X-HEC Seminar in Economic Theory Our next speaker will be:
- Dec 16, 2010: Two speakers.
12:00—13:30 Bruno Strulovici, Northwestern University, “Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information”. (Lunch will be provided).
14:30—16:00 Nicolas Klein, Bonn University, “The Importance of Being Honest”.
Please consult the calendar for the schedule of other talks.
Our past speakers have included: - Dec 2, 2010 Toshimasa Maruta, Nihon University, Stochastically stable states in n-person binary coordination game
- Nov, 2, 2010 Federico Echenique (CalTech) "Aggregate Matchings"
- Sept 23, 2010 Fujito Kojima (Stanford).
- Feb 4, 2010: Nick Baigent (TBA)
- Feb 11:Olivier Gueant (Dauphine) presentera
"Mean field games and a new approach of the Hotelling problem"Abstract: The first part of the talk will be dedicated to a simple presentation of the theory of "mean field games" through a static problem that allows for explicit resolutions. Then we shall introduce the framework for a dynamical game with a continuum of players. This framework boils down to a system of two partial differential equations. These equations will then be used to propose a new approach to the Hotelling problem of optimal extraction of an exhaustible resource.
Location: Librairie du RDC, batiment Economie, Ecole polytechnique. Time: 2.30pm. - Jan 21: Bhaskar Dutta (Warwick).
- Dec 10, Ivana Komunjer (University of California, San Diego): "Dynamic Identification of DSGE Models."
Location: Librairie du RDC, batiment Economie, Ecole polytechnique. - Dec 17, Johannes Hörner (Yale University) ''Selling Information''.
Location: Librairie du RDC, batiment Economie, Ecole polytechnique. - November 26: Ron Harstad (University of Missouri), “Auctioning Rights to Choose When Competition Persists”.
Location: Librairie du RDC, batiment Economie, Ecole polytechnique. - Thursday Nov 5, 14h30, Nicolas Lambert (Stanford University): "Eliciting information on the distributions of future incomes".
Location: Librairie du RDC, batiment Economie, Ecole polytechnique. The paper is available here - Harris Schlesinger (University of Alabama)
joint work with Cary Deck (University of Arkansas)
Title: Exploring Higher-Order Risk Effects
Abstract: Higher-order risk effects play an important role in examining economic behavior under uncertainty. A precautionary demand for saving has been linked to the property of prudence and the property of temperance has been used to show how the presence of an unavoidable risk affects one’s behavior towards a second risk. These two properties also play key roles in aversion to negative skewness and to kurtosis, respectively. Both properties recently have been characterized by preferences over lottery pairs in simple 50-50 gambles. The simplicity of this characterization is ideal for experimental investigation. This paper reports the results of such experiments and concludes that there is behavioral evidence for prudence, but not for temperance. Implications of these results for both expected-utility and non-expected-utility models are examined.
The paper is available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_2487.html
Harris' webpage is available at: http://cba.ua.edu/~hschlesi/ - Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern), Feb 10, 2008, 2.30-4pm.
Location: Polytechnique, Departement d'Economie.
Title: "Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation."
Abstract: This paper analyzes collective decision making when individual preferences evolve through learning. Votes are affected by their anticipated effect on future preferences. The analysis is conducted in a two-arm bandit model with a safe alternative and a risky alternative whose payoff distribution, or “type”, varies across individuals and may be learned through experimentation. Society is shown to experiment less than any of its members would if he could dictate future decisions, and to be systematically biased against experimentation compared to the utilitarian optimum. Control sharing can even result in negative value of experimentation: society may shun a risky alternative even its expected payoff is higher than the safe one’s. Commitment to a fixed alternative can only increase efficiency if aggregate uncertainty is small enough. Even when types are independent, a positive news shock for anyone raises everyone’s incentive to experiment. Ex ante preference correlation or heterogeneity reduces these inefficiencies.
The paper is available at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/nuf/econwp/0808.html
Bruno's webpage is available at: http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~bhs675/
- Bernard Salanie (Columbia), Jan 20, 2008, 2.30-4pm.
Location: HEC.
Title: You are what you bet: eliciting risk attitudes from horse races
Abstract: As a textbook model for contingent markets, horse races have provided an interesting way to study the attitude towards risk of bettors. We innovate on the literature by explicitly considering heterogeneous bettors, with different utility functions (possibly non-expected utility). Based on a simple single-crossing condition, we derive testable predictions; and we show that parimutuel data allow to uniquely identify the distribution
of preferences among the population of bettors. We then estimate the model on data from US races. Preliminary empirical results illustrate how well families of preferences towards risk and/or uncertainty can explain the behavior of bettors.
Bernard's webpage is available at: http://www.columbia.edu/cu/economics/faculty/current/bs2237.html
- Ivar Ekeland (UBC), Dec 16, 2008.
Title: Growth theory under time-dependent discount rate
Abstract: Various considerations, notably intergenerational fairness, lead to time dependent discount rates. When this is the case, the social planner exhibits time inconsistency, and optimal growth cannot hold. In this talk, I shall introduce a concept of equilibrium growth, and investigate what becomes of the classical results of Ramsey and von Neumann.
Ivar's webpage is available at: http://www.pims.math.ca/~ekeland/
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Ċ ď Alfred Galichon, Nov 7, 2009 4:14 AM
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