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The Paradoxes of Taxes on Traffic Congestion: the Case of Italy © (Marco Cerisola, 1987)

Parking charges and parking restrictions are today the most cornmon methods of restraining traffic in large

towns (see Hebster, 1986, p.146). But if there are not enough parking spaces, car drivers would park on pavements or in double lane, hence increasing congestion. On the other hand, "if parking provision is over-generous, more people may be encouraged to drive ... so congestion is increased" (Webster, 1986, p. 146). But in absence of physical restraints to flows of vehicles, the traffic could be left unaffected and some parkings could remain empty. For instance "Villa Borghese" car park in Rome remained empty as long as cars were allowed to go through the city centre (see Fontana, 1987, p.5).

Therefore parking charges and parking restrictions may not completely succeed in decreasing congestion.

An irnportant reason for the increase in private traffic is that public transport is not satisfactory:

people consider more inconvenient and expensive to use bus services. Indeed the cast of a journey is not only the running cast of the car or the bus fare, but it is also the opportunity-cost of the time employed, "the

money value the traveler attaches to the time his trip requires" (Mohring, 1972, p.591). In presence of high

degree of congestion, people prefer private transport which on average implies a shorter time - in term of

waiting time and partly in term of travelling time - for a given journey. Potential bus passengers do not travel if the sum of the opportunity-cost of the time and the fare is higher than the value placed on the journey, or they switch to private transport.

Due to congestion, bus services face high operating costs; in fact it is necessary a longer travelling tirne per given unit of service provided to the public. Italian municipalities have decided to increase fares and to reduce the number of bus journeys, in order to balance the budget. This policy may cause a substitution effect towards private transport.

Under these assurnptions, it is difficult to understand the utility of marginal cost pricing for bus fares.

Moreover, bus services are inferior goods (see Mohring, 1972, p.602: "As real incomes increase, the demand for these services will undoubtedly continue to decline"), instead the private transport consumption raises with income (see Istat, Annuari Statistici, 1977-1984).

The preference for the private transport base itself on subjective judgements about its characteristics and on the influence of advertising and of wont. If a means of transport have not certain characteristics, it will be left without any market (see Tomasini, 1969). In the opinion of many people, car is the best means of transport, because is more useful, more comfortable anà faster than the others.

Therefore its characteristics could make well to tolerate an increase in the running cost. In general, the increase in a good price causes a reduction in its consumption and an increase in the consumption of a good succedaneum. We suppose that people regard rnoving exigences as an essential need, and that small increases in the price of transport services do not vary its demand. Therefore an increase in car running cast could not reduce its use, but it could imply the need of saving by means of a reduction in the consumption of other commodities. If bus services are not satisfactory, most people use their own cars. Therefore, in spite of an increase in car running cost, car drivers could use the same amount of road services. Then, if the moving exigences increase, private traffic will increase. This may be true in practice, even if the travel costs have lightly increased.

If car running cost goes beyond the "limit price" of the low income car drivers, some of them switch to public transport, while others reduce the use of their cars (far example they arrange to go together to work, or they ride on a bicycle, and so on). As a consequence of this fact, traffic will easily flow in previously congested areas. Indeed, especially in peak hours, there are less cars in the traffic and it is not difficult to find parking spaces. Therefore less congested roads are time saving, which can be devoted to leisure or to increase the supply of labour, hence to increase income. For several car drivers, time is so precious that they prefer to pay high travel costs for saving time. In their decisions the spur of free running traffic outweighs the price effect, and they can decide to increase the use of their own vehicles. Then, the result of an high raise in car running cost could be the increase of private traffic.

We may explain this result by dif ferentiating the demand equation with respect to car running cost:

the demand for road services is

(a) D = f ( c , k ( c ) )

\vhere the demand (D) is a function of the roads use price (c) and of the degree of congestion (k). Moreover, "k" is a function of "c".

The differential of D with respect to "c" is

(b) (∂ D / ∂ c) = (∂ f / ∂ c) + (∂ f / ∂ k) * (∂ k / ∂ c)

The thesis of this essay is that an high raise in the price of roads use tends to reduce the demand and the degree of congestion; but a lower degree of congestion may increase the demand. Therefore the aggregate demand could increase.

The justification for these assumptions is, first, that are not unreasonable, and secondly the fact that they could explain what has happened in Italy (see the increase in private traffic in Istat, Annuari, 1977-1984).

2 - SOME ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE CAR DRIVERS BEHAVIOUR

1 - TAXES ON CONGESTION

Car drivers use the roads, that are congested public facilities (for this sort of impure public goods, see

Boadway, 1979, p.33). The traditional solution to the traffic congestion (see Bertrand, 1978, p.244, and

Dodgson and Topham, 1987, p.57) is that of making car drivers pay for the external costs of congestion they cause.

Several devices cap be implemented to reduce private traffic (see Webster, 1986, p.145-146):

i) charging for the use of particular roads at certain times, for trip within congested area, and for parking;

ii) restrictions to parking, and other physical means to stop entrance to certain roads or areas.

The charging approach is a selective measure, in that "the price can be varied from street to street" (or from

parking to parking) "and from hour to hour" (Hebster, 1986, p .146). But it may fail to reduce traffic.

The physical approach increases the time employed per journey; it also raises fuel consumption and enlarges the congested area. But it is simpler and cheaper to operate than road pricing.

Other devices in dealing with congestion are tax on fuel and the "versement transport" . The first one,

which raises large revenue in Italy, does not discriminate between areas where traffic is free rùnning and congested areas, and it increases the cost for transport of goods.

The second device, according to an Italian author (see Del Viscovo, 1986, p.100-101), turned out to be successful in Paris; in fact the actual data show a reduction in private traffic (see again Del Viscovo, 1986, p.100-101). It consists of a tax levied on companies, in proportion to the wage bill.

Enterprises, instead of providing forms of organised transports for their employees, are subsidizing the public transport. In 1986 it financed about 20% of public transport total cost in Paris.

THE PARADOXES OF TAXES ON TRAFFIC CONGESTION: THE CASE OF ITALY

JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND POLICY

ESSAY COMPETITION FOR YOUNG RESEARCHERS - 1987

THE PARADOXES OF TAXES ON TRAFFIC CONGESTION: THE CASE OF ITALY

by Marco Cerisola

Summary

Under certain circumstances, taxes on congestion can increase private traffic, or decrease the number of

bus passengers, and may not succeed in decreasing pollution.

How this is possible will be shown by means of the discussion of some assumptions about the car drivers behaviour. This analysts leads to a suitable demand curve for transport services.

More frequent and faster bus services, at lower fares, are the best answer to congestion. The bus reserved lanes allow to supply an efficacious alternative to the private transport.

It can also change the people judgements about the characteristics of bus services (see the great importance of the characteristics in relation to the demand of transport services in Section 2). The total cost of using busses (fare plus opportunity-cost of waiting and travelling time) would therefore fall, favouring a substitution effect towards public transport.

To increase bus frequency, it is necessary an increase in inputs employed, The increase in inputs, however, could create a more than proportionate increase in output.

This is because bus reserved lanes allow a higher number of bus journeys per unit of time.

Even though taxes on congestion may reduce private traffic, nevertheless pollution may not decrease. Indeed the reduction in private traffic is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the decrease in pollution, because busses do pollute as well (see for example Martini, 1987, p.20).

It is therefore necessary, to reduce pollution, to substitute Diesel engines vlith natural gas or electric engines.

6 - CONCLUSIONS

In this essay some paradoxes of taxes on congestion have been pointed out. They are revealed by a more suitable specification of demand function for road services.

The preference for the private tran sport depends on subjective judgements about its characteristics and on the influence of advertising and of wont. In the opinion of most people, car is the best means of transport, because is more useful, more cornfortable and faster than, for example, bus. They consider it also cheaper, because the cost of a journey also includes the opportunity-cost of the time employed. Moreover people regard moving exigences as an essential need, therefore, if public transport is not satisfactory (and it has rather high fares, as in Italy today), the characteristics of private transport make well to tolerate an increase in the running cost. In other words, small increases in the price of roads use (due to, for example, a tax on congestion) do no reduce the amount of road services.

If car running cost goes beyond the "limit price" of the low income car drivers, the number of car drivers will reduce. As a consequence of this fact, traffic will easily flow in previously congested areas. Less congested roads are time saving. For several car drivers, time is so precious that they prefer to pay high travel costs far saving time.

Therefore they can decide to increase the use of their own cars. Then, small increase in tax on congestion may not succeed in decreasing congestion, while high raises in those taxes cauld increase private traffic.

Therefore, taxes on congestion, instead of causing the substitution effect towards public transport, can be compatible with a reduction in the number of public transport passengers, as the Italian actual data show.

Moreover, taxes on cars, if not depending on the actual use of them, would result in a further increase in traffic.

In order to reduce congestion, it is necessary to rationalize private traffic and to supply an efficacious

alternative to the private transport. Therefore this essay proposes a solution for the parking problem and a more intensive use of bus reserved lanes. In fact, bus reserved lanes allow to supply a more frequent and faster bus services. In the short period, this device can at least avoid the worsening of congestion, because many people would switch to public transport. In the long period the best answer to congestion is the Underground.

The reduction in private traffic is not sufficient for the decrease in pollution, because busses may pollute as well. It is therefore necessary to substitute Diesel engines with natural gas or electric engines.

REFERENCES

- A.C.I., "Inchiesta: Atac, Acotral, F.S . e traffico privaton, in Settestrade, Automobil Club d'Italia, Rome, december 1986, p.23.

- A.R.E.A., Entrate tariffarie e tresferimenti nel finanziamento dei servizi pubblici locali in disavanzo, Associazione Ricerche di Economia Applicata, Rome, 1986.

- Banca d'Italia, Indagine sui bilanci delle famiglie italiane nel 1982, Banca d'Italia, Rome, 1984.

- Berechman J., "Costs, Economies of Scale and Factor Demand in Bus Transport", in Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 1983, p.7.

- Bertrand T.J., "Congestion Costs in a Transport System", in Journal of Transport Ec. and Pol., 1978, p.244·

- Boadway R., Public Sector Economics, Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, c1979.

- C.I.S.P.E.L., Compendio dati 1982-1984, Confederazione Italiana dei Servizi Pubblici degli Enti Locali, Rome, 1986.

- Del Viscovo M., "Per una imposta locale sui salari da destinare al trasporto urbano", in Atti III Conferenza Nazionale Economica della Cispel, Confederazione Italiana dei Servizi Pubblici degli Enti Locali, Florence, november 1986.

- Dodgson J.S. and Topham N., "Benefit-Cost Rules for Urban Transit Subsidies", in Journal of Transport Ec. and Pol., 1987, p.57.

- Fontana L., "Roma sta morendo di traffico?", in Settestrade, Automobil Club d'Italia, Rome, march 1987, p.3.

- Glaister S. , "Bus Deregulation, Competition and Vehicle Size", in Journal of Transport Ec. and Pol., 1986, p.217.

- Glaister S. and Collings J.J., "Maximisation of Passenger Miles in Theory and Practice", in Journal of Transport Ec. and Pol., 1978, p. 304.

- ISTAT, Annuari Statistici Italiani, Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Roma, years 1977-1984 .

- Martini S., "Il gasolio inquina? Cambiamo carburante", in L'Automobile, Automobil Club cttitalia, Rome, may 1987, p.20.

- Mohring H., "Optimization and Scale Economies in Urban Bus Transportation", in The American Economic Review, 1972, p.591.

- Nash C.A., "Management Objectives, Fares and Service Levels in Bus Transport", in Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 1978, p. 70.

- Stefani G., La produttività delle imprese pubbliche, C.I.R.I.E.C., Franco Angeli, Milan, 1973.

- Steve S., Lezioni di Scienza delle finanze, VII ed., Cedam, Padua, 1976.

- Tomasini L.H., "Funzioni di utilità, teorie del consumo e stima della domanda", in L'Industria, n.3 and 4, 1969.

- Walshe G., "A Stagger Enquiry", in Journal of Transport Ec. and Pol. , 1970, p. 284.

- Webster F. V., "Transport in Towns", in Journal of Transport Ec. and Pol., 1986, p .129.

5 - URBAN TRANSPORT POLICY

Taxes on congestion do not succeed in reducing private traffic, and they tend to result mainly in a financial transfer from car drivers to the Public Authorities.

In order to reduce congestion, it would be necessary to shift the demand curve to the left (see Figure 1). There are at least three policies which should all be implemented:

a) taxes on congestion, to finance the other two measures;

b) to rationalize private traffic;

c) to supply an efficacious and cheaper alternative to the private transport.

Private traffic could be rationalized also by means of the solution of the parking problem. Good ideas may be the "Park-Ride system" and the "filter parking system".

The first system should operate in the suburbs, near public transport stations, and should be free. The second system of parking should be located by the centre of the town, with increasing marginal fare per hour and with absolute higher fares according to the proximity of the parking to the city center (see Aci, Inchiesta sul traffico, 1986, p.24).

Physical restraints on private vehicles should be the extreme measures in dealing with congestion in certain areas.

Public transport is a merit good in that, among other things, its use reduces congestion. The best answer to the moving exigences is the Underground. But, in the short period, an efficacious alternative to the private transport could be bus services, if they are frequent, fast and at low fares, especially in peak hours.

It is often thought that the increase in the number of bus journeys will cause a considerable worsening of congestion (see for example Glaister, 1986, p.229). However an increase in bus frequency would not raise congestion, if it is implemented by a more intensive use of bus reserved lanes.

Bus reserved lanes will, moreover, reduce the room available to private vehicles. Therefore car drivers will face higher costs - in tenn of time employed and fuel consumption - and will have an incentive to use public transport. As pointed out in Section 2, the cost of a journey also includes the opportunity-cost of the time employed. Frequent and fast bus services reduce both waiting time and travelling time.

An intensive use of bus reserved lanes can greatly change the cast of using busses relatively to that of using cars.

4 - A NEW DEMAND CURVE FOR ROAD SERVICES

The common demand curve for road services (see for example Bertrand, 1978, p.246) is not able to explain how taxes on congestion can increase private traffic.

Therefore, this essay proposes a new aggregate demand curve. Figure 1 presents. this mor e suitable demand curve (DD), and the average cost per mile curve (ACM) faced by the car drivers, leading to an aggregate consumption of 260 miles, at cost of TN for the consumers and at congestion cost of EN for the community. The total cost (TCT) is the sum of average costs per mile and of congestion costs (cc); e.g., for 150 miles, total cost will be SL, which is made up of XL (average cost per mile) and YL (congestion costs).

The proposed demand curve (SEE FIGURE 1) shows both the demand indifference to the small price increases (see the assumptions about car drivers behaviour) - the almost vertical outline - and the increase in the aggregate demand caused by a high raise in roads use price - the positively sloped outline.

Therefore, as pointed ou in Section 3, a tax, proportional to congestion costs, would cause an increase in traffic: P would be the new equilibrium point, in Figure 1.

While a tax on cars, if not depending on the actual use of them, would result in an upward shift in the average cost curve (see Figure 1) and therefore in a shift of total costs curve; as a consequence of this fact, traffic will increase.

But a doubt could arise from Figure 1: why do car drivers choose to increase the use of their cars, if they can use the same total arnount of road miles at a lovver price of roads use? Indeed, for exarnple the points P and R are both on demand curve and correspond both to 283 road miles, but P is at an higher price. The response to this is that the aggregate demand can increase even if some car drivers reduce the use of their cars, because others have a more intensive use of their private vehicles (see the numerical example in Section 3). In conclusion, the point P is better than the point R because it corresponds to less congested roads: there are less car drivers in traffic, which use their vehicles also in other day times, so that they drive in a dilute traffic. The fact that the point P is better than the point R is an opinion of high income car drivers; indeed people which have reduced the use of their private vehicles (because they can not pay high travel cost), obviously, do not agree on this opinion.

The first paradox comes directly from the assumptions about car drivers behaviour. Accordingly taxes on congestion, which increase the private cost of transport, could cause an increase instead of the expected decrease in traffic.

This will be also shown by means of a numerical example.

We suppose that people live in the suburbs and work in the city center. Before taxing private traffic, 35 people use bus services, while 65 people use their own cars and consider public transport not satisfactory. Then, there are 65 cars which use daily 4 miles of road each. In total, 260 road miles are the aggregate daily consumption. Now, Public Authorities levy a tax on congestion (i.e. surcharging for parking, or road pricing). Then, 4 low income car drivers switch to public transport, 1 worker ride on a bicycle, while other 16 low income car drivers arrange to go together to work (in other words, they use, in total, only 8 cars). 19 people regard car use as an essential need, therefore they use the same amount of road services. Moreover 25 high income car drivers decide (see the assumptions pointed out in Section 2) to increase the use of their cars. Therefore, after taxing private traffic, there will be 52 cars, 8 of whom will use daily 4 miles of road each (for transport 16 low income workers); 19 cars will use daily 4 miles of road each, as before; 25 high income car drivers will use daily 7 miles of road each.

The total daily miles will be 283 , and the result will be an increase in private traffic.

The second paradox is the reduction in public transport passengers. Taxes an congestion can not cause the substitution effect towards public transport. In last years, Public Authorities have raised tax on fuel, traffic tax and fines.

But they have also begun to make easy the roads use, by means of a stagger in the hours of shops, offices and schools, or building new large roads, or new underground parkings.

As a consequence of these facts and because of the increase in real income, people could judge not convenient to use public transport (that is an inferior good, too) any more; therefore they will prefer to use their own vehicles and to pay taxes an congestion in order to saving time. Then, high taxes on congestion can be compatible with an increase in private traffic and with a reduction in the number of public transport passengers (see the Italian actual data in Cispel, Compendio dati, 1986, p.386: in Italy the total public transport passengers were 4,847.8 millions in 1982, 4,826.9 millions in 1983, 4,726.8 millions in 1984; bus passengers were 3,919.6 millions in 1982, 3, 894.5 millions in 1983, 3, 807.7 millions in 1984).

The third paradox is determined by the special feature of existing traffic tax in Italy. The "traffic tax" in Italy is a property tax and does not depend on the actual use of the car. It represents a fixed cost in running the car, and therefore it operates as an incentive for a more intensive use of it. Therefore the most common idea of tax on congestion in Italian political debate, the "traffic surtax" is also the worst one.

In general , taxes on cars, if not depending on the actual use of them, would result in an increase in traffic.

3 - THE PARADOXES