I received my PhD in Economics from Bocconi University. I work in the field of industrial organizations, and my research focuses on the effects of competition on innovation. I study this policy relevant issue empirically. I exploit a change in pre-merger notification rules as a key to determine whether antitrust policy can encourage innovation of merging firms by fostering competition. Moreover, I use text analysis on patents to identify mergers between close competitors, even for small private firms. I find that horizontal mergers that are not reported to the authorties lead to 30% less innovation. An increase in the number of horizontal mergers after the policy change is consistent with deterrence as mechanism behind my results. Several countries experienced similar changes in pre-merger notification rules, and all of them show evidence supporting antitrust deterrence. Furthermore, affected industries become more concentrated, while labor share decreases. This generates resource redistribution from workers to firm owners, accentuating existing inequalities.