suitable to begin with the outstanding developments witnessed by the Muslim Brotherhood following the 9/11 attacks, especially during the year 2002.
First: Selection of the new General Guide
The death of the fifth Muslim Brotherhood General Guide, Mustafa Mashour (1921-2002) and the necessity of selecting another General Guide posed many problems related to the internal power structure as well as kind of political conflict and its determinants among the group's elite that controls sources of power and influence as well as mechanisms of decision-making, pattern of internal democracy and other issues. Now that such issues and crises are renewable with every selection of a new General Guide, the current circumstances experienced by the group, especially its stance on the ongoing local and regional situations, make it incumbent upon the group to face the challenge of carrying out real ijtihad (independent legal opinion) not only to its ideological and political stances but also in its reconsideration extending to organizational structure and internal mechanisms of action. Success in facing such challenges should be a determinant of the groups' future scenarios and capability to continue and act politically. Such scenarios can be outlined through unveiling the nature of the political elite in control of sources of power and influence and the nature of the current balances managing internal conflicts, which can be featured by fathoming its early beginnings as well as the historical and political contexts in which the group has emerged and grown as an influential political force (1).
In light of such an atmosphere, the absence of the group's fifth General Guide represented an important moment that uncovered the deep internal interactions and developments the Muslim Brotherhood undergoing now. When tackling such interactions and developments we should, however, take two main points into consideration. Firstly, we talk about a social political group with a general Islamic platform. Its general makeup and structure are like other right, left and center groups except in the content of its platform. It is natural, therefore, that it experiences, like any other group, many internal developments and internal interactions that could sometimes take the form of multi-level disputes. Secondly, when analyzing Muslim Brotherhood internal developments and interactions we should pay attention to the influence of the surrounding Egyptian (local), regional or international contexts, which should not be seen from their current perspective. Rather, their previous historical developments that led to their current formation should also be taken into account (2).
Regarding the selection of a new General Guide after the demise of the Muslim Brotherhood fifth General Guide Mustafa Mashour, the then (late) deputy General Guide Ma'moun Al-Hudhaibi, a former counselor, decided at the time to put into force the Muslim Brotherhood executive regulation that provides for the deputy General Guide undertaking responsibilities of the General Guide in case of chronic disease or senility that leads to loss of memory and in both cases the group shall limit his competence and another General Guide shall be nominated (3). However, this decision and the start of selecting another General Guide aroused what the Egyptian media called "covert boiling over among Muslim Brotherhood ranks". The media pointed out that some Muslim Brotherhood members viewed that Al-Hudhaibi would fragmentize the group's future because he was a personality that did not accept the others' opinions, and that was apparent in his dealing with Center Party group and his stance on the group's south Cairo bureau members on top of whom was Ahmed Abul-Fotouh after the first discussion with Al-Hudhaibi, which stimulated them to render their resignations. However, the same media quoted some other Muslim Brotherhood sources giving explanations to the state of despotism practiced by Al-Hudhaibi on the ground that it was the outcome of some reasons, which were all in his favor, including police clampdowns, the group's being keen on maintaining stability and avoiding schisms, especially in light of the emergence of a young Muslim Brotherhood generation (Renovation Trend) calling for ideological reconsiderations (4). Other Egyptian media viewed the conflict over the General Guide post might shake the group up and that it unearthed disputes that had already been existing for a long time and that conflict over the General Guide post was new. According to such Egyptian media, Al-Hudhaibi's control over the group and the so waning competence of the late General Guide during his life that his deputy (as the official spokesman for the group) used to issue statements by his name, which were the most outstanding reasons for such disputes (5).
Regardless of the media assessments, objective studies see that the roots of the conflict within the Muslim Brotherhood group dates back to what some called "inter-generation contradiction" between the first generation (represented in the General Guide, the Guidance Bureau and the Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council) which has the historical legitimacy and controls the group on the one hand and the second generation who has the 'real legitimacy on the ground', as this generation's experience started in the Egyptian universities during the second half of 1970s when they formed a big student political movement opposing late president Sadat's policies, especially foreign policies. This contradiction between the 'legitimacy' of two generations was not strange in Egyptian political context. Rather, the most outstanding inter-generation contradiction within the Muslim Brotherhood as well as other political groups lies in the fact that such contradiction is not associated with contradictory political and social views, i.e. between the 'radical' views of the young and the 'conservative' views of the old generations, which is the most influential difference within the Muslim Brotherhood. Although the two generations belong to the urban and rural Egyptian middle class categories, they are locked in wide differences regarding their relationship with the state and other Egyptian political forces and the outside world (6).
Not only have the previous reasons fueled conflict within the Muslim Brotherhood group following the death of their General Guide, but also the increasing crystallized feelings of rejection among the younger generations regarding the method of selecting a new guide were added to the situation, as the oldest member in the Guidance Bureau is nominated to the General Guide post. The young generations seemed to be reluctant to this nomination method and insisted on election as a base for choosing a new guide, especially after the 'graveyard pledge of allegiance', a famous event when late General Guide Mustafa Mashour was given the pledge of allegiance and chosen General Guide while his predecessor Hamed Abul-Nasr was being buried, as all attendances of the burial ceremony were surprised to see Ma'moun Al-Hudhaibi carrying the 'allegiance banner' for Sheikh Mashour. At this moment, the young generation started to suggest that there should be a real mechanism for nominating key figures for any vacant leading post within the group and laying down more collective bases regarding any decision that has to do with this issue instead of the 'pledge of allegiance', which could make the Muslim Brotherhood lose its credibility.
Although there were many indicators of some difference within the group over the issue of nominating the new General Guide after the death of Mashour, some leading figures, especially the new guide at the time late counselor Ma'moun Al-Hudhaibi, categorically denied any conflicts or differences inside the Muslim Brotherhood whether over that issue or any other internal or external issues and that all circulated reports regarding that issue were completely divorced from reality. According to Al-Hudhaibi's view, the succession of the late General Guide was carried out within a group looked upon as one of the biggest Islamic groups in the Muslim world and that it is unreasonable to leave it without executive regulations controlling the movement. "Any abrupt emptiness should be filled in through an organizational regular method," Al-Hudhaibi argued. Regarding the so-called 'graveyard pledge of allegiance', Al-Hudhaibi emphasized that it was completely contrary to what its critics allege, as there was a previous agreement within the group and regulation procedures were taken to select Hamed Abul-Nasr's successor; what took place at the graveyard was just a kind of publicity. This means that what happened in public gave the impression that the 'allegiance' was just a spur-of-the-moment decision, while it was in fact preceded by a process of preparation and selection according to the regulations that control the group's actions. Al-Hudhaibi also denied any conflicting trends or differences of opinions and views within the group. Sometimes we have more than one opinion, he said, indicating that this does not necessarily mean there are any differences (7).
In light of such circumstances and internal and external argumentations, the Muslim Brotherhood decided on their new General Guide. Members of the Guidance Bureau reached a solution whereby all Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council members are allowed to select the General Guide without making the council vulnerable to the threat of arrest while convening, as it is still an outlawed group in Egypt. Sources close to the Ikhwan pointed out that by the end of third week of October 2002 the Guidance Bureau members unanimously agreed upon forming a committee to be assigned the task of meeting the Ikhwan Shura Council in small groups or individually to avoid being entrapped by the security forces, the mistake they committed in 1995 when the security forces arrested 28 Ikhwan cadres on a charge of attending an (Ikhwan) Shura Council metting. Members of the Shura Council who were met by the committee agreed on nominating counselor Mohamed Al-Ma'moun Al-Hudhaibi as a General Guide. The sources added that regarding the selection of the General Guide deputies and the Ikhwan spokesman, as per the executive regulation, the General Guide shall choose them, as he shall choose his aides (8). The selection of Al-Hudhaibi (83 years old) for the General Guide post, while he had been Deputy General Guide since 1996, led to the continuation of the old guards steering the wheel. However, contrary to the denial of any disagreement or conflict over the nomination of a new General Guide by the old guards including Al-Hudhaibi himself, facts and reality confirm the existence of disagreements and conflict inside the Ikhwan, especially after the absence of a large number of historic leaderships, due to being old, and the emergence of Ikhwan youth.
Such a reality was emphasized following the death of General Guide Ma'moun Al-Hudhaibi on 8/1/2004 when he was succeeded by Mohamed Mahdi Akef on 14/1/2004. This, nevertheless, confirmed the continuous contribution of the old guards (Akef was born on 12/7/1928, the year of the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt).
However, the death of the Ikhwan General Guide, the selection of a new one, and controversy over such issues may probably raise significant questions: Are the Ikhwans locked in a leadership crisis? Was it the selection of a new General Guide that gave rise to such a whirlwind of conflicts and disagreements within the group? Actually, the leadership issue has been the main concern of Ikhwans throughout the past decades and is considered the weakest point in the movement's structure and performance. Many experts concerned with the movement's course of action believe that the movement suffers from serious leadership structure problems, vigorously impacting on their present and future. Most Ikhwan regional groups were founded centralized around the founder/leader of the Ikhwan founder and then there were - after his death - two options before them: adhering to his stiff-frozen ways and views regardless of the changed circumstances and conditions or falling to pieces. This is natural; any single person-led organization would inevitably suffer from this problem after the absence (death) of such a person. An experienced researcher observed this interruption of Ikhwans' activities after the assassination of the movement's founder Hassan Al-Banna, as the movement remained without leadership from 12/2/1949 (the date of the assassination of Al-Banna) to 19/10/1951 (when Hassan Al-Hudhaibi assumed leadership), i.e. the Ikhwan remained without leadership for about three years (9). Another researcher on the Ikhwan movement also monitored this phenomenon and pointed out the relationship between the word rushd and the person murshid (guide) within the Ikhwan, which was based in the beginning on the skills of individuals and not a specific system of the organization (10).
To fathom the dimensions of the Ikhwan leadership dilemma we will cast a glance at two significant documents that framed the organizational and leadership structures of the Ikhwan for a long time and most of their provisions are still valid. The first document is "the Articles of Association of the Muslim Brotherhood" in Egypt, issued by its general assembly 8/9/1945 (modified on 3/1/1948) and "the Public Order of the Muslim Brotherhood' issued on 29/7/1982, which is the constitution of the Ikhwan's international organization (11). Those two documents reveal a serious defect in the leadership structure of the Ikhwan in Egypt, as the leadership legitimacy principle is violated from the very beginning. This principle stipulates that the movement's members have the final say in choosing its leaders. However, the role of the constituent assembly of the Ikhwan in Egypt in establishing the movement denies this fact. Article (34) of the Articles of Association provided that the constituent assembly is considered "the general Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood and the general assembly of the Guidance Bureau", the highest executive authority in the movement. Article (19) of the movement's constitution also stipulated that the general guide and the elected members of the Guidance Bureau shall be members of the same constituent body.
The strange thing is that neither the constitution nor the by-law referred to any kind of election or election renewal within the constituent body. Article (33) of the Articles of Association only mentions that the constituent body consists of the Ikhwans who took the lead and exerted efforts to promulgate this da'wah (call). Who does decide on those? What is the criterion of selection? Thus, the text did not mention the source of leadership legitimacy of the highest constitutional body in the movement. The reason for this is that founder sheikh Hassan Al-Banna chose by himself members of the constituent body (12). Article (11) of the Public Order granted the Ikhwan Shura Council the competence of electing the general guide. The constituent body was granted such competence by the Articles of Association before. The problem always lied in: Who shall elect the elected? This means disregarding the general rules of selecting leaders whether on their own behalf or on behalf of others, and monopolizing this right by a clique of them only for their historical record and seniority (13).
Article (17) of the Articles of Association also stipulates: "the General Guide shall undertake his task as long as he lives, unless otherwise emerges a reason for his giving up. This is also mentioned in the Public Order, Article (13), which stipulates that the General Guide "shall maintain his post so long as he is qualified for that", a phrase that is more diplomatic than the previous one after a great deal of heated controversy, but it does not add anything from the legal point of view, as it practically means that the General Guide shall remain in his post till his dying day. Although the Public Order, Articles (22) and (30), limits the term in office of both the Guidance Bureau and the Shura Council to four years of the Hegira calendar, it does not however define a term in office for the General Guide, as if the continuation of a certain person is more important than the continuation of establishments (14). Furthermore, the powers of the General Guide are almost countless: he is the head of the body, the Guidance Bureau, and the constituent body according to Article (10) of the Articles of Association. Moreover, he is entitled to annul decrees of the Investigation and Retribution Committee, and suspend members of the constituent body pursuant to Articles (37) and (39) respectively.
Regarding the conditions of selecting an Ikhwan General Guide, Article (13) of the Public Order set three conditions – other than the condition of being 'Egyptian' or 'the new Quraishite' (belonging to ancient Mecca's main tribe of Quraish) as some call it – for the eligible candidate for the international organization general guide's post: he should not be less than 40 years of the Hegira calendar, spending not less than 15 years of the Hegira calendar as an 'active brother', and should be qualified in terms of knowledge – especially the Shari'a (Islamic law) – and the practical and moral qualifications that qualify him for leading the group (15). This reveals that the Ikhwan gave priority to seniority over leadership efficiency, which characterized the movement with obvious internal inflexibility and intransigence after the death of the founding imam and seniority of the leading generation. This is, however, inevitable in every organization disregarding legitimacy and internal flexibility in its structure.
In this regard, Farid Abdel-Khaliq – a leading Muslim Brotherhood figure and a disciple of Hassan Al-Banna and was also a member of the constituent body and Guidance Bureau, but he abandoned the movement since Omar Al-Telmisani stepped into leadership in 1976 – see that inter-Ikhwan practices (internal affairs) should be tackled in more freedom and democracy than ever. Among the ideas he adopted, he adds, is that the General Guide may only remain in his post for only two 6-year terms in office. Abdel-Khaliq gives an ideological explanation of the Ikhwan leadership crisis, as he attributes it to mixing the 'reasons for formation' and the 'reasons for continuation' within the movement, i.e. Hassan Al-Banna was more in need of who might appreciate his efforts and depend on them more than who might sanctify and stop at him. However, the former trend prevailed among the Ikhwan (in Egypt) as well as other Islamists in different countries. "If we suppose that Al-Banna's efforts were faultless without any shortcomings, much of what fit his time does not necessarily fit the following eras, because he belonged to the movement's formation, rather than continuation phase," Abdel-Khaliq argues (16). It is to be noted here that the succession of late General Guide Mustafa Mashhour was an occasion for some Ikhwan key figures to talk about procedural changes in choosing the General Guide, although none of such changes has not been ever published in any Ikhwan official document so far. Among the significant ideas under discussion is limited the General Guide's term in office to indefinite renewable 6-year terms. Although this development does not include a change in the leadership structure of the Ikhwan, it may, in case it is put into force, limit even cosmetically and theoretically the principle of the movement's General Guide maintaining his post lifelong without the need to be re-elected.
Secondly: The Renovation Trend and the Muslim Brotherhood Movement
Since late 1980s and early 1990s, the contemporary Islamic movement in general has been witnessing a large-scale internal critical reconsiderations, deep contemplations, criticism, and self-criticism in an almost comprehensive way including methods, strategies, concepts and ideas. It – the Islamic movement – seems as if it is looking forward to a fresh formulation to its movement structure and its Islamic civilization political project in a way that could get it out of the Islamic movement's traditional crisis and inflexible conventional Islamic thought. However, the Islamic movement, like any social political phenomenon, is currently undergoing some difficulties and challenges that face its change reform political project. Such main challenges stem from three interacting levels:
First Level: International and Regional Environment's Challenges, Including:
1- The American and Western hegemony challenge: This challenge has become so evident that most researchers agree that many facets of the Arab and Islamic countries' strategic decisions are defined by the United States in most crucial issues (the Arab-Israeli conflict is an example in this respect). The Islamic movement's file and how to deal with it is considered one of main files that set the agenda of most regimes with regard to the relationship with the United States, which considers it in general one of the strongest threats to the American hegemony and interests in the region. The question can therefore be: Does the Islamic movement have a vision for how to deal with such a challenge, which is no more external in most countries and has even become a main component of most internal policies toward the movement?
2- Settlement with the Hebrew state challenge: Israel has a stable strategic vision for dealing with the region's issues. It also realizes unequivocally that one of its main enemies is the Islamic grassroots movement. Reviewing Sharm El-Sheikh resolutions and what was written by former Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres, one can find this clearly, as Peres considers the Islamic movement, termed by him as 'terrorist' and 'fundamentalist', as the "common enemy" of both Israel and the ruling regimes in the region. Some practices of the Palestinian Authority with Hamas and Jihad movements through the so-called security coordination with Israeli bodies can be taken as a clear example in this regard.
3- Regimes-Islamic movement relationship challenge: Most of the political ruling regimes consider the Islamic movement their opposite and archrival at the present time. That's why its social and political presence ranges between 'outlawing' and 'calculated allowing'. Security is often the main tool of dealing with it, including arrest, detention, aborting its activities, and paralyzing efficiency (17). Second Level: Challenges of the Islamic Movement's Societal Context, including:
1- Popularity of the Islamic movement: No real conviction can be proved so far at different Islamic and Arab countries' public opinion sectors that what the Islamic movement is providing is the demanded alternative of the reform and change requirements. Indicators available in this regard (results of different level elections) pinpoint that the Islamic movement takes 20-25% of the sympathy of such countries' societies at best. Anyway, reform or change can not be carried out only through sympathy, so to what extent has the Islamic movement studied its popularity at present? Is it the real popular, or rather the most organizational and discipline force? These are some questions that need definite answers.
2- The leading role in the society: The Islamic movement has presented itself as the leader of reform and change in its societies, based on public slogans. The phenomenon has been crystallizing for the last two decades during which the Islamic movement tried this, even partially, via different degrees of participation, but it failed to present real examples for the desired reform and change. Even the cases presented as examples of success achieved by the Islamic movement at the state level, such state level made by teh he ionlor its s providign nsidered it out of the traditional Afghanistan, Sudan (in its early stages) and Iran, the current disagreements, conflicts and reconsiderations they are undergoing are so evident. As for the Islamic movement participating in political action, the achievement it has made at the reform and change level is still weak.
Third Level: Challenges from within the Islamic Movement itself, including:
1- "Vision and Project": The Islamic movement needs a clear-cut methodological vision to deal with ruling political authority and the ruled society as well as a political reform or change project. Therefore, there should be differentiation between an integrated political project on the one hand and the electoral platforms promoted by the movement in most countries where it practiced political and syndicate action on the other hand. Therefore, the movement should confess that it has not presented an integrated political reform and change project at the national as well as international levels. This does not, however, mean that there are general ideas about the political vision, most of which are stemmed from the heritage of the movement, but need reconsideration. In a nutshell, the Islamic movement in general has not laid down a clear political reform and change project that can respond to the challenges it is facing at present (18).
2- Leadership: Most of the Islamic movement leaderships belong to the founding generation. This leadership has not been yet passed down to other generations so that the movement as an establishment and rotation of leadership could not be tested. Most of such leaderships also reached their posts through equivocal undemocratic methods. Therefore, there are many questions regarding the shift from the type of 'leadership' to 'presidency' and from legitimacy based on 'historical experience' to the legitimacy associated with the 'actual achievement' and commitment to the building of real democratic establishments.
3- Contradictory visions regarding targets and methods of reform and change: The phenomenon of generations is natural and well-known by almost all human communities, including of course Islamic movements as a societal trend. However, the crisis here has nothing to do with the existence or absence of generations but rather with the nature of relationship among such generations. It is not just an inter-generation crisis, i.e. a conflict over leadership, but the problem is that such generations pose dangers to the future of the movement. This is mainly represented in the different, contradictory and unharmonious visions regarding reform, change, the movement's relationship with the state and society, etc (19).
In light of such challenges that face not only the Brotherhood but also the Islamic movement in general, emerged some renovation attempts to upgrade the Islamic thought and action and formulate a fresh renovation methodology that is more of relativity than absoluteness, more of realism than idealism, and more of moderation than extremism. About this methodology, Hassan Al-Turabi, one of those who suggested and formulated it, says, while talking about the Islamic movement in Sudan, "After probing into absoluteness, abstractionism, generalization and globalizations in the movement's call and thought, it shifted into realism. The steady development of the functions of the movement toward coherence with the society developed its own concerns to the society's concerns" (20). In Egypt also there was an attempt to crystallize and formulate a visualization of the Islamic action, as about one hundred and fifty cultured Islamists convened under the title "Toward a New Islamic Trend". Some of the conclusions of such visualization talked, inter alia, about "many advocates of Islam and its principles, values, systems and culture talk in generalization and vagueness about 'the Islamic solution', the God's method against the human's, the need to Islamizing life, knowledge and sciences, but they failed to talk about the elements of such method or the components of such solution and means of implementation" (21).
It can be said that most Islamic movements' internal reconsiderations of their actions, schemes and strategies came in two main stages. The first took place in the early 1980's when there was a large-scale Islamic renaissance in different Arab countries. The internal assessment at that stage was meant to keep abreast of the Islamic renaissance through intensifying the tempo of action and shifting from the stage of da'wa (call to Islam) and indoctrination into the political stage. The second stage took place late 1980's and early 1990's when some Islamic movements discovered that their political and strategic calculations had not been accurate during the previous stage, as harm was getting more aggravated and they were shocked more than once while they were unready, a situation that led to profound schism inside Islamic movements. Assessment at that stage was focused on how to reconsider all that. The reconsiderations consequently led many Islamic movements to experience self variables and shifts. This was in the political side.
As for the ideological side, in the second half of the 1980's, there was a remarkable development in the critical studies and researches of the Islamic movement, which was almost absent or rare, as writings that had to do with the Islamic movements concentrated in general on appreciating such movements rather than criticizing or rationalizing (22). Among such critical studies from within the Islamic movement were fi an-naqd az-zati: darurat an-naqd az-zati lil-harakah al-islamiah (On the Self Criticism: the Necessity of Self Criticism by the Islamic Movement) by Khalis Al-Gabali (1985); al-sahwah al-islamiah baina al-gumud wa at-tataruf (The Islamic Renaissance between Inflexibility and Extremism) by Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (1982); azmat al-wa‘i ad-dini (The Crisis of Religious Awareness) by Fahmi Huwaidi (1988); al-harakah al-islamiah fi ad-dawamah: hiwar hawla fikr Sayed Qutb (The Islamic Movement in a Whirlpool: Dialogue on Sayed Qutb's Thought) by Salaheddin Al-Gurshi (1985); al-harakah al-islamiah: ru’yah mustaqbaliah - awraq fi an-naqd az-zati (The Islamic Movement: Future Vision - Papers in Self Criticism) edited and introduced by Abdullah Al-Nafisi (1989), and most of late Muhammad Al-Ghazali's works such as as-sunnah an-nabawiyah baina ahlul-fiqh wa ahlul-hadith (The Prophet's Traditions between Men of Fiqh and Men of Traditions) (1990) and turathuna al-fikri baina mizan ash-shar‘ wa mizan al-‘aql (Our Ideological Heritage between Shari'a and Reason), in addition to some significant symposiums such as 'The National-Religious Dialogue' (23). This made a prominent intellectual event that increased vividness of change and shift, such as the opening up of some political movements into Islamic trends and getting closer to each other to the extent of cooperation and coordination. Some political regimes also got closer to Islamic movements, not to mention the major global developments that changed the standards and methods of thinking in general.
As for the Muslim Brotherhood from within and despite all the aforementioned challenges and renovation attempts experienced by the movement over three quarters of a century on the political or ideological arenas, such attempts have not reached, according to the majority of observers and a reasonable percentage of some of its members, the stage of comprehensive and radical renovation of the movement's thought and method of action. Some analysts attribute the Brotherhood's failure – or rather inability – to radically and comprehensively reconsider its ideas and methods of action to the surrounding unnatural circumstances, such as detention without charge or practicing activities without permission and other difficulties. Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood started its serious reconsiderations by Sayed Qutb, who had a great influence over the last decade, for concentration on the Islamic creed issue and almost complete negligence of democracy and public liberties. Qutb mainly focused on exclusion, jahiliyah [the pre-Islamic era, but here means jahiliyah-like practices and ideas], discrimination and preferences. It was thus natural to develop a movement that clashes and gets isolated from the society rather than develops it. The Brotherhood tried to square up to such ideas, so they issued du‘ah la qudah (Preachers not Judges), a book written by their second General Guide counselor Hassan Al-Hudhaibi. In this book they distinctively differentiated between their ideas and Qutb's, which mostly belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology and which formed the modern Islamic jihad thought school. During the 1980's and 1990's, the Brotherhood experienced renovation attempts, especially among the middle-age ranks, focused on democracy, the ruling system, the relationship with other political forces, the status of Copts in the society and state, and the women status.
The movement has been always witnessing personalities calling for renovation and reconsideration, crystallizing sometimes in the form of 'wings' inside the movement, which can be observed inside it at present. In general, the main demands of the internal renovation wings have been revolving around the axes that emphasizing the traditional historical stances of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially the fact that it is a group of Muslims not the Muslim group, the necessity of internal dialogue channels, controlling relationship with the authorities, and the administrative and leadership mechanisms. In the current stage, it is observed that although such ideas are not primarily objected by Brotherhood members, it seems that the movement's traditional concerns in light of its distressed experiments on the one hand and the adopted ways of calling for renovation and reform on the other hand widened the gap between the two sides so much so that growing disagreements over some issues have become seriously imminent in a way that threatens the group's internal unity and cohesion.
Among the renovation initiatives that have been recently put up inside the group was an initiative made by Prof. Essam Al-Eryan, a prominent middle-age key figure and former MP, to the effect that the group has to conduct a reconsideration after the September 11 incidents. He suggests that this can be implemented through the following four reconsideration frameworks:
Educationally: The group needs, according to him, not to prioritize the organizational side over the da‘wa side due to security pressure, and recognize, get prepared for understanding and respecting difference with the other with all its diversities. Al-Eryan ascribes the reason for such reconsideration to that fact that the educational methods inside the group do not date back to the eras of freedom, namely the 1930's and 1940's, but rather the eras of distress on the Ikhwan, which created a special visualization about the other. That is why such educational methods regard the other as the one who wants to crush them and exterminate their existence.
At the da‘wa level: The Ikhwan key figure sees that the group needs a more tolerant internal discourse, criticizing what he considers a blight cast on the group by the prevailing the Salafi thought during the 1970's and 1980's. It was the blight of extremism and preferring hard-line opinions in fiqh issues. Therefore, the da‘wa discourse of the Ikhwan, according to Al-Eryan, needs much tolerance.
Politically: Al-Eryan believes that it is high time to develop the Ikhwan platform and plans of action for reconciliation with the ruling regime and participating with the political forces, which is a basic condition for reform, which could not be achieved without a sort of calm relationship with the ruling regimes. Regarding the ways and means of reconciliation with the ruling regime in Egypt, he sees that such ways and means are available for deep discussion. This includes, for example, calling on the Egyptian ruling regime to discuss the Moroccan experiment (after he had announced in the early 1990's his rejection of repeating the Algerian experiment in Egypt), which enjoys political stability and could absorb the Islamic trend and neutralize other trends that reject the ongoing situation such as Al-Adl wa Al-Ihsan (Justice and Charity) group, with full recognition of Egypt's peculiarities.
Socially: Al-Eryan believes that the Ikhwan should pay much attention to the social problems that have been prevailing in and pose a threat to the society so as to offer the remedy, as he views that it is unreasonable that the group wins political gains at a deteriorating society. Therefore, they should pay heed to different moral and social problems, including addiction and extremism. The Ikhwan, according to him, despite the pressures they are undergoing should honestly exert efforts to remedy such problems and offer practical solutions to them (24).
At the same time, another renovation initiative was made by middle-age key figure Mukhtar Noah, former Bar Association treasurer and former Ikhwan MP. He made his initiative following a prison 3-year sentence. The initiative aims at – according to his remarks to islamonline – purifying climates between the Egyptian regime and the Ikhwan and defusing the tension between them (25). The Ikhwan-state crisis lies, Noah says, in the existence of 'fake messages' between the two parties. The government has a message to the effect that the Ikhwan are 'power seekers' and want to come to power by any means and that they are preparing themselves as alternative to the ruling regime, while the message delivers a meaning to the Brotherhood that the ruling regime is seeking to exterminate them completely. Noah views that both messages are incorrect. Neither the government wants to exterminate the Ikhwan nor the Ikhwan want to come to power or prepare themselves to be the alternative. Those messages are delivered by many ways, some of which are unintentional but full of mistakes and some others are intentional and come from inside security agencies, as there are many who do not want to see the crisis solved or the file closed and they therefore play a role in adding fuel to the fire, he points out.
In order to overcome such 'fake messages', Noah suggests an initiative of four main items:
Firstly: Providing a period of tranquility allowing the absorption of the new international variables and developments, as he sees that over the last years the Ikhwan have not been given the opportunity to catch their breath and think calmly. All the procedures taken by the state against them are frustrating and make them feel that the state is seeking to uprooting them, which confirm the 'fake messages' delivered to them.
Secondly: Removing the 'infectious' factors and paving the way for a new contract between the state and the group.
Thirdly: The careful selection of the 'messenger' and the 'message' between the two parties.
Fourthly: The two parties should also be convinced that procedural mistakes were committed, as any political action should in one way or another include mistakes. Recognition of such mistakes would be the first step toward resolving them.
Noah called on the Ikhwan to understand the post-September 11 developments, which imposed good pressure on the Egyptian regime in a way that leads to a harmony between the requirements of both the Ikhwan and the state. It is unreasonable, he opines, that some call for Western democracy without preparing the public atmosphere for that. The Egyptian political reality allows a good margin for movement whether for individuals or groups provided that there should be national concord between state on the one hand and the political forces on the other, he said. This concord, he says, is the most important form among the three allowed legal forms in political action in Egypt, which are organized by corporate, societies and parties laws. This fourth form, i.e. concord, is the framework through which the group have moved for the 1970's and 1980's eras. He highlights the necessity of not concentrating on the legal framework or license regarding the state-Ikhwan relationship, as all legal forms can be overthrown once the states gives the green light to the action. Rather, the focus should be on the fact that there should be a healthy reconciliation atmosphere between the two parties. Reconciliation without a legal form secures continuity of the group, but the existence of a legal form without reconciliation nothing could be secured, he indicates. He also rejects the demand of some Ikhwan members that their action should be confined to the da‘wa not extends to the political action, as there should be something common between da‘wa action and the political action, because the latter calls for a notion that may contradicts the others' aspirations, which is the core of political action. However, this should not reach the extent of intimidating the da‘wa action by the political action, thus 'scaring' the others, he points out (26).
Noah's initiative was received by negative reactions and reservations on the part of the Ikhwan leaderships. On his first comment on the initiative, late General Guide Mustafa Mashhour said, as reported by islamonline, that he did not meet Noah since he had released from prison on 8/10/2002 after serving a 3-year sentence on a charge of penetrating professional syndicates. Mashhour added that he had not got familiarized with the initiative, inquiring about the reality of Noah's remark that some statesmen had agreed to open contact channels with the Ikhwan although they called more than one occasion for opening a contact channel with the government but his demand was turned down. Mashhour also cast doubt on the government's enthusiasm for conducting dialogue with the group, saying, "The government only applies the policy of detention and court-martials with the Ikhwan." However, Mashhour declined to disclose how the group would deal with the initiative in case it is serious, emphasizing, "This primarily depends on the ability and position of such people to whom Noah had talked and to what extent could the initiative bear fruit for the interest of the group. At this point, we can accept or reject the initiative, but now we can't talk about a hazy thing" (27).
Prof. Abdel-Men'em Abu Al-Fotouh, one of Mediate Generation and member of Guide Office, asserted that the Guide Office knew nothing about such an initiative. He also objected the initiative originally because it was produced by Security authorities, something contradictory to the nature of Ikhwan activity which had nothing to do with security. On the other hand, reconciliation and initiatives can be accepted between security authorities and the Islamic group which used force to deter the government, whereas the Ikhwan movement is merely a political supporting entity based on constitutional grounds permitting formulation of parties complying with social values and targeting power via legal means. In this regard, Abu Al Fotouh refused the notion of "False messages", which Nouh had used to explain the government-Ikhwan crisis and to be a basis to his so-called initiative, denying that stable, powerful Egyptian governance is a victim of false messages. Moreover, Abu Al Fotouh said the Ikhwan Movement turned down "satisfaction" via governmental grants or gifts shedding light on the Ikhwan claim to constitutional rights properly and legally practiced. Talks of reconciliation and satisfaction are completely unaccepted. However, Abu Al Fotouh emphasized that the movement could never pass over the home interests. The Ikhwan Movement could, according to him, postpone the search for its own interests and claims under solidarity of all parties in the face of the risks increasing around the region, Egypt, of course, in particular.
Thus it can be referred through the previous outlook to two significant issues coming into light within these Reconsiderations led by the "renovation trend". The two issues were highlighted by of the scholars specialized in Islamic movements study. The first issue is the hypersensitivity of Ikhwan leaders towards "Reconsideration" idea which was clear in the talks of the General Guide and the movement "Mediate Generation". All the movement figures were careful to assert that "Reconsideration" is to be adopted with the Islamic group adopting violence as the only means to change society. On the contrary, the Muslim Ikhwan Movement, according to them, had nothing to do with violence, thus Reconsiderations are needed!? In fact, such hypersensitivity is groundless for Reconsideration of political, religious and social movements is steady vital prerequisite for the movement continuity. Reconsideration is a legal, human and logical necessity for improvement, goal determination and approach development (29). The second issue related to Reconsideration made by renovation trend is warning against "Self-criticism" on the claim that the movement is always a prey to prejudice, suppression and crisis. This criticism can, eventually, lead to deterioration and pave the way for ordeal. Such a reason is merely an excuse for the movement's inability to do with self-criticism supporting the social movement. A social movement having fears of renovation and self-criticism is unqualified for correct development. Thus, it is necessary that Ikhwan Movement, with such a history deep-rooted in the modern Arab and Islamic revival, avoid opposition with such renovation, Reconsideration and self-criticism. Whereas the armed groups began to reconsider violence and force approach, peaceful Islamic groups, led by the Ikhwan Movement, will, more or less and on different levels, be prone to development and change (30).
The history of Muslim Ikhwan Movement reflects its new ideas in the form of documents and data directed to the nation since the Mid-1990s. The following are the most important changes and turns within the Muslim Movement group throughout the last few years:
Instance towards the Other: After independence and the establishment of state system in the Arab World, discord and conflicts spread over the Islamic trend and the other intellectual political trends. To make it worse, mistrust controlled the two parties' relationships for a long time period. Describing Islamic trend and national trend as an example, Tarek Al Beshri said: "The relationship between the two parties throughout the last few decades is based on exclusion, not understanding with military argumentation other than debating one." (31) On the Ikhwan's instance towards the other, including Christians, different parties and operating Islamic groups, Prof. Essam Al Erian revealed, "In this regard, Ikhwan have an old clear-cut instance based on religious and political choices, it is the general acceptance of the other, and i.e. "we (the Ikhwan) accept to deal with others irrespective of difference in beliefs and religion". As for the religion difference, the Ikhwan believes that the matter is indebatable for no one is enforced to embrace Islam; Muslims and non-Muslims have the very rights and duties. On the other hand, political acceptance relied on other grounds. According to Al Erian, the movement had no objections to other political parties. Ikhwan, conversely, accepted multi-political parties within the Muslim Community. They also support the dominance of constitution and judgment to deter who opposes constitution or laws. The movement had previously coordinated with the remaining political parties, such as Al Wafd, Al Ahrar and Labor Party, which share the same instance towards undertaking or boycotting elections to adopt coordinated political instances as the situation requires. As regards to acceptance of the Other in Islamic work, the Ikhwan leader asserted that Ikhwan was of the opinion that no agreement can be reached on disputable religious sub-issues. Thus the movement has no problem with different points of view. The Movement adheres to the old slogan declared by its founder, Hassan Al Bana, "Within the Islamic field, we are on good terms with the others. Our relationships are dominated by love, brotherhood and loyalty in search for understanding, consultation, coordination and cooperation with all operating in the Islamic arena." (32)
Power rotation: as for the issue of power rotation and the well-known and central question: What if the Brotherhood Movement assumes power, will it permit parties of different ideology and orientation to take part in? Al Erian said that all Islamic trends were of the opinion that basis of power assumption is popular acceptance reflected via general elections. Thus all trends and parties adherent to constitution and law can assume power with no little trouble. In this regard, Al Erian called to reconsider and employ the Western innovation of power assumption in order to prevent the old and modern conflicts in search for power. As for the issue of allowing the existence of a communist party, Al-Erian declared that the group is committed to an old rule which states that people should not be condemned for the ideas inside their heads, thus, the group is expecting every political group to announce its ideas, ideologies and programs in written documents. The Ikhwani leader did not express, within this context, a clear acceptance of such a party, but he newly asserted the necessity that all parties should respect the constitution provision stipulating that the Islamic Sharia is the main source for legislation, considering that the commitment of all parties to the constitution in full and to law is the condition of forming and continuance of the Egyptian parties, and the entity which is entitled to render a judgment in that respect is only the judiciary.(33)
Attitude toward Democracy: observers of the contemporary Islamic address and the movement of its cultural productivity observe that there are new readings that qualitatively vary from previous readings of some certain debatable issues with Islamic thought, such as the issue of democracy. Within this context it is observed that the new Islamic readings witness a sort of transformation from "the absolute" to "the relative" when considering the issue of "democracy"; from being a social and philosophical approach that differs the content of Islamic thought to being comprised of desired and preferable gains, and simultaneously is not in conflict with the purposes of Islamic legislation. According to the Muslim Brotherhood thought democracy means the peaceful coexistence among the various groups, the separation between the three powers in the state, peaceful power rotation, Shura, election and granting the people the right to express themselves, as well as applying the majority principle, provided that it does not conflict with any of the basics of Islamic Sharia. Since the beginning of the 90s of the former century the issue of democracy has been a subject of debate through an increasing and intensive tone within the contemporary Islamic speech, through various sorts of historical, philosophical, political and linguistic understanding and analysis uncovering the transformation of the political viewpoint and a change in the political intellectual theory.(34) Some aspects of democracy are evident in the Muslim Brotherhood group while formulating its political project, giving priorities to freedoms and human rights and political participation, as well as the formulation of its internal structure administratively and organizationally according to the methods of Shura and democracy through enlarging the circle of participation by expressing one's own vote, and the formulation of the political and organizational attitude and decision,ational attitude and deciaiand deciasiving pro the approval of nomination and election system, and applying the principle of majority of votes. (35)
As a more advanced step toward crystallization of the group attitude to democracy as well as power rotation, and within the context of reform process in the Arab world and especially in Egypt, the group announced in March 2004 its reform initiative comprised 18 articles including the acknowledgement of the people as the source of power without any sort of domination by any individual, political party or group, respecting the principle of power rotation, confirming the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the freedom to form political parties without any intervention by the administrative authorities, freedom of mass meetings, peaceful demonstrations, impartiality of election, cancellation of the army political role, the confirmation of the civil nature of the police departments, and security entities, determination of the tasks of all these authorities, obviously and in the light of the constitution provisions, limitation of the president's powers, the separation of the presidency of the state and the presidency of the political parties, cancellation of ill-reputed laws, the release of political lease of policl-rual party , the separatriod app;detainees, cancellation of laws blocking the activities of the professional and vocational syndicates. The content of this imitative shows the assertion of the Muslim Brotherhood on common targets included in the claims and reform priorities of the most of the political powers along with its assertion on some elements of special symbolic importance to the Muslim Brotherhood, especially the assertion on the freedom to form political parties and neutralization of security bodies.
The transformation to a political party: according to the aforementioned in relation to acceptance of the Muslim Brotherhood of the theory of political pluralism, consequently, the possibility of participation for the political groups and the state political institutions, voices are arising within the group which wish and claim the right to form a legitimate political party under its name. Although this movement constitutes the overwhelming majority of the group's members, the group has not yet internally decide whether a party formation shall mean the end of the group and its dissolution inside the party, or it shall continue side by side with this party ? In fact, the obvious and continuous rejection of the Egyptian government to allow the Brotherhood to form a legitimate and political party released the group from a serious internal discussion on the future of the group in case the government approves the formation of a party of the Muslim Brotherhood, so that this issue was silenced inside the group and only generally mentioned. But initial indicators make clear that the dominant viewpoint among the members of the middle generation is calling for striving toward a final decision in relation to the concept of the Brotherhood organizational "identity" through a full transformation toward the institutional political work and the formation of a party that constitutes a complete alternative to the group and replacing it.
With all this internal vagueness on the impact of a party on the group's destination, the voices of many members and leaders of the group rise from time to time in political and press forums asking for allowing the Brotherhood to form a political party, criticizing the government for its rejection to grant the group this right. Some leaders of the group think that there are several reasons for this governmental rejection, some are general, due to the fact that the political system o are general, relatieal l this the group rise form timeal owcept of "identity"lacks a true political will allowing for the formation of genuine political parties, which is evident in the parties law that imposes obstacles and barriers on the formation of new parties, and others are related to an obvious commanding decision preventing the existence of any political party adopting an Islamic ideology even if showed high flexibility, while a third party are attached to the viewpoint of the brotherhood as a very strong political movement with a large presence in the Egyptian street, and that the political system want to weaken this power and this presence. (36)
Third: The Relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Political Authority
The relationship to the political authority still represents the real challenge which the Muslim Brotherhood face. It is related to the phase of largest transformations within Islamic movements, whereas the call for a peaceful approach has put Arab governments, including the Egyptian one, in a definite situation. While the Egyptian government, represented in the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, has welcomed the intellectual revision of the Muslim group, it still continues to pursue the security confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood, in
spite of its peaceful approach. If the government really welcomes the peaceful transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood, but at the same time does not acknowledge the right of the peaceful Muslim Brotherhood to practice the public work, then this should mean that the official attitude of the Egyptian government is still rejecting to grant the Islamic movement its right to practice the peaceful political work (37). There are no many choices available to the Muslim Brotherhood as the present authority still rejects all kinds of fair and peaceful competition, as well as the collusion of the international powers which do not want the Islamic movements to politically express itself, thus affecting the reality of our societies. Consequently, the choices are often limited to one of two things: either to cooperate with the present political systems, or to accept the role of illegal opposition (38). If one of the major disadvantages of the despotic systems was represented in blocking all paths of political experiences and maturity in front of people, Islamists, too, through focusing on the seizure of political power, directly, without any preliminary steps, would miss the opportunity to learn anything in relation to the political process itself, including negotiation, relinquishment, decision making and developing procedural rules to practice political power (39).
The relationship of the Muslim Brotherhood to the political authorities went through 3 phases, the first of which could be described as the period of establishment, spread and popularity, which extends from 1928 until the assassination of its founder, Imam Hasan El-Bana on 12th February 1949. The second period, during which the group continued without any new General Guide until 1951 when judge Hasan Al-Hudaiby was finally appointed, extended to 1954, when the historical clash occurred between the then Neo-Nasserism and the Brotherhood following a short-lived period of harmony - a clash that lasted until the beginning of the 70s of the former century when President Abdel-Nasser died. The second half of the 70s was the beginning of the second foundation of the group as openness spread between the group and the system of President Sadat allowing the group to move widely to attract huge number of middle classes members who were more active in order to renew its basis of followers, after it had been almost frozen, due to the wide clash with the Nasserist system. Undoubtedly, the clash of the group with President Sadat system following his visit to Jerusalem, and his conclusion of the Peace Treaty with the Jewish State, has increased by the new comers to its membership among university students, thus giving a protesting impression on the group, Which in its turn helped them attracting huge numbers of his colleagues to the group, drawing them away from the other Islamic Jihad groups that were criticizing the Brotherhood group for its moderation, the "middle-ness" of its theses and avoidance of being in clash with the state.
With the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, and the beginning of the breakup of tension and escalation condition which lay heavy on Egypt during the last four years of his leadership, the members of this new generation started working actively to establish and build the group, after they had graduated from the universities and acquired well-respected professions in society. They were able to realize achievements on both political and syndicalistic levels more than the group could do during its previous history. The group could overrun the elections of most Egyptian professional syndicates, Teaching Staff Clubs in various universities. The group could also, despite the continuous legal prohibition imposed thereon, to win parliament seats for its members, most of whom are the sons of that generation, during 3 election (of the years 1984, 1987 and 2000) (40).
It could be said that the relationship of the Muslim Brotherhood to the Egyptian State in President Mubarak era since 1981 had gone through three stages: the first one, which could be described as the period of "disregard and tolerance" ,extended from the assassination of president Sadat until about 1988, during which the major target of the state was to break up the tension condition that accompanied and followed the assassination, provided that this would create new ruling legitimacy, whose core was based on national conciliation and interaction with the major political powers. It led to granting the Brotherhood with a large amount of free movement and ge amount of re nopanurationexpression without reaching an official acknowledgement of the legitimacy of its existence. This stage enabled the Brotherhood to support its political and social existence in Egypt, and to extend its influence to political and professional institutions and sectors such as People's Assembly, professions syndicates, students unions in universities and teaching staff clubs. By the end of People's Assembly election in 1987, which uncovered the potential of the Brotherhood under their alliance with both Al-Amal (Work) and Al-Ahrar (Liberals) parties under the banner of "Islam is the Solution", the second phase of its relationship to the state began, which could be described as the period "cautiousness and Friction', during which the state started trying to interrupt the advance of the Brotherhood inside the professional syndicates through freezing some of them, and raising problems inside others, while the Brotherhood started acting as a semi-legitimate power in the country.
In 1992 the Brotherhood could take hold of bar association board which had been a monopoly during its history of both the liberal and governmental trends, which led the state to get alarmed. In the ate to get alarmed.mental y.icem, amd Middle of the same year, the most aggressive wave of Islamic violence, which was carried out by both "Islamic Group" and "Jihad" broke out, during which the state blamed the Brotherhood for not condemning them, and merely announcing pompous statements. Thus, the relationship of the Brotherhood to the state entered the third stage, which started in the beginning of 1993 and continued until now, and which represents the period of "deterioration and clash". The state decision to enter into confrontation with the group is because the coincidence of its spread in the various sector of political and syndicalistic activities with the large and harsh wave of Islamic violence, which led the state to consider this as two aspects of one phenomenon, i.e. the Islamic awaking, where it has seen no intrinsic differences between the Brotherhood and Islamic violence groups. In addition, the state considered the banned group as a growing political danger threatening its control of ruling in the country, especially following the successes it achieved in many public and syndicate elections, which the state considered as the "alarm bells" and should be paid attention and be dealt with as a political rival to the state, which is able, when appropriate, to threaten the state power (41).
The political fears from the Muslim Brotherhood led the state to adopt the strategy of "premature abortion" when confronting it since the end of 1994. This strategy includes directing successive and separate hits to the group in order to achieve two major targets: First, exhausting it through bringing it before courts, and judging to send its leaders and members to jail according to various periods, second, depriving the group from the ability up ths lengthesd of 1994us to move with its full power, especially during public political campaign, whether nationally, regionally or internationally, in addition to achieve another target which is more general and central, that is to address a clear political message to the group as well as the other political powers which care about the conditions of political Islam in up as eEgypt implying that the state is insisting on its attitude of not allowing - at any time and under whatever circumstances – the grant the – banned - group a legal and a legitimate position enabling it to interact in the political and social arena as other legitimate political powers (42). The governmental campaigns have especially focused on the second generation of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has achieved the political and electoral victories for the group, whether inside the parliament or the professional syndicates, and which has carried out the "second establishment" thereof, while it did not approach, but rarely, the older generation who is responsible for the "first establishment" whose importance declined within its actual activities for the interest of the first generation.
The state increased the use of this strategy following the success of the Brotherhood of acquiring 17 seats in the last People's Assembly election in 2000 at the same time when all the legitimate parties could acquire only 16 seats. Afterwards occurred the incidents of September 11th and its consequences, which led the Egyptian government to decide to intensify its campaigns against the banned group in Egypt without being exposed to official international pressures or to associations of human or legal rights because of those campaigns. Both these variants have led to increase the rate of these campaigns and the numbers of those detained, as well as the number of the judgments against them much more than during the last years following 1994 when the government started applying this strategy, whereas the state intensified the application of this strategy during the period following the incidents of September 11th, so that nearly every two months huge numbers of the group had been arrested and referred to military courts sending them to jail for periods reached till 5 years. During all these times almost the same charge had been addressed to the leaders and members of the group: "the formation of a secret organization that is resisting the ruling system," "possession of leaflets urging to topple this system, " and "preparation for demonstrations which lead to disturb the public peace." (43)
This developments have affected the address of the Muslim Brotherhood following the appointment of Mohamed Mahdy Aakef the post of the General Guide, who adopted a sort of address against the government characterized by an amount of tension and criticism. Mr. Aakef asserted that no positive changes had occurred in relation to the relationship of the group to the government as many members of the group are still imprisoned in jails and prisons, indicating that he was expecting the Egyptian government within the context of these conditions and the international challenges to achieve better understanding between the government and the Brotherhood as the group of the most prominent presence on the Egyptian political arena (44).
The aforementioned course of the Brotherhood relationship to the state shows that the Muslim Brotherhood movement had always to deal with a number of key intellectual and political dualisms in order to achieve a fruitful cooperation or an acceptable co-living with the ruling power. One of these dualisms is the duality of acceptance and rejection, whereas the first thing that confronts the movement within this course is the challenge of harmonization between accepting the political power as a prerequisite of co-living policy, and the rejection of the legitimacy of this power at the same time, for which the movement, however, seeks to find an alternative. This is a highly complicated formula, which one of the researchers described as the combination of: "the work methods allowed under the ruling system, and the work manner rejecting the basis of this system." (45) In addition, there is the dualism of disregard and justification, whereas the co-living of the ruling power or the cooperation therewith requires disregard some certain matters without any justification thereof, but it seems that the borders between the processes of pwruitful cooperation or disregard and justification are not quite clear for some members of the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, there is the duality of opposition and confrontation, as opposition does not necessarily mean the other, and any thoughtless deficiency in relation to this formula may have a negative effect on both the movement and the society. One of researchers concerned with Islamic movements has observed that there is "some kind of clear mixing among the members of the Islamic movement between the concepts of "opposing the ruling power" and the "struggle against this power." (46) And finally, there the duality of address and effectiveness, whereas some Muslim Brotherhood groups abstain from forming an alliance with non-Islamist ruler, or with a national political power in order to maintain the pure image of its members, thus, missing the strategic gain that may be the future result thereof. When former president Abdel-Nasser asked the then Brotherhood General Guide, Hasan Al-Hudaiby, to nominate one of the group's members to share with him in the authority, he refused to do so unless the there was a 100 % Islamic ruling, and contended himself with nominating some competent persons who were not members of the Brotherhood. One of researchers called this phenomenon "image worshipping", whose essence represents a failure to harmonize between requirements of the mission and address, and those of political effectiveness (47).
Fourth: 2002 Interactions
This section will focus on studying the most prominent reactions of the political role of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt during 2002. They are represented in the complimentary elections of the People's Assembly- held in Alexandria in June 2002- arrest campaigns against members of the movement in the same year, the movement's role during the People's Assembly's 2002/2003 third session with a view to providing a comprehensive analysis and a deeper understanding of the movement's political role and relationship with the state.
People's Assembly's Complimentary Elections in Alexandria
People's Assembly's Complimentary Elections in Alexandria took place long before the scheduled date of the parliamentary elections, October 18th, 2000. It's crystal clear that Al-Raml is one of Alexandria's biggest constituencies; it has 146.000 electors voters in 94 constituencies. And because each constituency has different political currents, it has got 26 electors representing all political parties and currents although the competition, from the start, was limited to representatives of the Islamic Current, those of the ruling NDP and a small number of Independents. A few days before holding the elections, the security forces in Alexandria tightened the grip around the Ikhwan candidates Jihan Al-Halafawi (professional) and Al-Muhammadi Sayed Ahmed (worker). Also, their representatives were arrested and jailed in Al-Raml police station custody. Due to such arbitrary measures, the two candidates submitted a request to the Administrative Judiciary Court to postpone or cancel the elections within the constituency until their respective representatives were released. The court issued a ruling postponing elections till December 24th, 2000. However, Ministry of the Interior shrugged off the judgment and assigned the State Litigation Authority (Alexandria branch) the task of submitting a challenge to the ruling before a non-jurisdiction court to stop the implementation of the ruling of postponing elections.
The aforementioned judgment was followed by another one issued by the Ministry of Interior. It stated that the elections would be run within the constituency on October 18th, 2000, the same day assigned for Alexandria in the first round. And because the Ministry of Interior did not declare the election date on a large scale, this affected the voter attendance. Also the siege struck by the policemen around the ballot stations helped confirm the decision of the cancellation of elections within this constituency. Furthermore, some voters were prevented from entering the ballot stations. However, according to the election final results, the Muslim Brotherhood candidates won the highest percentage of votes. According to the Ministry of Interior's report, Jihan al Halafawi secured 3662 votes, al-Muhamadi Sayed Ahmad Ali 3602, the NDP candidate Gomaa al-Gharabawi 1797, and Salah Iysa (Independent) 1234. And due to the failure of all these candidates to win 50% of the votes, a run-off round was set on October 24th, 2000, for the big-vote winners.
However, the government, in light of such results, insisted on the postponement of the elections according to the aforementioned ruling by the Alexandria Supreme Administrative Court. As a result, the re-election round did not take place a week later. Minister of Interior issued a decree No. 15514 of the year 2000 to stop the re-election according to the court's ruling. From October 2000 till June 27th, 2002, the court issued 17 rulings, the last of which issued on July 4th, 2001, demanding the Ministry of Interior to set an immediate date for the re-election of the four persons, who won the biggest votes in the first round, within 60 days, at most, from the date of the Court's ruling. The NDP candidates Sami al-Jindi and Gomaa al-Gharabawi won the re-election.
The elections coincided with large-scale riots and the Egyptian authorities reacted against what they looked upon as an escalation by the Ikhwan. Moreover, the State Security Prosecution sent 101 people, arrested by the police, to jail for 15 days pending investigation, for charges of demonstrating, agitating the public, revolting against public order, violating security and threatening social peace. Interrogations proved that the accused tried to interrupt the course of elections using force, reiterated slogans jeopardizing social security and peace, attacked security forces, and sabotaged 6 buses by throwing stones at them. The procedure taken by Egyptian authorities came as a new blow to the movement which hoped to win two seats in People's Assembly, a wish for which one lady was elected to win one of the two seats, such an unprecedented action in the history of Ikhwan, in order to emphasize the shift and change made to the movement's thought and that the Ikhwan was not against women's involvement in the public work (48).
Observers agree that this issue reveals one of the negative phenomenon within the Egyptian community; people's unwillingness to put the judicial rulings into force. The main reason for the Al-Raml consistency crisis was the Ministry of Interior's insistence on the non-compliance with the binding rulings of the court to postpone the elections. The ministry, instead, made an appeal against the ruling in the ordinary judiciary in order to bypass the ruling and evade its execution. Although the last ruling of the ordinary judiciary was appealable before Supreme Administrative Court, the ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court is self-executing regardless of any appeal as stated in the two Articles 49 and 50 of the State Council Law No. 47 of the year 1972. Such a ruling could never be resisted except when stopped by the appellation district of the Supreme Administrative Court. And because this did not happen, the Ministry of Interior was obliged to guarantee an exclusive and typical execution of this ruling.
B- Arrest and Detention Campaigns Against the Muslim Brotherhood
The arrest campaigns by Egyptian authorities against the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) are the feasible and practical execution of the governments' policy towards the movement. The first indication of the confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government was the latter's uncovering "Salsabil PC" in 1992 and sending a big number of the members of the movement to the Supreme Administrative Court which did not convict theme. According to some Ikhwan sources, there are about 400 Ikhwans now in the Egyptian prisons. Since 1993, the movement has undergone 38 detention campaigns in different governorates, not to mention the regular individual suspensions on and off.
The Egyptian government, on the other hand, issued Law No, 100 of the year 1993 concerning the professional syndicates' arrangements when the Ikhwan managed to rule over the board of directors of the Lawyers Syndicate. In mid 1990, a steamy confrontation between the Egyptian government and the Ikhwan inside the Lawyers Syndicate following the assassination of the lawyer Abdel-Harith Madani and accusing the Ikhwan of the assassination. In the summer of 1994, the government excluded the Ikhwan from the National Dialogue Conference. This was accompanied by a massive detention campaign which, for the first time, putting leading figures in the movement under arrest. Ibrahim Sharaf and other outstanding political leaders such as Mukhtar Nuh were among the detainees. However, such campaigns were but a warning message to the apex and base of the Muslim Brotherhood.
On September 2nd, 1995, the confrontation between the Ikhwan and the government entered a dangerous phase when the government issued the presidential decree No. 279 of the year 1995 to send 49 leading Ikhwan figures to the Military Court on criminal charge No. 8 of the year 1995. The trial included some of the members involved in Salsabil case and those who had a hand in "Deviations of the Doctors Syndicate's Relief Committee". According to the aforementioned decree, some members of the movement stood trial by the Military Court for the first time in 30 years. Some Ikhwan members were sent to the Military court earlier in 1965 concerning the famous case of Sayed Qutb. Another group, on top of the list Prof. Essam Al-Irian and Prof. Abdel-Min'em Abul-Futuh, during the same month, stood trial on the criminal case No. 11 of the year 1995. They were accused of reconstructing the movement. The case showed that the security structures recorded their meetings, using video cameras.
However, only one week before the Egyptian Legislative elections (November 1995), the Military Court sentenced 54 of the movement cadres and also issued a decree to the effect of the closure of the movement's downtown headquarters (At-Tawfiqiya), confiscation of their funds and files and banning their magazine (al-Da'wa). The rulings dealt with two separate cases with 82 defendants, 27 of them were acquitted and 5 were sentenced 5 years penal servitude, among them were Prof. Essam Al-Irian, one of the candidates. The remaining 49 members were sentenced to 3 years penal servitude, among them were Prof. Abdel-Min'em Abul-Futuh and Prof. Muhammad Al-Sayyid Habib. The rulings were based upon their conviction of attempting to revive an illegitimate organization with a view to obstructing the country's laws and institution. The Egyptian government had already decided in 1954 to dismantle the movement- established by Hasan Al-Banna in 1954- and ban its activities.
On January 27th, 2002, the Muslim Brotherhood received another blow from the Egyptian authorities; 8 leading Ikhwan figures were busted, accusing them of agitating university students and holding them responsible for the demonstrations led by the Islamic-trend university students. They were sent to stand before the State Security Prosecution, among them were Prof. Abu Zeid Nabawi Muhammad, a professor in the Faculty of Agriculture, Al-Monufiya Univ., Prof. Al-Sayyid Abdel-Nour Abdel-Bari, professor in the Faculty of Agriculture, Zagazig Univ., Prof. Usama Abdel-Aziz Abdel-Ati, professor in the Medicine School, Kafr Al-Shaikh Univ., and others along with Amin Al-Lubudi, who was arrested in his place. They received charges of orchestrating the students' activity inside the organization, masterminding all Ikhwan students' demonstrations in different governorates, spreading the Ikhwan ideas and principles, having new members of the movement, putting plans for establishing a women's organization from among the female students within the movement, collecting funds under a claim of supporting the Palestinian Intifada (49).
Moreover, the Egyptian authorities released, as a sudden step, the member of the Guidance Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood Prof. Rashad Al-Bayumi, on the execution of a ruling by the State Security Prosecution. This took place three days after the movement's appointing of Mamoun Al-Hudaibi as General Guide. There were also released other 19 Ikhwan icons who had been arrested during that security campaign on September 19th, 2002. They were accused of joining an organization that aimed at toppling the regime and possessing printouts poisoning the Egyptian public against the government. Some Ikhwan communities were satisfied with this decision. And, as a result, the Ikhwan lawyer Abdel-Men'em Abdel-Maqsud declared that the movement would comply with their own life-long approach based on peaceful work and most gracious means (50).
Here is a number of the cases some of the Ikhwan elements were involved with in 2002:
- Case No. 1066 of the year 2001; 16 people accused of joining the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood (by the end of 2001).
- Case No. 196 of the year 2002; 8 people accused of joining the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.
- Case No. 583 of the year 2002; 6 people charged with publishing printouts accusing the government of neglecting the Egyptian public.
- Case No. 703 of the year 2002; 22 people were accused of joining the politically outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.
- Case No. 760 of the year 2002; 28 people were accused of joining the politically outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.
- Case No. 796 of the year 2002; 33 people were accused of joining the politically outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.
- Case No. 868 of the year 2002; 12 people accused of joining the politically outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.
- Case No. 872 of the year 2002; 5 people accused of joining the politically outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.
- Case No. 876 of the year 2002; 6 people accused of joining the politically outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.
- Case No. 881 of the year 2002; 21 people accused of joining the politically outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.
- Case No. 884 of the year 2002; 2 people accused of joining the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood (51).
This, however, shows how hectic the relationship between the Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood has been; such a roller-coaster relationship in light of detention campaigns and arresting a large number of the Ikhwan members and sending most of them to military courts. It's noteworthy that members and leaders of the movement almost received the same charges (establishment of an underground organization opposing the regime, possession of printouts to topple the regime, masterminding demonstrations to obscure peace and public security). There's no denying the fact that such arrest and detention campaigns reflect the strategy adopted by the Egyptian government against the movement since the end of 1994, a strategy which could be known as "premature-abortion strategy" (52).
C- Muslim Brotherhood in the Parliament
Political action is of great concern to the Muslim Brotherhood. The group did not only manage to penetrate into professional entities, syndicates and student unions, but it also managed to join the legislative elections three times in 1984, 1987 and 2000 despite banning its activities. We will focus our analysis on the latest elections and the Ikhwan representatives' performance within the parliament.
One of the most critical developments for the Muslim Brotherhood in the People's Assembly in 2002 was when Prof. Gamal Heshmat, MP for Damanhour constituency in Behaira Governorate, got struck off. The People's Assembly agreed to drop Heshmat's membership at its session on December 12th, 2002, with a majority of 337 MPs from the total of 454 MPs following fierce debates between supportive and opposing members. The nullification of the Brotherhood MP's membership took place in implementation of the Court of Cassation's ruling to nullify the elections held in Damanhour in 2002 due to errors occurred while sorting out the polls and observing the election results following that challenge filled by the Al-Wafd Party candidate Khairy Qalag. On the other hand, Ikhwan MP Prof. Gamal Heshmat declared, during the assembly's discussion of the Legislative Committee's report that decided to accept the Court of Cassation's ruling, his rejection of the report because of the dualism of the committee's standards. Moreover, Heshmat called for forming a special committee to reinvestigate the poll papers, just like what the committee had decided on before concerning the nine reports sent to the Court of Cassation in respect of electoral challenges, which were, to his way of thinking, more obvious than the assembly's report against him. However, the Legislative Committee formed ad hoc committees, chaired by the under secretary, that approved their memberships and refused to execute the rulings issued.
Muslim Brotherhood Representatives' Performance Throughout the Third Session
The People's Assembly Third Session witnessed a strong participation on the part of Muslim Brotherhood representatives, either in matters relating to membership of the assembly's specific committees or participation in monitoring activities.
Specific Committees Membership: the People's Assembly Third Session began with Ikhwan simple shifts within the assembly's specific committees; Prof. Akram Al-Sha'er joined the Committee on Foreign Relationships as a major member retaining the reserve membership of Committee on Planning and Budget, of which he was a major member throughout the last two sessions. In addition, Prof. Mohammed Mursi, Ikhwan representatives' spokesman, joined the Constitutional and Legislative Committee as a substitute for the Committee on Industry and Energy beside his major membership of Committee on Education and Scientific Research. Moreover, Prof. Hamdy Hassan became a major member of Economic Committee and a substitute member of Health Committee and Mohammed Al-Adly joined the Youth Committee as a major member. In this regard, representatives Aly Laban and Mohammed Al-Gharabawy remained as members of Committee on Education, Mahfouz Helmi and Mustafa Mohammed Mustafa as members of Committee on Industry, Azzab Mustafa and Saber Abdel-Sadek as members of Committee on Housing, Al-Sayyid Abdel-Hamid as members of Committee on Health, Al-Sayyid Hozein as a member of Committee on Agriculture and Irrigation, Hussein Mohammed Ibrahim as a member of Committee on Proposals and Complaints, Mustafa Awadalla as a member of Arab Affairs Committee, Aly Fath Al-Bab as a member of Labor Committee and Hasanin Al-Shura as a major member of Committee on Local Administration and a substitute member of Committee on Transportation.
Participation in the Parliamentary Monitoring: Muslim brotherhood members submit some significant inquiries, the most important of which were that of Prof. Akram Al-Sha'er about Lake Manzala, two inquiries by Prof. Hamdy Hassan about the destruction of Lake Mariout and the Egyptian Villagers Development Project and that inquiry by Hussein Mohammed Ibrahim about the serious problem of Al Nasr Salines and a number of other inquiries relating to agriculture, banks and education issues (53). Moreover, the Brotherhood Movement representatives submitted some quests for notification and questions and proposed some draft laws to the PA. Examples are shown below.
Representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood submitted a number of inquiries, two of them by Prof. Hamdy Hassan: the first inquiry was about the destruction and pollution of Lake Mariout in Alexandria and officials' intentional negligence. The other inquiry tackled the reasons why the Egyptian Farmers Development Project came to a halt. The notable thing is that this was the first inquiry throughout the history of Egyptian Parliament to rely on some video cassettes on the project considered as key inquiry documents. The third inquiry was by Prof. Akram Al-Sha'er on the drainage and deterioration in Lake Manzala in Port Said due to wrong policies and lack of effective management. The fourth inquiry was by Hussein Mohammed Ibrahim about the L.E. 0.5bn losses of Al Nasr Salines residences. In this regard, Ibrahim said he had all evidence "documents" and that many authorities had a hand in that disaster.
Meanwhile, Azzab Mustafa submitted another inquiry about bank corruptions, making it clear that he had "critical documents" that proved bank figures' involvement with facilitating loan making for fugitive businessmen. Azzab added that his inquiry was an attempt to improve the deteriorating position of such a vital sector. The inquiry focused on the reasons for such deterioration and its political, economic and social impacts on the Egyptian society. Azzab also encompassed appropriate solutions and an alternative vision to reform the banking system via Islamic experiences (54). Meanwhile, Prof. Akram Al- Sha'er submitted his inquiry about the negative consequences of cancellation of Port Said Tax-Free Zone by a Decree of Ex-Prime Minister Prof. Atef Ebaid. He asserted that it was a wrong decree, emphasizing the resulting negative impacts on the governorate's income due to the low customs fees and moribund tourism. That was Al-Sha'er's first time to discuss an inquiry in the assembly despite the fact that he had submitted 5 inquiries that were never discussed (55).
Prof. Hamdy Hassan interrogated Prof. Atef Ebaid and ex-Minister of Agriculture Prof. Youssef Wali about the Pilot Project on Developing Human Environment in the Egyptian desert, a project enrolled in the five-year state plan. Prof. Hassan held both Ebaid and Wali responsible for bringing one of the successful national projects to a halt and giving no attention to the project's research findings, which would cause an unprecedented increase in the feddan productivity, according to the words of all officials who monitored the project. In this regard, Hassan called upon the government not to impede the "pioneering" project, which managed to "introduce a desert residence model" in tune with that introduced by the international Egyptian scientist Hassan Fathy, at just 5% of the cost of the ordinary system. Prof. Hassan also impeached both Ebaid and Wali for not taking the chance for Egypt to become the Middle East first investment market according to UNESCO reports as well as making Egypt unable to achieve food and water self-sufficiency because they exerted no effort to develop other alternative water resources other than the Valley and the River Nile. Hassan also blamed the two ex-officials for wasting public money due to entrusting a corrupt financial administration. Prof. Hassan stressed the point that the project set up some 24 pilot research centers across Egypt and helped revive some 12 crafts almost fell into oblivion. Surprisingly, the project, funded by a charitable loan by the European Union (EU) as a would-be example to be followed, was described by Egyptian ex-minister of agriculture in an official speech as a source of pride before deciding to bring it to a stop (56).
B. Questions & Quests for Notification
The questions and quests for notification, submitted by the Muslim Brotherhood representatives, addressed many political, social, economic and educational policies as follows:
Representatives Aly Laban and Akram Al-Sha'er asked the Prime Minister about the closure of five Azhar legal faculties in Port Said, Khanka, and Kafr Al-Sheikh and sending their students to other faculties starting from SY2003-2004. In this regard, the representatives added that this news made students and parents worry so much. They asked for an immediate answer on the government's part to calm those students and their parents down (57).
Prof. Mohammed Mursi, the Muslim Brotherhood Spokesman and member of Committee on Education, submitted a quest for notification to Minister of Education on chaotic education policies over the past decade. The quest for notification covered many topics, including the high-school system's shifting from one-year system to the two-year system and cancellation of grade improvement, which confused teachers, students, and parents and caused the educational process to be inefficient too. In addition, the representative referred to the illegal decisions made, such as transferring teachers to administrative positions and remote governorates without being interrogated, and other decisions made by the ministry of education that put the educational process in this critical position. He also shed light on the primary education system shifting from a six-year system to that five-year system then back to six-year system again, which led the primary education to chaos throughout the last decade and had negative impacts on education stability (58).
In a question to the Prime Minister on Sunday September 28th, 2003, Mr. Azzab Mustafa accused the government of wasting L.E.6bn on governmental vehicles during 2002/2003. In this regard, Mustafa asserted that the Central Auditing Organization Report on the 2002/2003 Budget revealed extreme extravagance on vehicles; for even governmental vehicles operation and maintenance requirements got imported. More surprisingly, the CAO's report asserted that these requirements beside fuels, oils and spare parts reached L.E. 6.6bn from the State Budget. The Muslim Brotherhood questioned the credibility of governmental statements on expenditure rationing and anti-extravagance trends amidst an imminent economic crisis to crash the Egyptian economy (59).
Hasaneen Al-Shura asked Prime Minister about the rise in essential needs prices, especially bread, heating oil, sugar, clothes, school tools and expenses...etc. The representative inquired about the procedures the government took or about to take to control prices (60).
Mahfouz Helmi asked the Prime Minister and Ex-Minister of Public Business Sector to submit a statement on the activity; profits and losses of the sector's companies as well as the procedures taken to hold those responsible for the collapse of many companies accountable. The representative leaned on a CAO's report on evaluation of Public Business Sector and Public Sector companies' performance in 2002. The report revealed breakdown of 228 companies due to administrative deviations for billions of pounds were spent on badly-studied projects and adopting bad purchasing policies, which led eventually to grave losses. In spite of much warning against companies' breakdown due to inefficient management, negligence, weak control, fragile financing structures and accumulation of local and foreign debts, nothing was done to punish those involved in such a breakdown (61).
Aly Fath Al-Bab asked Minister of Foreign Affairs about the nuclear missiles the Zionists have and the threat they pose to Egypt's national security. For more evidence, the representative depended on the London-based International Strategic Studies Institute's annual report on armament race which revealed that the "Zionist entity" has massive nuclear potentials; Israel has a nuclear arsenal of some 100 nuclear warheads which can be launched via missiles "Ariha-1" or "Ariha-2" with a 500-2000km range. In addition, the report asserted that "Zionists" were keen on spreading ARO-2 anti-long missile batteries, not to mention the American project to be carried out in October 2003 to provide Israel with equipment to use its 900-kilogram-bombs stock more thoroughly and efficiently. The representative wondered how Egypt reacted towards that threat posed at its border (62).
Al-Sayyid Hozein asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the US military bases in Egypt. He referred to what the then Minister of Information Safwat Al-Sherif said to one of the national newspapers on April 5th, 2003: "Thank God, there are no foreign military bases on our land. No foreign rockets are launched from our land." Controversially, the Ex-Ministry's statement was conflicting with what News Week (Arabic version) said on April 1st, 2003, according to US Military Intelligence, that there are five US military bases in Sinai along the Red Sea, three of which are marine, the other two are ground bases. In addition, the representative submitted a copy of Ex-Minister's speech and that of the foreign paper, asking for the truth as soon as possible (63).
Prof. Mohammed Mursi submitted a quest for notification to Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research about the bad, deteriorating services provided in educational hospitals. In addition, the representative relied on a CAO's report revealing serious dissents within the educational hospitals such as expired in-use medicines, lack of beds for free-of-charge patients, shortage of medical important medication and requirements as well as the low-level services. As a result, these factors influenced the medical services provided to the poor and low-income citizens, eventually endangering the Egyptian citizen's health (64).
The same representative submitted a quest for notification concerning the loss of more than L.E.20bn in the Housing Sector; for the new urban communities were still suffering from the poor vital services, such as insufficient means of transport, lack of schools, hospitals and security units. This, in turn, caused the dead stock rise of L.E.5.6bn, the value of residences and lands designed for residential, industrial and commercial purposes. He added that despite the huge value, the luxury investment in these cities cost more than L.E.13bn with no purchasing power or real demand for such real estate projects. Furthermore, the CAO's report revealed scandalous deviations at the Fayoum Building Cooperative Society, affiliated to General Building and Housing Cooperative Authority; the Authority has been collecting L.E.1000 from each member of the Syndicate of Educational Professionals with a view to establishing residences for teachers on Madabegh land since 1996. Yet, no units were delivered until the date of the quest for notification submitted – five years after the due date of delivery. What's more, the units had not been built until the quest for notification was submitted to the Assembly (65).
Moreover, the same representative submitted a quest for notification to Minister of Education about the loss of some L.E. 2.6mn as actual investments made by General Authority for Educational Buildings. In this regard, the representative referred to a CAO's report on L.E. 2,615,000mn investments made by General Authority for Educational Buildings which haven't been made use of. services provided to te nes es provided inn tion ad Some other L.E.3.2mn educational constructions in the governorates of Assiut and Gharbeya were useless too (66).
C. Draft Laws
The representative Prof. Akram Al-Sha'er submitted a draft law to appoint jobless teachers pursuant to 3-year-temporary contracts to be officially appointed with no need to the Ministry's competition. Committee on Proposals and Complaints approved the draft law. In addition, the Committee and representatives of Ministry of Finance approved the representative's proposal for teachers to get their salaries plus an annual overall reward and have a share of the rung of the ladder, as partial solution to the unemployment problem (67).
In addition, Al-Sha'er came up with a bill to permit the Azhar-high-school graduates to join Police Academy. In this regard, People's Assembly approved the bill upon Ministry of Interior's approval and the bill was referred to the appropriate Committee on Defense and National Security (68).
Muslim Brotherhood representative Hamdy Hassan submitted a bill opposing the remand procedure for journalists or physicians due to wrong professional practices. In this respect, the representative suggested that a new article No. "135" be added to Criminal Procedure Law prohibiting remand in press crimes unless the crime is stipulated under Law No.179 of Penalty Law. In addition, the proposed article prohibits remand for physicians when committing unintended errors that would harm patients. Moreover, the representative revealed in the bill clarification memorandum that remand is a kind of deprivation of freedom for a time period determined by inquiries in accordance with law disciplines. Thus, remand is the most dangerous interrogation procedure as a violation of individual freedom (69).
D. Government Statement and Budget
For the third year respectively, the Muslim Brotherhood representatives kept rejecting the Financial Statement and the State Budget submitted by ex-prime minister Prof. Atef Ebaid to People's Assembly. The Budget, according to the representatives, had brilliant figures and, thus, was far from reality and actual potentials of the state. The Muslim brotherhood representatives, the strongest anti-budget voice, submitted a detailed refusal notice concerning the financial statement or plan. Eventually, they rejected the proposed budget under the claim that it had nothing to do with the ambitions and needs of the public.
In this regard, Prof. Mohammed Mursi, Head of Muslim Brotherhood Parliament Authority, rejected the government's explanations for the economic crisis and the Minister of Finance's statement which ascribed the national economic crisis to the world economic variables, 9/11 attacks and war on Iraq. And instead of taking such factors into account, the government officials kept blaming the crisis on the outside world. Mursi also pointed out that being fragile to world events reflects the state's inability to learn the lessons of the past economic global crises in South Eastern Asia, Russia and Mexico. Because while the Egyptian economy was paying the price for the economic crisis of South East Asia, the economies in disarray recovered by the end of 1999. Thus, Mursi called upon the government to take precedent procedures to face world crisis in order to mitigate the losses of Egyptian economy. "The State Budget actual results as stated during the last few years in the financial statement revealed disparity between budget resources and increasing rates of expenditure, leading to a budget deficit and raising so many questions on such a period, as the Minister of Finance came to office in 1999. That was his third time to prepare a State Budget", said Mursi. Finally, the representative wondered who was responsible for such false estimates which troubled the state economy, whereas Ministry of Finance is responsible for drafting and presenting the budget (70).
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is undoubtedly the most important modern Islamic movement to influence the Arab countries and some Islamic countries throughout the last seventy-five years.
In light of global huge developments and rapid variables in the Arab Islamic world, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has been trying to make changes in terms of thought, structure, dealing with the government and other political parties and reach a historic reconciliation. In addition, the movement is doing its level best to solve the law problematic; the best evidence of that is the movement's initiative for comprehensive reform in Egypt.
Muslim Brotherhood managed to develop their political experience under hard circumstances; they adopted a long-term policy and decided to move ahead step by step and accumulate experience. They gained large popularity and clear political approval. For example, they admitted the significance and necessity of multi-political system under Islam. In addition, they gave woman the political right to run in elections, vote and get involved in politics, as an activation of her right to command the right and forbid the wrong. They remained on good terms with religious minority in Egypt according to the legal principle "WE ARE ALL EQUAL". Muslim brotherhood has been trying lately to win the confidence of the ruling party which is afraid of the movement's influence and popularity. Muslim Brotherhood's relationship with the government will, more or less, be paid much attention in the future. Despite the clampdown and tight policy of the government towards the movement, Muslim Brotherhood still have their powerful existence in the Egyptian community.
Therefore, the government has to adopt a policy in containing and taming Muslim Brotherhood. The movement, on the other hand, has to understand the game and its rules and deal positively with it.
Emad Siam, Muslim Brotherhood; does Conflict Control the Future, Al-Democratiah, issue 9, 3rd year, 2003, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, p. 125.
Diaa Rashwan, Post-Mashhour Muslim Brotherhood, islamonline.net, 17/11/2002, pp. 1,2, http:\\www.islamonline.net
Al-Mussawar magazine, 1/11/2002
Al-Ahram Al-Arabi magazine, 9/11/2002
Akher Sa'a magazine, 6/11/2002
Diaa Rashwan, op cit, p. 2
Akher Sa'a, op cit, 6/11/2002
Abdel-Raheem Ali, Muslim Brotherhood Decided on their New Guide, islamonline.net, 25/11/2002, http:\\www.islamonline.net
Abdullah Al-Nafeessi (editor), The Islamic Movement, Future Vision; Papers in Self Criticism, Madbouli Bookshop, Cairo, 1989, 1st Edition, p. 247.
Mohamed Emarah, Some Disruptions in Modern Islamic Movements, included in The Islamic Movement, Future Vision; Papers in Self Criticism, ibid, p. 346
Mohamed Al-Mukhtar Al-Shankiti, Features of the Muslim Brotherhood Leadership Dilemma, Al-Jazeera.net, 8/1/2003, p. 3
Ibid, p. 4
Ibid, p. 5
Ibid, p. 6
Ibid, p. 7
Fareed Abdel-Khaleq, Toward Reviewing Statements and Mechanisms, included in The Islamic Movement, Future Vision; Papers in Self Criticism, op cit, p. 316
The text of an interview with Essam Al-Eryan, http:\\www.islamonline.net
ibid, p. 4
ibid, p. 6
Hassan Al-Turabi, The Islamic Movement in Sudan: Development, Gains and Methodology, Khartoum, AH 1410, p. 23
Ahmed Kamal Abul-Magd, Modern Islamic Vision; Declaration of Principles, Cairo, Dar Al-Shorouk, 1991, p. 6
Khalis Al-Gabali, On the Self Criticism; the Necessity of Self Criticism for the Islamic Movement, 3rd Edition, Beirut, Al-Resalah, 1985, p. 20
This symposium was held at the Arab Unity Studies Center, Cairo, 25-27 September, 1989
Abdel-Raheem Ali, an interview with Essam Al-Eryan, islamonline.net, op cit, p. 4
Abdel-Raheem Ali, A Muslim Brotherhood Initiative for the Interest of the Egyptian Regime, islamonline.net, 9/10/2002
Abdel-Raheem Ali, The Initiative of the Fourth Option between Government and Muslim Brotherhood, islamonline.net, 13/10/2002
Abdel-Raheem Ali, Noah's Initiative…Brotherhood's Reservations and Security's Doubts, islamonline.net, 10/10/2002, p.p. 1, 2
Gamal Sultan, Muslim Brotherhood Renovation Trend, Al-Manar Al-Gadeed, 20 issue, October 2002, p. 6
Ibid, p. 7
Tarek Al-Beshri, About Arabism and Islam, a paper presented in the national-religious dialogue, working papers and discussions organized by the Arab Unity Studies Center, Bierut, 1989
The text of an interviwe with Prof. Essam Al-Eryan, ibid, p.4.
Zaki Ahmed "Democracy in the contemporary Islamic discourse", Al-mostaqbal Al-Arabi, year 15. Issue No: 165, October 1992, p.37.
The text of an interview with Prof. Essam Al-Eryan, ibid, p.9
Rafeeq Habeeb "Islamic Movements' Shifts Clash with Inflexibility of Movements", islamonline.net, 20/3/2002. p.3.
Muhammad Al-Mukhtar As-Shanqeety "Muslim Brotherhood and Their Relation with Authority", Aljazeera.net, 18/3/2003, p.1
Dia' Rashwan "Muslim Brotherhood …….After Mashhour", ibid, p.2.
Nafizat Misr, 15/11/2005.
Abdullah An-Nafeesy "the Future of Islamic Awakening", Arab Union Studies Center. Beirut, Edition 2, 1989, p.329.
Abdullah An-Nafeesy "Editor" Islamic movement, Future Vision, ibid, p. 25.
Abdulmut'al Al-Gabry, why Hassan was Al-Banna assassinated? New Facts and Confidential Documents, Dar-Al-Itsam, Cairo, Edition.2, 1987, P.17.
Egyptian Human Rights Organization Report, Annual report of 2002, Egyptian Human Rights Organization, Cairo, 2003.
Dia' Rashwan, "Muslim Brotherhood …….After Mashhour", ibid, p.4.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 17/4/2003.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 17/4/2003.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 16/4/2003.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 19/3/2003.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 5/7/2003.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 3/2/2003.
Nafizat Misr, Cairo, 29/9/2003.
Nafizat Misr, Cairo, 27/9/2003.
Nafizat Misr, Cairo, 4/9/2003.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 17/4/2003.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 7/4/2003.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 12/4/2003.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 18/5/2003.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 18/5/2003.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 30/12/2002.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, With no date of publication.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 4/5/2003.
Haqaeq Masryah, Cairo, 12/6/2003.
Anatomy of Egypt's
Militant Islamic Groups
Methodological Notes And preliminary finding 1980
by Saad Dean Ebrahem
Iran's Islamic Revolution took the world by surprise. The Western media have subsequently been alarming their readers with warnings of Islamic "revival" "resurgence" "rumble" and "anger" Strategists and political practitioners have joined in – invariably using the same or more academic – sounding jargon, such as the " arc of trouble" or the "crescent of crisis." The area referred to stretches from Morocco to Indonesia. Where nearly 800 million Muslims live in which some of the world's most strategic raw materials and real estate are located. The rising attention and the West's alarm are understandable and indeed quite justifiable. After all, most of that alleged anger is directed at the west and its local allies and surrogates – the Shah being a case in point. The seizure of the American embassy in Teheran along with some fifty hostages in November 1979 highlighted this deep-seated resentment. But in neighboring Afghanistan another chapter of the Islamic drama is unfolding – this time in the form of a resistance to the Soviets and their local surrogates. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December of 1979 compounded an already complicated situation. It plunged the world closer to the brink.
The Islamic factor in all this should be studied with deserved care. It should not, however, be exaggerated. Mystified. Or metaphysicalized. The majority of American specialists on Middle East who subscribed to modernization, theories in the 1950 s and 1960 s have tended to ignore Islam as a salient social force. The Orientalists treated Islam ideationally and insulated it from a changing social structure. The modernization school of social scientists believed Islam to be a polar opposite of secularism, science, and technology, and they thought that as these modes spread and struck roots. Islam would weaken. Some have argued that Islam without a Martin Luther-like reformation would be antithetical to any socioeconomic and political development. The choice was to be between Islam and progress. Many of these contentions were propagated as social science theories until the mid 1970 s . their exponents, if they have not already disclaimed them, must now be hard pressed to come back with rejoinders or apologia. For the present and future, however, there is danger of an intellectual backlash that exaggerates. Mystifies. Or metaphysicalizes the Islamic comeback.
Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups
Nothing can guard against such overreactions more than careful in depth observaltion of the indigenous scene. Specificities and local particularities have to be identified and correlated with the alleged Islamic revival. No matter how great the temptation to generalize. Such scientific quests must be checked until sufficient numbers of case particulars have been documented and analyzed. Only then will inductively based generalizations make sense. Otherwise how can we lump together what is happening in Saudi Arabia (where the regime is allegedly based on Islamic fundamentals) with what happened in Iran (where the former regime was secular and anticlerical) or what is happening in Egypt (where the regime prides itself on being based on faith and science [al-ilm wa-l-imanl] with what is happening in Afghanistan (where the antagonists are patriotism and tribalism on the one hand and allegedly progressive but Soviet-supported forces on the other) This is not to mention the Islamic eruptions in Turkey and Tunisia that have occurred recently- the regimes of these countries. As well as the problems facing them. Are quite diverse. Of course, there may be a common denominator underlying of these cases. But such vectors are not to be cavalierly ascertained without careful country case studies.
Motivated by these methodological considerations. My colleagues and I undertook, in the fall of 1977 a study of Islamic movements in Egypt. That was at least one full year before the dramatic unfolding of events in Iran. Very few observers in September 1977 could have foretold the coming of an Islamic – led popular revolution in that country. Of course, there were signs of unrest in Iran, as there were in other Middle Eastern countries at the time. During 1977, however , Egypt witnessed three major events that had collective political implications. The first was the occurrence in January of massive food riots, which were blamed on leftist elements and communist organizations7 and which were followed by a multitude of repressive measures against all kinds of political opposition – right, center, and left. The second event was a bloody confrontation in July between the regime and the members of a militant Islamic group labeled in the mass media as "Repentance and Holy Flight" (RHF) (al-Takfir wa-l- Hijra) The incident was set off when the group kidnapped a former cabinet minister for religious endowments, demanding the release of RHF members being detained by the government, and then carried out their threat to kill the former minister when the release did not materialize. Crackdowns and shootouts resulted in scores of dead and wounded around the country. The third event was President Sadat 's historic decision to travel to Israel in search of peace.
The three events are, in a curious way, intertwined. The January riots reflected the mounting frustrations of the lower and lower-middle classes in Egypt with the negative payoff of President Sadat 's socioeconomic policies. The bloody confrontation in July between a religious group and the government reflected the growing despair of the most volatile element of the population- youth of the lower – middle and working classes – who sought salvation in Islamic militancy. Sadat 's visit to Jerusalem was motivated as much by these mounting internal problems as by a genuine desire for peace. He thought and said that with peace would come instant prosperity.
My concern here is with only one of that year 's three curiously interlinked events- the confrontation between the regime and RHF. Although known for some to exist, the size and organization of the group came as a surprise to the government and the public. The rounding – up operations, subsequent interrogations, and the trials revealed a sizable movement of between three thousand and five thousand active members who were highly organized and widely spread horizontally and vertically throughout Egyptian society.
Having been challenged by a popular uprising earlier in the year that was officially blamed on leftists, the regime was now in the embarrassing position of having to blame the religious right. Moreover, with an equally serious challenge from the liberal center, represented by the New Wafd party, the regime found itself in an even tighter positing 12. absurd as it may sound, the regime eccused Moscow of supporting and instigating militant Muslim groups to challenge its legitimate authority 13. Thus the regime miraculously lumped the secular left. The atheist forces, and the religious militants into one sinister alliance directed by the Soviets. Later on the regime was add the Wafdists to the list.
The violent confrontation mounted by RHF was not the first of its kind against the Sadat regime. Three years earlier (April 1974) another militant Islamic group. Known interchangeably as the Islamic Liberation Organization. Or "Technical Military Academy" (MA). Al-Fanniya al-Askariya, attempted to stage a coup d`etat. The group succeeded in taking over the Technical Military Academy in preparation for a march on the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) where Egypt 's top ruling elite were scheduled to listen to a speech by President Sadat, the plot was foiled while in process but only after dozens had been killed and wounded 14. This attempt was spectacular in size. Planning, and timing. Significantly it took place only a few months after the October War, which was hailed as a victory for President Sadat, and while he was presumably still riding high in popularity.
There were further scattered confrontations between the authorities and other militant Islamic elements, but they attracted much less publicity than the two mentioned above.
Most Observers of the Egyptian scene agree on the following 15.
1. the rise of these religious movement dates back to aftermath of the Arab defeat of 1967.
2. the regime of President Sadat made a reconciliatory gesture toward these groups from 1970 to 1973 to counterbalance what the regime perceived as a Nasserist-leftist opposition.
3. these Islamic groups represent the small hard core of a broad but amorphous mass of religiosity in the society a whole.
ANATOMY OF EGYPT'S MILITANT ISLAMIC GROUPS
The Islamic resurgence was further evidenced by landslide victories of Muslim groups in university student union elections from 1975 to 1979 – a fact that prompted the government to dissolve these unions by presidential decree in the summer of 1979 . Religious publications have. In addition. Increased in number and circulation. Two important periodicals. Al-Da'wa (the or the mission) and al-Itisam (per-severance) are run by former members of the Muslim Brotherhood (technically banned since its dissolution by the Nasser regime in 1954). Since these periodicals appeared in 1976. their readership has steadily increased. At first. They were encouraged by the Sadat regime to counterbalance the leftist and Nasserist opposition and to enhance Sadat 's popular base. But while bitterly anti-Nasserist, these publications have gradually become more critical of Sadat 's domestic and foreign policy. A near total break with the regime occurred over his peace initiative. The signing of the Camp David Accord. And the peace treaty with Israel. 16 The regime is understandably annoyed and embarrassed by the escalating attacks in these publications but is in a predicament as to how to deal with them. Sadat had staked his quest for legitimacy on a democratization drive' and on declaring religious faith (al-iman) as one of the two pillars of the state ( the second being science, al-ilm). If sadat were to counterattack against these respectable Muslim critics, he would appear to be both antidemocratic and anti-Islamic. So far, Sadat has grudgingly tolerated al-Dawa and al-Itisam. Meanwwhile both publications have continued to solidify opposition to Sadat 's policies. His only chances to crack down on them arise when militant groups use violence. This gives the regime a legitimate excuse to go on an allout Overkill against all Islamic groups. 17 Government counterattacks. However, do not seem to have stemmed the rising tide of militant groups. For every group that is liquidated. Two or three new organizations emerge spontaneously.
In our research we approached the phenomenon of these emerging religious groups as social movements. The government labeled members of these militant groups as "deviants" "abnormals" "heretics, " and Khawarij. When we applied for permission to interview the leaders of the two most prominent groups. We were first turned down because we had called them members of "revivalist movements." After prolonged negotiation we reached a compromise on the label: our work was to be called a study of religious violence. The state nevertheless continues to treat members of these groups as common criminals, although prison wardens who are daily touch with them cannot help treating them as de facto political prisoners.
Our interest in militant Islaic groups was stimulated by a multitude of academic as well as existential factors. First, to a social scientist these groups represent a significant variant of social movements that have been proliferating all over the Third world in recent decades:
Some of the movements have developed into full-fledged revolutions. whose goal is to establish new social orders. Second, these Islamic social movements have not been sociologically studied before. Similar movements (for example, the Wahhabis, the Mahdiya. And the Muslim Brotherhood) have been studied by historians, often a long time after the event and with different emphases. The study of such movements. By employing a typically sociological perspective and sociological methods, would no doubt complement historical treatises. The sociological investigation. In this context at least, promises firsthand data (throughinterviews and questionnaires) and a quest for an explanation that would anchor them in their broader social structure.
The recent emergence of Islamic militant movements in Egypt takes on a special importance. Since Egypt is the center of the Arab-Mus-lim world, vibrations from Egypt often reach the much broader cultural hinterland beyond its borders. This has been the case with other political and ideological currents throughout the last two centuries. The cultural unifiers in the Arab-Muslim world make it possible for this vast area to respond to one center, especially in times of crisis.
The sociological study of militant Islaic groups presents the researcher with a host of obstacles. There are political, ethical, and practical problems in carrying out empirical research on groups that are extremely polemical and whose activities are still unfolding. Both the protagonists and the antagonists may be tempted to use the research project for their own purposes. There are vast and continuously fueled reservoirs of suspicion concerning the motives of the social scientist. Furthermore, there is overall inhospitality to empirical research even when initial goodwill is established. The theoretical problems are equally complex.
Our interest in studying militant Islamic groups was translated into a simple research design. We defined Islamic militancy as actual violent group behavior committed collectively against the state or other actors in the name of Islam. Two groups of substantial size met this definition. The first is the Islamic Liberation Organization (Munazzamatal – Tahrir – al-Islami), known in the Arab mass media as Gama'at al-Fanniya al-Askariya (Technical Military Academy group) henceforth abbreviated as MA. The second is Gama'at al-Muslimin (the Muslim group) known in the Arab media as Repentance and Holy Flight (al-Taktir wa –L – Hijra) henceforth RHF.
After the arrest, trial, and sentencing of most their members in 1974 and 1977. the two groups had no legal existence, technically speaking. The two leaders of MA and the five leaders of RHF were exected. However, many of their second-echelon leaders were still in prison. Continued clandestine activities by both groups were rumored. The two groups seemed, from the preliminary information we gathered, to be typical of several others that have mushroomed under various names since the late 1960s. Many of the leaders of these groups, including the two in question, had some direct or indirect affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, 19 as we shall see shortly.
The approval of the authorities. Difficult and protracted as it was to obtain. Proved to be the easiest of a host of research problems we were to encounter. The initial refusal by the militants to see us was predicated on several grounds. For some of them we were simply part of a corrupt society, contact with which could only mean pollution (najasa). The majority, However, strongly suspected that we were working for the government. The prison officials had told us of earlier unsuccessful attempts by others, ostensibly religious clergy, to talk with the militants. After several weeks of negation with their leaders, frist through written messages, then in face-to-face contact, they agreed to cooperate with us.
Our objective, as we told them, was to hear their story in their own words and then to communicate it to the outside world as objectively as possible. We promised to draw a sharp line between the facts as stated by them on one hand and our analysis and opinions on the other. We stressed that they had been smeared so much by the government. We stressed that they had been smeared so much by the government – controlled mass media that whatever we said could not really be any worse.
Our promise to be neutral and objective did not mean much to them at first. The militants requested to be allowed to read every-thing the members of the research team had ever published. They read the material carefully and discussed some of these interviews were more like graduate seminar sessions, with lively and hot-tempered exchanges. In other words, they refused to play the conventional role of research subjects. They interviewed us as much as we interviewed them. At times they asked us to react to their views, something that goes against the grammar of social research. Some of them accepted our refusal to react; others made our reaction a condition for continuing the interview. They asked us some very personal questions and commentated critically on the dress and appearance of female members of the team. Some would not meet with women researchers; others would if these women wore veils or covered all parts of their bodies. The leaders subjected us to some "honesty tests" and ran their own security checks on us through their out-of-prison followers. We acquiesced to some of these measures, negotiated some, refuse others. One of the three women in the team rejected their veiling demand; and the militants finally tolerated her "sinful" behavior.
We must ultimately have seemed honest and credible enough to the jailed militants, for they allowed us to spend approximately four hundred hours interviewing them over a two-year period. This amounts to more than ten hours per person for the thirty-three militants we managed to interview. Some of the interviews, especially with RHF militants, were collective. As in other protracted research encounters, a human bond developed between the research team and the Muslim Militants. They became not only open but quite eager to talk. Some of them even dared to discuss their internal differences and to offer candid criticism of the movement. So deeply did they become committed to our research objective that when the government withdrew research permit, their leaders tried to reach us through secret channels, bypassing the prison authorities altogether.
In February 1979, the Egyptian authorities put an end to our prison interviewing. They did not give official reasons, but we attributed this action to the tense situation that prevailed in Egypt as a result of the steady march of the Iranian revolution toward seizure of power. President Sadat never hid his disapproval of Khomeini or his unequivocal support for his friend the Shah. Egypt 's mass media echoed that sentiment.
Throughout the remainder of 1979 we attempted to obtain a permit to resume our interviewing but in vain. The research data, therefore, remain incomplete. What is reported here must be read with this caveat in mind.
The data reported in the following section were obtained primarily from interviews conducted inside prison, as well as some from outside prison with members who had been charged but acquitted. The information gained in interviews was supplemented by three additional sources of data. We tried to use questionnaires, but many of the militants refused to fill them out, preferring to be interviewed. Eleven people did respond to the questionnaire, however, and refused to be interviewed. Three people did both. Thus questionnaire data represent the second source of information. The third source was material written by leaders of the two militant groups on various issues – some of which was prepared for their rank – and file members and some especially written in answer to questions we raised in the course of our research. Finally we used official documents to obtain strictly factual data (dates, numbers, arrests, trial proceedings, and so forth).
The amount of data gathered from these four sources is staggering. No attempt is made here even to summarize it. Instead we have selected a few aspects of the two militant groups to analyze in light of our preliminary findings.
Sociologists who study social movements are invariably interested in the general societal conditions that give rise to a movement, as well as its ideology, leadership, membership recruitment, and membership profile ( that is, social base) its internal organization, strategy, and tactics. Some of these aspects are discussed below. One striking feature of the militants' response to our questions is their uniformity. There was practically no variance among the responses of members of each group. A high degree of ideological discipline (or homogeneity) existed. On rare occasions where variance did exist, we report on it. But there were significant differences between the two groups, and these are pointed out in the text. Instead of quoting respondents at length, we have synthesized and paraphrased their answers to various questions, helped by the fact almost the same words and phrases, the same Quranic verses, and the same Hadith (Saying of the Prophet) were used by most members of each group in making their points regarding various issues.
IDEOLOGY OF EGYPT'S ISLAMIC MILITANTS
Much has been written on what Islamic movements are seeking: the rebuilding of a new social order based on Islam. This has generally come to mean application of the Shari' a (that is, the Quran and Hadith ) to everyday social life. Islam regards itself as the repository of the will of cod, which has to be acted out on earth through a political order. Members of the two militant groups we interviewed are no exception in this respect. They subscribe to this objective wholeheartedly. There is no point in repeating here what has elsewhere been written about extensively in this regard. Suffice it to say that for the militants we interviewed, adherence to Islam provides a complete and righteous vision for a healthy society on earth and provides for a heavenly paradise for a heavenly paradise hereafter.
A vision of what ought to be, however, is one part of any ideology. Analysis of the past, the present, and the unfolding process that links them is often an integral part of an ideology. In describing the present, an ideology offers an assessment of the role played by major segments of society (classes, tribes, ethnic groups, institutions, and so forth). It also points out actual and potential enemies of the new social order envisioned by the ideology.
One most of the principal elements of ideology, we found a near consensus among members of the two militant groups, Typically they start with axiomatic statements to the effect that man was created for a purpose to embody the will of god by leading a righteous life and following the correct path (al-sirat al – mustaqima). The operational content of such life is well-detailed in the Quran and the Sunna (the Prophet Muhammad 's words and deeds). It goes without saying that strict adherence to the five pillars of Islam is an irreducible minimum for every Muslim. But to become a good Muslim a person must do more: aside from observing the commandments, taboos, and other rituals, a good Muslim is one who sees to it that the will of god in creating mankind is truly fulfilled on the collective level as well. Phrased differently, the righteous Muslim cannot exist individually; he must strive to build and maintain a righteous community of the faithful (al-umma). Struggling to bring that about is a duty of every true Muslim.
It is this last component of their ideology that sets the militants apart from others in Muslim societies at present. Creating and sustaining a social order in the moral image outlined in the Quran is problematic, both intellectually and politically. Intellectually, most ruling regimes in Muslim countries, Egypt included, claim to be following the essence or the spirit of Islam. They justify what may otherwise seem to be variations in form necessitated by a changing and complex world. Spokespeople for these regimes, including establishment "ulama" would be quite prepared to marshal religious evidence in such debates.
Against this moral "relativism" the militants believe that it is their religious duty to see to it that a truly Muslim social order comes about. Such a belief sooner or later takes on an organizational form leading to confrontation with the ruling elite. The objective is to force the elite either to conform to the precept and edicts of Islam or to step down. In other words, a serious challenge to the status quo is a built-in component of militant Islamic ideology.
The way in which the two groups view the present is an integral part of their ideology. Both agree that the political system is corrupt and inept. The evidence is abundant. Externally it has been defeated by the enemies of Islam: the Christian West. Jewish Zionism, and atheist communism. The regime has made humiliating concessions to those enemies. The system. By deviating from the "straight path" has failed to prepare sufficiently to repel external assaults on Dar al – Islam (the homeland of Islam) Internally. The regime is oblivious to the Shari, a and has adopted and enforced man-made. Western-im-ported legal codes. The leaders have not set an Islamic example in behavior and lifestyle, nor have they displayed any intention to rein state Muslim institutions. The inevitable outcome is moral decay. Poverty. Disease. Illiteracy. and the spread of vices (radhila) . In short, all the external setbacks and internal socioeconomic ills of Egypt (and other nations in the Muslim world) are attributable to a corrupt, inept system that has intentionally deviated from the correct path embodied in the Shari 'a. the obverse of this proposition is clear: the sure solution for all such problems is a system is a system that commits itself and indeed begins to implement the Shari a.
There were some differences between the two groups on these aspects of ideology. The Military Academy group (MA) condemned the political system in the main. The society at large, though described as decaying and riddled with problems, was not blamed. It was viewed as a victim of unscrupulous and God-fearless leaders at the top of the political system. Thus a victimized society is seen as eager but unable to rid itself of its Victimizers. The militants reading of the nature Egyptian society with regard to religion is quite interesting. One of the surviving leaders of the attack on technical Military Academy stated, "we believe that the Egyptians are basically the most religious of all Islamic peoples. They were so before Islam, from the time of the Pharaohs. They have continued to be very religious. Egypt would therefore be a good base to start the world Muslim revival. All that the religious Egyptians need is a sincere Muslim leadership. This conviction, we believe, had a decisive impact on shaping the strategy of Ma, as will be shown later.
The Repentance and Holy Flight (RHF) group does make that distinction between the political system and the society at large. They see both as equitable and as manifestations one another, According to RHF . a corrupt society breeds a corrupt political system, and vice versa. Thus the present political and society in Egypt are beyond redemption. The most frequent term used to describe this state of affairs is a new jahiliya, that is, a combination of infidelity, decadence, and ignorance, similar to that prevailing in pre-Islamic Arabia.
There are also several doctrinal differences between the two groups but they are not as significant as the one mentioned above. These differences are reflected in the organizational, strategic, and tactical aspects of each movement, as will be seen shortly.
In order to go beyond ideological generalities, we built several probes into our research design about specific issues. In both the questionnaire and the freewheeling interviews, members of the two groups were challenged to answer their critics as to how an Islamic social order would handle some contemporary problems on which the Shari 'a is either vague or noncommittal. A sample of typical responses helps put their ideological perceptions in focus.
On the question of the status of women the consensus was that the Shari 'a in essence gives women balanced rights and obligations. The militants concede that men have neglected women's rights and have been excessive in extracting obligations. But this is due to the overall corruption and religiosity of the present social order. The militants are not against women receiving equal education up to the highest level. They insist, however that a woman's rightful place is the home and that her first obligation is to her husband and to the socialization of truly Muslim children. Women could work outside the home if they had fulfilled their primary obligations and if the interests of the community (maslahat al-umma) called for it. Significantly, members of Ma were closer to the egalitarian model on this issue than members of RHF. But the latter accepted female members in their movement while the former did not, Both groups insisted on the imperative of modesty, the protection of women from temptation (al-fitna, al-ghiwaya) and the separation of sexes in public places. They believe that the application of hudud (Islamic penal codes) with regard to sexual offenses is both necessary and sufficient to ensure these ends. They perceive the family as being the basic unit of Muslim society. Its soundness derives from strict observance of Shari 'a values and regulation. Authority and protection from the male head of a household down to females and the young; respect and obedience flow in the opposite direction. The Muslim family is built around obedience, complementarity, protection, and respect not around equality, competition, and self-reliance.
On economic issues, both capitalism and communism were dismissed as inhuman and ungodly. But or could give a complete and coherent answer. But one emerges from scattered incomplete answers and an overall impression. Excessive wealth and excessive poverty would have no place in a Muslim society- if the faithful respect religious edicts and taboos (muharammat). The edicts include payment of the zakat (alms tax) fair payment of wages to laborers, hard and honest work by every Muslim. And charitableness (aside from zakat) The taboos include cheating, extravagance (tabdhir) hoarding (iktinaz), and extracting or receiving usury interest. It is also clear that no single individual or group of individuals could monopolize or control public utilities (the analogy from early Islam is water, fire, and grazing land, or al-ma wa-l-nar wa –l-kala) Private property, profit, and inheritance are allowed. A Muslim government, however, could and should create something analogous to a public sector if the interest of the umma required it.
This last stipulation, interest of the community, seemed to perform two import ideological functions. First, it gives the Islamic state tremendous flexibility to engage in or refrain from engaging in major economic activities. Second, it accentuates the collective or communal nature of the envisioned Muslim society. We nothing about the interest of the individual; it was always that of the umma.
The militants perceive Egypt's present economic problems as the outcome of the mismanagement of resources, the application of imported policies, conspicuous consumerism, the corruption of top officials, and low productivity. Other factors- overpopulation, scarcity of cultivable land and other natural resources, the burdens of defense, And the war efforts – are not considered causes of Egypt's present economic difficulties.
The militants blueprint for dealing with Egypt's problems is rather straightforward: it requires austerity, hard, work, and self-reliance.
Building basic industries and developing appropriate technology are integral parts of Islamic economics.
An important component of the militants' economic thinking is its pan-Islamic nature. This point raised interesting issues during the interviews. The excessive differential in the wealth of various Muslim countries is frowned upon by the militants. They believe that no true Muslim rulers would allow some Muslims to enjoy too much wealth (as in Saudi Arabia) while fellow Muslims elsewhere were starving (as is the case in Bangladesh)
On the question of classes and stratification the two groups readily concede social differentiation as an accepted pillar of the Muslim social order, as the Quran states, "we (god) have put some of you in classes above others. " But the only acceptable mechanism of differentiation is man's labor, not his race, color, tribal or family origin. As a matter of fact, this labor differentiating mechanism determines one's standing. Both in this life and in the hereafter. The concepts of social justice (adala) and equity (al-qistas) are central in the envisioned Muslim society. It is the responsibility of the ruler, commander of the faithful (amir al-mu'minin, the caliph) to ensure that justice and equity are observed. This constitutes the essence of governance, al-adl asas al-hukm. Contless episodes were related by members of the two groups to show such principles were implemented and observed by the Prophet and the Guided Caliphs.
What the militants are calling for in the socioeconomic organization of Muslim society may come very close to a variety of moderate socialism (similar, say, to that of the British Labor party or even to Nasser's socialism), but any suggestion to that effect invariably produced an outraged response. Islam is not be likened to any manmade doctrine or philosophy. It would be more acceptable to them if we were to say that British socialism resembled Islam. In fact some of them have attributed Mao Zedong 's success in China to his emulation of Islam, rather than to his adherence to Marxism. The Marxism. The militants often use phrases such as "the poor " (al-fuqara) "the wretched" (al-masakin) and "the weak on earth" ( al-mustada afinfi-l-ard) to mean what secular leftists call " the working class" the exploited" or " the proletariat." The militants, however, have an instant adverse reaction to the latter terms because of their association with imported secular ideologies. By the same token. The militants use terms such as " the corrupt on earth" (al-mufsidun fi-l-ard) and " the unjust" (al-zalama) to mean what secularists call "exploiters" or "oppressors."
As to the political system, the two groups expressed their conviction that the head of the community, the ruler, must be selected by the faithful, must be an adult, rational, pious male and must abide by the Shari'a. He must consult his fellow Muslims in all important decisions on which there is no clear-cut ruling in the shari'a.
But how would they organize matters related to selecting the ruler or ensuring his consultation with the community? The militants had not worked out the details of that, but when asked if they would go about it the same way as in western-type democracies, they agreed in essence. Aside from not liking to use the word democracy and preferring the term shura (consultative) both groups stipulated that elected shura assemblies would have no legislative powers in matters covered by the shari'a. Rather, these elective bodies would be responsible primarily for the enforcement of Shari'a they would choose among alternative interpretation and would issue rules on matters not directly dealt with in the Shari'a. Elective bodies would have the authority to check on the rulers, to hold them accountable, and to remove them from office if they to carry out their duties. So long as the rulers are dutiful to God and the community, it is the obligation of every Muslim to obey their orders.
The tradition of tolerating an unjust ruler for the sake of preserving the unity of the umma is completely rejected by Ma and RHF. In fact they believe it is the duty of every true Muslim to remove injustice (al-zulm) and misguidance (dalala), including that committed by a ruler.
How do the militants see the ulama ' the learned men of religion? Here there was no consensus among members of either group or between the two groups. Attitudes ranged from indifference to hostility. None had anything positive to say abput the ulama as a group. Those who ignored or expressed indifference toward them tended to view the "ulama" as just a group of state employee bureaucrats who take no initiative and who are more interested in observing rituals and formalities than in the essence and spirit of Islam. The "ulama" were invariably described as babqhawat al-manabir (pulpit parrots) Most members of MA dismissed them as pathetic cases for whom pity rather than anger should be felt. Most RHF group members, however, were openly hostile toward the 'ulama' especially their top leaders. They viewed such men as hypocrites and opportunists and described them as people who would reverse religious edicts (yuhallilun al-haram wa yuharrimun al-halal) to suit the whims of the rulers. So much were the 'ulama' considered a disgrace to Islam that members of RHF were strongly advised not to pray behind them or in mosques where official 'ulama' presided. As a matter of fact, when RHF decided to confront the Egyptian state. They kidnapped no less a person than one of Sadat 's former cabinet members. The minister of religious endowment. The man, Husayn al-Dhahabi. Was one of Egypt's top 'ulama' His kidnapping and subsequent execution by RHF dramatized the group's hostility toward Egypt's religious establishment.
Underlying these negative attitudes is the Muslim militants' belief that the 'ulama' and al-Azhar have abdicated their responsibility toward Islam. Have emptied the religion of its sociopolitical component, and have therefore ceased to be qualified to lead the community of believers. Worse still. From the militants' point of view, the 'ulama' stand in the way of rebuilding a true Islaic social order.
If these are their attitudes toward Egypt's religious establishment, what is their attitude toward similar militant Muslim groups, namely the Muslim Brotherhood? In terms of the religious component of their ideology, their reading of history, and their overall vision for the future, members of Ma and RHF expressed no difference with the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact consider themselves a natural continuation of the Brotherhood, which was banned and persecuted by both the royalist regime before 1952 and by Nasser's regime after 1952. MA and RHF revere the founder of the Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, and the pioneers who gave their lives as martyrs for Islam.
It is generally with the surviving members of the Brotherhood and their current practices that MA and RHF group members take some exception. They consider some of these surviving members either as weak, burned out, or as having sold out. Some of the early member-hood, seeking advice and offering support. They were advised to mind their own business, to stay out trouble, and to worship God. This was quite disillusioning to the youngsters, who then decided to form their own organization.
In closing this sketchy presentation of the militants' ideology, it may be appropriate to say a word about the intellectual roots of their ideas. According to its members' own testimony, MA has been primarily influenced by the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially the writings of Hassan al-Banna and Sayid Qutb. Also important in shaping their ideas were the translated works of Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi in Pakistan and 'al Shariati in Iran. In Iran. The intellectual roots of RHF group were far more complex. Besides the above sources, its leader Shukri Mustafa synthesized the works of the Kharajites (al-khawarij), Ibn Taymiya (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries). Muhammad Ibn al-wahhab (late eighteenth century), and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (nineteenth century). Curiously enough, the works of some modern Islamic reformers were not endorsed by the militants, notably those of Muhammad Abdu and 'Ali Abd al-Raziq. The primary reason for that seems to be the association of the latter with secularst trends that opted for separation of religion and state.
STRUCTE OF THE MILITANT GROUPS
We have already indicated that following the Arab defeat of 1967, a tidal wave of religiosity swept the country. In an organizational sense, however, this religiosity remained by and large quite amorphous. Part of this religiosity took retreatist, mystical, or sufist forms- individual search for meaning and salvation by turning inward. What distinguished both MA and RHF in this ocean of generalized religiosity was precisely their organization and their outward turning, their desire to change not just their individual lives but also the world. To be sure, the climate of religiosity enabled to groups to recruit members and challenge the Egyptian regime, but their organization, as far we were able to determine from their testimonies, began with a single man in each case. The organizational evolution of both groups reflected to a significant degree the style and temperament of the two men responsible for their initiation. But the organizational structure and matters of strategy were just as much reflections of their respective ideologies. Below are some of the organizational features of both groups, their leadership, membership. Internal control, and strategy.
MA began on the initiative of Salih Siriya, a modern, educated man with a Ph.D.in science education. A Palestinian by birth and in his mid-thirties, he had been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Jordan (Known as the Islamic Liberation Party, Hizb al-tahrir al Islami). After the Arab defeat of 1967 he intermittently joined various Palestinian organizations, tried to cooperate with various Arab regimes that claimed to be revolutionary (Libya and Iraq, for example), spent brief periods in, and finally settled in Egypt in 1971 and Joined one of the specialized agencies of the Arab League in Cairo. It was from that vantage point that he began to attract the attention of some of the religious students. Undergound cells, called usar ((families) by the group, began to form in Cairo and Alexandria.
Interestingly enough, the initiator of RHF, Shukri Mustafa, was also in His early thirties and a veteran of the Muslim Brotherhood. He had been arrested in 1965, tried, and jailed for a few years on charges of being a member of the Brotherhood. In prison he became disillu-sioned with older members of the Brotherhood. As he saw some of them either breaking down under torture during interrogation or engaging in petty fighting. The prison experience nevertheless did not disillusion him as far as the Brotherhood's ideology was concerned. If anything, it made him more of a true believer. The first RHF cell in fact was started while Mustafa was in prison. As soon as he was released, in 1971 , he launched a steady and relentless effort to expand his movement. Mustafa was also educated in Cairo, with a B.Sc. in agricultural science.
Thus the founder – leaders of the two groups had several characteristics in common: age, modern scientific education, previous membership in the Muslim Brotherhood. Prison experience. And a disposition toward secret organization. Both leaders had been hanged by the time we started our research. So personality characteristics of the two leaders could not be directly observed. We therefore relied heavily on what their closest lieutenants, the second-echelon leaders, told us. Both leaders were said to have possessed a great amount of charisma. They commanded tremendous respect from their followers, were considered exemplary Muslims, and were emulated. Besides the respect and admiration commanded by both leaders, Siriya reportedly elicited love and Mustafa elicited awe (some would say fear). None of the members of the two groups had anything negative to say about their fallen leaders. If there was criticism at all, it was self-criticism on the part of those interviewed for having failed or misled their leaders. This was especially true in the case of Ma members, some of whom considered themselves primarily responsible for pressuring Siriya into a miscalculated action against the Egyptian regime. Both leaders were perceived as extremely eloquent, Knowledgeable about religion, well-versed in the Quran and Hadith, and highly understanding of national, regional, and international affairs. Both were perceived as virtuous, courageous, fearless of death, and even eager for martyrdom (istishhad).
Siriya and Mustafa initiated their respective groups about the same time, in the early 1970s, but independently from one another. It was somewhat later, in early 1974, that each became aware of the other's group. They made one attempt to join forces, but it ended because of differences in leadership style, ideology, organization, and strategy.
The leadership style differed significantly in the two militant groups. MA was fairly democratic in its deliberations and decision-making. An informal executive council of about twelve members was presided over by Siriya. All points view were expressed and discussed. Formal voting however, was quite rare. Consensus was always sought by the leader. His power of persuasion was often decisive in steering the views of the majority in one direction. As far as those interviewed could remember, there was only one occasion when Siriya was unable to persuade the council to adopt his point of view. The occasion involved the question of when to confront the regime violently in an attempt to take over power.
Siriya, as one those who was present, felt very strongly that the time was not ripe for such an attempt. His argument was predicated on several facts: that the regime was still riding a popular upswing following the October War, that MA had not perfected its organizational machinery, and that it had not thoroughly prepared a program of action for running the country in case of success and seizure of power. Siriya estimated their chances of success at the time as no more than 30 percent. The majority (all but one other member) saw otherwise. Even if success was not assured, they argued. Their action would be an "outrage for god" (ghadba li-llah) – propaganda by deed. The ideological justification for those who wanted to act immediately was the saying of the Prophet, "Any of you who sees something repugnant (Munkar) ought to remove it with his hands; if unable, then by his tongue; and if unable. Then by his heart. "The political justification was Sadat 's apparent moves toward the West and toward an accommodation with Israel, both of which are perceived (along with communism) as archenemies of Islam. An immediate action, therefore, was needed to circumvent such treasonous acts. At any rate, the majority view prevailed, and the leader was obliged to go along in accordance with the shura principle that the group had adopted from the beginning.
The leadership style of RHF, on the other hand, was quite autocratic. Mustafa, the founder, was established by his followers as the amir gama 'at al-mu 'minin (commander of the faithful group) Although he encouraged discussion and dialogue. The final word was always that of the amir. The multitude of issues on which he made such final judgments ranged from the very personal (marriage and divorce) to intergroup and international issues. He was considered by his followers as an authority on matters of doctrinal theology, Islamic jurisprudence, worship, and Islamic social transaction. His followers' perceptions of the general competence of their leader was steadily reinforced by both leader and followers. Over time, the RHF leader was elevated in their eyes until he became an almost omnipotent figure. Even after the death sentence had been issued, Mustafa 's followers would not believe that the government could take his life. For several weeks after he was hanged, his closest followers refused to believe the news. We asked them if they thought that Mustafa was immortal; they answered in the negative. However, they all believed that, because God had ordained him and his group to restore Islam, he would not die before accomplishing "divine mission."
Both leaders recruited followers from among students or recent university graduates. Three recruitment mechanisms were employed: kinship, friendship and worship. RHF relied heavily on kinship and friendship, Mustafa began with close friends from prison days, and relatives, like his brother and a nephew. These in turn enlisted their close friends and relatives as members of the group. MA relied on friendship and worship. In the late 1960 and early 1970, with so many young people increasingly observing religion and attending mosques for prayers, members of the first cell formed by Siriya would find their potential recruits among the worshipers. Typically, the older members would observe young worshipers in the college or neighborhood mosque. If the young persons appeared to be deeply religious (especially if they observed the dawn prayer). They would be approached to attend religious discussion after regular prayers. It was during these discussions that the potential member was discovered already to be or capable of becoming politically conscious. Since plain religiosity was evident, it was 'politicizability' that had to be ensured before a person was actually invited to be a member. More significant sociologically, of course, was the social selectivity of members, that is, their background and the segment of society they came from.
Since we studied only thirty-four members of both groups (twenty one MA and thirteen RHF members) generalizations on the social selectivity of members must be taken with extreme caution. It must also be borne in mind that those studied were among the most active in both groups, as is evidenced by the fact that the government considered them responsible enough to sentence them to imprisonment.
Regional background. There were some regional background differences. Most MA members were from Cairo. Alexandria, and the Delta, while most RHF members were from Upper Egypt. This difference is readily explainable; Siriya operated from Cairo and had a link with Alexandria university; Mustafa. On the other hand, operated from Asyut, his hometown in Upper Egypt, before moving to Cairo at a later stage. Since recruitment mechanisms were kinship, friendship, and worship, it followed that potential members would tend to be marked by social and geographical proximity.
Age. Aside from these regional differences, the profile of membership in both groups was extremely similar. Age, a crucial veriable in most militant organizations, ranged from seventeen to twenty-six at the time of joining as a fully fledged member. The median age for Ma was twenty-two, and for RHF twenty-four.
The leader of MA, Siriya, was fourteen years above the median age of his followers, and the leader of RHF, Mustafa, was sixteen years older than the average member of RHF, Mustafa, was sixteen years older than the average member of his group. Thus, although youthful in both leadership and membership, followers were significantly younger than their respective leaders. This may suggest that, even in a radical movement such as we are discussing here, the age reverence tradition of Middle Eastern society still operates.
Rural and small-town origins. Another important component of the membership profile is the rural and small-town background of two-thirds of those interviewed (twenty-one of thirty-four). They were born in villages or small towns and were recent arrivals in big cities when they joined MA or RHF. Most of them had come to Cairo, Alexandria, or Asyut after completing secondary school, to enroll in a university. Fully one-half of those interviewed were living in the city by themselves or with roommates, but not with their parents. Even some of the one-third were born in urban centers had lived in smaller communities during their early and middle teens. Five such members had moved with their government-employed fathers to smaller communities and had lived there for several years.
Although women are not represented in our sample, RHF did recruit from both sexes. At the time of the government crackdown on the group, some eighty women members were arrested along with several hundred male members. Secondary analysis of the backgrounds of these women indicates that they were mostly relatives or wives of male members of RHF. Interestingly enough, RHF (as indicated earlier) was the more literal and dogmatic on women 's inequality. The more flexible MA group did not recruit female members.
Class affiliation of the members was hard to establish directly, Broadly speaking we inferred it from the occupation and education of fathers, as well as of the members themselves. There was no significant difference between MA and RHF in this respect. With regard to fathers' occupation , about two-thirds (two-thirds (twenty-one out of thirty four) were government employees, mostly in middle grades of the civil service. Four members had fathers who were in high-level professional occupations (two university professors, one engineer, and one pharmacist). Four members had fathers who were small merchants; three had fathers who were small farmers (owning between six and eleven acres); and two had working-class fathers. With regard to education, only seven fathers (20 percent) had a university education. A majority of nineteen fathers (56 percent) had intermediate education (ranging from secondary school to less than four years of college). Five fathers had below intermediate certificates, and three were illiterate.
Although fathers spanned both the educational and occupational spectrums, the central tendency was decidedly and occupational spectrums, the central tendency was decidedly in the middle-62 percent occupationally and 56 percent educationally. It is not unsafe therefore to conclude that the class affiliation of most members of these militant Islamic groups is middle and lower-middle class.
Achievement and mobility. The educational and occupational attainment of the members themselves was decidedly higher than that of their parents. All but five (twenty-nine out of thirty-four) were university graduates or university students who were enrolled in college at the time of their arrest. The rest were secondary school educated. Occupationally, only sixteen (147 percent) of the members were classifiable, the rest being students. Most of these were professionals (twelve out of sixteen) employed by the government: five teachers, three engineers, two doctors, and two agronomists. Three were self-employed (a pharmacist, a doctor, and an accountant), and one worked as a conductor for a bus company. Among those who were students at the time of their arrest (eighteen members. Or 53 percent), six majored in engineering, four in medicine, three in agricultural science, two in pharmacy, two in technical military science , and one in literature. It is worth nothing here that four of the above majors require very high grades in Egypt's statewide examination of thanawiya 'amma:
Medicine, engineering, technical military science, and pharmacy. These four majors accounted for fourteen out of the eighteen students (80 percent). In other words, student members of the two militant Islamic groups were decidedly high in both motivation and achievement.
Incidence of family cohesion. Most members came from 'normal' cohesive families, that is, families with no divorce, no separation. No death of either parent. None in ether group was an only child. And none reported any significant tragic events in his family history. Seven members (20 percent) had experienced what may be considered family strain. Of these, three had lost their fathers, and the mother of one had remarried. The parents of two had divorced, and one father had remarried. One member had lost both parents and was living with an older brother. One member reported having been "shocked" by the behavior of his westernized parents at a New Year's party and had subsequently moved out and was living with a friend. Aside from these seven cases, everyone else reported what a friend. Aside from these seven cases, everyone else reported what may be generally considered a normal family background.
The typical member of the militant Islamic groups could therefore be described as young (early twenties), of rural or small-town back-ground, from the middle or lower-middle class, with high achievement and motivation, upwardly mobile, with a scientific or engineering education, and from a normally cohesive family. This profile, as we shall discuss later, poses theoretical problems, since it is sometimes assumed in social science that members of 'radical movements' must be alienated, marginal, or must possess some other abnormal characteristic. Most of those we investigated would normally be considered model young Egyptians. If they were not typical, it was because they were significantly above the average in their generation.
Another aspect of organization worth looking into is membership control. Both MA and RHF demanded total commitment and ironclad discipline from their members. Decisions arrived at by the semi democratic MA leadership and orders given by the autocratic RHF leadership were by carried out scrupulously. Members in varying levels of the organizational structure did so with zeal and joy, in the unshakable belief that they were serving the cause of Islam. Thus the primary factors in controlling members' behavior were the members' own internal conviction and their exhilarating sense of mission.
RHF, however, employed additional secondary means of controlling its members. One such mechanism was the virtual absorption of all the members' time in activities related to the group-worshiping, studying, proselytizing, exercising, or working in one of the group's economic enterprises. This tended gradually to insulate the members from outside society, something that was urged and welcomed openly in any case. Indirectly, this total absorption and insulation made the typical member quite dependent one the group to satisfy spiritual, social. And economic needs. In fact at a certain point in the evolution of RHF, members were ordered to relinquish their jobs in the society at large, to desert their families, and to sever all relations with the outside world. In other words, RHF was to become the members' total and only world.
Both groups were quite keen on preparing their members for maximum personal sacrifice of worldly possession as well as life itself. Simply expressed, the member was rigorously conditioned to be a martvr (shahid). The heavenly rewards awaiting martyrs are boundless. Fear or hesitation to die for Islam is the ultimate betrayal of fellow faithful Muslims, and among other things it means one's exclusion from their spiritual communion in both livers. Thinking of the joy and rewards of martyrdom is said to make any physical torture by the enemies of Islam quite bearable. Several members reported that the stories they had heard about the torture of members of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1966 had a profound on them at the time and on their subsequent decision to join MA and RHF. The severe torture seems to have marked sharply the diving line in their minds between a "merciless jahiliya society and a community of self denying faithful."
Another mechanism for controlling members is the threat of being excommunicated from the group should one fail fellow members or the movement. In several instances, RHF not only carried out such a threat but also meted out physical punishment to mrmbers31 .
What most of these control mechanisms amount to in the end is no. less than an attempt at total resocialization of their members. The individual member was asked not only to adhere to the ideas and principles of the group but also to in a serious transformation of behavior, attitudes, and relationships. In other words, both MA and RHF represented the kind of movements that fundamental, simultaneous transformation of both the individual and society. It was quite evident to us that typical members felt (and readily expressed) a moral superiority vis-à-vis people outside the movement. Their ability to impose self-discipline in accordance with the commandments and prohibitions of Islam while others cannot or will not was the source of this feeling. It was equally evident that, aside from the moral superiority, members felt deep joy in defying society and its physical means of coercion. Several who claimed to have been severely tortured reported having images and drams of prophets and saints welcoming them to the Garden of Eden or of the just Islamic society that would be established after their martyrdom.
The two groups, as should be clear by now, have one common objective: to topple Egypt's present social order and establish an Islamic social order. It is on questions of strategy that MA and RHF differ most. Interestingly enough each group invoked a different Islamic principle or precedent to justify strategy in achieving the ultimate goal of truly Muslim society.
MA perceived the majority of Egyptians as basically religious people who were helpless victims of ungodly political regimes that had superimposed on them non-Islamic institutions. Such a situation was read as sinful and abhorrent, necessitating immediate removal of such regimes by those who are truly Muslims. One of the Prophet's famous saying was invoked to justify direct and immediate action, we have already reported on the debate on the debate on this subject within MA. An 'outrage for god' (ghadba li-llah) was the rallying cry for a violent confrontation designed to topple the regime. Of course they had to prepare well for the showdown. Arduous training in the use of various arms, infiltration of the army and the police, detailed study of the behavior and daily routines of the president and other leaders, map construction and map reading of all important strategic site in the capital, and communiqués to be aired on radio and television were all prepared long in advance. Several rehearsals of parts of the plan were carried out before the actual final countdown on 18 April 1974.
The RHF strategy on the other hand was a patient and long-range one. Their reading of the situation was quite different from that of MA. It was not just the political regime that was corrupt, but other social institutions as well. It was not only the rulers who were ungodly and sinful, but most members of the society were as well. Thus the moral revamping had to be done from the ground up. Their strategy was to build a nucleus community, a miniature society of believers who would act out the true life of Islam. This was to be a genuine alternative to the sinful ways of Egyptian society at large. Establishing this model community was the first step in RHF strategy. After its completion, this Islamic community of believers would grow in numbers and in spiritual and material strength. When it had reached a certain point the true believers would march onward to bring down the already crumbling sinful social order of Egypt at large.
Like MA, RHF invoked a precedent from early Islam to justify this strategy. The prophet Muhammad, surrounded and harassed by the jahiliya people of Mecca. Fled to Medina with a few followers and established there the first true Muslim community. As the community gained in strength it engaged the infidels of Mecca in a series of battles (Ghazwat) and finally conquered Mecca itself. It is this model that was being emulated RHF.
Thus while the Ma showdown with the regime followed logically from its strategy, the RHF confrontation did not. In other words, MA timed its move and planned a coup d'etat in April 1974. But RHF, when it clashed with the regime in July 1977, had no such intention in mind. RHF had long way to go in implementing the first component of its strategy-building the model community of believers somewhere in the unpopulated hinterland on edge of the Nile. They had barely begun. It is safe to accept RHF 's explanation that their move in July 1977 was basically a tactical one forced on them by the regime. As they tell the story, the security forces arrested several of their brothers and detained them without trial, thus going far beyond what the law allows. The rest of RHF demanded that their brothers be tried or set free. When their pleas were ignored, they kidnapped the former minister of endowments and kept him as a hostage, saying they would hold him until their brothers were freed. The deadline set by RHF passed without a positive response from the government. They felt they had to kill their hostage as they had warned they would.
But there were signs of other influences of the Iranian example on the strategic thinking of both groups. The use of popular uprisings as a mechanism to topple the regime was more seriously looked into in late 1978 and early 1979. until then such organizational weapons were perceived by the Islamic militants as essentially "communistic." Our interviewing was terminated before we could establish whether either or both groups had adopted popular uprisings as a strategic weapon in their fight against the regime. It is worth noting, however, that during 1979 and 1980 a host of Islamic groups began to stage sit-ins as well as campus and street demonstrations- protest activities similar to those that occurred during the early stages of the Iranian Revolution.
TOWARD AN EXPLANATION
In search of an explanation for the rising tide of Islamic militant movements, we would do well to place the phenomenon in its historical and comparative perspectives.
In modern Arab history, militant Islamic movements have sprung up in several countries – Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Libya, Sudan, and Egypt. Most of them have used violence to change the status quo or to repel an external encroachment. They members were mostly puritanical, fundamentalist, or neotraditionalist. They are to be distinguished from the rising tide of Sufist movements. The latter, although they have revivalist overtones, are basically oriented toward the individual's spiritual rejuvenation and toward changing the social structure. The militant movements are also to be distinguished from the religious reformism that was attempted by people like Muhammad 'abduh' and from action oriented but nonpolitical movements like al-Shubban al-Muslimin, which was a character –building organization equivalent to the YMCA in the west. Here it may be useful to adopt a typology that looks simultaneously at the locus of change and the amount of change sought by the movement. Some Islamic movements aim at changing the individual as means of reforming society; others aim primarily at society as the locus of change. Some movements seek partial change; others seek total change in whatever locus they believe to be most significant. Both MA and RHF were of the type that aimed at total change of the individual and society, using violence if necessary to bring this about.
In premodern time the Muslim world witnessed several such movements. As early as the middle of the first century of Islam, one such protest movement appeared on the Islamic landscape under the name of the Kharajites (al-khawarij, or the 'dissenters' as the most establishmentarian Muslims were to call them). This was to be followed by one Islamic militant movement after another. In all these movements throughout the last ten centuries we find three common components: total change, change of the individual and society, and the use of violence.
Our investigation revealed that in modern times (that is, since 1800) ideological and organizational similarity has existed between MA and RHF on the one hand and the Wahhabi (Arabia). The Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), and the Mujahidin (Iran) on the other.
Since both the Muslim Brotherhood (1928-54) and the Mujahidin (1963- 80) are more recent, and since one appeared in the same society (Egypt) and the other in a structurally similar society (Iran), the sociological comparison between them and the two militant groups we studied is theoretically more promising. Our tentative investigation revealed that MA and RHF members. Neither MA nor RHF had the kind of leadership that could navigate its wa through the mainstream of Egyptian politics without becoming polluted by it. The Brotherhood, as a result of its more effective leadership, was able to survive much longer (about thirty years), to broaden its social base, to increase its membership (some say to over one million) and to organize at the grassroots level.
The Brotherhood kept a low profile politically until the early 1940s and did not use violence until the late 1940s and early 1950s. in other words, it had more than ten years to develop organizationally before its first confrontation with the regime. Neither Ma nor RHF had such a long organizational evolution. In internal control of membership there was more similarity between the Brotherhood and MA than between the Brotherhood and RHF. The Brotherhood never demanded of its members the kind of insulation and absorption that RHF insists upon.
In comparing MA and RHF with Iran 's Mujahidin, we found similarities with regard to age, educational background. Rural and small town background, and class affiliation. Organizationally, there were also significant similarities, especially between MA and the Mujahidin. Both resorted to violence early on as a means of toppling the regime. Both believed that society was ripe. That the regime was vulnerable, and that an example had to be set (propaganda by deed).
Ideologically all four groups subscribe to Islam and believed that the implementation of the shari'a would be the fundamental solution to all existing societal ills. None of them had detailed operational plans or action programs to implement once in power. All had a primary social commitment to the poor (al-mustada afin fi-l-ard, 'the meek of the earth) and to social justice. All perceived their foreign enemies as western capitalist imperialism. Marxist communism, and Zionism. They perceived local political regimes in their area as explicit or covert allies or by-products of one or more of the external enemies of Islam. In brief, all four militant groups were ideologically hostile to any external encroachment (economic, military, political, or cultural) on Dar al-is-lam. Any outside influence is termed "imperialism" and considered inimical to Islam. The most apparent of the three archenemies of Islam at a particular point in time is usually the one that receives the harshest attack. Thus the enemy is Israel (and Zionism) at all time and for all four movements. It was Britain for the Brotherhood in the 1940s. it was the Soviet union for MA and RHF in Egypt during the 1960s early 1970s. It was the United states for the Mujahidin in the 1960s and 1970s and for MA and RHF in the 1970s.
If such similarities exist between past and present militant Islamic movements in Egypt or between contemporary movements in countries like Iran that are structurally similar to Egypt, then we must move a step forward toward an explanation. What common structural features existed in all three situations – Egypt, then we must move a step forward toward an explanation. What common structural features existed in all three situations- Egypt's past (1930s. 1940s), Egypt's present's present (1970s) and Iran's present (1970s) ? if we can put a finger on common underlying structural forces, then we are that much closer to an explanation. Are these militant Islamic groups the only ones whose ideology and actions challenge the present social orders? If not, what other groups and ideologies do so and why have they not made similar headway? Again, answers to these questions would advance an explanation as to why Islamic movements and no others at this time carry the banner for change.
As to the first set of questions it seems that all four comparable Islamic movements (MA, RHF, Brotherhood, and Mujahidin) have grown primarily out of the middle and lower sectors of the new middle class; they are of recent rural background, experiencing for the first time life in huge metropolitan areas where foreign influence is most apparent and where impersonal forces are at maximum strength. There seems also to be, in each case, an acute national crisis intertwined with social and psychological frustration. In Egypt in the 1930s there was the great Depression and its aftermath, combined with the feeling that the earlier national struggle for independence had come to a halt before the signing of the 1936 treaty with great Britain a treaty that fell short of national expectations. The events of the 1940s the war, increasing influx of foreign troops, soaring migration from rural areas to serve the war efforts of the Allies, rising inflation, immediate postwar unemployment – all contributed to widespread social discontent. That was the decade during which the Brotherhood enjoyed its greatest expansion and organizational strength. The middle and lower – middle classes were most adversely affected by the socioeconomic and political developments of the 1930s and 1940s. and sure enough, they were the most responsive to the call of the Muslim Brotherhood50.
Iran in the 1960s and 1970s witnessed developments of a similar nature to those of the 1930s and 1940s in Egypt: frustration of the national struggle (the crushing of the Musaddaq movement), increasing foreign (especially American) presence and influence, massive migration from rural to urban areas, and soaring inflation. In Egypt during the late 1960s and the 1970s there was a national defeat (1967) followed by an increasing foreign presence (Russian, then American), hardening of the social and political arteries of the country *as upward mobility and political participation significantly diminished) soaring inflation, and dim future prospects for the youngest and brightest members of the middle and lower middle class.
What we argue here is that a sense of national crisis, accompanied by a class factor interacting adversely with personal aspirations have been common structural features surrounding the rise of the four movements. The national crisis in all four cases has something to do with foreign encroachment. The class factor in all cases has to do with collective status incongruity (that is, strong achievement motivation, with justified high aspiration, yet little economic and political apportunity). In all four cases the middle and lower-middle classes felt this incongruity most sharply. The individual biography element sensitizes the confluence of both the national crisis and the class incongruity in a highly anomic, impersonal setting – the big urban centers.
It may be argued, however, that the combination of factors (national crisis class incongruity, and individual anomie) could lead individuals to join non – Islamic movements. In this quite possible. The social profile of those who join radical leftist movements seems quite similar to that of Islamic militants in all four cases. The only significant difference in profiles, at least the case of Egypt, is a preponderance of rural background among Islamic militants, compared with a preponderance of urban background among leftists. It is evident that both Islamic and leftist (including Marxist) ideologies provide a persuasive intellectual response to the issues of national crisis, class malaise, and individual alienation. The question remains why,
In Egypt and the Arab world, people with roughly the same social profile have flocked into militant Islamic movements more readily than they have into leftist or Marxist groups?
Without more data and proper statistical controls than we have, this question cannot be satisfactorily answered. However, we submit that at least four factors in recent years have tilted the balance in favor of Islamic groups over their leftist or Marxist counterparts.
The first factor is the ability of the ruling elite to dismiss leftist and Marxist opposition as atheists or agents of a foreign power (usually the Soviet union) bent on destroying Islamic and authentic national heritage. With the mass media nearly controlled by the government, such charges are repeated daily, enabling the elite to crush these leftist elements with impunity. It is much harder to use the same propaganda weapon against groups proclaiming Islam as their ideology, especially when those groups are avowedly opposed to foreign influence – Soviet, western, and Zionist.
The second factor has to do with recent historical setbacks suffered by quasi-socialist experiments in Egypt and the Arab world. Even though Egyptian socialism was reasonably effective, Nasser's crushing defeat in the 1967 war was blamed on his entire system, including his socialist policies. The soviet Union was equally blamed for letting the Arabs down in that war. Thus socialism, Marxism, and the Soviet Union have gradually acquired negative reputations. They were tried, s it is claimed, and they did not Egypt's problems.
The third factor has to do with the deep-rootedness of Islam in the entire Middle East. In Egypt particularly people are said to be quite religious. There is a positive sociocultural sanction to being religious. Even the most avowed liberal or leftist secularist regimes in the area find it necessary and expedient to invoke Islam when the try to institute any major new policy. The point is that for any militant Islamic movement, half task of recruiting members is already done by socialization and cultural sanctions in childhood. The other half of their task is merely to politicize consciousness and to discipline their recruits organizationally. For a Marxist movement, the task must be three times harder: it involves eradicating negative cultural stereotypes of Marxism, teaching its precepts. Politicizing, and organizing.
The fourth factor is the strong sense of communion that Muslim groups provide for their members. As we have seen, the typical recruit is usually of recent rural background, a newcomer to an impersonal city. Abu-Lughod found that in an earlier time relatives and fellow villagers who may have preceded him would offer the rural newcomer a soft landing in the city. This mode of adjustment still exists for some. But for an increasing number of migrants such adjustment mechanisms may not be there. In such cases the militant Islamic groups with their emphasis on brotherhood, mutual sharing, and spiritual support become the functional equivalent of the extended family for young people who have left theirs behind. In other words, the Islamic group fulfills a de-alienating function for its members in ways that are not matched by other rival political movements.
In the absence of a credible, secular national vision effective means to repel external encroachment, Islamic movements exert a strong attraction. To enhance the present and future socioeconomic prospects of the middle and lower classes, and to galvanize the imagination of the educated youth and give them a sense of being essential parts of a grand design, Islamic militancy offers the alterative. To their credit, Egypt's middle classes have given the benefit of the doubt to some other secular alternative: a liberal experiment (1922-52), a nationalist-socialist experiment (1952-70) and a quasi-liberal, quasiautocratic regime (1970-80). These experiments all seem to have fallen short of fulfilling their promises. It may be argued that none of those experiments was allowed to run its full course or that one of them (Nasser's regime, 1952-70) was aborted by foreign powers. Such arguments nay very well be valid not the formal level. But history seldom operates as neutral laboratory for societal experiments. Thus, a fact of Egypt's modern history is that with the mounting troubles of each secular alternative, the appeal of Islamic militancy grows until it becomes a tidal wave. The last such cycle was stemmed by the 1952 Revolution, which addressed itself to most of the national and socioeconomic issues bedeviling the middle and lower classes. It was only when Nasserism seemed to have run out of steam in the late 1960s that Islamic began its present resurgence.
Two sets of factors will decide the future of Egypt's Islamic militancy. The first has to do with the ability of the present regime or another secular alternative to address itself to the issues discussed above (independence, social equity, and a credible vision for the future that enlists the commitment of educated youth). The second set has to do with other regional models. An effective secular alternative may not readily appear in Egypt but in a neighboring country, and yet may appeal to middle-class educated youth. However, the most salient regional effect on the future growth of Islamic militancy in Egypt and elsewhere is likely to come from the Iranian Revolution. Its success in dealing with the host of global, societal. And individual issues discussed in this paper would enhance Islamic militancy. Its failure, especially from within, and without foreign intervention, would set back Islamic militancy. The vision of establishing an Islamic social order has dazzled the imaginations of all Muslims for ages. But it usually becomes a passionate craving during national crisis or in the aftermath of a humiliation at the hands of the outside world. The Islamic vision will never be cut down to its proper size until it is tried at least once. This is why the Iranian Revolution is uniquely significant for the present and the near future.
1- I wish to express my gratitude to the National Center for Sociological of the research team-Sohair Lutfy, Afaf Mahfouz, Ibrahim al-Fahham, Adly Hussain. Mohammad Mohi-eddin, and Mona Al-Arint.
2- See for example time magazine, 15 Jan. 1979 "the Crescent of Crisis"; in other stories on Iran the same theme, the resurgence of Islam, was central (see Time, 17 Feb, 26 Feb, 26 Nov, and 3 Dec. 1979) the New York Yimes, 2 June, 23 Nov. 9 Dec., 13 Dec 1968, 7 Jan and 11 Dec. 1979. The Guardian (London) featured a special report on Islam (Dec. 1979) and several articles on 26 Jan. and 23 July 1977 and an article by Martin Woolacott, "New Politics of the Muslim World, 22 Nov . 1979.
3- Zbigniew Brzezinski is reputed to be fond of these. Recent scholarly treatment of resurgence of Islam includes Bernard Lewis, "The Return of Islam, "Commentary, Jan 1976, P. 3949; John A. Williams, "A Return to the Veil in Egypt, "Middle East Review, vol. 11, no, 3, spring, 1978. pp 40 – 55; R.S. Humphreys, "Islam and Political Violence in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria." Middle East Journal 33, winter, 1979 pp. 1-19 Israel Altman "Islamic Movements in Egypt, "The Jerusalem Quarterly, winter, 1979. pp. 1-19; Israel Altman. "Islamic Movements in Egypt in Egypt. "the Jerusalem Quarterly. Winter, 1979 pp. 87-108 : Hrair Dekmejian. "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival and the Search for Islamic Alternatives. "Middle East Journal, 34, winter, 1980 pp. 1-12.
4- See, for example, Manfred Halpern. Politics of Social Change in the Middle in the Middle East (Princeton . N. J. : Princeton University press, 1963) A native Arab, Western – educated scholar Hisham Sharabi echoes the same thesis about the decline of Islam. In 1966 he wrote. "In the contemporary Arab world, Islam has simply been by-passed…. The decline if Islam in the twentieth century as an organized institutional force capable of exerting direct influence on society and the state cannot be explained or accounted for a simple or unitary diagnosis. "Sharabi then lists the factors that contributed to the decline of Islam. See his article "Islam and Modernization in Arab world. "in J.H. Thompson and R.D. Reischauer, eds., Modernization of the Arab World (New York: Van Nostrand, 1966) pp. 26-27.
5- For a critical discussion of the limitation of the Orientalist approach see Ed-ward Said. Orientalism ( New York; Pantheon, 1978).
6- Writing some thirteen years later and taking note of what is happening in Iran and eisewhere. Hisham Sharabi, for example, wrote in 1977 that "Islamic conservatism is at present the dominant ideological force in Arab society." See his "Islam, Democracy and Socialism in the Arab World. " in M.C. Hudson, ed., The Arab Future: Critical Issues (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1979) pp. 95-104 .
7- The reference here is to the countrywide urban uprising on 18 and 19 January 1977. following an announcement that the government in effect would end the state subsidies of a number of essential consumer items (such as rice. Flour. Cigarettes, and sugar), thus raising their prices by 30 t0 50 percent. The rioting and clashes with the police left an estimated seventy-nine people dead and about eight hundred injured. The rioting subsided by 20 January after the government retracted its economic measure and restored the subsidies, declared martial law, and called in the army to enforce a curfew. See al-Ahram, 19,20,21January 1977; also Arab Reports and Records (henceforth ARR) 16-31 Jan 1977.p. 35.
8- Interior Minister Sayid Husayn Fahmi announced on 20 January 1977 that the authorities had uncovered a plot to burn Cairo. As reported by Middle East News Agency (henceforth MENA) and quoted in ARR 16-31 January 1977.p. 35 Public Prosecutor Ibrahim al-Qalyubi announced on 26 January that "two hundred suspects have been arrested and are being questioned by the security forces for being linked with subversive groups – namely the Egyptian Communist labor party, the Revolutionary Current and Eighth of January organizations. "ARR, 16 -31 January 1977. p. 35, then on 30 January Prime Minister Mamduh Salim repeated the same accusations in the People's Assembly, adding that the National Progressive Unionist party, one of Egypt's legitimate parties but one that is leftist and Nasserite. Had involved itself shamefully in this abominable national crime. "al-Ahram, 31January 1977.
9- The Egyptian cabinet on 26 January 1977 issued an order banning all demonstrations and strikes, Le Monde, 27 Jan. 1977.
10- The group calls itself Gama at al-muslimin (the Muslim Group). But the security forces and the mass media call it al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra group (Repentance and Holy Flight' (RHF). After initial resentment of this imposed name. members of the group began gradually to adopt it as their own.
11- The estimated number of those Killed in shootouts was six, and those injured in shootouts and explosions numbered fifty – seven, ARR, 1-15 July 1977. Eventually all top leaders of RHF as well as some 620 members of the group were arrested, of which 465 were to stand trial before military courts, al-Ahram, 21 July 1977.
12- See especially Sadat 's statements in interviews published in the Cairo weekly Uktubir, 18 and 25 December 1977.
13- The original wafd party was established in 1919 as a result of a popular uprising in that year. The founder and leader of the party until 1928 was the Egyptian nationalist Saad Zaghloul. The party continued under the leadership of his successor, Mustafa al-Nhhas, as a grassroots majority party until it was banned along with all other parties in 1953 by the new revolutionary regime. During 1977 some of the survivors of the old wafd began attempts to resurrect the party. The initial rallying of many young and prominent intellectuals took Sadat 's regime by surprise. In 1978 regime was to resort to legal, constitutional, and plebiscite maneuvers to ban several of the leaders of the New Wafd from political life. In mid-1978 the party decided to dissolve itself rather than function without its prominent figures, namely Fu'as Sirag al-Din and Ibrahim Farag.
14- See Sadat 's speech at Alexandria University, al-Ahram, 27 July 1977.
15- al-Ahram, 20 April 1974. reported that eleven people were killed and twenty seven wounded when the group, henceforth MA, attacked the Technical Military Academy on 18 April 1974.
16- See for example Humphreys, "Islam and Political Values" ; Dekmejian. "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival"; Nazih Ayubi, "The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt, "mem. (April,1980) Ali Dessouki, "the Resurgence of Islamic Movement in Egypt, Mem. (1979).
17- Al-Da'wa, unlike most Egyptian opposition publications, never veiled its outright disapproval. The reader can see the escalation of its criticism of the whole Sadat peace strategy, starting with its issue of December 1977 and continuing through 1979.
18- An example of the use of one incident as a pretext for an all-out crackdown on Islamic groups was the government 's arrest of members of two other religious groups in the aftermath of the confrontation with RHF. Thus according to Uktubir magazine. 28 August 1977, security authorities had arrested 104 members of an extremist religious group calling itself Jund Allah (Soldiers of God) Two days later al-Ahram reported. 30 August 1977, that "security police had arrested eighty of the leaders of a group called Jihad ('Holy Struggle') in Alexandria. "No violent showdowns were reported, but the media alleged that the two groups were preparing and plotting an attack on the state and its citizens.
19- al-Khawarij, or Kharajites, were a group of early Muslim dissidents who sought strict adherence to Islamic egalitarian and pious principles as they saw them. They disapproved of the behavior and action of the fourth Guided Caliph Ali, as well as that of his challenger Mu'awiya. The Kharajites fought both at one time and never consented to the central authority of the Umayyad in Damascus or the Abbasids in Baghdad. The mainstream Sunni establishment consider the Kharajites heretics. The term has now come to be used in describing any group that the established political and religious authority perceives as threatening the 'unity' of society by rebelling. For a concise account of the evolution of Kharajites in history see Fazlur Rahman, Islam (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966) pp. 167-80 .
20- The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, One of its avowed principles was the creation of an Islamic society through the application of the Shari'a. it gradually grew until it became one of the largest mass movements in Egypt during the 1940s. for a detailed account the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood see Ishaq Musa Husayni, The Moslem Brethren, the Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements, trans. From Arabic (Beirut: Kayat College Book Cooperative, 1956) Richard Mitchell. The Society of the Moslem Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
21- These were later revealed to us by members of the two groups themselves. The honesty tests were designed to see if we were consistent and reliable. Different militants would ask us at various times the same questions about ourselves or other matters and then compare our answers.
22- The security checks, as the militants later told us. Put members of the research team under surveillance for several weeks. When they told us the kind of things they knew abut us (including some very personal information) we were quite impressed but also somewhat frightened by their intelligence network.
23- The veiling that the militants demanded of the female members of the team varied widely. Some militants insisted on complete covering of the body, including the face. Others were satisfied with long. Maxi-type dresses with full sleeves and with a covering for the hair.
24- President sadat 's most violent attack on the Iranian Revolution and the ayatollah Khomeini came in a long television interview on 25 December 1979 (his birthday) which was reported fully in al-Ahram the following day. Among other things, he described Khomeini as a "lunatic madman … who has turned Islam into a mockery." In the same interview Sadat renewed his invitation to the exiled Shah to reside in Egypt, an invitation the Shah accepted in March 1980.
25- See articles already cited: Mitchell, Husayni, Humphreys, Altman, and Dekmejian.
26- See Sadat 's speech before Egypt 's people 's Assembly, al-Ahram, 16 May 1980, in which he proposed a constitutional amendment to appease the Muslim groups but in which he insisted on separation of religion and state.
27- Husayn al-Dhahabi, who was kidnapped and assassinated by RHF, was a typical example of the establishmentarian ulama of al-Azher, While a minister of religious endowments and religious affairs, he mounted blistering attacks on militant groups. Calling them misguided. In that he echoes the line of the ruling elite toward these groups.
28- Sheikh 'Ali Abd al-Raziq especially was condemned by the militants for his famous book, al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Foundations of Governance) in which advocated a secular theory of state.
29- See al-Ahram, 7 July 1977. for more details about those arrested and their backgrounds see al-Ahram 7-20 July 1977.
30- This Kind of proposition is to be found. For example. Enic Hoffer. The True Believer: thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (New York: Harper, 1951) The Ordeal of Change (New York: Harper & Row, 1963) Reflections on the Human Condition (New York: Hark Harper & Row 1973) An exponent of similar arguments is Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of social Movements (New York: Wiley, 1941); The Politics of Despair (New York: Basic Books, 1958)
31- Most of the RHF enterprises were small in scale and in an embryonic stage at The time of the group 's showdown with the government. These enterprises included bakeries, Bookshops, candy making and vegetable gardening.
32- It was such attempts to penalize former members that first drew government attention to the potential strength and danger of RHF. See al-Ahram. 7 July 1977.
33- The saying of the Prophet is addressed to all Muslims "Whom of you sees a repugnance (munkarun) he must remove it with his hands: if unable, then by his tongue; and if unable. Unable, then by his heart, and that is the least the pious can do.
34- For details on this early period of Islam. Consult any of the standard references on the history of Islam, the Arabs, or the Middle East. See for example, Fazlur Rahman, Islam (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966) S.C Coon, Caravan: the story of the Middle East (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 1958) Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History (London: Hutchinson Univ. Library, 1950) The flight from Mecca to Medina the day of the first year of the Islamic calendar.
35- This strategy by the Prophet Muhammad is explicitly discussed by Fazlur Rahman in Islam, pp 18-29.
36- As those RHF members reported it to the research team, "The group debated several places to start its new community of believers. "The sites included Yemen. Libya, The Sudan, and several spots in Egypt. Two sites were actually used by RHF. One was in Minya governorate in Upper Egypt. The second and more important was in the desert strip between Ma'adi, Ma'asara, and Helwan, south of Cairo. The group however, never moved entirely to either site.
37- Three MA leaders (Salih Siriya, Karim al-Anaduli, and Tallal al-Ansari) and five RHF leaders (Shukri Mustafa, Mahir A.Bakri Zanati, Ahmad Tariq 'Abd al-'Alim, Amwar Ma'mun Saqr, and Mustafa A.Ghazi) were sentenced to death. All but one (Tallal al-Ansari, whose sentence was reduced to life imprisonment) were actually executed on 9 November 1976 and 19 March 1978, of the other ninety-two MA members tried by the state security court, twenty-nine were found guilty and sentenced to varying penalties (eight to life imprisonment; seven to fifteen years; eight to ten years; and six to four years). Of the 204 RHF members who were tried, thirty six were found guilty (twelve received life sentences, six got ten years with hard labor, and the remainder received sentences varying from five to ten Years) al-Ahram, I December 1977.
38- MA members who this contention claimed that one member of the group who was part of the plan betrayed them by informing the state security forces of the intended plot to overthrow the regime. Curiously enough the informant was not taken seriously for several hours, and that enabled MA to implement the first part of its plan successfully-that is, the occupation of the Technical Military Academy. By the time they were to move on to Arab Socialist Union building to carry out the second part of the plan, the authorities had already acted on the information and had started a siege and a counterattack on the academy, al-Gumhuriya, 21 April 1974.
39- A typical example of this was reported in al-Ahram, I April 1980 quoting the minister the interior's account to the People's Assembly of a student conference that began in a mosque in Asyut. Then was converted into a march across the city protesting Sadat 's invitation to the Shah to reside in Egypt and also protesting the peace treaty with Israel. Islamic in other universities staged similar demonstrations.
40- For an account of these movements see Fazlur Rahman, Islam, pp. 193-254: and Zeinab al-Bakry, "Mahdiyya Movement in the Sudan with a Comparison of Wahhabis and Sanusiyya, "unpublished M.A. thesis in sociology, American University in Cairo 1977.
41- For the meaning of 'puritanical. Fundamental, and 'neotraditionalist, see John A. Williams, "A Return to the Veil in Egypt, pp. 51-55; Stephen Humphreys, "Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, Middle East Journal, vol. 11,no. I, winter 1979, pp 1-19 Ali Dessouki, "The Resurgence of Islamic Movements in Egypt, mem,: Nazih Ayubi, "The Political Revival of Islam, mem. In oral remarks to the author, Professor Nikki Keddie suggested that the term neotraditionalists 'describes most of the militant Islamic movements of recent times (such as the Wahhabis and the Iranian Revolution).
42- Muhammad 'Abduh (1854-1905) an Egyptian religious thinker, was a disciple of Jamal al-Din Afghani, but he was significantly less militant in the latter part of his life. He is credited with serious attempts to modernize Islamic thought by showing that Islam is consistent with reason, science, and adoption of modern technology. Among his famous writings is Rasa 'il al-ghufran (Messages of Atonement') For more on Muhammad 'Abduh see Malcolm Kerr, Islamic Reform: The political and Legal Theories of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).
43- Al-Shubban al-Muslimin, literally Muslim Youth. Was established in 1927 in emulation of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA). The founders, headed by a retired army general, Salih Harb , meant it to be a nonpolitical, social, and athletic organization.
44- This typology is an adaptation of that proposed by David F. Alberle in The Peyote Religion among the Navaho (Chicago: Aldine, 1966) Alberle 's typology entails only four types (two by two) along the two axes of locus and amount of change.
45- The Kharajites (al-Khawary) were the first dissident group in Islam: see note 18. One fundamental tenet of the Kharajites is insistence on the unity of faith and deeds. Thus a tyrant a tyrant ruler is not to be obeyed, nor can there be obedience to a sinful command. This goes against the mainstream Sunni doctrine, which would tolerate a tyrant for the sake of preserving the unity the umma. See Fazlur Rahman, Islam, pp 168-70.
46- Other militant Islamic movements in premodern times include the Shia, on and off from the end of the first Islamic century to the present. One of the Shia sub-sects, the Isma'ilis, staged a revolt and a socioreligious campaign under the leadership of Hamdan Qarmat, after whom they came to be called Qarmatiyas (al-Qaramita). He established a post near Kufa (A.D. 890) in Iraq and levied taxes on his followers. This process of taxation was soon replaced by a communist – type society (common ownership of all objects of general utility in the imam). See Fazlur Rahman Islam, p. 176 . Bernard Lewis surveys many modern militant Islamic movements and argues that some two hundred such cades were primarily resistance movements against foreign intrusion, The Return of Islam, pp. 17-20 .
47- The Wahhabi movement began in the latter decades of the eighteenth century. Its founder, Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, a puritanical fundamentalist, allied himself politically with the house of al-Sa'ud of Najd in central Arabia. Together they began a drive to unite Arabia and to institute fundamentalist Islamic Institutions. Despite the ups and downs of this alliance. Vis-à-vis the outside world. It persisted and finally triumphed politically in the early decades of the twentieth century. Saudi Arabia today is a culmination of this effort. For more details on 'the Wahhabis. See John S .Habib. the Ikhwan Movement the Najd: its Rise, Development and Decline (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press. 1970) Harry S. Philiby, Saudi Arabia (Beirut: Librairie du Liban. 1968)
48- The data on the Muslim Brotherhood are derived from R . Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood; I.M. Husayni, the Moslem brethren: and Christina Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: the Role the Muslim Brother hood (The Hague: Mouton 1964)
49- Our data on the Mujahidin in Iran are derived from Ervand Abrahamian. "The Guerrilla Movements in Iran 1963-77 "in MERIP Reports, 86, March/ April, 1980, pp 3-15 The social profile of the Mujahidin could be inferred from the characteristics of those who died during the struggle against the Shah's regime. Of some eighty known cases, thirty were college students five teachers, fourteen engineers, ten professionals and office workers, ten women (including housewives) two shopkeepers, two workers, one clergyman. And six of unknown occupational background.
50- The concept of the new middle class come to modern-educated university graduates, professionals, or salaried employees. For a full discussion of this social formation see Halpern, Politics of Social change. Pp. 51-68.
51- For substantiation and elaboration of this point is, the appeal of the Brotherhood to the lower-middle class in Egypt) see Mitchell, Brotherhood, and Ayubi. "Political Revival."
52- The social profiles of those who joined militant leftist movements in both Iran and Egypt were similar to those of their Islamic counterparts in several respects. For a substantiation of this contention in Iran see Abrahamian "The Guerrilla Movements, especially table I and table 11 .P.5 For information about militant Egyptian leftists we relied on published lists in al-Ahram and ARR of over two hundred alleged members of communist organizations (for example, the Egyptian communist party, communist labor party) who have been charged, tried or sentenced during the period from January 1977 to April 1980 . of 198 whose occupations were identified, sixty-eight were students, sixty-one were professionals, twenty –eight were workers. Twenty-five were middle-and lower-level civil servants, eight were peasants and eight were small shopkeepers.
53- On this point see R.S. Humphreys, "Islam and Political Values"
54- See Janet Abu-Lughod. Migrant Adjustment to city life: The Egyptian case," American Journal of Sociology, 67/1, July 1961, pp 22-32.
اللائحتان العامة والعالمية لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين
اهتمَّت جماعة الإخوان المسلمين منذ نشأتها سنة 1928م بتوضيح فكرتها وتبيان حقيقة دعوتها وكونها هيئةً إسلاميةً جامعةً، تحمل مشروع اليقظة في العالم الإسلامي كله، ولذلك أكدت منذ البداية مرجعيتها الإسلامية ومنهجها في العمل، وسجَّلت كل ذلك في أدبياتها الكثيرة التي تحتشد في المكتبات ويعتمد عليها الباحثون والدارسون في شتَّى التخصصات.
ومما سجَّله المؤرِّخون في مرحلة مبكرة النهج المؤسسي الذي اعتمدته جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، وبيَّنته في لوائح واضحة محددة بكل دقة، تؤكد إدراك الجماعة المبكر لأهمية العمل المؤسسي وأسسه وقواعده، التي تنظِّم هيكل الجماعة وعلاقة مستوياتها المختلفة ببعضها وتحدد مسئوليات كل مستوى في نظامها الداخلي.
من هذا المنطلق يعلن الإخوان المسلمون اللائحتين العامة والعالمية للجماعة، وإلى النص:
اللائحة العامة لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين
مادة (1) الهيئات الرئيسية
أولاً- المرشد العام
ثانيًا- مكتب الإرشاد
ثالثًا- مجلس الشورى
رابعًا- مجالس شورى المحافظات
خامسًا- المكاتب الإدارية للمحافظات
الشورى ومكتب الإرشاد
مادة (2) المرشد العام هو مرشد الجماعة وممثلها، وبالإضافة إلى مسئولياته واختصاصاته طبقًا للائحة العامة هو الرئيس العام للجماعة في مصر ورئيس كل من مكتب الإرشاد ومجلس الشورى، وله حق حضور جميع أقسام وتشكيلات الجماعة وتنظيماتها ورئاستها، والمرجع في كل ما يتعلق به إلى اللائحة العامة.
مادة (3) للمرشد العام أن يخول نائبه الأول بعض اختصاصاته حسبما تقتضيه المصلحة، وله أن ينيب غيره من النواب في رئاسة مكتب الإرشاد أو مجلس الشورى أو في غير ذلك من أقسام وتشكيلات الجماعة وتنظيماتها.
مادة (4) في حالة غياب المرشد العام خارج الجمهورية أو تعذر قيامه بمهامه لمرض أو لعذر طارئ يقوم نائبه الأول مقامه في جميع اختصاصاته.
مادة (5) في حالة حدوث موانع قهرية تحول دون مباشرة المرشد لمهامه يحل محله نائبه الأول ثم الأقدم فالأقدم من النواب ثم الأكبر فالأكبر من أعضاء مكتب الإرشاد.
الفصل الثاني- مكتب الإرشاد
مادة (6) مكتب الإرشاد:
هو الهيئة الإدارية والقيادة التنفيذية العليا وهو المشرف على سير الدعوة والموجه لسياستها وإدارتها والمختص بكل شئونها وبتنظيم أقسامها وتشكيلاتها.
مادة (7) تكوين مكتب الإرشاد:
يتكون مكتب الإرشاد- فضلاً عن المرشد العام- من:
أ) ستة عشر عضوًا ينتخبهم مجلس الشورى من بين أعضائه بطريق الاقتراع السري على أن يكون من كل قطاع جغرافي عضو واحد على الأقل.
ب) ثلاثة أعضاء على الأكثر يجوز لمكتب الإرشاد تعيينهم بأغلبية أعضائه المنتخبين المقيمين بالجمهورية.
جـ) يشترط حصول العضو المنتخب على أكثر من نصف أصوات أعضاء مجلس الشورى الحاضرين بجلسة الاقتراع، فإذا لم يتحقق ذلك في الاقتراع الأول أعيد الاقتراع على أن ينحصر الاختيار بين مَن حصلوا على أعلى أصوات في الاقتراع الأول، فإذا كان عددهم يزيد على ضعف العدد المطلوب استكماله يقتصر الاقتراع بين ضعف العدد المطلوب من الحائزين على أكثر الأصوات.
وفي حالة خلو مكان أحد الأعضاء المنتخبين يحل محله من يليه في آخر اقتراع في عدد الأصوات من الفئة التي ينتمي إليها بشرط ألا يقل عن 40% من عدد الأعضاء الحاضرين بجلسة الاقتراع، فإذا لم يتحقق ذلك انتخب مجلس الشورى في أول اجتماعٍ له مَن يحل محله.
وإذا زالت عضوية أحد الأعضاء المعينين جاز لمكتب الإرشاد أن يعين من يحل محله.
مادة (8) شروط عضوية مكتب الإرشاد:
يشترط فيمن ينتخب أو يعين عضوًا بمكتب الإرشاد الآتي:
أ) أن يكون قد بلغ من العمر ثلاثين سنة.
ب) أن يكون قد مضت على قبوله عضوًا بالجماعة عشر سنوات على الأقل.
جـ) أن يكون عضوًا بمجلس الشورى.
د) أن يكون متصفًا بالصفة الخلقية والعلمية التي تؤهله لمهام المكتب ومسئولياته، ويستثنى العضوان المقيمان بالخارج من شرط عضوية مجلس الشورى.
هـ) يجوز لمكتب الإرشاد بموافقة أحد عشر عضوًا من أعضائه المنتخبين المقيمين بالجمهورية استثناء الأعضاء المعينين من الشرطين المنصوص عليهما بالفقرتين ب، ج، وفي هذه الحالة يعتبر العضو المعين بالمكتب عضوًا معينًا بمجلس الشورى، ولو جاوز ذلك العدد الجائز لمكتب الإرشاد تعيينه على أن تجبر الزيادة عند خلو مكان أحد الأعضاء المعينين.
و) باستثناء رئيس المكتب الإداري لمحافظة القاهرة لا يجوز الجمع بين عضوية مكتب الإرشاد وعضوية المكاتب الإدارية.
وفي حالة انتخاب رئيس المكتب الإداري أو تعيينه عضوًا بمكتب الإرشاد ينتخب مجلس شورى المحافظة رئيسًا له وللمكتب الإداري من بين ممثليه في مجلس الشورى العام، فإذا لم يكن للمحافظة ممثلون في مجلس الشورى العام غير الرئيسي السابق انتخب من بين أعضائه رئيسًا له وللمكتب الإداري، ويعتبر العضو المنتخب في هذه الحالة عضوًا بمجلس الشورى العام على أن تجبر الزيادة عند أول خلو.
وفي حالة انتخاب أحد أعضاء المكتب الإداري عضوًا بمكتب الإرشاد أو تعيينه ينتخب مجلس شورى المحافظة من يحل محله في عضوية مكتب إداري المحافظة.
مادة (9) مدة عضوية المكتب:
أ) مدة عضوية مكتب الإرشاد أربع سنوات اعتبارًا من تاريخ أول انعقاد للمكتب بعد تمام إجراءات انتخابه على ألا يتأخر ذلك عن خمسة عشر يومًا من بداية دورة مجلس الشورى التي تجري فيها الانتخابات وتكون مدة الأعضاء المعينين لنهاية مدة المكتب المنتخب أيًّا كان تاريخ تعيينهم.
ب) يكمل العضو الذي يحل محل غيره المدة المقررة للمكتب طبقًا للفقرة (أ) السابقة.
جـ) في جميع الأحوال أيضًا تستمر عضوية المكتب ولو تجاوزت المدد المشار إليها آنفًا إلى أن يجتمع مجلس الشورى وينتخب المكتب الجديد.
د) يجوز لمجلس الشورى تجديد انتخاب الأعضاء الذين انتهت مدة عضويتهم لدورة واحدة تالية فقط ولا يجوز للمكتب تعيين عضو المكتب لأكثر من مرة واحدة.
مادة (10) زوال العضوية:
تزول عضوية مكتب الإرشاد لأحد الأسباب الآتية:
ب) انتهاء مدة العضوية دون تجديدها.
جـ) طلب الإعفاء ويجوز للمكتب قبول الطلب أو مراجعة العضو، ويعتبر طلب الإعفاء مقبولاً إذا لم يسحبه العضو خلال ستين يومًا من تاريخ تقديمه رغم مراجعة المكتب له.
د) فقد العضو الصلاحية لأسباب صحية أو غيرها، ويصدر قرار الإعفاء من مجلس الشورى باقتراع سري بأغلبية عدد أعضائه بناءً على طلب مكتب الإرشاد أو عشرين عضوًا من أعضاء مجلس الشورى بعد تحقيق تجريه لجنة التحقيق المشار إليها بالبند (م) من المادة 17 بالباب الثالث.
هـ) قيام ظروف قهرية تحول دون إمكان مباشرة العضو مهامه مدة تزيد على ستة أشهر ويصدر قرار الإعفاء من مكتب الإرشاد بعد أخذ رأي اللجنة المشار إليها في البند (م) من المادة 17 من الفصل الثالث بأغلبية أحد عشر عضوًا من أعضاء المكتب المقيمين بالجمهورية.
و) بالنسبة للعضوين المقيمين بالخارج تزول العضوية بانتهاء إقامة العضو بصفة مستقرة بالخارج، ويصدر القرار بزوال العضوية في هذه الحالة مكتب الإرشاد على النحو المشار إليه بالفقرة السابقة.
مادة (11) اجتماعات مكتب الإرشاد.
أ) مقر مكتب الإرشاد واجتماعاته تكون بالقاهرة ويجوز انعقاده بمكان آخر إذا دعت الضرورة لذلك بناءً على قرارٍ من المرشد العام أو أغلبية أعضاء المكتب.
ب) تكون اجتماعات مكتب الإرشاد اجتماعات دورية يحددها، وللمرشد العام أن يدعو المكتب لاجتماعاتٍ أخرى كلما وجد داعيًا لذلك، كما يجب دعوة المكتب كلما طلب خمسة من أعضائه ذلك.
هـ) تكون اجتماعات المكتب صحيحة بحضور أكثر من نصف أعضائه المقيمين بالجمهورية، وفي حالة تخلف المرشد العام ونائبه الأول عن حضور اجتماع المكتب يرأس الجلسة أقدم نواب المرشد ثم أكبر الأعضاء سنًا.
د) فيما عدا ما ورد بشأنه نص خاص تصدر قرارات المكتب بأغلبية أعضائه الحاضرين، وفي حالة تساوي الأصوات يعتبر الأمر المعروض غير موافق عليه، ويجوز إعادة عرضه للمداولة فيه في ذات الجلسة أو في جلسة أخرى، فإذا تساوت الأصوات بشأنه في المرة الثانية رجح الجانب الذي فيه المرشد العام إن كان حاضرًا أو نائبه الذي يحل محله، فإن لم يكن أيهما حاضرًا اعتبر الموضوع مرفوضًا.
هـ- يشكل مكتب الإرشاد من بين أعضائه المقيمين بالقاهرة هيئة دائمة يرأسها المرشد العام أو نائبه الأول، وتضم أربعةً من الأعضاء، ويكون لهذه الهيئة حق اتخاذ القرارات في الحالات الآتية:
1- القرارات العاجلة في الظروف الطارئة التي لا تتحمل انتظار دعوة المكتب للانعقاد.
2- المسائل الجارية التي لا تعتبر ذات أهمية بالغة.
ويجب إحاطة الهيئة العامة لمكتب الإرشاد بقرارات الهيئة الدائمة في أول اجتماع لهيئة المكتب العامة ويكون لمكتب الإرشاد بهيئته العامة تقرير ما يراه بشأن قرارات الهيئة الدائمة.
مادة (12): مع عدم الإخلال بأحكام اللائحة العامة يكون مجلس الشورى هو السلطة التشريعية لجماعة الإخوان في مصر، ويكون مختصًا بمناقشة السياسات العامة التي تتبعها وإقرارها، والخطة العامة والوسائل التنفيذية اللازمة لها، وكذا مناقشة التقارير السنوية التي يتقدم بها المكتب.
ويتكون مكتب الشورى من:
أ) خمسة وسبعين عضوًا على الأقل وتسعين عضوًا على الأكثر يختارون بطريق الاقتراع السري من بين أعضاء مجالس شورى المحافظات طبقًا لأحكام المادة (13) التالية.
ب) ما لا يزيد على خمسة عشر عضوًا يجوز لمكتب الإرشاد تعيينهم.
جـ) ويكون عضوًا بحكم اللائحة، كل مَن سبق توليه عضوية مكتب الإرشاد مدةً لا تقل عن عامين طبقًا لأحكام هذه اللائحة ما لم يكن زوال عضويته من المكتب لأسباب فقد الصلاحية المنصوص عليها في الفقرة "د" من المادة (10) من هذه اللائحة.
أ) ينتخب مجلس شورى كل محافظة عددًا من بين أعضائه الذين لم يكتسبوا عضوية مجلس الشورى بحكم اللائحة لعضوية مجلس الشورى العام كما هو موضح في البيان التالي:
- القاهرة الكبرى:
1- القاهرة 5 أعضاء.
2- الجيزة 5 أعضاء.
3- القليوبية عضوان.
- الإسكندرية 6 أعضاء.
- السويس عضو.
- الإسماعيلية عضو.
- شمال سيناء عضو.
- بورسعيد عضو.
- الدقهلية 10 أعضاء.
- دمياط 4 أعضاء.
- الشرقية 8 أعضاء.
- المنوفية 5 أعضاء.
- الغربية 5 أعضاء.
- البحيرة 6 أعضاء.
- كفر الشيخ عضوان.
- الفيوم عضوان.
- بنى سويف عضوان.
- المنيا عضوان.
- أسيوط عضوان.
- سوهاج عضوان.
- قنا عضو.
- أسوان عضو.
- الوادي الجديد عضو
المجموع 75 (خمسة وسبعون عضوًا).
ويجوز بقرار من مكتب الإرشاد تعديل العدد المخصص لكل محافظة، مع وجوب مراعاة المجموع الكلي للأعضاء المنصوص عليه بالمادة السابقة، ويجب أن يحصل العضو المنتخب على أكثر من نصف أصوات أعضاء مجلس شورى المحافظة الحاضرين بجلسة الاقتراع، فإذا لم يتحقق الأول أُعيد الاقتراع على أن ينحصر الاختيار بين ضعف العدد المطلوب استكماله ممن حصلوا على أعلى الأصوات في الاقتراع السابق.
وإذا خلا مكان أحد الأعضاء المنتخبين انتخب مجلس شورى المحافظة المختص مَن يحل محله.
وإذا خلا مكان أحد الأعضاء المعينين جاز لمكتب الإرشاد أن يعين مَن يحل محله.
ب) ينتخب الإخوان المصريون المقيمون بالخارج ثلاثة أعضاء طبقًا للائحة الخاصة بهم.
في مباشرته لمهام المجلس يمثل العضو المنتخب أو المعين الدعوة بصفة عامة.
مادة (15) شروط عضوية مجلس الشورى:
يشترط في عضو مجلس الشورى المنتخب الآتي:
أ) أن يكون مصريًّا بلغ من العمر ثلاثين سنة.
ب) أن يكون قد مضى على قبوله عضوًا عاملاً بالجماعة خمس سنوات.
جـ) أن يكون عضوًا بمجلس شورى المحافظة، ويُستثنى الأعضاء الممثلين المقيمين بالخارج.
د) أن يكون متصفًا بالصفات العلمية والخلقية التي تؤهله لعضوية المجلس.
هـ) يجوز لمكتب الإرشاد أن يتجاوز- بالنسبة للأعضاء المعينين- عن الشروط المنصوص عليها في الفقرات أ، ب، جـ من هذه المادة.
أ- مدة عضوية مجلس الشورى:
مدة عضوية مجلس الشورى أربع سنوات تبدأ من تاريخ انعقاد أول دورة للمجلس بعد انتخاب أعضائه، وتنتهي عضوية جميع الأعضاء المنتخبين والمعينين- أيًّا كان تاريخ تعيينهم- بانتهاء هذه المدة، ويكمل العضو الذي يحل محل غيره مدة سلفه.
ب) وإذا قامت ظروف قاهرة حالت دون إتمام انتخاب مجلس الشورى في الموعد المقرر استمر المجلس القائم في أداء مهامه إلى أن يتم انتخاب المجلس الذي يخلفه.
مادة (17) اجتماعات مجلس الشورى:
أ) يجتمع مجلس الشورى بدعوةٍ من المرشد العام دورتين كل عام، الأول خلال النصف الأول من شهر صفر والثانية خلال النصف الأول من شهر شعبان.
ب) يضع مكتب الإرشاد جدول أعمال كل دورة وتستمر اجتماعات المجلس إلى أن ينتهي من نظر الأعمال المدرجة في جدول الأعمال؛ وذلك دون إخلالٍ بحقِّ المجلس في استبعاد ما يرى استبعاده وتأجيل ما يرى تأجيله من الموضوعات المدرجة في جدول الأعمال، ويُضاف إلى جدول الأعمال الموضوعات التي يطلب عشرة من أعضاء المجلس إضافتها.
جـ) يجوز دعوة مجلس الشورى لاجتماع طارئ من المرشد العام أو بناءً على قرار مكتب الإرشاد، وإذا دعت حاجة لذلك.
د) على المرشد العام دعوة مجلس الشورى للانعقاد خلال خمسة عشر يومًا إذا طلب عشرون من أعضائه ذلك.
هـ) يكون اجتماع المجلس صحيحًا بحضور أكثر من نصف عدد أعضائه، وفي حالة غياب المرشد العام ونائبه الأول أو من ينيبه المرشد العام لرئاسة الجلسة يرأس الجلسة الأقدم فالأقدم من نواب المرشد العام ثم أكبر الحاضرين سنًّا من أعضاء مكتب الإرشاد ثم الأكبر فالأكبر سنًّا من أعضاء المجلس.
و) تصدر قرارات المجلس بأغلبية الأعضاء الحاضرين، وذلك فيما عدا الأحوال التي يشترط فيها نصاب خاص فيجب توفر النصاب المشروط، وفي حالة تساوي الأصوات يعتبر الموضوع محل الاقتراع غير موافق عليه.
ز) يقدم مكتب الإرشاد في الاجتماع السنوي الأول لمجلس الشورى تقريرًا شاملاً عن نشاط الدعوة وأعمال المكتب خلال العام السابق، كما يتضمن التقرير إيضاحًا لبرنامج العمل والسياسة التي يرى اتباعها خلال السنة التالية، ويناقش مجلس الشورى التقرير، ولكلٍّ من أعضائه أن يتقدَّم بما يراه من مقترحات، وينفذ مكتب الإرشاد ما يتم تصديق المجلس عليه.
وفي غير حالات الضرورة يطلب مكتب الإرشاد تصديق مجلس الشورى على قرارات المكتب المتعلقة بالمشاركة في الحكم أو في الانتخابات العامة أو إنشاء حزب أو غيرها مما له أهمية خاصة.
ح) ينتخب مجلس الشورى في أول اجتماع له أعضاء مكتب الإرشاد كلما حل موعد انتهاء عضوية المكتب السابق، كما تستكمل العضويات الشاغرة.
ط) مع مراعاة نصوص اللائحة العامة وفي حالة خلو منصب المرشد العام يحل محله نائبه في مصر ويتولى مكتب الإرشاد دعوة مجلس الشورى للاجتماع خلال مدة لا تزيد على ثلاثين يومًا للتداول في اختيار مرشح لمنصب المرشد العام، ولا يكون اجتماع المجلس في هذه الحالة صحيحًا إلا بحضور ثلاثة أرباع عدد أعضائه، ويكون قراره بتزكية اسم المرشح لمنصب المرشد العام بأغلبية خمسة وخمسين عضوًا من أعضائه.
ى) إذا لم تتوافر الأغلبية المشار إليها في البند السابق، يؤجل الاجتماع مدة لا تقل عن خمسة عشر يومًا ولا تزيد على ثلاثين يومًا، ويعيد مكتب الإرشاد الدعوة لاجتماعٍ ثانٍ يكون صحيحًا بحضور أكثر من نصف عدد أعضاء مجلس الشورى ويكون قرار التزكية صحيحًا بموافقة خمسة وأربعين عضوًا من أعضاء المجلس.
ك) في حالة عدم توافر الأغلبية المشار إليها في البند السابق يؤجل الاجتماع لمدة لا تقل عن خمسة عشر يومًا ولا تزيد على ثلاثين يومًا، ويكرر مكتب الإرشاد الدعوة لاجتماع ثالث يكون صحيحًا بحضور أكثر من نصف عدد أعضاء المجلس، ويكون قرار التزكية معتبرًا بأغلبية أصوات الحاضرين.
ل) تكون اجتماعات مجلس الشورى بالقاهرة أو في أي مكان آخر يحدده مكتب الإرشاد.
م) ينتخب مجلس الشورى من بين أعضائه لجنة تحقيق تتكون من ثلاثة أعضاء أصليين وثلاثة أعضاء احتياطيين يحلون محل الأعضاء الأصليين إذا وجد مانع لديهم أو لدى أحدهم، وتختص لجنة التحقيق بما يحيله إليها المرشد العام أو مكتب الإرشاد أو المجلس مما يمس سلوك أحد الأعضاء أو يفقد الثقة به، وتقترح هذه اللجنة الجزاء الذي تراه مناسبًا، وتعرض قرارها على مكتب الإرشاد أو المجلس طبقًا لاختصاص كل منهما.
مادة (18) زوال العضوية:
تزول عضوية مجلس الشورى لأحد الأسباب الآتية:
ب) انتهاء مدة العضوية دون تجديدها.
جـ) طلب العضو إعفاءه.
د) فقد الصلاحية لأسباب صحية أو غيرها، ويصدر القرار بالإعفاء من العضوية في هذه الحالة باقتراع سري بأغلبية عدد أعضاء المجلس بعد تحقيق تجريه اللجنة المشار إليها في البند (م) من المادة 17 من الباب الثالث.
هـ) قيام ظروف قهرية تحول دون إمكانية مباشرة مهام عضويته دون عذر مقبول، ويصدر القرار بالإعفاء من العضوية في هذه الحالة باقتراع سري بأغلبية عدد أعضاء المجلس.
و) وبالنسبة للأعضاء المنتخبين من الأخوة المصريين في الخارج تزول العضوية بانتهاء إقامة العضو بالخارج إقامة مستقرة ويصدر مكتب الإرشاد قرارًا بذلك بعد أخذ رأي المسئول بالخارج.
الفصل الرابع: مجالس شورى المحافظات
مادة (19) تشكيل مجلس شورى المحافظة:
يُشكَّل بكل محافظة مجلس شورى يحدد مكتب الإرشاد عدد أعضائه، ويختاره الأعضاء العاملون بالمحافظة طبقًا للإجراءات التي يعتمدها مكتب الإرشاد.
ويجوز لمكتب الإرشاد أن يضمَّ إلى الأعضاء المختارين عددًا لا يزيد عن الخمس بعد أخذ رأي المكتب الإداري، ويُعتبر عضوًا بمجلس شورى المحافظة التي يتبعها من عُيِّن عضوًا بمجلس الشورى العام أو اكتسب عضويته بحكم اللائحة، طبقًا للفقرة (ج) من المادة (12)، ويجوز بقرار من مكتب الإرشاد ضمُّ أكثر من محافظة ليكون لها معًا مجلس شورى واحد ومكتب إداري مشترك، وفي هذه الحالة يحدِّد مكتب الإرشاد عدد الأعضاء الذين يمثلون كل محافظة لكل من مجلس الشورى والمكتب الإداري.
ويجوز لمكتب الإرشاد أن يقرر أن تكون لكل منطقة أو لعدد من المناطق بالمحافظة الواحدة مجلس شورى ومكتب إداري خاص، وفي هذه الحالة يحدِّد مكتب الإرشاد عدد الأعضاء الذين ينتخبهم مجلس شورى كل منطقة لمجلس الشورى العام من مجموع العدد المقرر للمحافظة.
مادة (20) شروط العضوية:
يشترط فيمن يُختار عضوًا في مجلس شورى المحافظة:
أ) أن لا يقل سنُّه عن 30 سنة.
ب) أن تكون قد مضت على قبوله عضوًا عاملاً بالجماعة خمس سنوات على الأقل.
جـ) أن يكون متصفًا بالصفات الخلقية والعلمية التي تؤهِّله لذلك.
مادة (21) مدة العضوية:
مدة عضوية مجلس شورى المحافظة أربع سنوات من التاريخ الذي يحدِّده مكتب الإرشاد لانتهاء إجراءات الاختيار في جميع المحافظات، ويسري ذلك بحق الأعضاء الذين يقرِّر مكتب الإرشاد تعيينهم لمجلس شورى المحافظة؛ أيًّا كان تاريخ التعيين.
وفي حالة خلوِّ مكان أحد الأعضاء المختارين، يختار الأعضاء العاملون مَن يحلُّ محلَّه، طبقًا للقواعد والإجراءات المعتمدة في هذا الشأن من مكتب الإرشاد، وفي جميع الأحوال يكمل العضو الجديد مدة سلفه.
مادة (22) زوال العضوية:
ب) انتهاء مدة العضوية، ويجوز تجديد اختيار العضو أو تعيينه.
د) تعذُّر قيام العضو بمهامِّ العضوية لأسباب صحية، أو غير ذلك من تخلِّفه عن مباشرة مهامِّ عضويته دون عذر مقبول.
هـ) فقدان الثقة والاعتبار.
ويكون زوال العضوية في الحالتين (د)، (هـ) بقرار من مكتب الإرشاد بأغلبية عدد أعضائه المقيمين بالجمهورية بعد أخذ رأي مكتب إداري المحافظة.
مادة (23) انعقاد مجلس شورى المحافظة:
أ) يكون انعقاد مجلس شورى المحافظة بعاصمة المحافظة ما لم يقررْ المكتب الإداري أو غالبية أعضاء المجلس انعقاده في مكان آخر.
ب) يرأس أولى جلسات مجلس شورى المحافظة أحد أعضاء مكتب الإرشاد أو أكبر الأعضاء الحاضرين سنًّا، وينتخب المجلس في هذه الجلسة- وبطريق الاقتراع السري- الأعضاء الذين يمثلون المحافظة في مجلس الشورى العام، طبقًا لما هو منصوص عليه بالمادة (76).
ثم ينتخب المجلس رئيسًا له من بين الأعضاء الذين تمَّ انتخابهم بمجلس الشورى العام ويكون أيضًا رئيسًا للمكتب الإداري.
ثم ينتخب المجلس بعد ذلك نائبًا للرئيس ثم أعضاء المكتب الإداري، مع مراعاة تمثيل مختلف المناطق ما أمكن ذلك، وتسري بحقِّ رئيس ونائب رئيس المكتب الإداري وأعضائه المنتخبين شرط النصاب والإجراءات المقرَّرة بشأن انتخاب أعضاء مجلس الشورى العام.
وإذا خلا مكان أحد أعضاء المكتب الإداري انتخب مجلس شورى المحافظة من يحلُّ محلَّه.
جـ) يجوز إعادة انتخاب رئيس المجلس ونائبه وأعضاء المكتب الإداري.
د) ينعقد مجلس شورى المحافظة بصفة دورية مرتين كل عام الأولى خلال الأسبوع الثاني من شهر محرم، والثانية خلال الأسبوع الثاني من شهر رجب، ويقدم إليه مكتب إداري المحافظة في الاجتماع السنوي الأول تقريرًا شاملاً عن سير الدعوة بالمحافظة خلال العام المنصرم، ولمجلس شورى المحافظة أن يناقش التقرير، وأن يُبدي ملاحظاته، وأن يُصدر توصياتٍ يبلغها لمكتب إداري المحافظة الذي عليه أن يقدمها في تقريره إلى مكتب الإرشاد.
هـ) يكون اجتماع مجلس الشورى بناءً على دعوة رئيسه أو نائبه، عند غيابه، ويجوز دعوته لاجتماع غير عادي بناءً على طلب رئيسه أو نائبه عند غيابه أو بقرار من مكتب إداري المحافظة أو كلما طلب نصف أعضائه ذلك، ويكون اجتماعه صحيحًا بحضور الرئيس أو نائبه أو من يُنيبه ونصف عدد الأعضاء، وتصدر قرارات المجلس وتوصياته بأغلبية الحاضرين.
الفصل الخامس: مكتب إداري المحافظة
مكتب إداري المحافظة هو الهيئة التنفيذية المسئولة عن تنفيذ مهامِّ الدعوة بالمحافظة، طبقًا للسياسة العام للجماعة وتوجيهات مكتب الإرشاد، ويُنتخب مجلس شورى المحافظة طبقًا لما نُصَّ عليه بالباب السابق.
يَنتخِب مكتب إداري المحافظة من بين أعضائه أمينًا للصندوق وأمينًا للسرِّ، كما يعهد لكل عضو من أعضائه بالمهامِّ التي يحدِّدها له بعد تشكيل الأقسام المختلفة للدعوة.
يعقد مكتب إداري المحافظة اجتماعاتٍ دوريةً نصف شهرية على الأقل تكون صحيحةً بحضور رئيسه أو من ينوب عنه في حالة غيابه ونصف عدد الأعضاء.
لرئيس المكتب دعوته للانعقاد كلما رأى مصلحةً في ذلك أو كلما طلب.
يجب على عضو مكتب إداري المحافظة الانتظامُ في حضور جلسات المكتب والمحافظة على سريَّة المداولات والالتزام بتنفيذ قرارات المكتب، ولو خالف ما ارتآه.
يقدم مكتب إداري المحافظة تقريرًا إلى مجلس شورى المحافظة عن سير أعماله خلال السنة في الأسبوع الأول من شهر محرم من كل عام، ثم يرفع إلى مكتب الإرشاد في ميعاد لا يتجاوز الأسبوع الثالث من شهر المحرم من كل عام.
يجوز لمكتب الإرشاد- إذا دعت الضرورة لذلك- أن يقرر وقْف كل أعضاء مكتب إداري المحافظة أو بعضهم عن مباشرة أعمالهم، وله أن يعيِّن من يباشر مهامَّ المكتب بصفة مؤقتة، وفي هذه الحالة يجب دعوة مجلس شورى المحافظة لاجتماع طارئ، في خلال مدة لا تتجاوز ثلاثين يومًا لانتخاب بديل عمَّن تقرر وقفه، فإذا انتُخب رئيس جديد لمجلس شورى المحافظة وللمكتب الإداري من غير ممثلي المحافظة في مجلس الشورى اكتسب الرئيس الجديد عضويةَ مجلس الشورى، وإن جاوز ذلك العدد المحدد لممثلي المحافظة، على أن تُجبر الزيادة عند حدوث أي خلوٍّ.
أحكام عامة ومؤقتة
مادة (31) يجوز تعديل أحكام هذا النظام بناءً على اقتراح:
أ) المرشد العام.
ب) أغلبية أعضاء مكتب الإرشاد المقيمين بالجمهورية.
جـ) عشرين عضوًا من أعضاء مجلس الشورى.
ويُنظر اقتراح التعديل في جلسة خاصة للمجلس يُدعى إليها قبل ثلاثين يومًا على الأقل، مع إخطار الأعضاء بموضوع التعديل المقترح، ويعتبر مقبولاً بأغلبية أكثر من نصف عدد أعضاء المجلس.
في حالة تعذَّر اجتماع مجلس الشورى لأسباب اضطرارية، يتولَّى مكتب الإرشاد جميع اختصاصاته.
تنتهي ولاية أعضاء مكتب الإرشاد القائمين بأعمال العضوية حاليًّا- باستثناء المرشد العام- باجتماع مجلس الشورى وانتخابه أعضاء مكتب الإرشاد.
التقويم المعتمد هو التقويم الهجري والأشهر الهلالية.
لا تسقط عضوية مكتب الإرشاد عند تعرُّض العضو للحبس والاعتقال السياسي لحين انتهاء هذه الظروف، وفي حالة زوال السبب يعود لممارسة عضويته، حتى لو أدَّى ذلك إلى زيادة عدد أعضاء المكتب عما ورد في هذه اللائحة، ويتمُّ جبر الزيادة عند أول خلوٍّ.
تمَّ اعتماد هذه اللائحة من مجلس الشورى العام عام 1990م
التعديلات التي اعتمدها مجلس الشورى في مايو 2009م مدرَجة في هذا النص: (مادة 7 ومادة 9 "أ" ومادة 36)
مادة 95 مكرر: "إذا رأى المكتب إمكانية قيام مجلس الشورى ببعض اختصاصاته مع تعذر اجتماعه فللمكتب أن يحدد الآلية المناسبة للقيام بذلك".
وافق مجلس الشورى على إضافة هذه المادة (95 مكرر) للائحة يوم 12 مايو 2010م
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اللائحة العالمية لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين
إن الحمد لله نحمده ونستعينه ونستغفره، ونعوذ بالله من شرور أنفسنا ومن سيئات أعمالنا، من يهد الله فلا مضل له، ومن يضلل فلا هادي له، ونشهد أن لا إله إلا الله وحده لا شريك له، وأن محمدًا عبده ورسوله، بلَّغ الرسالة وأدَّى الأمانة، ونصح الأمة، وجاهد في الله حق جهاده، صلوات الله وسلامه عليه وعلى آله وصحابته وسلم.. وبعد،
ففي التاسع من شوال 1402 هجرية الموافق 29 يوليو 1982م ميلادية انعقد مجلس الشورى العالمي وفقًا للائحة المؤقتة السابق اعتمادها من فضيلة المرشد العام للجماعة بتاريخ 3 جمادى الآخرة 1398 هجرية الموافق 10 مايو 1978 ميلادية، وتم إقرار النظام العام لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين، وأصبح هذا النظام (اللائحة) والمتضمن سبعة وأربعون مادةً تنتظمها خمسة أبواب؛ ملزمًا لجميع الأقطار والأفراد.
وبعد مرور ما يزيد عن عشر سنوات من إقرار هذا النظام، وبناءً على اتساع نشاط الجماعة، وعلى ضوء ما مر بها من تجارب، وسعيًا إلى الوصول إلى الأكمل بعون الله تعالى؛ فقد قامت الجماعة بإجراء دراسة تقويمية لنشاطاتها والأسس التنظيمية لها، ومن بينها النظام العام الذي يحكم حركتها، وقد أجمعت الآراء على أنه لا خلاف حول ما نصت عليه اللائحة من أهداف ووسائل، وأن الأمر بالنسبة لهاتين النقطتين لا يتطلب تعديلاً لائحيًّا، قدر ما يتطلب الاجتهاد في العمل لتحقيقهما بالصورة المتكاملة، والالتزام الفعلي للأقطار والأفراد بما تمَّ الإشارة إليه والنص عليه.
وانتهت بعض هذه الآراء إلى أن المطلوب بعد هذه المرحلة إجراء تعديلات تشمل:
1- مدة ولاية المرشد العام.
2- تعديل نسب ممثلي الأقطار في مجلس الشورى، حسب تغير أحوال بعض الأقطار، مع التوسع في أعداد الإخوة أصحاب الاختصاص الذين يضافون إلى المجلس بطريقة الاختيار للاستفادة من خبراتهم.
3- التوسع في تفصيل حقوق الأفراد تجاه الجماعة وتجاه إخوانهم.
4- إعادة صياغة المادة الخاصة بالبيعة؛ ليكون واضحًا أنها تُؤخذ من الفرد ولشخص المرشد العام للجماعة تحديدًا.
5- ضبط عضوية الأقطار في التنظيم العالمي؛ لتكون موازيةً لضبط عضوية الفرد في القطر.
وبتاريخ 16 من شوال 1414 هجرية الموافق 28 من مارس 1994م ميلادية، قام مجلس الشورى بدراسة ما قُدِّم إليه من مقترحات، وأقر التعديلات الجديدة التي ضمنها النظام العام (اللائحة)، وأصدرها متضمنة أربع وخمسون مادةً، تنتظمها ستة أبواب وهي المرفقة مع هذه المقدمة.
وبناءً على ذلك؛ فإنني أطلب من كل الإخوان الالتزام الصادق بهذه اللائحة، وبذل أقصى الجهد لتحقيق أهدافها، سائلين المولى عز وجل أن يهيئ لهذه الجماعة أمر رشدها؛ لتقوم بأداء رسالتها على الوجه الذي يرضيه عنها.
كما نسأله أن يرحم إمامنا الشهيد حسن البنا وإخواننا الذين سبقونا بالإيمان، وأن يلحقنا بهم على الخير ونحن مستمسكون بقرآن ربنا دستورنا وبسنة زعيمنا محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم، إنه سبحانه غايتنا وولينا وهو نعم المولى ونعم النصير.. وصلى اللهم على سيدنا محمد النبي الأمي وعلى آله وصحبه وسلم.. والله أكبر ولله الحمد.
محمد حامد أبو النصر
القاهرة في: غرة ذي القعدة 1414 هجرية= 12 أبريل 1994 ميلادية.
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
النظام العام للإخوان المسلمين
اسم الجماعة ومقرها
مادة (1): في شهر ذي القعدة 1347هج 1928م تألفت جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، ومقرها الرئيسي مدينة القاهرة، ويجوز نقل القيادة في الظروف الاستثنائية بقرار من مجلس الشورى إذا تعذَّر ذلك من مكتب الإرشاد.
مادة (2): الإخوان المسلمون هيئة إسلامية جامعة، تعمل لإقامة دين الله في الأرض، وتحقيق الأغراض التي جاء من أجلها الإسلام الحنيف، ومما يتصل بهذه الأغراض:
أ- تبليغ دعوة الإسلام إلى الناس كافة وإلى المسلمين خاصة، وشرحها شرحًا دقيقًا يوضحها ويردها إلى فطرتها وشمولها، ويدفع عنها الأباطيل والشبهات.
ب- جمع القلوب والنفوس على مبادئ الإسلام، وتجديد أثرها الكريم فيها، وتقريب وجهات النظر بين المذاهب الإسلامية.
ج- العمل على رفع مستوى المعيشة للأفراد وتنمية ثروات الأمة وحمايتها.
د- تحقيق العدالة الاجتماعية والتأمين الاجتماعي لكل مواطن، ومكافحة الجهل والمرض والفقر والرذيلة، وتشجيع أعمال البر والخير.
هـ- تحرير الوطن الإسلامي بكل أجزائه من كل سلطان غير إسلامي، ومساعدة الأقليات الإسلامية في كل مكان، والسعي إلى تجميع المسلمين حتى يصيروا أمة واحدة.
و- قيام الدولة الإسلامية التي تنفِّذ أحكام الإسلام وتعاليمه عمليًّا، وتحرسها في الداخل، وتعمل على نشرها وتبليغها في الخارج.
ز- مناصرة التعاون العالمي مناصرة صادقة في ظل الشريعة الإسلامية التي تصون الحريات وتحفظ الحقوق، والمشاركة في بناء الحضارة الإنسانية على أساس جديد من تآزر الإيمان والمادة، كما كفلت ذلك نظم الإسلام الشاملة.
مادة (3): يعتمد الإخوان المسلمون في تحقيق هذه الأغراض على الوسائل الآتية:
أ- الدعوة: بطريق النشر والإذاعة المختلفة من الرسائل والنشرات والصحف والمجلات والكتب والمطبوعات وتجهيز الوفود والبعثات في الداخل والخارج.
ب- التربية: لتطبع أعضاء الجماعة على هذه المبادئ، وتعكس معنى التدين قولاً وعملاً في أنفسهم أفرادًا وبيوتًا، وتربيتهم تربية صالحة؛ عقيديًّا وفق الكتاب والسنة، وعقليًّا بالعلم، وروحيًّا بالعبادة وخلقيًّا بالفضيلة، وبدنيًّا بالرياضة، وتثبيت معنى الأخوة الصادقة والتكامل التام والتعاون الحقيقي بينهم؛ حتى يتكون رأي إسلامي موحد، وينشأ جيل جديد يفهم الإسلام فهمًا صحيحًا، ويعمل بأحكامه ويوجه النهضة إليه.
ج- التوجيه: بوضع المناهج الصالحة في كل شئون المجتمع من التربية والتعليم والتشريع والقضاء والإدارة والجندية والاقتصاد والصحة والحكم، والتقدم بها إلى الجهات المختصة، والوصول بها إلى الهيئات السياسية والتشريعية والتنفيذية والدولية لتخرج من دور التفكير النظري إلى دور التنفيذ العملي، والعمل بجد على تنقية وسائل الإعلام مما فيها من شرور وسيئات والاسترشاد بالتوجيه الإسلامي في ذلك كله.
د- العمل: بإنشاء مؤسسات تربوية واجتماعية واقتصادية وعلمية، وتأسيس المساجد والمدارس والمستوصفات والملاجئ والنوادي، وتأليف اللجان لتنظيم الزكاة والصدقات وأعمال البر والإصلاح بين الأفراد والأسر، ومقاومة الآفات الاجتماعية والعادات الضارة والمخدرات والمسكرات والمقامرة، وإرشاد الشباب إلى طريق الاستقامة، وشغل الوقت بما يفيد وينفع ويستعان على ذلك بإنشاء أقسام مستقلة طبقًا للوائح خاصة.
ه- إعداد الأمة: إعدادًا جهاديًّا؛ لتقف جبهة واحدة في وجه العزاة والمتسلطين من أعداء الله، تمهيدًا لإقامة الدولة الإسلامية الراشدة.
الأعضاء وشروط العضوية
أ- يقضي المرشح لعضوية الجماعة مدة سنة على الأقل تحت الاختبار، فإذا ثبت قيامه بواجبات العضوية، مع معرفته بمقاصد الدعوة ووسائلها، وتعهَّد بأن يناصرها ويحترم نظامها، ويعمل على تحقيق أغراضها، ثم وافقت الجهة المسئولة عنه على قبوله عضوًا في الجماعة؛ فيصبح أخًا منتظمًا لمدة ثلاث سنوات.
ب- إذا ثبت خلال السنوات الثلاث الآنفة الذكر قيام الأخ بواجبات عضويته؛ فللجهة المسئولة أن تقبله أخًا عاملاً على أن يؤدي البيعة التالية لفضيلة المرشد العام:
(أعاهد الله العظيم على التمسك بأحكام الإسلام والجهاد في سبيله، والقيام بشروط عضوية جماعة الإخوان المسلمين وواجباتها، والسمع والطاعة لقيادتها في المنشط والمكره- في غير معصية- ما استطعت إلى ذلك سبيلاً، وأبايع على ذلك، والله على ما أقول وكيل). ويمكن أن تؤخذ لشخص المرشد العام أمام المراقب العام للقطر (أو من ينوب عنه) إذا تعذر إعطاؤها للمرشد العام مباشرة.
مادة (5): على كل عضو أن يدفع اشتراكًا ماليًّا شهريًّا أو سنويًّا وفق النظام المالي لكل قطر، ولا يمنع ذلك من المساهمة في نفقات الدعوة بالتبرع والوصية والوقف وغيرها، كما أن للدعوة حقًّا في زكاة أموال القادرين على ذلك.
مادة (6): إذا قصَّر العضو في بعض واجباته، أو فرَّط في حقوق الدعوة اتُّخذت الإجراءات الجزائية اللازمة في حقه، وفق النظام الجزائي الخاص بقطره بما في ذلك الإعفاء من العضوية.
مادة (7): لكل أخ الحق في التعبير عن رأيه، وفق آداب الإسلام وبالصورة التنظيمية.
مادة (8): للأخ الحق في المبادرة والابتكار في الاقتراحات المختلفة.
مادة (9): للأخ الحق في التظلم والمقاضاة والاستئناف.
مادة (10): للأخ على الجماعة وعلى إخوانه الحق في التكافل والتضامن كما أمر الإسلام.
الهيئات الإدارية الرئيسية للإخوان المسلمين
مادة (11): الهيئات الإدارية الرئيسية للإخوان المسلمين هي: المرشد العام، مكتب الإرشاد العام، مجلس الشورى العام.
أولاً: المرشد العام:
مادة (12): المرشد العام للإخوان المسلمين هو المسئول الأول للجماعة، ويرأس مكتب الإرشاد ومجلس الشورى العام، ويقوم بالمهمات التالية:
أ- الإشراف على كل إدارات الجماعة، وتوجيهها، ومراقبة القائمين على التنفيذ، ومحاسبتهم على كل تقصير وفق نظام الجماعة.
ب- تمثيل الجماعة في كل الشئون والتحدث باسمها.
ج- تكليف من يراه من الإخوان للقيام بمهام يحدد نطاقها له.
د- دعوة المراقبين العامين الممثلين للأقطار للاجتماع عند الحاجة.
مادة (13): يشترط فيمن يرشح مرشدًا عامًّا ما يلي:
أ- لا يقل عمره عن أربعين سنةً هلاليةً.
ب- أن يكون قد مضى على انتظامه أخًا عاملاً مدة لا تقل عن خمس عشرة سنةً هلاليةً.
ج- أن تتوفر فيه الصفات العلمية (وخاصة فقه الشريعة) والعملية والخلقية التي تؤهله لقيادة الجماعة.
مادة (14): يتم اختيار المرشد العام وفق المراحل الآتية:
أ- يقوم مكتب الإرشاد العام بعد استشارة المكاتب التنفيذية في الأقطار أو المراقبين العامين أو ثلث أعضاء مجلس الشورى بترشيح أكثر اثنين قبولاً لدى المكاتب إذا لم يتم الإجماع على واحد ممن تتوفر فيهم الشروط المذكورة في المادة (13).
ب- بناء على ذلك وبقرار من مكتب الإرشاد العام؛ يوجه نائب المرشد العام الدعوة إلى مجلس الشورى العام لاجتماع مدته أسبوع كحد أقصى يجري فيه انتخاب المرشد العام الجديد، ويحدد في الدعوة الزمان والمكان والموضوع والنصاب، وتوجه الدعوة قبل شهر على الأقل من الموعد المحدد.
ج- ينعقد اجتماع مجلس الشورى العام برئاسة نائب المرشد العام، فإذا كان هو المرشح فأكبر الأعضاء سنًّا، ويجري انتخاب المرشد العام بأكثرية ثلثي أعضاء المجلس (النصاب لا يقل عن الثلثين)، فإذا لم يتم ذلك أُجِّل الاجتماع إلى موعد آخر لا يقل عن شهر ولا يزيد عن شهرين ولمدة أسبوع أيضًا، ويجري فيه انتخاب المرشد العام بالأكثرية المطلقة من أعضاء المجلس (النصاب لا يقل عن ذلك).
مادة (15): عندما يتم اختيار المرشد العام يؤدي العهد التالي أمام مجلس الشورى العام:
(أعاهد الله تعالى على التمسك بكتاب الله وسنة رسوله صلى الله عليه وسلم ما استطعت إلى ذلك سبيلاً، والالتزام بمنهاج الإخوان المسلمين، ونظامهم الأساسي، منفذًا قرارات الجماعة المناطة بي ولو خالفت رأيي، والله على ما أقول شهيد).
ثم يجدِّد أعضاء مجلس الشورى العهد أمام فضيلة المرشد العام، مستشعرين أركان البيعة العشرة:
(أعاهد الله العظيم على التمسك بأحكام الإسلام والجهاد في سبيله، والقيام بشروط عضوية جماعة الإخوان المسلمين وواجباتها، والسمع والطاعة لقيادتها في المنشط والمكره- في غير معصية- ما استطعت إلى ذلك سبيلاً، وأبايع على ذلك، والله على ما أقول وكيل).
مادة (16): يضطلع المرشد العام بمهمته فور انتخابه وأدائه للعهد، وعليه أن يستقيل من عمله الخاص ويتفرغ للمهمة التي اختير لها، ويبقى في مسئوليته ما دام أهلاً لذلك.
مادة (17): لا يصح للمرشد العام بشخصه ولا بصفته أن يشترك في إدارة شركات أو أعمال اقتصادية، حتى ما يتصل فيها بالجماعة وأغراضها صيانةً لشخصه وتوفيرًا لوقته ومجهوده على أن يكون له الحق في مزاولة الأعمال العلمية والأدبية بموافقة مكتب الإرشاد العام.
مادة (18): تتحمل الجماعة نفقات المرشد العام وفق اللائحة المالية الخاصة بالمتفرغين.
مادة (19): تنتهي ولاية المرشد العام في الحالات الآتية:
أ- إذا أخل المرشد العام بواجباته، أو فقد الأهلية اللازمة... فلمجلس الشورى دراسة الوضع واتخاذ القرار المناسب فإذا وجد أن مصلحة الدعوة تقتضي إعفاءه يدعو إلى جلسة أخرى مخصصة لذلك، ويجب أن يصدر قرار الإعفاء بأكثرية ثلثي أعضاء المجلس.
ب- إذا قدَّم المرشد العام استقالته يدعو مكتب الإرشاد مجلس الشورى لدراسة أسباب الاستقالة واتخاذ القرار المناسب، وفي حالة إصرار المرشد على استقالته يتم قبولها بالأكثرية المطلقة لأعضاء المجلس.
ج- إذا تُوفي المرشد العام يتولى نائبه صلاحياته كافة، وتتخذ إجراءات انتخاب جديد وفق المادة (13) من هذه اللائحة.
مادة (20): يختار المرشد العام نائبًا له أو أكثر من بين أعضاء مكتب الإرشاد العام.
مادة (21): تكون مدة ولاية المرشد العام ست سنوات قابلة للتجديد، ويستثنى من ذلك المرشد الحالي.
مادة (22): يحتفظ المرشد العام بعد انتهاء ولايته بعضوية مجلس الشورى العالمي مدى الحياة، إلا إذا كان انتهاء الولاية داخلاً تحت نص الفقرة (ا) من المادة (19) من اللائحة، وهي الإخلال بواجباته أو فقد الأهلية.
ثانيًا: مكتب الإرشاد العام:
مادة (23): مكتب الإرشاد العام هو القيادة التنفيذية العليا للإخوان المسلمين، والمشرف على سير الدعوة والموجه لسياستها وإدارتها.
مادة (24): يتألف مكتب الإرشاد من ثلاثة عشر عضوًا عدا المرشد العام، يتم اختيارهم وفق الأسس التالية:
أ- ثمانية أعضاء ينتخبهم مجلس الشورى من بين أعضائه من الإقليم الذي يقيم فيه المرشد العام.
ب- خمسة أعضاء ينتخبهم مجلس الشورى من أعضائه، ويراعى في اختيارهم التمثيل الإقليمي.
ج- يختار المرشد العام من بين أعضاء مكتب الإرشاد أمينًا للسر وأمينًا للمالية.
مادة (25): يشترط فيمن يرشح لعضوية مكتب الإرشاد العام ما يلي:
أ- أن يكون من بين أعضاء مجلس الشورى العام.
ب- ألا تقل سنه عن ثلاثين سنةً هجريةً.
ت- أن يتفرغ من عمله لعضوية مكتب الإرشاد العام.
مادة (26): إذا تم انتخاب أعضاء المكتب يؤدي كل منهم أمام المجلس العهد التالي:
(أعاهد الله تعالى على التمسك بكتاب الله وسنة رسوله صلى الله عليه وسلم، وأن أكون حارسًا لمنهاج الإخوان المسلمين ونظامهم الأساسي، منفذًا لقرارات مكتب الإرشاد وإن خالفت رأيي، مجاهدًا في سبيل تحقيق غاية الجماعة العامة ما استطعت إلى ذلك سبيلاً، وأبايع الله على ذلك، والله على ما أقول وكيل).
مادة (27): مدة ولاية مكتب الإرشاد أربع سنوات هجرية، ويجوز اختيار العضو لأكثر من مرة، وإذا خلا مكان أحد الأعضاء قبل مضي المدة المحددة حل محله الذي يليه في عدد الأصوات في انتخابات المكتب، وإذا كان أحد أعضاء المكتب مراقبًا عامًّا في قطره، فعلى القطر أن يختار مراقبًا بدله.
مادة (28): من واجبات عضو المكتب الحرص على مصلحة الجماعة، والمواظبة على حضور الجلسات، والحفاظ على سرية المداولات واحترام القرارات ولو كانت مخالفة لرأيه الخاص، وليس له نقدها أو الاعتراض عليها متى صدرت بصورة قانونية، والقيام بالمهمات التي يكلف بإنجازها على أكمل وجه، وإذا قصر في واجبات عضويته كان للمكتب أن يؤاخذه على التقصير بلفت نظره أو إنذاره أو بالإيقاف مدة لا تزيد عن شهر، أو بالإعفاء من عضوية المكتب، ويجب أن يصدر قرار الإعفاء من مجلس الشورى في جلسة يحضرها العضو ليشرح وجهة نظره فيما نُسب إليه.
مادة (29): يقوم مكتب الإرشاد العام بالمهمات الآتية:
أ- تحديد مواقف الجماعة الفكرية والسياسية من كافة الأحداث العالمية، أو تلك التي ترتبط بسياسة الجماعة، أو التي تؤثر في أي قطر من الأقطار، وذلك في ضوء الخطة العامة التي يضعها مجلس الشورى مع مراعاة أحكام المادة (50) من الباب السادس، وله أن يقوم بنفسه أو يكلف من يرى بتأليف الرسائل وإصدار النشرات والتعليمات التي تكفل شرح الدعوة وبيان أغراضها ومقاصدها، ومراجعة ما تصدره تنظيمات الأقطار قبل نشره لصلته بصميم الفكرة.
ب- الإشراف على سير الدعوة وتوجيه سياستها، وتنفيذ أحكام اللائحة العامة، ومراقبة القائمين على التنفيذ.
ج- رسم الخطوات اللازمة لتنفيذ قرارات مجلس الشورى العام في جميع الأقطار.
د- تكوين اللجان والأقسام المتخصصة في المجالات اللازمة، واعتماد لوائحها ومحاسبتها.
ه- وضع الخطة العامة وعرضها على مجلس الشورى العام لاعتمادها.
و- إعداد التقرير السنوي العام عن أعمال القيادة وأحوال الجماعة والوضع المالي لعرضه على مجلس الشورى العام.
ز- اختيار مراجع للحسابات من غير أعضائه.
مادة (30): جلسات المكتب دورية وتحدد بقرار منه، وعلى كل عضو حضور الجلسات الدورية دون حاجة إلى دعوة، ويجتمع المكتب في غير الموعد الدوري إذا حدث ما يدعو إلى ذلك بدعوة من المرشد العام أو من يقوم مقامه أو بطلب يقدم إليه من أحد أعضائه، وبموافقة أربعة أعضاء على الطلب، وتكون الجلسة قانونية إذا حضرها أغلبية الأعضاء المطلقة، وتكون القرارات صحيحة متى صدرت عن الأغلبية المطلقة للحاضرين، وإذا تساوت الأصوات رجح جانب رئيس الجلسة.
مادة (31): يرأس اجتماعات المكتب المرشد العام أو نائبه عند غيابه أو أكبر الأعضاء سنًّا في حالة تخلف النائب، يتلى محضر الاجتماع السابق ويصدق عليه، ثم ينظر في جدول الأعمال ولا يكون القرار المتخذ في غياب المرشد أو نائبه نافذًا إلا بعد اعتماده من أحدهما.
مادة (32): أمين السر العام يمثل مكتب الإرشاد العام تمثيلاً كاملاً في كل المعاملات إلا في الحالات الخاصة التي يرى المكتب فيها انتداب أخ آخر بقرار قانوني منه.
مادة (33): تشكل الأمانة العامة من جهاز تنفيذي، يرأسه الأمين العام على أن يقيم في البلد الذي يقيم فيه المرشد، ويجوز أن تمارس عملها من خارج بلده إذا دعت الضرورة لذلك.
مادة (34): مهمة أمين السر العام متابعة تنفيذ قرارات مكتب الإرشاد، ومراقبة نواحي النشاط وأقسام العمل، وله أن يستعين بغيره من الأعضاء أو الموظفين، ولكنه هو المسئول أمام المكتب عما يسنده إليهم من أعمال، وفي حالة غيابه أو تعذر قيامه بعمله ينتدب المكتب من بين أعضائه من يحل محله مؤقتًا.
مادة (35): مهمة أمين المالية ضبط أموال الجماعة، وحصر ما يرد منها وما يصرف ومراقبة كل نواحي النشاط المالي والحسابي، والإشراف على تنظيمها وفق اللائحة المالية، وإحاطة المكتب علمًا بذلك في فترات متقاربة، وله أن يستعين بغيره من الإخوان العاملين تحت مسئوليته، وفي حالة غيابه أو تعذر قيامه بعمله ينتدب المكتب من يقوم بمهمته مؤقتًا.
ثالثًا: مجلس الشورى العام:
مادة (36): مجلس الشورى العام هو السلطة التشريعية لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين وقراراته ملزمة، ومدة ولايته أربع سنوات هجرية.
أ- يتألف مجلس الشورى العام من ثلاثين عضوًا على الأقل، يمثلون التنظيمات الإخوانية المعتمدة في مختلف الأقطار، ويتم اختيارهم من قِبل مجالس الشورى في الأقطار من بين أعضائها.
ب- يجوز لمجلس الشورى إضافة خمسة أعضاء من ذوي الاختصاص إلى عضوية المجلس.
ج- يمكن تمثيل أية تنظيم إخواني جديد في مجلس الشورى إذا اعتمده مكتب الإرشاد العام.
د- إذا كان ممثل القطر في مجلس الشورى العام واحدًا، فيجب أن يكون هو المراقب العام، وإذا كان للقطر أكثر من ممثل فيجب أن يكون المراقب العام أحدهم، وإذا تعذر مشاركة المراقب العام كعضو ثابت في المجلس يمكن للقطر اختيار غيره.
مادة (38): يشترط فيمن يختار لمجلس الشورى الشروط الآتية:
أ- أن يكون من الإخوان العاملين الذين مارسوا عضوية المكتب التنفيذي أو مجلس الشورى في أقطارهم.
ب- ألا يقل سنه عن ثلاثين سنةً هجريةً.
ج- أن يكون قد مضى على اتصاله بالدعوة خمس سنوات على الأقل.
د- أن يكون متصفًا بالصفات الخلقية والعلمية التي تؤهله لذلك.
ه- أن لا تكون قد صدرت في حقه عقوبة التوقيف خلال الخمس سنوات السابقة.
مادة (39): يقوم مجلس الشورى العام بالمهمات التالية:
أ- انتخاب المرشد العام وأعضاء مكتب الإرشاد العام وفق المادتين (14)، (24).
ب- إقرار الأهداف والسياسات العامة للجماعة، وتحديد موقفها من مختلف الاتجاهات والتجمعات والقضايا المتنوعة.
ج- إقرار الخطة العامة والوسائل التنفيذية اللازمة.
د- مناقشة التقرير العام السنوي والتقرير المالي وإقرارهما، واعتماد الميزانية للعام الجديد.
ه- انتخاب أعضاء المحكمة العليا التي تنظر في القضايا التي تحول إليها من قِبل المرشد العام أو مكتب الإرشاد أو مجلس الشورى العام.
و- محاسبة أعضاء مكتب الإرشاد العام مجموعة وأفرادًا، وقبول استقالتهم بالأغلبية المطلقة لأعضاء المجلس.
ز- إعفاء المرشد العام أو قبول استقالته وفق المادة (19) من هذه اللائحة.
ح- تعديل اللائحة بناء على اقتراح يقدمه فضيلة المرشد العام أو مكتب الإرشاد، أو اقتراح يوافق عليه ثمانية من أعضاء مجلس الشورى العام، ويجب إبلاغ الأعضاء بنص التعديل قبل شهر من النظر فيه، ويتم التعديل بموافقة ثلثي الأعضاء.
مادة (40): يجتمع مجلس الشورى العام دوريًّا كل ستة أشهر في موعد يحدده لنفسه، ويجتمع استثنائيًّا بدعوة من المرشد العام، أو من يقوم مقامه، أو بقرار من مكتب الإرشاد العام، أو بناء على طلب يوافق عليه ثلث أعضاء مجلس الشورى، ولا يكون الاجتماع صحيحًا إلا إذا حضرته الأغلبية المطلقة إلا في الحالات التي اشترط فيها نصاب خاص، فإذا لم يتوفر العدد أجل الاجتماع لموعد آخر، وأعيدت الدعوة، ونص فيها على الموضوع، فإذا لم يتوفر النصاب مرة أخرى؛ تطبق المادة (43) من هذه اللائحة.
وتكون القرارات صحيحة إذا صدرت بموافقة أغلبية الحاضرين المطلقة إلا في الحالات التي اشترط لها نصاب خاص.
مادة (41): يجب أن يتم إبلاغ أعضاء المجلس بموعد أي اجتماع قبل انعقاده بشهر على الأقل، ويرفق مع التبليغ جدول الأعمال إلا في الحالات الطارئة أو المستعجلة.
مادة (42): إذا تم استبدال أحد الأعضاء وفق النظام الداخلي للقطر الذي ينتمي إليه؛ فيجب إبلاغ مكتب الإرشاد العام بذلك فورًا.
مادة (43): إذا تعذَّر اجتماع مجلس الشورى العام يقوم مكتب الإرشاد العام بجميع صلاحياته، باستثناء تعديل اللائحة أو إعفاء المرشد العام حتى يتيسر اجتماع المجلس.
مادة (44): يشكل مجلس الشورى العام محكمة عليا تحدد صلاحياتها وأصول المحاكمة لديها في لائحة خاصة، وللمجلس حق تشكيل لجان تحكيمية عند الحاجة.
مادة (45): إذا قصر أحد أعضاء مجلس الشورى العام في واجباته، أو أخل بشروط عضويته نصحه فضيلة المرشد العام، فإذا تكرر منه نفس الفعل أحاله إلى المحكمة العليا إلا إذا كان عضوًا بالمكتب فيتخذ بشأنه ما نص عليه في المادة (39).
مادة (46): تزول صفة العضوية عن عضو مجلس الشورى العام بقرار من المجلس نفسه أو المحكمة العليا، كما يجوز لفضيلة المرشد العام أن يأمر بإيقاف أي عضو عن عمله على أن يعرض أمره فورًا على الجهة المختصة للنظر في شأنه، وله أن يتظلم لدى فضيلة المرشد العام.
مادة (47): يؤلف مجلس الشورى العام من بين الإخوان العاملين أقسامًا ولجانًا دائمة أو مؤقتة تختص كل منها بدراسة أحد أوجه النشاط، وتضع كل لجنة لائحة داخلية يقرها مجلس الشورى.
مادة (48): الأقسام واللجان المقترحة يمكن زيادتها أو إنقاصها حسب ما يقتضيه نشاط الجماعة.
شروط عضوية القطر في التنظيم العالمي
مادة (49): يشترط لقبول أي تنظيم قطري عضوًا في التنظيم العالمي تحقق الأمور الآتية:
أ- أن يكون لهذا التنظيم لائحة يعتمدها مكتب الإرشاد العام، وتتضمن وجود مجلس شورى ومكتب تنفيذي على الأقل إلى جانب المراقب العام.
ب- أن يعتمد المنهج التربوي للجماعة.
ج- أن يكون له تأثير بارز على الساحة الإسلامية في بلده.
د- يتم اعتماد عضوية القطر بقرار من مكتب الإرشاد العام بعد تحقق الشروط المنصوص عليها في كل من (أ، ب، ج).
تنظيم العلاقة بين القيادة العامة
مادة (50): تتحدد العلاقة بين القيادة العامة للجماعة وقيادات الأقطار ضمن الدوائر التالية:
أ- الدائرة الأولى: وهي التي يجب فيها على قيادات الأقطار الالتزام بقرارات القيادة العامة متمثلة في فضيلة المرشد العام ومكتب الإرشاد العام ومجلس الشورى العام، وتشمل ما يلي:
1- الالتزام بالمبادئ الأساسية الواردة في هذه اللائحة، والالتزام بالمنهج الذي يقره مجلس الشورى العام.
2- الالتزام بفهم الجماعة للإسلام المستمد من الكتاب والسنة والمبين في الأصول العشرين.
3- الالتزام بسياسات الجماعة ومواقفها تجاه القضايا العامة، كما يحددها مكتب الإرشاد العام ومجلس الشورى العام.
4- الالتزام بالحصول على موافقة مكتب الإرشاد العام قبل الإقدام على اتخاذ أي قرار سياسي هام.
ب- الدائرة الثانية: وهي التي يجب فيها على قيادات الأقطار التشاور والاتفاق مع فضيلة المرشد العام أو مكتب الإرشاد العام قبل اتخاذ القرار، وتشمل جميع المسائل المحلية الهامة، والتي قد تؤثر على الجماعة في قطر آخر.
ت- الدائرة الثالثة: وهي التي تتصرف فيها قيادات الأقطار بحرية كاملة، ثم تعلم مكتب الإرشاد العام في أول فرصة ممكنة أو في التقرير السنوي الذي يرفع من المراقب العام، وتشمل هذه الدائرة ما يلي:
1- كل ما يتعلق بخطط الجماعة في القطر ونشاط أقسامها ونمو تنظيمها.
2- المواقف السياسية في القضايا المحلية، والتي لا تؤثر على الجماعة في قطر آخر شريطة الالتزام بالمواقف العامة للجماعة.
3- الوسائل المشروعة التي يعتمدها القطر لتحقيق أهداف الجماعة ومبادئها على ضوء أوضاعه وظروفه.
مادة (51): لكل قطر أن يضع لنفسه لائحة تنظم أوجه النشاط وتتفق مع ظروفه، مع مراعاة عدم تعارض أحكامها مع هذه اللائحة، ووجوب اعتمادها من مكتب الإرشاد العام قبل تنفيذها.
مادة (52): يقدم كل مراقب عام تقريرًا سنويًّا عن سير الدعوة ونشاط الجماعة والاقتراحات التي يراها كفيلة بتحقيق المصلحة في إقليمه إلى مكتب الإرشاد العام قبل انعقاد الاجتماع الدوري لمجلس الشورى العام.
مادة (53): مساهمة في أعباء الدعوة يلتزم كل قطر بتسديد اشتراك سنوي تحدد قيمته بالاتفاق مع مكتب الإرشاد العام.
مادة (54): على الإخوان الذين يغتربون عن أوطانهم أن يخضعوا لقيادة الجماعة في القطر الذي يقيمون فيه.
سبحانك اللهم وبحمدك نشهد أن لا إله إلا أنت نستغفرك ونتوب إليك.
(وَالْعَصْرِ(1) إِنَّ الإِنسَانَ لَفِي خُسْرٍ(2) إِلاَّ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ وَتَوَاصَوْا بِالْحَقِّ وَتَوَاصَوْا بِالصَّبْرِ(3))
إن حركة الاتجاه الإسلامي بتونس تتخذ منطلقاً لها العقيدة الإسلامية المباركة: القاعدة المركزية في التفكير الإسلامي، التي إليها يعود تحديد المواقف والرؤى إزاء قضايا الوجود عموما والوجود الإنساني بصفة خاصة.
وترى أن أي عمل تغييري نحو الأفضل، وأي منهاج للحياة، يجب أن ينبثق عن جملة تصورات واضحة لمنزلة الإنسان ووظيفته في هذا الوجود وعلاقاته ببقية عناصر الكون، لأن هذا المعنى به ترتبط كل الحياة.
وانطلاقا من مبدأ التعامل الصادق والمسؤول مع ديننا الحنيف، واعتمادا على مبدأ الشمول في فهم الإسلام بشكل لا يحصره في مجال العقائد والشعائر، بل يتعداه ليشمل إلى جانب ذلك الحيز الاجتماعي والسياسي والاقتصادي، نرسم في ما يلي الأسس العقائدية والأصولية لحركتنا، حيث تكون معالم نلتقي حولها ونجعلها منطلقا نبني عليه عقيدتنا، ونتفاعل به مع الواقع فكراً وممارسة.
ولا يفوتنا أن نشير أننا لا نؤسس عبر هذه الأسس عقيدة جديدة ولا تصورا مقطوع الجذور، وإنما هو رصد لمنهج التقى عليه أبناء هذه الحركة، ينطلق من كناب الله العزيز، ويسترشد بالفكر الإسلامي عبر مساره الطويل.
ونحن نقدر أن هذه الأسس العقائدية والأصولية، حقيقة بأن تستنهض همم الكافة للتفاعل معها بكل رشد وإيجابية، وللتعامل من خلالها معنا ككيان واضح الأسس محدد المعالم.
وتضم هذه الأسس محورين رئيسيين:
- محور عقائدي
- محور أصولي منهجي
تتبوأ العقيدة مكانة مركزية ضمن النسق الإسلامي العام، فهي الأساس الذي تنساب منه بقية التصورات والأفكار والأحكام، وعليه كلما صحت العقيدة وسلمت من الشذوذ والانحراف، كلما استقامت صور الحياة واندفعت نحو الأفضل والأكمل.
ولـمّا كان للعقيدة مثل هذا الدور في حياة الإنسان وصلاح الكون، اقتضى ذلك انبناؤها على اليقين الذي لا يرتقي إليه احتمال، ولا يداخله ظن.
وإن عقيدتنا لتستقي أركانها من القرآن الكريم والسنة المتواترة، وتستقي فروعها من ظواهر الكتاب المعضدة بما صح من أحاديث نبوية مجتمعة.
وأركان العقيدة ستة، وهي: الإيمان بالله وملائكته وكتبه ورسله واليوم الآخر والقضاء والقدر. وقد ورد ذكرها جميعاً في آيات محكمات. قال تعالى: "آمن الرسول بما أنزل إليه من ربه والمؤمنون كل آمن بالله وملائكته وكتبه ورسله لا نفرق بين أحد من رسله وقالوا سمعنا وأطعنا غفرانك ربنا وإليك المصير" [البقرة 285 ] وقال أيضا: "قل لن يصيبنا إلا ما كتب الله لنا هو مولانا وعلى الله فليتوكل المؤمنون" [ التوبة 51]
1- الإيمان بالله تعالى
إن عقيدة المسلم تقتضي الإيمان والتصديق الجازم بوجود الله، كما أخبر سبحانه وتعالى بذلك، وهو اطمئنان القلب وسكون النفس إلى ذلك بحيث لا يبقى في القلب أدنى مرض وظلمة، ولا في العقل أقل شبهة أو ريبة في وجود الله جل جلاله، فلو ضل الناس جميعا عن الإيمان به، ثبت هو على ذلك الإيمان.
والإيمان بأن الله واحد ليس كمثله شيء، قديم لم يزل ولا يزال، هو الأول والآخر، عليم حكيم عادل حي قادر سميع بصير، ولا يوصف بما توصف به المخلوقات، وأنه خالق كل شيء ومدبر أمره: "إن ربكم الله الذي خلق السماوات والأرض في ستة أيام ثم استوى على العرش يغشي الليل النهار يطلبه حثيثا، والشمس والقمر والنجوم مسخرات بأمره ألا له الخلق والأمر تبارك الله رب العالمين" [ الأعراف 54 ] وأن وجوده مباين تمام المباينة للوجود الكوني ذاتا ووضعا.
ونؤمن أن له ذاتا سبحانه، وصفات لذاته، وهو المتصف بكل صفات الكمال، والمنزه عن كل صفات النقص: "فاطر السماوات والأرض، جعل لكم من أنفسكم أزواجا ومن الأنعام أزواجا يذرؤكم فيه، ليس كمثله شيء وهو السميع البصير" [ الشورى 11]
وهو الغني عن الشريك في الذات والصفات، وأن الوحدانية من أخص خصائص الألوهية والربوبية المطلقة.
ونؤمن بما وصف به نفسه من غير تحريف ولا تعطيل، ولا تكييف ولا تمثيل ولا تشبيه، فليس كمثله شيء وهو السميع البصير، وهو المنزه عن المشابهة بخلقه، وعليه فإن ألفاظ النصوص المفيدة للتشبيه لا تفهم على ظواهرها، بل نضعها في إطار التنزيه المطلق.
ونؤمن بأنه المتفرد بالحاكمية المطلقة وبالعبادة له دون سواه: "والله يحكم لا معقب لحكمه وهو سريع الحساب" [الرعد 41 ] "وما أمروا إلا ليعبدوا إلها واحداً لا إله إلا هو سبحانه عما يشركون" [التوبة 31 ]
2- الإيمان بالملائكة
إلى جانب إيماننا بعالم الشهادة فإننا نؤمن بعالم الغيب، والملائكة أحد عناصر هذا العالم، كما أخبر بذلك القرآن الكريم والرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم، وهم مخلوقات غيبية من نور محضهم الله تعالى للخير والعبادة وتنفيذ أمره القاهر.
وأن الإيمان بالملائكة ليحي في النفس البشرية من المعاني ما يجعلها تستوحي أكثر فأكثر صور الخير والرحمة والعدل أثناء سعيها إلى الاكتمال والقيام بأعباء الأمانة، كما يزكي شعور الأنس والاطمئنان أثناء مجاهدة قوى الشر المختلفة.
3- الإيمان بالكتب
إن إيماننا بالله يقتضي الإيمان بأنه سبحانه قد أنزل على رسله عليهم الصلاة والسلام، كتباً مقدسة لهداية الناس والتشريع لهم، وإن ما بقي منها اليوم بين أيدي أهل الكتاب هي كتب حرفها المفسدون منهم، فلا تعتمد لاختلاط الحق بالباطل فيها، وأن القرآن الكريم جاء مهيمنا عليها وملغيا لاعتبارها، فكان هدى خاتما وحجة قائمة على الناس كافة إلى قيام الساعة.
والقرآن هو كلام الله الأزلي الذي نزل به الروح الأمين على قلب رسوله محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم بألفاظه العربية ومعانيه الحقيقية من الله عز وجل، وهو مصدر هذه الشريعة الأول ومرجع كل أدلتها، والأصل الذي يتفرع عنه كل ما جاء به محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم، فهو ينبوع الحكمة وآية الرسالة.
وقد تكفل الله سبحانه وتعالى بحفظه من التحريف والتزييف “إنا نحن نزلنا الذكر وإنا له لحافظون" [ الحجر 9]
4- الإيمان بالرسل
وهو الاعتقاد الجازم بأن الله ـ رأفة بعباده ورحمة بهم ـ قد بعث في كل أمة منهم رسولا، وهم بشر اصطفاهم المولى سبحانه من بين عباده، وخصهم بالوحي، وعصمهم دون سائر الناس من النقائص، وحفهم بالرعاية والعناية الربانية.
والوحي هو تلقي نبأ مقطوع بمصدره الإلهي بغير السنن والطرق المعهودة عند البشر، وإننا نؤمن بجميع رسل الله الذين ورد ذكرهم في القرآن أو لم يرد، دون تفريق بينهم، فنشهد لهم جميعا بالرفعة والعصمة والأمانة والصدق والتبليغ، وإن كنا نقر تفاوت منازلهم عند الله تعالى.
مرتبة الطلب، فلا يقبل عمل إذا لم يكن وراءه هذه العقيدة كدافع للعمل وواقع حسبما تقتضيه هذه العقيدة. فإن اختلت العقيدة أو فسدت أو كانت باطلة أو لم تتضمن أصولها كان العمل فاسدا أو غير مقبول، وبقدر رسوخ معالم العقيدة وأصولها في النفس يكون العمل ثقيلا في ميزان الحساب.
وعليه، فإننا لا نكفر مسلما أقر بالشهادتين وتوابعها مما سبق ذكره، وعمل بمقتضاها وأدى الفرائض برأي أو معصية، إلا أن أقر بكلمة الكفر أو أنكر معلوما من الدين بالضرورة، أو كذب صريح القرآن أو فسره على وجه لا تحتمله أساليب اللغة العربية بحال أو عمل لا يحتمل تأويلا غير الكفر.
إن العقيدة في التصور الإسلامي ليست مجرد معرفة تجريدية طبيعتها التأبي عن معالجة الواقع وبحث قضاياه، بل هي نظام كامل متناسق في حياه الإنسان والكون، وهي توحيد الطاقات والقوى والميولات والنوازع في اتجاه الخير والعدل والحق، ولها صور عملية واقعية وأبعاد في حياة الفرد والمجتمع.
وأن النسق العقائدي يستمد موازينه وقيمه ومفاهيمه من إفراد الله سبحانه وتعالى بالألوهية والربوبية والعبادة والسيادة على ضمير الإنسان وسلوكه، ويقدم للإنسان رؤية متكاملة ينظر بها إلى الكون والحياة ونهجا شاملا في تصرف الإنسان، سواء في سياسة نفسه فرداً أو مجتمعاً أو في تعامله مع الكون أو في صلته بخالقه، وبذلك يكون التوحيد في التصور الإسلامي هو مسار للطبيعة وكائناتها، وغاية لإبداع الكون، وهدى للحياة، ووسيلة لبناء الحضارة وتحقيق العدالة الاجتماعية، وليس نظرية ذهنية أو لفظ يتردد على الألسن من دون محتوى أو منهج يحدد العلاقات الكونية والاجتماعية: "ولقد أرسلنا رسلنا وأنزلنا معهم الكتاب والميزان" [الحديد 25 ]
وعلى هذا الأساس من التوحيد، فنحن لا نفرق بين التوجه لله بالشعائر والتلقي منه في الشرائع، لا نفرق بينهما بوصفها من مقتضيات توحيد الله وإفراده سبحانه بالألوهية والحاكمية، ولا نفرق بينهما لأن الانحراف عن أي منهما يخرج صاحبه من الإيمان والإسلام قطعا.
وبذلك، فالتصور الإسلامي يعلن تحرير الإنسان من نوازع الهبوط والارتكاس وظلمات الشرك والجهل والخرافة والخوف، ويعلن تحرير العلاقات الاجتماعية من كل ألوان التسلط ومهاوي الهلاك والسقوط في المظالم ومحق الكرامة الإنسانية "ويضع عنهم إصرهم والأغلال التي كانت عليهم" [ الأعراف 157 ]
ويقوم التوحيد في فهمنا، على دفع الإنسان إلى منطقة الفعالية والتأثير واقتحام الكون ثقة واطمئنانا، لمنع أي ضرب من ضروب الظلم والاستغلال والتفكك المعيقة لدور الإنسان في الخلافة والعمارة: "وإذ قال ربك للملائكة إني جاعل في الأرض خليفة" [البقرة 29]
إن العقيدة الإسلامية في فهمنا تقضي على كل العوائق القائمة على تجميد طاقات الإنسان وإهدار إمكانياته وكرامته، وتركز معاني المسؤولية للنهوض بأعباء الأمانة في ممارسة دور الخلافة عبادة لله، وبذلك يجسد الإنسان ضمن هذا التصور معاني الاستخلاف والاقتراب من الله والكدح المستمر: "يا أيها الإنسان إنك كادح إلى ربك كدحا فملاقيه" [ الانشقاق 6 ]
وهذا التجسيد للاستخلاف يبدأ بتحرير النفس من آثار العبودية لغير الله تعالى، والثورة العامة على عوامل الخوف والسلبية، ويدعو إلى الجهاد في سبيل إحلال العلاقات الاجتماعية والسياسية القائمة على أساس قيم الحرية والخير والعدل.
وإن حملة التوحيد وهم يقدمون للبشرية هذا التصور الجديد، يقيمون معه منهجا كاملا للحياة، يقوم على تكريم الإنسان وعلى إطلاق يديه وعقله وضميره وروحه من كل عبودية، وعلى إطلاق كل طاقاته لينهض بالخلافة عن الله في الأرض، عزيزا كريما كما أراده خالقه، وفي نهوضه بالخلافة وهو حر كريم يملك أن يقدم إضافة حضارية وهو في أوج حريته وفي أوج كرامته وعزته، حتى تتخلص الإنسانية من الضياع والتيه عبر بناء صرح الأمة الإسلامية الموحدة، وإقامة دولة الحق والحرية والقوة والعدل، التي تأخذ بيد الإنسانية نحو طريق العبودية لله وحده، وتنصر المستضعفين في الأرض.
المحور الأصولي المنهجي
إن قضية العقل والنص يجب أن توضع في سياق التأصيل المنهجي والعقدي والمعرفي، حتى لا تطرح ببساطة وانبتات. فهذه المسألة فرع من تصور عقدي شامل يتعلق بمنظومة متكاملة، وإذا كان الهدف من دراسة هذه القضية ومن معالجة العلاقة بين العقل والوحي هو تحديد ما لكل منهما من دور في إنجاز مهمة الإنسان في الوجود، فإن السياق يقتضي أن تطرح هذه القضية ضمن تأصيل عقائدي.
منزلة الإنسان في العقيدة الإسلامية
تفسر العقيدة الإسلامية الوجود على أنه يشمل طرفين: الأول هو الله جل جلاله والثاني ما سواه من عناصر الكون جميعا.
والإنسان كائن ينتمي إلى الوجود العالمي ضمن الطرف الثاني، ولذلك فهو يشترك مع سائر المخلوقات في مظاهر واحدة مثل الاشتراك في المأتى: "ذلكم الله ربكم خالق كل شئ لا إله إلا هو" [ غافر 62 ]
والاشتراك في المصير: "ولله ملك السماوات والأرض وما بينهما وإليه المصير" [ المائدة 18]. والاشتراك في بعض عناصر التكوين "والله خلق كل دابة من ماء فمنهم من يمشي على بطنه ومنهم من يمشي على رجلين، ومنهم من يمشي على أربع" [ النور 45]
غير أن الإنسان في وحدته مع عناصر الكون، يمتاز عليها بالرفعة في مظهرين هما: التكريم والتسخير. وقد ظهر تكريم الإنسان في أول لحظة من وجوده بسجود الملائكة له ـ وهي أشرف المخلوقات ـ مؤذنا بتراجع ما دونها. وبتكوينه من عنصرين أساسيين لم يستجمعهما أي مخلوق آخر، هما: العنصر الترابي المادي والعنصر الروحي العقلي وهو ميزة الإنسان على غيره، إذ من آثاره:
-القدرة على استيعاب العالم الخارجي استيعابا معرفيا يسهل له الإشراف عليه "وعلم آدم الأسماء كلها" [البقرة 31ـ] وذلك بما يجمع الإنسان في تكوينه من عنصري المادة والروح الذين تفرقا في الكون.
-حرية الإرادة والاختيار، فقد خلق الإنسان مزودا بملكات واستعدادات يميز بها بين الحق والباطل في العقائد، وبين الخير والشر في الأفعال، وبين الصدق والكذب في الأقوال: "إنا هديناه السبيل إما شاكرا وإما كفورا" [ الإنسان 3] "وهديناه النجدين" [البلد 10 ]
وقد يسر الله عز وجل للإنسان سبل ذلك التمييز بما أرسل به رسله من بينات لقوم الناس بالقسط، ويتبع هذه الحرية مسؤولية في تحمل تبعات الأعمال: "كل نفس بما كسبت رهينة" [ المدثر 18]. فيكون الحساب في اليوم الآخر حسب تلك الأعمال وهو مقتضى العدل الإلهي الذي وسع كل شيء.
ومن شأن إدراك هذه المسؤولية والإيمان بما يتبعها من ثواب وعقاب، أن يجعل لحياة الإنسان غاية سامية هي التعلق بالخير وفعله ونبذ الشر وتركه وتحقيق خلافة الإنسان على الأرض.
ويظهر تميز الإنسان في هذا الوجود تميز رفعة عن بقية عناصر الكون في تسخيرها له بما يخول له توظيفها في مصلحته وفق منهج الخلافة في الأرض: "وسخّر لكم ما في السماوات وما في الأرض جميعا منه، إن في ذلك لآيات لقوم يتفكرون" [الجاثية 13]
ويبدو هذا التسخير فيما صنع عليه من هيئة تتلاءم مع المهمة التي أنيطت بعهدة الإنسان وهي مهمة الخلافة، ونحن إذ نؤكد على هذه المعاني العقائدية إنما نبرز أبعادها الأخلاقية على سلوك الإنسانية، إذ يؤدي الاعتقاد بوحدة الإنسان والكون إلى تحقيق الشعور منه وينفي مشاعر الخوف والعداء له، ويؤدي شعور الرفعة بالتكريم والتسخير إلى اقتحام الكون واستثمار موارده: "هو الذي جعل لكم الأرض ذلولا فامشوا في مناكبها وكلوا من رزقه وإليه النشور" [ الملك 15]
كل ذلك يعتبر إطارا مساعدا لأداء الإنسان وظيفته كما ارتضاها له خالقه سبحانه وتعالى، وهي الخلافة في الأرض، على معنى أن يكون خليفة في الكون ينجز تعاليمه بما يؤدي إلى تحقيق مصالحه التي يستجمعها ترقيه فردا ومجتمعا، عبر التفاعل مع الكون وعمارة الأرض، وفيما جاء في آية الخلق: "وإذ قال ربك للملائكة إني جاعل في الأرض خليفة" [ البقرة 30]. من تسمية الإنسان بهذه الوظيفة دلالة على محورية هذه الوظيفة للوجود الإنساني ومنهج تحقيق هذه الخلافة وهو العبادة: " وما خلقت الجن والإنس إلا ليعبدون" [ الذاريات 56] وهذا المدلول للعبادة يندرج فيه كل السلوك الإنساني فهو عبادة إذا كان مستجيبا للأمر الإلهي.
وبهذا المعنى للعبادة يتوجه الإنسان إلى الله بكل خاطرة في الضمير، وكل حركة في الجوارح، وكل سعي في الحياة، توجها خالصا متجردا من كل شعور آخر، ومن كل معنى غير معنى الخضوع لله.
وبهذا التوجه يتحقق معنى العبادة، فيصبح العمل كالشعائر، والشعائر كعمارة الأرض، وعمارة الأرض كالجهاد في سبيل الله، وهذا كله تتضمنه وظيفة الخلافة التي تقتضي القيام على شريعة الله في الأرض.
إن أداء هذه المهمة الوجودية كما رسمتها العقيدة الإسلامية يضفي على الوجود الإنساني قيمة عظيمة تتحقق بها العزة والكرامة، لأنها مهمة بعيدة الهدف، مما يجعل الإنسان وهو يسعى إلى تحقيق ذلك الهدف البعيد "مرضاة الله بتحقيق أوامره في ترقية الذات وعمارة الأرض" يستصغر كل الأهداف الصغيرة التي من شأنها أن تبدد جهده وتعطل من سعيه إلى الكمال.. وقد جاءت الرسالات السماوية بواسطة الرسل الكرام عليهم السلام تتابع الواقع الإنساني في تطوراته وتقلباته، لترشيد الإنسان إلى هذه الوظيفة ومنهج تحقيقها ثم جاءت النبوة الخاتمة تحدد المنهاج النهائي للخلافة، ليكون الموجه الأبدي للإنسان، فيما ينبغي أن يعتقد من حقيقة الوجود وفيما ينبغي أن يسلك في تصريف الحياة.
وقد زود الله هذا الإنسان بالعقل وجعله أساسا للتكليف بالخلافة لما ركب فيه من قدرة على إدراك الحق وتحمل الأمانة.
فكيف يكون تعامل العقل مع الوحي في سبيل استجلاء مضمون المنهج الخلافي أولا، وفي سبيل تنزيه في الواقع ثانيا؟
لقد انتظمت أنظار الفكر الإسلامي في هذه القضية في قطبين:
قطب نصي: اعتبر المنتمون إليه أن تعاليم الوحي هي المحدد الوحيد في كل الأزمان للمنهج الخلافي، دون أن يكون للعقل سوى دور التنزيل المباشر لظواهر النصوص، وقد ترددت هذه الوجهة بين درجات من الحرفية المتفاوتة، مثلتها الحشوية والظاهرية ونفاة القياس.
قطب عقلي: قام على الـتأويل والمقاصد، وترددت هذه الوجهة بين إهدار الدلالة اللغوية وبين القول بالظرفية الزمنية للأحكام النصية، وقد مثلها الباطنية وغلاة المؤوّلة.
وانتهى الأمر في القضية إلى اختزال لدور العقل إلى ما يقارب الإلغاء، واختزال لدور الوحي إلى ما يقارب الإهدار.
ولمعالجة هذه المسألة ينبغي التعرض لحقيقة وخصائص كل من الوحي والعقل:
1 - حقيقة الوحي وخصائصه:
الوحي "السمع أو النقل أو النص" هو جملة التعاليم الهادية التي جاء بها النبي محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم مبلغا إياها عن ربه، ومنضبطة في النص القرآني ونصوص الحديث الشريف: "قل إنما أنذركم بالوحي ولا يسمع الصم الدعاء إذا ما ينذرون" [ الأنباء 45] وللوحي خصائص منها:
إن مصدر الوحي هو الله ولا مدخل لذات النبي فيه، فالقرآن إلهي المصدر لفظا ومعنى، والحديث القدسي إلهي المصدر في معناه دون لفظه، كما أن الحديث الشريف لا يخرج عن كونه وحيا لقوله تعالى "وما ينطق عن الهوى، إن هو إلا وحي يوحى" [ النجم 4]
خطاب الوحي كلي عام للناس كافة إلا ما جاء دليل بتخصيصه، ذلك لأن الإسلام جاء يخاطب كل البشر: "وما أرسلناك إلا كافة للناس بشيرا ونذيرا" [ سبأ 28]
خطاب الوحي شامل يتناول مظاهر الحياة جميعا: "ونزلنا عليك الكتاب تبيانا لكل شيء" [ النحل 89]
حقائق الوحي مطلقة، لأنها صادرة عن علم إلهي مطلق بما ينبغي أن يكون في حياة الإنسان، ولذلك فهي غير خاضعة للتعقيب الإنساني في ذاتها، سوى العمل العقلي لاستجلاء أحكام الوحي: "والله يحكم لا معقب لحكمه وهو سريع الحساب"
حقائق الوحي لا تنافي حقائق العقل ومبادئه وإنما هي جارية على مقتضاها، لأن مناط التكليف هو العقل، وإذا افتقد العقل ارتفع التكليف أصلا..
أحكام الوحي راجعة غالبا إلى الحكم على أجناس الأفعال، كحلية البيع وحرمة الربا، وبالنظر العقلي الخالص يتم إلحاق أفراد الأفعال بأجناسها حسب الزمان والمكان.
إن الوحي إذا كان في مجالي العقيدة والعبادة فإنه يحدد مبادئ وأحكاما تفصيلية نهائية لا مجال لتغييرها عملا بالقاعدة الأصولية: لا يعبد الله إلا بما شرع، وإذا كان الوحي في مجال التشريع الاجتماعي والسياسي، "أو ما يسمى فقه المعاملات" فإنه عدا بعض الاستثناءات المحددة ـ يكتفي بوضع أصول كلية ورسم قواعد عامة تفتح أمام العقل البشري مجالا متسعا يمكنه من الاجتهاد في استنباط ما لا نهاية له من التطبيقات العملية لتلك الأصول، وتحويلها إلى تشريعات تفصيلية متصلة بواقع الحياة تمسح كامل جوانبه، ومتلائمة مع مستلزمات كل تطور يمر به المجتمع والإنسانية عامة.
فالوحي لا يقدم مبادئه التشريعية للحياة بوصفها علاجا موقوتا أوتنظيما مرحليا يجتازه التاريخ بعد فترة من الزمن إلى شكل آخر من أشكال التنظيم، ولكن يقدمها دائما باعتبارها الصورة النظرية الصالحة لجميع العصور، والقادرة على التكيف وفقا لظروف مختلفة.
وعلى هذا الأساس ترك الوحي منطقة فراغ في الصورة التشريعية التي نظم بها الحياة، لتعكس العنصر المتحرك وتواكب تطور العلاقات وتدرأ الأخطار التي تنجم عن هذا التطور المتنامي على مر الزمن. إن منطقة الفراغ تعبر عن قدرة الشريعة على مواكبة العصور المختلفة، لأن الوحي لم يترك منطقة الفراغ هذه بالشكل الذي يعني نقصا أو إهمالا، وإنما حدد للمنطقة أحكاما تمنح كل حادثة صفتها التشريعية الأصلية، مع إعطاء المجتهدين صلاحية منحها صفة تشريعية ثانوية بحسب الظروف لملء ذلك الفراغ.
يشتمل الوحي على نصوص قطعية الدلالة، لا تحتمل إلا معنى واحداً ونصوصا ظنية الدلالة يتردد معناها بين وجوه محتملة تتسع لها أساليب العرب في القول كالتردد بين الحقيقة والمجاز، وبين الإطلاق والتقييد، وبين العموم والخصوص.
كما يشمل نصوصا قطعية الورود وهي القرآن والحديث المتواتر، ونصوصا ظنية الورود وهي أحاديث الآحاد..
2 - حقيقة العقل وخصائصه:
العقل وسيلة إنسانية للإدراك والتمييز والحكم، فهو قوة إدراكية معيارية حمل على أساسها الإنسان أمانة الخلافة وخوطب على أساسها بالوحي ليتحمله فهما وتطبيقا. ومن خصائص العقل:
أنه وسيلة بوسعها إدراك الحقيقة إذا التزمت بالموضوع والمنهج، وقد جعل الله إهماله موجبا للوم والتقريع "وقالوا لو كنا نسمع أو نعقل ما كنا في أصحاب السعير" [ الملك 15]
إن له دورا هاما في إثبات قضايا العقيدة بالنظر في الآيات الكونية، ودورا هاما أيضا في استيعاب الوحي المجرد من جهة، وتفريغ ما تركه للتفصيل بحسب المتقلبات المستمرة في الحياة من جهة أخرى، والنظر في منهج تطبيق هذا أو ذلك على الواقع الإنساني من جهة ثالثة.
إنه لا يصل إلى الحقيقة مباشرة، وإنما يسلك طريقا أساسها النظر أو الفكر. وهذا الطريق يتصف بالمرحلية والتدرج والترابط، فهو طريق المقايسة والموازنة والانتقال بين المقدمات للوصول إلى النتائج.
وفي هذه المراحل من الأخطار ما يهدد بإعاقة العقل عن إصابة الحق، فالإنسان خلق عجولا مما قد يعرضه لتعجل المراحل في النظر العقلي، وركب على نزعات من الهوى قد تشوش عليه ترتيب تلك المراحل، كما أنه اكتسب في خضم حياته الانشداد إلى موروث الواقع والعادة مما قد يؤدي به إلى الغفلة عن مراحل النظر.
إن العقل الإنساني محكوم بظروف المادة زمانيا ومكانيا، لأنه يعتمد معطيات الحس، وهذه المعطيات لا تمكن من إصابة الحق المطلق في تقدير ما ينبغي أن تكون عليه الحياة الإنسانية فعلا وتركا، وغاية ما في الأمر أنها تمكن العقل من الإدراك النسبي للحق والخير.
3 - تحديد قيمة الأفعال الإنسانية بين الوحي والعقل:
تنطوي الأفعال الإنسانية على أوصاف تقويمية لها ذاتية فيها غير مضفاة عليها من خارجها، وإن نفي هذه القيمة يؤدي إلى حرج عقلي وحرج ديني عظيمين، إذ العقل يأبى دعوى التناقض في قيمة الشيء الواحد، والشرع يأبى التسوية بين المتناقضين كالسجود لله والسجود للطاغوت.
إن القيمة الذاتية للأفعال الإنسانية تندرج ضمن ما ركب الله عز وجل عليه الكون من سنن وعلل وأسباب، فهذه القيمة ليست مستقلة عن ذلك التدبير الإلهي.
الوحي هو المصدر الأول الذي يكشف عن تلك القيمة ويخبر عنها ويقدر الأفعال على أساسها، ذلك أن الله هو صاحب العلم المطلق بماضي الإنسان وحاضره ومستقبله، فهو أعلم بما ينطوي عليه كل فعل من خير للإنسان أو شر.
خلق الله في الإنسان عقلا وهيأه لأن يكون على قدرة للكشف عن قيم الأفعال وتقديرها، وهذا بدليل جعله مناطا للتكليف، كما أن الشرع لم يتكلم في كثير من تفصيلات ما يصل إليه العقل، وهذا ما يعطي للعقل دور تتبع المستجدات من أفعال الإنسان وتقويمها على ضوء روح الشريعة ومقاصدها.
للعقل حدود في تقدير الأفعال الإنسانية، إذ أنه يتحرك في معطيات الزمان والمكان المحدودة، فإذا كان دور الوحي الإخبار بقيم الأفعال، فإن دور العقل استيعاب ذلك الخبر وتمثل التقدير الشرعي.
والحقيقة العلمية الثابتة لا تصطدم بحقيقة شرعية ثابتة، ويأول الظني منهما ليتفق مع القطعي، فإن كانا ظنيين فالنظر الشرعي أولى بالإتباع حتى يثبت العقلي أو ينهار.
وإذا لم يرد الوحي بتقدير بعض الأفعال فإن للعقل أن يقدرها وذلك على ضوء روح الشريعة ومقاصد المصلحة العامة، وما مشروعية الاجتهاد إلا إقرار بهذا الدور للعقل.
منهج التعامل مع الوحي فهما وتطبيقا
إن "حركة الاتجاه الإسلامي"، انطلاقا من التزامها بمبادئ الإسلام في عملية إحداث التغيير الاجتماعي الشامل، تعتمد في إطار تعاملها مع نصوص الوحي من الأصول والقواعد ما يلبي احتياجات الحياة المتجددة، تحقيقا لمصلحة الإنسان دون إهدار أو تعطيل لنصوص الكتاب والسنة، ودون إلغاء لدور العقل في فهمها وتنزيلها في واقع الحياة. هذا المنهج ذو مرحلتين: مرحلة الفهم، ومرحلة التطبيق الواقعي.
1 - منهج فهم الوحي
إن موضوع مرحلة الفهم هو البحث عن مراد الله تعالى فيما أمر به ونهى عنه في نصوص الوحي، وهذا البحث يعتمد أسسا تهدي إلى الفهم ويؤدي إهمالها إلى التعسف على تلك النصوص.
أولا: الأساس اللغوي
نفهم نصوص الوحي طبقا لمنطق اللغة العربية وقواعدها وأساليب استعمالها وصيغ تراكيبها في البيان وقت التنزيل، ويجب في ذلك الاعتماد على حقائق الألفاظ والتأكد من حدود المعاني المقصودة بها والوقوف عندها، كما يجب الاحتراز من الخداع اللفظي، فالعبرة بالمسميات لا بالأسماء.
ثانيا: الأسس المقاصدي
ونفهم نصوص الوحي على أساس المقاصد الشرعية وهي المعاني والحكم والغايات التي وردت في التشريع، سواء نص عليها الشارع في الوحي أو أشار إليها، أو ما استقرئ من مجموع تصرفات الشريعة في أدلتها وعللها وأحكامها.
وهذه المقاصد تتعلق بالإنسان وترجع في عمومها إلى تحقيق مصلحته الشاملة وضمان سعادته في الدنيا والآخرة، ومن المهم أن نلاحظ أن هذه المقاصد ليست بمعان خارجة عن نصوص الوحي حتى نطلب إدراكها من جهة غير جهة تلك النصوص. ومقاصد الشريعة تنقسم بحسب اعتبارات ثلاثة:
فهي بحسب اعتبار أثرها في قوام أمر الأمة ثلاث أقسام: مصالح ضرورية ومصالح حاجية ومصالح تحسينية.
وهي بحسب اعتبار تحقق الاحتياج إليها فعلا في قوام أمر الأمة أو الأفراد: مصالح قطعية ثابتة ومصالح ظنية ومصالح وهمية باطلة.
وهي بحسب تعلقها بعموم الأمة أو جماعاتها وأفرادها: مصالح كلية.. مصالح جزئية. وتقدير الصلاح والفساد راجع إلى الشريعة نفسها، فالمصلحة في الشريعة الإسلامية ليست متروكة للاضطراب واعتماد الأمزجة والأهواء في تقديرها.
وللمصلحة ضوابط في كشفها وتحديدها وهي:
- اندراجها في مقاصد الشريعة
- عدم معارضتها للكتاب العزيز
- عدم معارضتها للسنة الشريفة
- عدم معارضتها للقياس
- عدم تفويتها مصلحة أهم منها
ثالثا: الأساس الظرفي
ونفهم نصوص الوحي قرآنا وسنة على أساس معرفة ما صح من مناسبات النزول التي تحمل من مقتضيات الأحوال ومن القرائن ما يكون ضروريا في فهم المراد من النصوص، وقد تؤدي الغفلة عن ذلك إلى صرف المعنى إلى غير محله، كأن يصرف حكم في المؤمنين وقد نزل في الكفار أو العكس.
رابعا: الأساس التكاملي
ونفهم نصوص الوحي على أساس التكامل بين أحكام الشريعة، فالتناقض فيها محال، كما نراعي في ذلك توقف بعض النصوص على بعض في تبين المراد الإلهي منها، فرب آية قرآنية ناسخة لحكم آية أخرى، ورب آية يفهم منها حكم عام وقد وقع تخصيصه في آية لاحقة.
خامسا: الأساس العقلي
ونفهم نصوص الوحي على أساس ما توصل إليه العقل الإنساني من معارف وحقائق علمية، إذ أن النص قطعي الثبوت والدلالة لا يناقض الحقيقة العلمية الثابتة، فإذا كان في النص احتمال لأكثر من معنى وجاءت الحقيقة العلمية ترجح إحدى الاحتمالات، تعين في هذه الحالة فهم النص بما وافقها.
وبناء على هذه الأسس نجتهد في فهم المراد الإلهي، غير أن هذا الاجتهاد في الفهم يتنوع باختلاف النص ذاته، من حيث ثبوته ودلالته، قطعية كانت أم ظنية.
فالنصوص القطعية وروداً ودلالة ينحصر عمل العقل في فهمها في إدراك المعاني التي تدل عليها واستيعابها وتمثلها كتمثل الحدود والكفارات.
والنصوص الظنية إما أن تكون ظنية من حيث الدلالة بحث يمكن أن يفهم منها أكثر من وجه واحد من وجوه المعاني، كالمشترك من الآيات القرآنية مثلا، أن تكون ظنية الثبوت بحصول تردد في نسبتها إلى مصدر الوحي كبعض الأحاديث النبوية.
فإذا كان الحديث ظني الثبوت، كان من عمل العقل التحقق من نسبته إلى الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم بطرق من النقد معروفة في علم الحديث سندا ومتنا.
وإذا كان النص ظني الدلالة كان عمل العقل متحققا في الاجتهاد في مختلف الاحتمالات التي هي مظنة أن تكون مرادا إلهيا لترجيح إحداها بقرينة معتبرة شرعا.
وإذا كان سبب الظنية في دلالة النص غموض وإبهام به، فإن التأويل هو طريق الخروج منه بصرف المعنى الأصلي إلى المعنى المجازي، غير أننا نقيد التأويل بشروط تحفظ من الزيغ، إذ كثيرا ما يكون التأويل مدخلا إلى التحلل من بعض التزامات الشريعة، وأهم هذه الشروط:
أن يكون التأويل في مجال النصوص ظنية الدلالة
أن يقوم على دليل قوي يبرره
أن يكون في اللغة ما يسعه منطوقا أو مفهوما أو مجازا
أن لا يتعارض مع نص قطعي أو أصل شرعي
ومن المهم أن نتساءل في هذا الصدد عن القيد الزمني لهذه الأفهام العقلية، فهل هي أفهام مطلقة عن الزمن على معنى أنها مستمرة فيما بين السابق واللاحق على نفس الوضع دون أن يصيبها تغيير بتغير الزمن؟ أم أنها أفهام تنالها قيود الزمن على معنى أن كل جيل من الناس بحسب تغاير الزمان والمكان له أن ينشئ أفهاماً قد تخالف السابقين وتكون هي بدورها عرضة لأن تخالفها أفهام اللاحقين؟
إن الأفهام العقلية لنصوص الوحي تنقسم في هذا الخصوص إلى نوعين: أفهام قد ينالها التغيير بتغير الزمن، وأفهام ثابتة على مر الزمن لا يمكن أن ينالها التغيير بين السابق واللاحق.
- فالأفهام القابلة للتغيير: هي تلك الأفهام التي نشأت من النظر في نصوص ظنية في ثبوتها أو دلالتها ما لم يرد فيها إجماع من الصحابة، إذ قد تكون الأدلة والقرائن التي انبنت عليها تلك الأفهام محل نظر جديد بناء على معطيات جديدة يتفطن إليها العقل أو تكشفها حقائق العلم، فيؤدي هذا النظر إلى العدول عن أدلة الترجيح وقرائنه القديمة إلى أدلة وقرائن أخرى ترجح احتمالا آخر، فينشأ فهم جديد.
- وأما الأفهام التي تتصف بالإطلاق الزمني فهي على ضربين: الأفهام الناشئة من النظر في نصوص ظنية ولكنها حظيت بإجماع الصحابة عليها، فهذا الإجماع من الصحابة يسبغ على فهم النص الظني ديمومة زمنية، ولذلك كان الإجماع أصلا من أصول التشريع عند سائر المسلمين، على معنى أن الفهم الذي يحصل عليه الإجماع يصير أصلا ثابتا تبنى عليه الأحكام. وفي المسألة خلاف في الاعتبار بين إجماع الصحابة وإجماع المجتهدين.
الأفهام الناشئة من النظر في النصوص القطعية، فهذه النصوص لما كانت الدلالة فيها منحصرة في وجه واحد من المعاني، كان الفهم فيها منحصرا في ذلك الوجه دون أن يناله التغيير على مر الزمان.
فهذه الأفهام الثابتة لا تتعرض للتغيير بحسب الأزمان، ونحن لا نفرق بين مقاصد الوحي وبين الأساليب التي جاء الوحي للأمر بتحقيقها في حياة الإنسان، ونحن نتمسك بالمسالك والأساليب واتباع الوسائل المحددة في النصوص، فلا يمكن الفصل إذا بين المقاصد الشرعية وبين الأساليب والأشكال، على معنى أنها لا تتحقق إلا بتلك الأساليب المنصوص عليها.
ونحن نؤمن بعمومية الخطاب التشريعي ولا نرى اختصاص النص بظروف نزوله وأسبابه، فمنهاج الخلافة الذي جاءت نصوص الوحي تحدد مسالكه، لم يكلف به قوم دون قوم، ولا أهل زمن دون أهل زمن آخر، فإن عمومية الخطاب بالوحي تقتضي أن يتعامل المكلفون به في كل زمن مع مقتضيات اللسان العربي الذي جاء في ضبط التكاليف بما يفيد العموم إلزاما للإنسان مطلقا عن الزمان والمكان، ولا يقوم دليل قط ـ لا عقلي ولا نصي ـ على أن هذه النصوص يخص بالتكليف من تعلقت به ظروف نزولها دون غيرها، إلا أن تكون حالات معدودة ورد فيها تنصيص جلي على التخصيص. لذلك ورد إجماع الأصوليين على القوم بأن العبرة في الخطاب بعموم اللفظ لا بخصوص السبب.
ونحن نرى أن الأوضاع السائدة بقيمها ومفاهيمها لا تحدد أوجه الفهم في النصوص القطعية "كالتعدد في الزواج ـ الحدود ـ منع الربا الخ"، فلا يتأسس عندنا الفهم العقلي على معطيات الواقع الإنساني فحسب.
ونحن نعتبر الاجتهاد في الفهم مفتوحا بابه وليس قصرا على جيل دون جيل ولا زمن دون آخر إذا توفرت شروط الاجتهاد. وليس معنى الاجتهاد أن نهمل الفقه الموروث أو نحط من قيمته، وإنما المقصود من ذلك أن نعيد النظر في تراثنا الفقهي العظيم بمختلف مدارسه ومذاهبه وأقواله المعتبرة في شتى العصور لاختيار أرجح الأقوال فيها وأليقها بتحقيق مقاصد الشريعة وإقامة مصالح الأمة في عصرنا في ضوء ما جد من ظروف وأوضاع.
كما أننا نعني بالاجتهاد العودة إلى المنابع الأصلية وهي نصوص الوحي الثابتة والتفقه فيها على ضوء المقاصد العامة للشريعة، كما نعني بالاجتهاد أيضا استنباط الأحكام المناسبة في ضوء الأدلة الشرعية للمسائل والأوضاع الجديدة التي لم يعرفها فقهاؤنا الماضون.
وأما على مستوى الاستدلال وهو طلب الدليل الشرعي للتوصل بالنظر الصحيح إلى الحكم الشرعي، فنحن نقول إن أدلة الأحكام بمعنى أصول التشريع ومصادره ليست كلها في مرتبة واحدة، بل هي متفاوتة المراتب في الاستدلال بها. فالأدلة نوعان:
وهي القرآن والسنة: ولا تتوقف دلالتهما على الأحكام على دليل آراء. والدليل الأول هو الكتاب أو القرآن، وهو كلام الله تعالى الذي نزل به جبريل الأمين على محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم باللفظ العربي المنقول إلينا بالتواتر المكتوب بالمصاحف المتعبد بتلاوتها، المبدوء بسورة الفاتحة والمختوم بسورة الناس.
فالقرآن الكريم هو المصدر الأول للتشريع، ويجب العمل بما ورد فيه والرجوع إليه لمعرفة حكم الله تعالى، ولا يجوز العدول عنه إلى غيره من مصادر التشريع إلا إذا لم يقف العالم على الحكم في القرآن الكريم، فهو أساس الشريعة الإسلامية وأصلها ومعتمدها في العقيدة والعبادة والأخلاق والتشريع، وإنه المرجع الأول في كل ذلك، وإنه المحتكم إليه عند الاختلاف.
والدليل الثاني هو السنة المطهرة، وهي ما نقل عن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم من قول أو فعل أو تقرير، فالسنة الصحيحة الثابتة التي صدرت عن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم بقصد التشريع حجة على المسلمين وهي حجة كاملة في ثبوت الأحكام، وهي مصدر تشريعي مستقل تأتي في الدرجة الثانية بعد القرآن الكريم.
وتتوقف دلالتها واعتبارها على سند شرعي، وأهمها الإجماع والقياس، وقد زاد أصوليون أنواعا أخرى مختلف فيها بين الأئمة كالاستحسان والمصالح المرسلة وسد الذرائع والعرف والاستصحاب وغيرها.
ومع هذا الاختلاف في العد والاعتبار، فالقرآن الكريم والسنة المطهرة مرجع كل مسلم في تعرف أحكام الإسلام، فهما المصدران الأساسيان اللذان تراجع إليهما كل المصادر الأخرى، وأن كل نزاع أو خلاف فمرده إليهما، بل إن كتاب الله هو أصل الأصول ومصدر المصادر وهو الحكم في كل شيء. ثم يجيء بعد الكتاب والسنة.. الإجماع، إن تحقق ونقل نقلا صحيحا، ثم الرأي والاجتهاد الذي يتنوع إلى أنواع.
2 - منهج تطبيق الوحي:
ونحن إذ نؤكد على أهمية مرحلة الفهم التي تصل أحكام الوحي بالعقل تصورا واستيعابا للمراد الإلهي، فإننا نعتبرها مرحلة أساسية تمهد لمرحلة التطبيق التي تصل الأحكام بالواقع الإنساني بغاية الانسجام بينهما، ذلك أن الوحي لم ينزل لمجرد الاستيعاب والتمثل في العقل فحسب، وإنما نزل بغاية إجراء أفعال الإنسان على أحكامه بما يحقق مصلحته الشاملة.
وهذه الغاية تتحقق بالتزام منهج في تطبيق أحكام الوحي على الواقع يحقق صلاح نظم الشريعة لكل زمان ومكان. ذلك أن الشريعة لم تنص على حكم كل جزئية على حدة، وإنما أتت بأمور كلية وأحكام عامة تتناول أعدادا لا تنحصر من الأعمال في الواقع، لذلك وجب الاجتهاد في إلحاق الأفعال وجزئياتها بأجناسها كحركة الربا والظلم ووجوب الشورى والعدل.
ونحن نقدر هذا العمل الاجتهادي حق قدره، إذ أن تطبيق أحكام الوحي تطبيقا آليا بدون وعي بمقاصدها وطبيعة الواقع المنزلة فيه قد يؤدي إلى فوات مصلحة أو إلحاق ضرر بالناس من حيث قصد الشارع تحقيق النفع لهم، ولذلك فإننا نقيم منهج تطبيق الوحي على أساسين رئيسيين هما: العلم بعلل الأحكام، والعلم بالواقع المنزلة عليه الأحكام.
أ ـ العلم بعلل الأحكام:
إننا كما نفهم نصوص الوحي على أساس مقاصدها فإننا نتقصى علل الأحكام في التطبيق، ذلك أن هذه العلل هي مقاصد قريبة تنتهي إلى تحقيق المقصد العام، والعلة هي وصف مناسب لظاهرة منضبطة أناط الشارع به الحكم، والأحكام تناط بعللها وتدور معها وجودا وعدما، وهذه العلل يجتهد العقل في ترتيبها وتنقيحها وتحقيقها، فمنها ما هو واضح تنصيصا أو إشارة بالوحي، ومنها ما يستلزم البحث والتقصي على ضوء المقاصد العامة للشريعة، ولا سبيل لأن يقال على هذا الأساس بتعطيل حكم شرعي اعتمادا على مقصد فرعي مع إهمال مقصد كلي، ذلك أن المقصد العام مقدم على المقصد الخاص. لذلك فإننا نعمل على تحري مقاصد الأحكام في نصوص الوحي قدر الطاقة باعتباره أصلا في تنزيل الأحكام على الوقائع.
ب ـ العلم بالواقع:
انطلاقا من وعينا بتطور المجتمعات وعدم ثباتها على نسق واحد، فإننا نؤمن بأن تطبيق الأحكام الشرعية على الواقع يجب أن يسبق بعلم واسع بواقع الأفعال الإنسانية المعينة، يشمل مختلف أحوالها وأسبابها ودوافعها وتأثرها وتأثيرها، ونستخدم في ذلك جملة من وسائل المعرفة الباحثة في هذا الواقع مثل علوم النفس والاجتماع والإحصاء والاقتصاد ونهدف بهذا البحث في الواقع إلى تحديد ما إذا كان الفعل يتدرج تحت الحكم المعين ليطبق عليه أو يندرج تحت حكم آخر. وتقدير ما إذا كان هذا الفعل مستجمعا للشروط التي تجعل تطبيق الحكم عليه مؤديا إلى تحقيق المقصد القريب فيطبق، أو غير محقق فلا يطبق، ونحن نقدر كذلك أن الجهل بالواقع الإنساني في تطبيق أحكام الوحي قد يفضي إلى فوات مصلحة الإنسان وحصول الضرر.
وعبر هذين الأساسين ينطلق العمل الاجتهادي بهدف الملاءمة بين التكاليف الواردة في الأوامر والنواهي، وبين المقاصد الشرعية وبين صور وأشكال عملية لأفعال الناس، نظرا إلى تعدد واختلاف الأفعال الإنسانية في جزئياتها بحسب تغير الأزمنة والأمكنة، فإن هذا العمل الاجتهادي لا يداخله التقليد بوجه من الوجوه إلا أن يكون استضاءة بأحكام سابقة من المفتين والعلماء طبقوها على أحداث ووقائع مشابهة، وهذا يقتضي أن يحدد النظر الاجتهادي في كل وضع واقعي جديد، سواء تمثل في حالات فردية أو في مظاهر عامة.
وبناء على هذا يتحدد منهج الحركة في تصور التراث، فهي تعتبر ماضي الأمة متشابكاً مع حاضرها، فالفكر الإسلامي إنما ينمو ويتكامل بإضافة اللاحقين إلى ما بناه السابقون، لا بهدمه أو تركه جملة. وهذه الإضافة قد تتخذ شكل التهذيب والتنقيح أو الانتقاء والترجيح أو التصحيح والتعديل أو التكميل والتجديد.
فلا تلغي الحركة ثراء تراثنا، بل تعتبر أن فهم كثير من القضايا يمر عبر فهم التراث واستيعابه بدرجة أولى بدل إهماله أو احتقاره، كما أن الحركة لا تعتبر ما لا يندرج ضمن التشريع نموذجا يجب احتذاؤه وإسقاط قيمه وأشكاله العملية على الواقع على وجه الالتزام "كأشكال الحكم التي سادت ـ أساليب توزيع الثورة ـ علاقة الرجل بالمرأة ـ الملكية ..." بل لقد كان تاريخ الأمة حقلا لتجارب بشرية في مجال الفكر والاجتماع والسياسة، تفاعلت مع الإسلام بطريقتها الخاصة والمتأثرة بخصوصيات الظرف التاريخي، مما طبع كل تصوراتها وأوضاعها بطابع قد لا يتحمله الحاضر، ومن باب أولى المستقبل. ونحن نتعامل مع هذه التجارب من منظور تحليلي نقدي يفهم عوامل التخلف والانحطاط فيها ـ وهي كثيرة ـ، ويستلهم من جوانبها الإيجابية ما يؤصل هويتنا ويطور واقعنا ويثري نهضتنا.
ونحن واعون تمام الوعي بالفرق الجوهري بين هذا التراث بتطبيقاته التاريخية وبين الوحي بنصوصه المطلقة إذ الوحي جاء بغاية أن يصبح حياة للناس، وأن تكون أوامره ونواهيه سيرة عملية للخلق. وفي طبيعة خطابه المتصفة بالعموم والشمول والإطلاق فسحة للاجتهاد في تنزيل الأفهام على واقع الحياة تبيانا لما يندرج تحت كل حكم من وقائع، وتثبتا من استجماع الوقائع للشروط التي تخول تنزيل الأحكام عليها. فلقد حصل خلط عند البعض بين مستويين في تعامل العقل مع الوحي: مستوى الفهم ومستوى التنزيل، وجعلت تبعا لذلك الإمكانية المطلقة للتطبيق الفعلي في كل الأزمان قيمة على أصول الفهم، فيكون الفهم بذلك تابعا لإمكانية التطبيق. ويتوهم هؤلاء أنهم يحاكون عمر بين الخطاب رضي الله عنه، والحق أن فهمه رضي الله عنه لبعض الأحكام لا يعد تعطيلا ولا تغييرا، ولكنه رأى أن شروط التنزيل على الواقع أصابها خلل ـ اجتهادا منه في التطبيق وليس تعطيلا في فهم النص القطعي.