PURPORTEDLY A RECENT PICTURE OF ZUPPA

 

 

 

Unconfirmed reports have placed Zuppa alive and well in an Eastern Suffolk County Forest along the banks of the Peconic River.  He is reported to live with natives of the region who treat him as some sort of deity. 

 

Above is a picture of a man that is supposedly Zuppa. 

 

In addition Zuppa’s Pit has received a cross motion allegedly drafted by Zuppa.  Whatever it is we here at Zuppa’s Pit believe that this is an excellent manner in which to counter those recent State Farm motions to dismiss pre answer based upon EUO no show. 

 

So in the memory of Zuppa we at Zuppa’s Pit provide the cross motion.

 

 Pre-Answer Motion Reply

 

God Bless you Raymond Zuppa.  God Bless us all.  Good Night and Good Luck.

 

Pray for Zuppa’s safe return.

NOTE FROM THE WEBMASTER:

 

Unfortunately, at this time the concern for the health and well being of Raymond Zuppa is steadily growing. Since the posting of "GOD CALLS ZUPPA HOME" Mr. Zuppa's behavior has been erattic and unstable. Those who have spoken to him last reported that all he would say is "whack-ho". Raising concerns further is an undated letter found amongst Mr. Zuppa's personal effects:

 

  

 

 

This video was open on his computer:

 

 

 

As of this moment the staff of the Pit is unable to locate Raymond Zuppa. If anyone has any information leading to the discovery of his whereabouts Zuppa's Pit is prepared to offer a reward of one million dollars. 

 

I'm sure if Ray was here right now he'd want us to remember the good moments.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GOD CALLS ZUPPA HOME

 

 

After an assessment of what Zuppa’s Pit has done for Zuppa God is calling Zuppa Home. 

 

The Pit advanced the rights of others without advancing the monetary advancement of Zuppa.  Zuppa’s Pit did not feed Zuppa’s son or put money away for his child’s college.  It did not pay for the root canal that was recently performed on Zuppa’s son or a myriad of other expenses.

 

It came to Zuppa in the middle of the night.  The voice: “You are a putz.”  No it was not the voice of God.  But the voice of the one true hero Zuppa met in his life – Zuppa’s father.  However, as Zuppa’s father up in heaven is certainly one of God’s Lieutenants Zuppa’s father must have been motivated by God.

 

In any event before going Zuppa wishes to say the following:

 

I hereby denounce all organizations and renounce my membership in any organization save the Nature Conservancy, the World Wildlife Fund and Smithtown Youth Football.

 

Strike me from your membership roles so I can go in peace because everyone is out for themselves and don’t you forget it putz.

 

Farewell,

 

Raymond J. Zuppa Jr.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

ZUPPA SET TO TAKE THE BALL TO THE HOLE

 

THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 AT THE APPELLATE TERM 2^ND DEP’T. 9:30 A.M.

 

ZUPPA WILL LAY IT ALL ON THE LINE IN FRONT OF A HOSTILE AUDIENCE

            In A.B. Medical Services PLLC v. Utica Mutual Insurance Company, the sum total of the Court’s analysis in reaching the holding that a Mallela defense is a coverage defense was a description of the holding in Mallela.  Specifically that an insurance company is not obligated to pay first party no fault benefits provided by fraudulently licensed medical corporations.  The Court than stated:

We hold that a defense based upon plaintiffs’ allegedly fraudulent corporate licensure is not precluded (see State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Mallela, 4 NY3d 313, 827 NE2d 758, 794 NYS2d 700 [2005] supra; see generally Central Gen. Hosp. v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 90 NY2d 195, 681 NE2d 413, 659 NYS2d 246 [1997].      

 

11 Misc.3d 71, 73, 2006 NY Slip Op 26068 (App. Term, 2d & 11^th Jud. Dists 2007)

 

            The Court’s citation to Mallela and Central Gen. Hosp. in support of its holding is ungrounded.  Simply put the cases cited to do not in any way support the proposition that alleged fraudulent corporate licensure is a defense that cannot be precluded.

            The first sentence in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Robert Mallela states:

On this certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, we are asked whether, under our “no-fault” insurance laws (see Insurance Law Section 5101 et. seq. and implementing regulations), insurance carriers may withhold payment for medical services provided by fraudulently incorporated enterprises to which patients have assigned their claims.

 

4 N.Y.3d 313, 319 (2005).  That is the scope of the decision.  The Second sentence in Mallela states: “We conclude that they may.”  (Id.)

            Here is the third and fourth sentence in Mallela.  Both its wording and placement in the decision are key. 

Patients covered by no-fault insurance often assign their claims to their health care providers rather than seek reimbursement from insurance carriers directly (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.11).  Regulations require the carriers to make prompt decisions on claims once the provider has furnished adequate factual support (see 11 NYCRR 65.15).

 

(Id.) (Emphasis added)  That language would not be found at the fourth sentence of the decision if the Court of Appeals meant the defense of fraudulent corporate licensure to be a coverage defense not subject to preclusion.  Specifically the Court squarely places the issue of fraudulent incorporation in the pay/deny/verify stage of the claims process: “Regulations require the carriers to make prompt decisions on claims once the provider has furnished adequate factual support (see 11 NYCRR 65.15).” (Id.)

            But there is more language squarely placing the issue in the pay/deny/verify stage:

 

We hold that on the strength of this regulation [11 NYCRR 65-3.16(a) (120)] carriers may look beyond the face of licensing documents to identify willful and material failure to abide by state and local law.  Defendants argue that the carriers will turn this investigatory privilege into a vehicle for delay and recalcitrance.

 

The regulatory scheme, however, does not permit abuse of the truth-seeking opportunity that 11 NYCRR 65-3.16 (a) (12) authorizes.  Indeed, the Superintendent’s regulations themselves provide for agency oversight of carriers, and demand that carriers delay the payment of claims to pursue investigations solely for good cause (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.2 [c]).

 

If the decision squarely asserts that the issue of so called fraud in the incorporation is to be addressed in the pay/deny/verify stage the Court is acknowledging what the Court has held in the past: coverage defense solely = (1) allegation that no policy exists for the subject vehicle; (2) allegation that there was no accident, but rather a staged/intentional event; (3) allegation that injuries did not arise out of accident.  Everything else is subject to the preclusion rule.

            The Court of Appeals does not entertain many No-Fault cases.  The Court of Appeals certainly knows what its prior landmark holdings are in the area.  The Court of Appeals knew about its above discussed holdings with regard to what is precluded and what is not when it decided Mallela.  It acknowledges this in its language in the Mallela case although the certified question the Court of Appeals was asked to answer had nothing to do with the issue of whether the defense was a coverage defense or a defense subject to preclusion.  Precisely speaking the language of the Mallela decision is in harmony with the Court’s prior decisions regarding preclusion by the very language of the decision.  Moreover, if the Court wanted the Mallela decision to carve out a new coverage defense that is in contradiction to its prior precedent the Court would have so stated.

Likewise whether viewed generally or specifically one will find no support for the assertion that the allegation of fraudulent incorporation is not subject to preclusion in Central General Hospital v. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 90 NY2d 195 (1997).  In fact the opposite is true.  Once again the Court in Central General referred to those coverage issues which need not be presented in a timely denial as an “exceptional exemption.” (Id.)  An “exceptional exemption” as a “situation in which an insurer claims no contractual relationship with respect to the subject vehicle and incident.”  (Id.) 

In Central General the issue was whether allegations that the injuries allegedly sustained in the accident actually occurred one year prior in a work related incident needed to be preserved in a timely denial.  The Court stated that it “decide[d] no more than is precisely before us in this action …” (Id. at 249) 

The insurer is not precluded, despite its untimely disclaimer, from raising as a defense its denial of liability on the ground that services rendered to treat the injuries at issue did not arise from the covered accident.  That is the narrow kind of coverage matter contemplated and implicated in the Zappone rationale and its antecedents …

 

(Id.)  “[T]he preclusion remedy does not apply to a defense of no coverage at all.”  (Id. at 250)  As stated the decision in Central General even goes as far as reining in its own concurrence: “Our precise holding is, therefore, narrower than the sweep of the proposition advanced by the concurring opinion.”  (Id. at 248)

The decision in A.B. Medical Services PLLC v. Utica Mutual Insurance Company and many other decisions which A.B Medical Services is representative of are therefore incorrect.

AND JUSTICE FOR ALL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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